CVE-2026-55530: praisonaiagents Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-cfxv-8fw8-rwpv",
  "modified" : "2026-08-25T14:46:13Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-25T14:46:13Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-55530" ],
  "summary" : "praisonaiagents: ast_grep_rewrite rewrites arbitrary files without the @require_approval gate enforced on every sibling mutation tool",
  "details" : "**Target:** PraisonAI (`MervinPraison/PraisonAI`)\n**Affected component:** `praisonaiagents/tools/ast_grep_tool.py` — `ast_grep_rewrite`\n**Affected versions:** master at `ce97667156a116c50b4a3d1aa21e09f048903fda`; reproduced against the current `praisonaiagents` PyPI release (`praisonaiagents` <= 1.6.52).\n\n## Summary\n\nTools in `praisonaiagents/tools/` that modify on-disk state or run code are uniformly wrapped with `@require_approval`, which routes the call through an interactive approval flow before the body runs and fails closed — on denial (or with no approval backend configured) it raises `PermissionError` and the side effect does not occur. This is applied at every sibling mutation entry point:\n\n| File | Line | Symbol | Risk level |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `file_tools.py` | 212 | `copy_file` | high |\n| `file_tools.py` | 239 | `move_file` | high |\n| `file_tools.py` | 266 | `delete_file` | high |\n| `edit_tools.py` | 38 | `EditTools.edit_file` | high |\n| `edit_tools.py` | 155 | `edit_file` | high |\n| `shell_tools.py` | 32 | `execute_command` | critical |\n| `python_tools.py` | 352 | `execute_code` | critical |\n\n`ast_grep_tool.py:149` `ast_grep_rewrite` is structurally a sibling of these but has no decorator and no `from ..approval import require_approval` import. With `dry_run=False` (LLM-controllable), it builds `sg --pattern <P> --rewrite <R> --lang <L> --update-all <path>` (lines 204–211) and calls `subprocess.run(cmd, ...)` (line 215), modifying every file under `path` matching the pattern. There is no approval gate, no `_validate_path` workspace check, and no `cwd=` sandboxing. The function is registered as a top-level tool (`__init__.py:182`) and exposed via the `code_intelligence` built-in profile (`profiles.py`).\n\nA secondary defect: on the `dry_run=False` path `ast_grep_rewrite` returns the literal string `No changes made` to the caller even when it modified files (the \"No changes made\" return at `ast_grep_tool.py:230` is reached on this path), so an operator inspecting tool output sees no record that a write occurred.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nSingle script, clean venv, `praisonaiagents` from PyPI, `ast-grep` CLI installed. `PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE` is removed from the environment first, so no env-bypass is in play.\n\n```python\nimport os, tempfile, textwrap\nos.environ.pop(\"PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE\", None)\n\nworkdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"poc-\")\ntarget = os.path.join(workdir, \"target.py\")\nopen(target, \"w\").write(textwrap.dedent(\"\"\"\n    def safe_function(x):\n        return x + 1\n\n    def hello(name):\n        return 'hi ' + name\n\"\"\"))\n\n# Positive: undecorated tool rewrites the file.\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.ast_grep_tool import ast_grep_rewrite\nast_grep_rewrite(\n    pattern=\"def $FN($$$): return $$$\",\n    replacement=\"def $FN($$$): import os; os.environ['POC_CANARY']='1'; return $$$\",\n    lang=\"python\", path=workdir, dry_run=False,\n)\n\n# Negative control: decorated sibling triggers the approval flow.\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.edit_tools import edit_file\nedit_file(file_path=target, old_text=\"def hello(name):\", new_text=\"def hello(name):  # X\")\n```\n\nResult, verified: `ast_grep_rewrite` rewrote `target.py` to contain the injected `import os; os.environ['POC_CANARY']='1'` payload, no approval prompt fired, and the call returned `No changes made`. The subsequent `edit_file` call in the same process rendered the Tool Approval Required panel and, on denial, raised `PermissionError(\"Execution of edit_file denied: User denied\")` without modifying its target. Same process, same approval backend — the only difference is the missing decorator on `ast_grep_rewrite`.\n\n## Threat model\n\nAn LLM agent running locally whose tool surface includes `ast_grep_rewrite` (via the `code_intelligence` profile or direct import). Triggers: the operator asks the agent to refactor code, or prompt-injection in fetched docs / RAG context / any LLM-visible input steers the agent to call `ast_grep_rewrite` with attacker-chosen `pattern`, `replacement`, and `path` (the `dry_run` field is in the LLM-visible tool schema, so `dry_run=False` is requestable). The agent can then rewrite any file the host process can write — source trees, build configs, dotfiles, the agent's own source. With `path=\"/\"` the rewrite is filesystem-wide. Because the rewrite injects arbitrary text, pointing it at a file that is later imported or executed turns this write primitive into code execution — the basis for the escalation noted in the CVSS line. No operator prompt and no audit record of the modification.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/praisonaiagents/tools/ast_grep_tool.py\n+++ b/praisonaiagents/tools/ast_grep_tool.py\n@@\n from praisonaiagents._logging import get_logger\n from typing import Optional, List\n+from ..approval import require_approval\n@@\n+@require_approval(risk_level=\"high\")\n def ast_grep_rewrite(\n     pattern: str,\n     replacement: str,\n```\n\n`high` matches the file-modifying siblings; `critical` is defensible given the write→exec escalation. In the same patch: add a `_validate_path` workspace boundary check (cf. `edit_tools.py:27`); fix the `No changes made` return so it reflects actual modifications; apply the decorator to `ast_grep_scan` (`ast_grep_tool.py:243`) if it can write. `ast_grep_search` is read-only and can stay undecorated. A regression test asserting `ast_grep_rewrite` requires approval (alongside the other mutation tools) would have caught this at review time.\n\n## Coordinated disclosure\n\n- Kai Aizen / SnailSploit — `kai@snailsploit.com` — PGP on request.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "praisonaiagents"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.6.58"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-cfxv-8fw8-rwpv"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-25T14:46:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}