CVE-2026-53530: Ratex parser Ratex-parser Panics On `\verb` With Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-4hgp-59h5-gvrj
CWE-400 CWE-1285 CWE-248
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-53530 is a HIGH ratex-parser panics on `\verb` with vulnerability (CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) affecting Ratex parser libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves ratex-parser panics on `\verb` with a multibyte delimiter (utf-8 byte-boundary slice). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.1.11.

CVE-2026-53530 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-53530
GHSA Identifier GHSA-4hgp-59h5-gvrj
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Affected Product Ratex parser
Package Ecosystem crates.io
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-53530

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Ratex parser dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

ratex-parser fixed: 0.1.11
Upgrade ratex-parser to 0.1.11
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for ratex-parser

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-53530, inspect your project dependencies for Ratex parser:

inspect dependencies for ratex-parser

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Ratex parser in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.1.11), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, where the product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. In Ratex parser, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The public parser entrypoint `ratex_parser::parse(&str)` panics on the **9-byte** input `\verbéxé` (i.e. `\verb` followed by the non-ASCII delimiter `é`). When handling a `\verb` command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with **byte** indices (`arg[1..arg.len() - 1]`); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index `1` lands inside that character and Rust panics with *“byte index 1 is not a char boundary”*. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets `panic = "abort"` (`Cargo.toml:48`), the panic aborts the **entire process** — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX. ### Details ## Affected code `crates/ratex-parser/src/parser.rs`, `parse_symbol_inner`: ```rust if let Some(stripped) = text.strip_prefix("\\verb") { // parser.rs:901 self.consume(); let arg = stripped.to_string(); // e.g. "éxé" let star = arg.starts_with('*'); let arg = if star { &arg[1..] } else { &arg }; // parser.rs:905 (also byte-sliced) if arg.len() < 2 { // byte length return Err(ParseError::new("\\verb assertion failed", Some(&nucleus))); } let body = arg[1..arg.len() - 1].to_string(); // parser.rs:910 <-- PANIC on multibyte delimiter ... } ``` For input `\verbéxé`: `arg = "éxé"`, where `é` = `U+00E9` (bytes `C3 A9`). `arg.len()` is the **byte** length (5), the `< 2` guard passes, and `arg[1..4]` starts at byte index 1 — inside the first `é` (bytes 0..2) — so the slice panics. The lexer groups `\verb<delim>…<delim>` correctly with char semantics (`lexer.rs` `lex_verb`); only the parser mishandles it. ### PoC <img width="1109" height="205" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cd4bc6ae-23dd-458f-826c-6ce4e85c7005" /> ``` $ printf '\\verb\xc3\xa9x\xc3\xa9\n' | ./target/release/parse thread 'main' panicked at crates/ratex-parser/src/parser.rs:910:27: start byte index 1 is not a char boundary; it is inside 'é' (bytes 0..2 of string) Aborted (core dumped) # exit 134 — panic=abort kills the whole process ``` ### Impact Any application that renders untrusted LaTeX through RaTeX (web “render this math” endpoint, WASM in-browser use, the FFI embedded in another app) can be crashed by a tiny string. With `panic = "abort"` in release builds, the crash takes down the whole process / server, so a single malicious formula causes a full-service DoS (and, in batch pipelines, drops all queued work). ## Remediation Slice by character boundaries instead of byte indices, mirroring the UTF-8-correct logic the lexer already uses. For example: ```rust let chars: Vec<char> = arg.chars().collect(); if chars.len() < 2 { return Err(ParseError::new("\\verb assertion failed", Some(&nucleus))); } let body: String = chars[1..chars.len() - 1].iter().collect(); ``` (Apply the same char-aware handling to the `*` strip at `parser.rs:905`.) More broadly, consider not using `panic = "abort"` for builds embedded in long-running services, and/or wrapping parsing in `catch_unwind` at the FFI/WASM boundary — but the byte-slice fix is the direct correction.

CVE-2026-53530 Affected Ratex parser Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.1.11
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
ratex-parser
crates.io
< 0.1.11
0.1.11

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-53530?
CVE-2026-53530 is a security vulnerability in Ratex parser involving ratex-parser panics on `\verb` with a multibyte delimiter (UTF-8 byte-boundary slice) under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption.
Which Ratex parser versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.1.11 across affected packages: ratex-parser.
What version fixes CVE-2026-53530?
Upgrading to 0.1.11 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is ratex-parser affected?
Yes, ratex-parser is affected in releases prior to 0.1.11. Upgrade your dependency to 0.1.11 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-53530?
CVE-2026-53530 is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.).
How can I check crates.io dependencies for CVE-2026-53530?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for ratex-parser'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-4hgp-59h5-gvrj",
  "modified" : "2026-07-07T23:39:12Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-07T23:39:12Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-53530" ],
  "summary" : "ratex-parser panics on `\\verb` with a multibyte delimiter (UTF-8 byte-boundary slice)",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nThe public parser entrypoint `ratex_parser::parse(&str)` panics on the **9-byte** input `\\verbéxé` (i.e. `\\verb` followed by the non-ASCII delimiter `é`). When handling a `\\verb` command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with **byte** indices (`arg[1..arg.len() - 1]`); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index `1` lands inside that character and Rust panics with *“byte index 1 is not a char boundary”*. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets `panic = \"abort\"` (`Cargo.toml:48`), the panic aborts the **entire process** — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX.\n\n\n\n### Details\n\n\n## Affected code\n\n`crates/ratex-parser/src/parser.rs`, `parse_symbol_inner`:\n\n```rust\nif let Some(stripped) = text.strip_prefix(\"\\\\verb\") {       // parser.rs:901\n    self.consume();\n    let arg = stripped.to_string();                         // e.g. \"éxé\"\n    let star = arg.starts_with('*');\n    let arg = if star { &arg[1..] } else { &arg };          // parser.rs:905  (also byte-sliced)\n    if arg.len() < 2 {                                      // byte length\n        return Err(ParseError::new(\"\\\\verb assertion failed\", Some(&nucleus)));\n    }\n    let body = arg[1..arg.len() - 1].to_string();           // parser.rs:910  <-- PANIC on multibyte delimiter\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nFor input `\\verbéxé`: `arg = \"éxé\"`, where `é` = `U+00E9` (bytes `C3 A9`). `arg.len()` is the **byte** length (5), the `< 2` guard passes, and `arg[1..4]` starts at byte index 1 — inside the first `é` (bytes 0..2) — so the slice panics. The lexer groups `\\verb<delim>…<delim>` correctly with char semantics (`lexer.rs` `lex_verb`); only the parser mishandles it.\n\n### PoC\n\n<img width=\"1109\" height=\"205\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cd4bc6ae-23dd-458f-826c-6ce4e85c7005\" />\n\n\n```\n$ printf '\\\\verb\\xc3\\xa9x\\xc3\\xa9\\n' | ./target/release/parse\nthread 'main' panicked at crates/ratex-parser/src/parser.rs:910:27:\nstart byte index 1 is not a char boundary; it is inside 'é' (bytes 0..2 of string)\nAborted (core dumped)            # exit 134 — panic=abort kills the whole process\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application that renders untrusted LaTeX through RaTeX (web “render this math” endpoint, WASM in-browser use, the FFI embedded in another app) can be crashed by a tiny string. With `panic = \"abort\"` in release builds, the crash takes down the whole process / server, so a single malicious formula causes a full-service DoS (and, in batch pipelines, drops all queued work).\n\n## Remediation\n\nSlice by character boundaries instead of byte indices, mirroring the UTF-8-correct logic the lexer already uses. For example:\n\n```rust\nlet chars: Vec<char> = arg.chars().collect();\nif chars.len() < 2 { return Err(ParseError::new(\"\\\\verb assertion failed\", Some(&nucleus))); }\nlet body: String = chars[1..chars.len() - 1].iter().collect();\n```\n\n(Apply the same char-aware handling to the `*` strip at `parser.rs:905`.) More broadly, consider not using `panic = \"abort\"` for builds embedded in long-running services, and/or wrapping parsing in `catch_unwind` at the FFI/WASM boundary — but the byte-slice fix is the direct correction.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "ratex-parser"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.1.11"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/erweixin/RaTeX/security/advisories/GHSA-4hgp-59h5-gvrj"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/erweixin/RaTeX"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-1285", "CWE-248", "CWE-400" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-07T23:39:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}