CVE-2026-46705: Russh Russh Server Userauth State Is Vulnerability
MODERATECVE-2026-46705 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.3) russh server userauth state is vulnerability (CWE-287: Improper Authentication) affecting Russh libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves russh server userauth state is not reset when authentication principal changes. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.61.0.
CVE-2026-46705 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 5.3
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-46705
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Russh dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade russh to 0.61.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for russh
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-46705, inspect your project dependencies for Russh:
inspect dependencies for russh
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Russh in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.61.0), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where when an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. In Russh, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-46705 Affected Russh Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
russh
|
crates.io |
≥ 0.34.0-beta.1
< 0.61.0
|
0.61.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-46705?
Which Russh versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-46705?
Is russh affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-46705?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-46705?
How can I check crates.io dependencies for CVE-2026-46705?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-hpv4-5h6f-wqr3",
"modified" : "2026-06-11T14:06:30Z",
"published" : "2026-05-29T19:39:41Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-46705" ],
"summary" : "russh server userauth state is not reset when authentication principal changes",
"details" : "### Summary\nThe `russh` server authentication path keeps internal userauth state across `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST` messages without separating that state when the request principal changes.\n\nRFC 4252 allows the `user name` and `service name` fields to change between authentication requests. The issue is not that such changes are invalid. The issue is that russh-owned authentication state, such as remaining methods, partial-success state, and in-progress method state, can remain associated with the connection and then influence a later request for a different `(user, service)`.\n\nThis is an internal library state mismatch. Applications are responsible for any authentication state they keep in their own handlers, but russh must reset or separate state that russh itself owns.\n\n### Details\nThe relevant server-side auth logic is in:\n\n- `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs`\n- `russh/src/auth.rs`\n\nRFC 4252 section 5 says the `user name` and `service name` fields are repeated in every `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST` and may change. It also says the server implementation must check those fields in every message and flush accumulated authentication state if they change; if it cannot flush that state, it must disconnect.\n\nIn vulnerable `russh` code, the username and service are decoded from each `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST`, while the `AuthRequest` state remains connection-scoped. That state includes:\n\n- `methods`, which is later encoded as the `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE` remaining-methods list.\n- `partial_success`, which is later encoded in `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE`.\n- `current`, which tracks in-progress method state such as public-key offer or keyboard-interactive challenge state.\n- `rejection_count`.\n\nIf one request narrows russh's internal `methods` set, a later request for a different user can observe that narrowed set unless the internal state is reset at the principal boundary.\n\n### PoC\nThe PoC demonstrates only russh-owned state. The handler does not store any cross-request state. Alice's request narrows russh's remaining methods to `password`; Bob's later plain reject should not reuse that internal state.\n\n```rust\nstruct RemainingMethodsUserSwitchServer;\n\nimpl server::Handler for RemainingMethodsUserSwitchServer {\n type Error = russh::Error;\n\n async fn auth_none(&mut self, user: &str) -> Result<server::Auth, Self::Error> {\n if user == \"alice\" {\n Ok(server::Auth::Reject {\n proceed_with_methods: Some(MethodSet::from(&[MethodKind::Password][..])),\n partial_success: true,\n })\n } else {\n Ok(server::Auth::reject())\n }\n }\n}\n\n#[tokio::test]\nasync fn auth_does_not_carry_remaining_methods_across_username_change() {\n let alice = session.authenticate_none(\"alice\").await.unwrap();\n\n assert!(matches!(\n alice,\n client::AuthResult::Failure {\n ref remaining_methods,\n ..\n } if *remaining_methods == MethodSet::from(&[MethodKind::Password][..])\n ));\n\n let bob = session.authenticate_none(\"bob\").await.unwrap();\n\n if let client::AuthResult::Failure {\n remaining_methods, ..\n } = bob {\n assert!(\n remaining_methods.contains(&MethodKind::PublicKey),\n \"server reused Alice's narrowed remaining methods for Bob: {remaining_methods:?}\"\n );\n }\n}\n```\n\nOn `upstream/main`, this fails with:\n\n```text\nserver reused Alice's narrowed remaining methods for Bob: MethodSet([Password])\n```\n\nThat failure is produced by russh's retained `AuthRequest.methods`; it does not depend on handler-owned MFA/session state.\n\n### Impact\nSuggested provisional CVSS v3.1:\n\n- `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N`\n- Score: `5.3`\n\nReasoning:\n\n- `AV:N`: reachable by a remote SSH client during authentication.\n- `AC:L`: the attack is a normal sequence of SSH user-auth packets.\n- `PR:N`: the attacker does not need an already-authenticated SSH session.\n- `UI:N`: no user interaction is required on the server side.\n- `S:U`: the impact is within the vulnerable SSH server implementation.\n- `C:N`: the narrow PoC does not disclose confidential data.\n- `I:L`: russh-owned authentication state for one principal can affect the authentication flow for a different principal.\n- `A:N`: the narrow PoC does not demonstrate an availability impact.\n\nThis report does not claim that username changes are inherently invalid, nor does it rely on application-owned authentication state being mishandled by the embedding server.\n\n### Fix / Patch Direction\nThe fix should update russh's internal userauth state handling so that accumulated russh-owned state is flushed or separated when `(user, service)` changes between `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST` messages.\n\nThe fix stores the last seen `(user, service)` on `AuthRequest`. When a new auth request arrives for a different principal, russh resets its internal auth state before dispatching the new request. This keeps username changes protocol-valid while preventing prior russh-owned auth state from carrying into the new principal.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "crates.io",
"name" : "russh"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0.34.0-beta.1"
}, {
"fixed" : "0.61.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-hpv4-5h6f-wqr3"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46705"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-287" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-29T19:39:41Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-10T22:17:00Z"
}
}