CVE-2026-46110: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-5hfj-3vgw-hm4r
CVSS 7.5
CWE-476
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-46110 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) security vulnerability vulnerability (CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The weakness occurs when the product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is null.. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-46110 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-46110
GHSA Identifier GHSA-5hfj-3vgw-hm4r
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-46110

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-46110, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference, where the product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is null. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer's physical address and a status flag ("OWN") indicating which side owns the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both "submissions" and "completions." In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called. This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own): - `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid) - `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated) - `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL) But because stmmac_rx() only checks OWN, it confuses `full`/`dirty`. In the past (see 'Fixes:'), there was a bug where the loop could cycle `cur_rx` all the way back to the first descriptor it dirtied, resulting in a NULL dereference when mistaken for `full`. The aforementioned commit resolved that *specific* failure by capping the loop's iteration limit at `dma_rx_size - 1`, but this is only a partial fix: if the previous stmmac_rx_refill() didn't complete, then there are leftover `dirty` descriptors that the loop might encounter without needing to cycle fully around. The current code therefore panics (see 'Closes:') when stmmac_rx_refill() is memory-starved long enough for `cur_rx` to catch up to `dirty_rx`. Fix this by explicitly checking, before advancing `cur_rx`, if the next entry is dirty; exit the loop if so. This prevents processing of the final, used descriptor until stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, but fully prevents the `cur_rx == dirty_rx` ambiguity as the previous bugfix intended: so remove the clamp as well. Since stmmac_rx_zc() is a copy-paste-and-tweak of stmmac_rx() and the code structure is identical, any fix to stmmac_rx() will also need a corresponding fix for stmmac_rx_zc(). Therefore, apply the same check there. In stmmac_rx() (not stmmac_rx_zc()), a related bug remains: after the MAC sets OWN=0 on the final descriptor, it will be unable to send any further DMA-complete IRQs until it's given more `empty` descriptors. Currently, the driver simply *hopes* that the next stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, risking an indefinite stall of the receive process if not. But this is not a regression, so it can be addressed in a future change.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-46110?
CVE-2026-46110 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-46110?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-46110?
CVE-2026-46110 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-46110?
CVE-2026-46110 is classified under CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference (The product dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-46110?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-5hfj-3vgw-hm4r",
  "modified" : "2026-10-15T03:36:00Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-28T12:30:28Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-46110" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted\n\nThe CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU\nallocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns\nownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC\ncoordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one\ndescriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer's\nphysical address and a status flag (\"OWN\") indicating which side owns\nthe buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set\nthe flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move\nthrough the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both\n\"submissions\" and \"completions.\"\n\nIn the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring\nwith the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks\nfor rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the\nnetwork stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the\nring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its\nposition with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the\ndescriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops\nearly (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called.\n\nThis means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own):\n- `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid)\n- `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated)\n- `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL)\n\nBut because stmmac_rx() only checks OWN, it confuses `full`/`dirty`. In\nthe past (see 'Fixes:'), there was a bug where the loop could cycle\n`cur_rx` all the way back to the first descriptor it dirtied, resulting\nin a NULL dereference when mistaken for `full`. The aforementioned\ncommit resolved that *specific* failure by capping the loop's iteration\nlimit at `dma_rx_size - 1`, but this is only a partial fix: if the\nprevious stmmac_rx_refill() didn't complete, then there are leftover\n`dirty` descriptors that the loop might encounter without needing to\ncycle fully around. The current code therefore panics (see 'Closes:')\nwhen stmmac_rx_refill() is memory-starved long enough for `cur_rx` to\ncatch up to `dirty_rx`.\n\nFix this by explicitly checking, before advancing `cur_rx`, if the next\nentry is dirty; exit the loop if so. This prevents processing of the\nfinal, used descriptor until stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, but\nfully prevents the `cur_rx == dirty_rx` ambiguity as the previous bugfix\nintended: so remove the clamp as well. Since stmmac_rx_zc() is a\ncopy-paste-and-tweak of stmmac_rx() and the code structure is identical,\nany fix to stmmac_rx() will also need a corresponding fix for\nstmmac_rx_zc(). Therefore, apply the same check there.\n\nIn stmmac_rx() (not stmmac_rx_zc()), a related bug remains: after the\nMAC sets OWN=0 on the final descriptor, it will be unable to send any\nfurther DMA-complete IRQs until it's given more `empty` descriptors.\nCurrently, the driver simply *hopes* that the next stmmac_rx_refill()\nsucceeds, risking an indefinite stall of the receive process if not. But\nthis is not a regression, so it can be addressed in a future change.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46110"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0bb05e6adfa99a2ea1fee1125cc0953409f83ed8"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4af2e62cbcda575a174acd230c3f3a208135e16d"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c910f7708e3c507b037ca91ca5b09f8cfe71e65"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/950cb436165aad0f8f2cd49da3cd07677465bcde"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e1c50b273298c7cd9b08b113e7a7598b531a02f5"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fdeb95b1fc7de25c9362990efb9996a8d761055c"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-476" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-28T10:16:26Z"
  }
}