CVE-2026-59219: Open WebUI Realtime Endpoints Accept Redis-revoked JWTs Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-855v-hq7w-jmjw
CVSS 7.1
CWE-613
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-59219 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.1) realtime endpoints accept redis-revoked jwts vulnerability (CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration) affecting Open WebUI libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves realtime endpoints accept redis-revoked jwts after signout/backchannel logout. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.10.0.

CVE-2026-59219 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-59219
GHSA Identifier GHSA-855v-hq7w-jmjw
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.1
CWE Classification CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration
Affected Product Open WebUI
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-59219

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Open WebUI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

open-webui fixed: 0.10.0
pip install open-webui>=0.10.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show open-webui

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-59219, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show open-webui

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Open WebUI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.10.0), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show open-webui command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration, where according to wasc, "insufficient session expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session ids for authorization.". In Open WebUI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary With Redis configured, Open WebUI supports JWT revocation: `POST /api/v1/auths/signout` (per-token `jti`) and OIDC back-channel logout (per-user `revoked_at`) record revocations in Redis, and HTTP auth (`get_current_user`) rejects revoked tokens with 401. The realtime authentication surfaces do not perform this check: Socket.IO connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note and the terminal websocket first-message auth validate tokens with `decode_token()` only (signature + expiry). A JWT revoked by sign-out or back-channel logout therefore continues to authenticate new realtime connections, even though the same token is rejected on HTTP. ## Affected component - `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` — Socket.IO `connect`, `user-join`, `join-channels`, `join-note` - `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` — terminal websocket first-message auth - `backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py` — the revocation check was applied to HTTP only ## Root cause HTTP auth enforces revocation: ```python # utils/auth.py — get_current_user if data.get('jti') and not await is_valid_token(request, data): raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail='Invalid token') ``` Realtime auth calls `decode_token()` only, which verifies signature + expiry but never consults the Redis revocation keys (`{prefix}:auth:token:{jti}:revoked`, `{prefix}:auth:user:{id}:revoked_at`): ```python # socket/main.py — connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note data = decode_token(auth['token']) # routers/terminals.py — _resolve_authenticated_connection data = decode_token(token) ``` ## Impact A JWT revoked by user sign-out or OIDC back-channel logout still authenticates new realtime connections. A stolen token therefore retains realtime access after the victim signs out or the IdP performs back-channel logout — the very remediation for a compromised token. The token can populate `SESSION_POOL` as the victim, join their user/channel/note rooms (receiving realtime channel messages, collaborative-note updates and presence), drive socket-level collaboration as the victim, and pass terminal websocket authentication when terminal servers are configured. HTTP remains correctly protected (401), so REST data and state-changing REST endpoints are not reachable with the revoked token. ## Proof of Concept Reporter PoC on a Redis-backed deployment (v0.9.6 and main): after `POST /api/v1/auths/signout`, HTTP returns 401 for the token while a Socket.IO user-join with the same token still authenticates, and the terminal WS reaches terminal-server lookup rather than rejecting it as `Invalid token`. ## Fix Apply the revocation check on the realtime paths. The logic is factored into `is_token_revoked(redis, decoded)` (covering per-token `jti` and per-user `revoked_at`); the Socket.IO handlers and the terminal WS reject tokens that fail it, using the main app Redis where revocations are stored. HTTP `is_valid_token` delegates to the same helper, so HTTP behaviour is unchanged. ## Affected / Patched - Affected: `>= 0.9.0, < 0.10.0`, and only when Redis is configured (without Redis, per-token revocation is not supported and sign-out does not invalidate JWTs by design). - Patched: v0.10.0. The revocation check (`is_valid_token`, covering per-token `jti` and per-user `revoked_at`) is applied on Socket.IO connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note and the terminal websocket first-message auth, using the main app Redis where revocations are stored. HTTP `is_valid_token` delegates to the same logic, so HTTP behaviour is unchanged.

CVE-2026-59219 Affected Open WebUI Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.10.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
open-webui
PyPI
≥ 0.9.0
< 0.10.0
0.10.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-59219?
CVE-2026-59219 is a security vulnerability in Open WebUI involving Realtime endpoints accept Redis-revoked JWTs after signout/backchannel logout under CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration.
Which Open WebUI versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.10.0 across affected packages: open-webui.
What version fixes CVE-2026-59219?
Upgrading to 0.10.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is open-webui affected?
Yes, open-webui is affected in releases prior to 0.10.0. Upgrade your dependency to 0.10.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-59219?
CVE-2026-59219 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.1 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-59219?
CVE-2026-59219 is classified under CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration (According to WASC, "Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization.").
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-59219?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show open-webui'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-855v-hq7w-jmjw",
  "modified" : "2026-07-24T17:00:11Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-24T17:00:11Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-59219" ],
  "summary" : "Open WebUI: Realtime endpoints accept Redis-revoked JWTs after signout/backchannel logout",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nWith Redis configured, Open WebUI supports JWT revocation: `POST /api/v1/auths/signout` (per-token `jti`) and OIDC back-channel logout (per-user `revoked_at`) record revocations in Redis, and HTTP auth (`get_current_user`) rejects revoked tokens with 401. The realtime authentication surfaces do not perform this check: Socket.IO connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note and the terminal websocket first-message auth validate tokens with `decode_token()` only (signature + expiry). A JWT revoked by sign-out or back-channel logout therefore continues to authenticate new realtime connections, even though the same token is rejected on HTTP.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` — Socket.IO `connect`, `user-join`, `join-channels`, `join-note`\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` — terminal websocket first-message auth\n- `backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py` — the revocation check was applied to HTTP only\n\n## Root cause\n\nHTTP auth enforces revocation:\n\n```python\n# utils/auth.py — get_current_user\nif data.get('jti') and not await is_valid_token(request, data):\n    raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail='Invalid token')\n```\n\nRealtime auth calls `decode_token()` only, which verifies signature + expiry but never consults the Redis revocation keys (`{prefix}:auth:token:{jti}:revoked`, `{prefix}:auth:user:{id}:revoked_at`):\n\n```python\n# socket/main.py — connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note\ndata = decode_token(auth['token'])\n# routers/terminals.py — _resolve_authenticated_connection\ndata = decode_token(token)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA JWT revoked by user sign-out or OIDC back-channel logout still authenticates new realtime connections. A stolen token therefore retains realtime access after the victim signs out or the IdP performs back-channel logout — the very remediation for a compromised token. The token can populate `SESSION_POOL` as the victim, join their user/channel/note rooms (receiving realtime channel messages, collaborative-note updates and presence), drive socket-level collaboration as the victim, and pass terminal websocket authentication when terminal servers are configured. HTTP remains correctly protected (401), so REST data and state-changing REST endpoints are not reachable with the revoked token.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nReporter PoC on a Redis-backed deployment (v0.9.6 and main): after `POST /api/v1/auths/signout`, HTTP returns 401 for the token while a Socket.IO user-join with the same token still authenticates, and the terminal WS reaches terminal-server lookup rather than rejecting it as `Invalid token`.\n\n## Fix\n\nApply the revocation check on the realtime paths. The logic is factored into `is_token_revoked(redis, decoded)` (covering per-token `jti` and per-user `revoked_at`); the Socket.IO handlers and the terminal WS reject tokens that fail it, using the main app Redis where revocations are stored. HTTP `is_valid_token` delegates to the same helper, so HTTP behaviour is unchanged.\n\n## Affected / Patched\n\n- Affected: `>= 0.9.0, < 0.10.0`, and only when Redis is configured (without Redis, per-token revocation is not supported and sign-out does not invalidate JWTs by design).\n- Patched: v0.10.0. The revocation check (`is_valid_token`, covering per-token `jti` and per-user `revoked_at`) is applied on Socket.IO connect / user-join / join-channels / join-note and the terminal websocket first-message auth, using the main app Redis where revocations are stored. HTTP `is_valid_token` delegates to the same logic, so HTTP behaviour is unchanged.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "open-webui"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.9.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.10.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-855v-hq7w-jmjw"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59219"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/33b91bd8ae8a100a5a306c91441a7d0b422c4cde"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-613" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-24T17:00:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-07-09T17:17:02Z"
  }
}