CVE-2026-42584: Netty codec http Netty Has HttpClientCodec Response Desynchronization Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3
CVSS 7.3
CWE-444
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-42584 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.3) netty has httpclientcodec response desynchronization vulnerability (CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')) affecting Netty codec http libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The issue involves netty has httpclientcodec response desynchronization. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.2.13.Final, 4.1.133.Final.

CVE-2026-42584 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-42584
GHSA Identifier GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.3
CWE Classification CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
Affected Product Netty codec http
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.3

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-42584

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Netty codec http dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

io.netty:netty-codec-http fixed: 4.2.13.Final
<dependency>
    <groupId>io.netty</groupId>
    <artifactId>netty-codec-http</artifactId>
    <version>4.2.13.Final</version>
</dependency>
io.netty:netty-codec-http fixed: 4.1.133.Final
<dependency>
    <groupId>io.netty</groupId>
    <artifactId>netty-codec-http</artifactId>
    <version>4.1.133.Final</version>
</dependency>
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-42584, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Netty codec http in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.2.13.Final), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling'), where the product acts as an intermediary http agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed http requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination. In Netty codec http, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary If HttpClientCodec is configured, there are use cases when a response body from one request, can be parsed as another's. ### Details HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by `queue.poll()` once per response, including for `1xx`. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. Prerequisites - HTTP/1.1 pipelining - HEAD in the pipeline - The server sends 1xx ### PoC ```java @Test public void test() { EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpClientCodec()); assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.GET, "/1"))); ByteBuf request = channel.readOutbound(); request.release(); assertNull(channel.readOutbound()); assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.HEAD, "/2"))); request = channel.readOutbound(); request.release(); assertNull(channel.readOutbound()); String responseStr = "HTTP/1.1 103 Early Hints\r\n\r\n" + "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\n\r\nhello" + "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\n"; assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(responseStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII))); // Response 1 HttpResponse response = channel.readInbound(); assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.EARLY_HINTS, response.status()); LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound(); assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes()); last.release(); // Response 2 response = channel.readInbound(); assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.OK, response.status()); last = channel.readInbound(); assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes()); last.release(); // Response 3 FullHttpResponse response1 = channel.readInbound(); assertTrue(response1.decoderResult().isFailure()); assertEquals(0, response1.content().readableBytes()); response1.release(); assertFalse(channel.finish()); } ``` ### Impact Integrity/availability of HTTP parsing on that connection, unsafe reuse of the socket.

CVE-2026-42584 Affected Netty codec http Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.2.13.Final4.1.133.Final
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
io.netty:netty-codec-http
Maven
≥ 4.2.0.Alpha1
< 4.2.13.Final
4.2.13.Final
io.netty:netty-codec-http
Maven
< 4.1.133.Final
4.1.133.Final

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-42584?
CVE-2026-42584 is a security vulnerability in Netty codec http involving Netty has HttpClientCodec response desynchronization under CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling').
Which Netty codec http versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.2.13.Final, 4.1.133.Final across affected packages: io.netty:netty-codec-http.
What version fixes CVE-2026-42584?
Upgrading to 4.2.13.Final, 4.1.133.Final (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is netty-codec-http affected?
Yes, io.netty:netty-codec-http is affected in releases prior to 4.2.13.Final, 4.1.133.Final. Upgrade your dependency to 4.2.13.Final, 4.1.133.Final or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-42584?
CVE-2026-42584 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.3 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-42584?
CVE-2026-42584 is classified under CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') (The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-42584?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3",
  "modified" : "2026-05-14T20:41:17Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-07T00:21:48Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-42584" ],
  "summary" : "Netty has HttpClientCodec response desynchronization",
  "details" : "### Summary\n If HttpClientCodec is configured, there are use cases when a response body from one request, can be parsed as another's.\n\n### Details\nHttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by `queue.poll()` once per response, including for `1xx`. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset.\n\nPrerequisites \n- HTTP/1.1 pipelining\n- HEAD in the pipeline\n- The server sends 1xx\n\n### PoC\n\n```java\n    @Test\n    public void test() {\n        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpClientCodec());\n\n        assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.GET, \"/1\")));\n        ByteBuf request = channel.readOutbound();\n        request.release();\n        assertNull(channel.readOutbound());\n\n        assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.HEAD, \"/2\")));\n        request = channel.readOutbound();\n        request.release();\n        assertNull(channel.readOutbound());\n\n        String responseStr = \"HTTP/1.1 103 Early Hints\\r\\n\\r\\n\" +\n                \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nContent-Length: 5\\r\\n\\r\\nhello\" +\n                \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\n\\r\\n\";\n        assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(responseStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));\n\n        // Response 1\n        HttpResponse response = channel.readInbound();\n        assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.EARLY_HINTS, response.status());\n        LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();\n        assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());\n        last.release();\n\n        // Response 2\n        response = channel.readInbound();\n        assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.OK, response.status());\n        last = channel.readInbound();\n        assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());\n        last.release();\n\n        // Response 3\n        FullHttpResponse response1 = channel.readInbound();\n        assertTrue(response1.decoderResult().isFailure());\n        assertEquals(0, response1.content().readableBytes());\n        response1.release();\n\n        assertFalse(channel.finish());\n    }\n```\n\n### Impact\nIntegrity/availability of HTTP parsing on that connection, unsafe reuse of the socket.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "4.2.0.Alpha1"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.2.13.Final"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.2.12.Final"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.1.133.Final"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.1.132.Final"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42584"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-444" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-07T00:21:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-13T19:17:24Z"
  }
}