CVE-2026-45720: Github.com/siderolabs/omni Omni Has A TOCTOU Race Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-5x9f-6vg5-qg4m
CVSS 7.0
CWE-367 CWE-294
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-45720 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.0) omni has a toctou race vulnerability (CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition) affecting Github.com/siderolabs/omni libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves omni has a toctou race condition that allows multiple concurrent uses of a single-use saml session token. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.6.6, 1.7.3.

CVE-2026-45720 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-45720
GHSA Identifier GHSA-5x9f-6vg5-qg4m
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.0
CWE Classification CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Affected Product Github.com/siderolabs/omni
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.0

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-45720

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/siderolabs/omni dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/siderolabs/omni fixed: 1.6.6
Upgrade github.com/siderolabs/omni to 1.6.6
github.com/siderolabs/omni fixed: 1.7.3
Upgrade github.com/siderolabs/omni to 1.7.3
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/siderolabs/omni

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-45720, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/siderolabs/omni:

inspect dependencies for github.com/siderolabs/omni

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/siderolabs/omni in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.6.6), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition, where the product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check. In Github.com/siderolabs/omni, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary `SAML.getSession` (`internal/pkg/auth/interceptor/saml.go`) checks the `Used` flag on a `SAMLAssertion` resource and then marks it used in two separate state operations. Because the check and the update are not atomic, concurrent requests carrying the same `saml-session` token can both observe `Used == false`, both pass validation, and both return a successful authentication context. An attacker who obtains a valid `saml-session` token can exploit this window to authenticate as the token's owner multiple times, defeating the one-time-use guarantee. ## Severity - **Attack Vector:** Local: the attacker needs to either be able to intercept the local, unencrypted traffic or needs access to user's browser. - **Attack Complexity:** High: the attacker must first obtain a valid `saml-session` token belonging to the victim (requires a separate interception step; the token is ephemeral and single-use by design). - **Privileges Required:** None: no Omni account is required to carry out the race once the session token is in hand. - **User Interaction:** Required: the victim must initiate a SAML authentication flow to produce the session token that the attacker intercepts. - **Scope:** Unchanged: the impact stays within Omni's authorization boundary. - **Confidentiality Impact:** High: successful exploitation authenticates the attacker as the victim's email identity, granting read access to any resource accessible to that identity. - **Integrity Impact:** High: the attacker can confirm one or more public keys under the victim's identity (via `ConfirmPublicKey`), establishing persistent access credentials tied to the victim's account. - **Availability Impact:** High: if the attacker can successfully perform the attack and if the victim is a privileged Omni user, e.g., an Omni Operator or Admin, they can take Omni down. ## Impact - **Session replay**: A stolen `saml-session` token can be used more than once, defeating its single-use guarantee. - **Multiple public key confirmations**: An attacker who steals the session can confirm N attacker-controlled public keys under the victim's identity in a single stolen session window, creating N persistent long-lived API credentials tied to the victim's account. - **Authentication as victim**: Any gRPC endpoint gated by the SAML interceptor can be reached as the victim's email identity during the race window. - **Audit log pollution**: Each raced call generates an audit entry attributed to the victim's email, obscuring the attacker's actions. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).

CVE-2026-45720 Affected Github.com/siderolabs/omni Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.6.61.7.3
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/siderolabs/omni
Go
< 1.6.6
1.6.6
github.com/siderolabs/omni
Go
≥ 1.7.0
< 1.7.3
1.7.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-45720?
CVE-2026-45720 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/siderolabs/omni involving Omni has a TOCTOU race condition that allows multiple concurrent uses of a single-use SAML session token under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition.
Which Github.com/siderolabs/omni versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.6.6, 1.7.3 across affected packages: github.com/siderolabs/omni.
What version fixes CVE-2026-45720?
Upgrading to 1.6.6, 1.7.3 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/siderolabs/omni affected?
Yes, github.com/siderolabs/omni is affected in releases prior to 1.6.6, 1.7.3. Upgrade your dependency to 1.6.6, 1.7.3 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-45720?
CVE-2026-45720 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.0 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-45720?
CVE-2026-45720 is classified under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition (The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-45720?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/siderolabs/omni'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-5x9f-6vg5-qg4m",
  "modified" : "2026-06-05T15:25:28Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-05T15:25:28Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-45720" ],
  "summary" : "Omni has a TOCTOU race condition that allows multiple concurrent uses of a single-use SAML session token",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n`SAML.getSession` (`internal/pkg/auth/interceptor/saml.go`) checks the `Used` flag on a `SAMLAssertion` resource and then marks it used in two separate state operations. Because the check and the update are not atomic, concurrent requests carrying the same `saml-session` token can both observe `Used == false`, both pass validation, and both return a successful authentication context. An attacker who obtains a valid `saml-session` token can exploit this window to authenticate as the token's owner multiple times, defeating the one-time-use guarantee.\n\n## Severity\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Local: the attacker needs to either be able to intercept the local, unencrypted traffic or needs access to user's browser.\n- **Attack Complexity:** High: the attacker must first obtain a valid `saml-session` token belonging to the victim (requires a separate interception step; the token is ephemeral and single-use by design).\n- **Privileges Required:** None: no Omni account is required to carry out the race once the session token is in hand.\n- **User Interaction:** Required: the victim must initiate a SAML authentication flow to produce the session token that the attacker intercepts.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged: the impact stays within Omni's authorization boundary.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** High: successful exploitation authenticates the attacker as the victim's email identity, granting read access to any resource accessible to that identity.\n- **Integrity Impact:** High: the attacker can confirm one or more public keys under the victim's identity (via `ConfirmPublicKey`), establishing persistent access credentials tied to the victim's account.\n- **Availability Impact:** High: if the attacker can successfully perform the attack and if the victim is a privileged Omni user, e.g., an Omni Operator or Admin, they can take Omni down.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Session replay**: A stolen `saml-session` token can be used more than once, defeating its single-use guarantee.\n- **Multiple public key confirmations**: An attacker who steals the session can confirm N attacker-controlled public keys under the victim's identity in a single stolen session window, creating N persistent long-lived API credentials tied to the victim's account.\n- **Authentication as victim**: Any gRPC endpoint gated by the SAML interceptor can be reached as the victim's email identity during the race window.\n- **Audit log pollution**: Each raced call generates an audit entry attributed to the victim's email, obscuring the attacker's actions.\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/siderolabs/omni"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.6.6"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/siderolabs/omni"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "1.7.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.7.3"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/security/advisories/GHSA-5x9f-6vg5-qg4m"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/releases/tag/v1.6.6"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/releases/tag/v1.7.3"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-294", "CWE-367" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-05T15:25:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}