CVE-2026-42461: Github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend Arcane Vulnerable To Unauthenticated Disclosure Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-cxx3-hr75-4q96
CWE-862
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-42461 is a HIGH arcane vulnerable to unauthenticated disclosure vulnerability (CWE-862: Missing Authorization) affecting Github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves arcane vulnerable to unauthenticated disclosure of custom compose template content (incl. `.env` secrets). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.18.0.

CVE-2026-42461 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-42461
GHSA Identifier GHSA-cxx3-hr75-4q96
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-862: Missing Authorization
Affected Product Github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-42461

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend fixed: 1.18.0
Upgrade github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend to 1.18.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-42461, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend:

inspect dependencies for github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.18.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where the product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. In Github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary Four `GET` endpoints under `/api/templates*` in Arcane's Huma backend are registered without any `Security` requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and `.env` content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane's UI exposes a "Save as Template" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator's *real* env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing authorization is an unauthenticated read of operator secrets in practice — not a theoretical info-disclosure. The frontend explicitly treats `/customize/templates/*` as an authenticated area (`PROTECTED_PREFIXES` in `frontend/src/lib/utils/redirect.util.ts`), and every CRUD operation (POST/PUT/DELETE) on the same paths requires a Bearer/API key, so this is a clear backend authorization gap, not intended public access. ### Details Affected file: `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:194-228`. In `RegisterTemplates`, four `huma.Register` calls have no `Security:` block: ```go // templates.go huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{ OperationID: "listTemplatesPaginated", Method: "GET", Path: "/templates", ... // <-- no Security }, h.ListTemplates) huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{ OperationID: "getAllTemplates", Method: "GET", Path: "/templates/all", ... }, h.GetAllTemplates) huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{ OperationID: "getTemplate", Method: "GET", Path: "/templates/{id}", ... }, h.GetTemplate) huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{ OperationID: "getTemplateContent", Method: "GET", Path: "/templates/{id}/content", ... }, h.GetTemplateContent) ``` Arcane's auth bridge (`backend/internal/huma/middleware/auth.go:168-172`) only enforces authentication when the operation declares one of the security schemes (`BearerAuth` or `ApiKeyAuth`). With `Security` omitted, `parseSecurityRequirements` returns `isRequired=false` and the request flows through with no token check. `TemplateHandler.GetTemplateContent` (`templates.go:478-499`) calls `templateService.GetTemplateContentWithParsedData` (`backend/internal/services/template_service.go:1303-1347`), which returns the model's `Content`, `EnvContent`, parsed services, and parsed env-variable key/value pairs verbatim. The model `models.ComposeTemplate` (`backend/internal/models/template.go:15-16`) stores `Content` and `EnvContent` as plain `text` columns and has no owner / user binding. ### Impact - Pre-auth confidentiality breach. An unauthenticated client on the same network (or through any path-unaware reverse proxy) recovers the full `envContent` of every locally-stored Compose template. Because the supported "Save as Template" workflow takes the operator's real env values verbatim, this commonly includes database passwords, registry tokens, third-party API keys (Stripe, Sentry, etc.), and OIDC client secrets. - Internal asset enumeration. `GET /api/templates` returns names, descriptions, tags, and registry metadata for every template, leaking what services the team runs internally and which compose files they reuse

CVE-2026-42461 Affected Github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.18.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend
Go
< 1.18.0
1.18.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-42461?
CVE-2026-42461 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend involving Arcane Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Disclosure of Custom Compose Template Content (incl. `.env` secrets) under CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
Which Github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.18.0 across affected packages: github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend.
What version fixes CVE-2026-42461?
Upgrading to 1.18.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend affected?
Yes, github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend is affected in releases prior to 1.18.0. Upgrade your dependency to 1.18.0 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-42461?
CVE-2026-42461 is classified under CWE-862: Missing Authorization (The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-42461?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-cxx3-hr75-4q96",
  "modified" : "2026-05-13T13:38:44Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-30T20:55:26Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-42461" ],
  "summary" : "Arcane Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Disclosure of Custom Compose Template Content (incl. `.env` secrets) ",
  "details" : "### Summary\nFour `GET` endpoints under `/api/templates*` in Arcane's Huma backend are registered without any `Security` requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and `.env` content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane's UI exposes a \"Save as Template\" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator's *real* env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing authorization is an unauthenticated read of operator secrets in practice — not a theoretical info-disclosure.\n\nThe frontend explicitly treats `/customize/templates/*` as an authenticated area (`PROTECTED_PREFIXES` in `frontend/src/lib/utils/redirect.util.ts`), and every CRUD operation (POST/PUT/DELETE) on the same paths requires a Bearer/API key, so this is a clear backend authorization gap, not intended public access.\n\n### Details\nAffected file: `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:194-228`.\n\nIn `RegisterTemplates`, four `huma.Register` calls have no `Security:` block:\n\n```go\n// templates.go\nhuma.Register(api, huma.Operation{\n    OperationID: \"listTemplatesPaginated\",\n    Method:      \"GET\",\n    Path:        \"/templates\",\n    ...\n    // <-- no Security\n}, h.ListTemplates)\n\nhuma.Register(api, huma.Operation{\n    OperationID: \"getAllTemplates\",\n    Method:      \"GET\",\n    Path:        \"/templates/all\",\n    ...\n}, h.GetAllTemplates)\n\nhuma.Register(api, huma.Operation{\n    OperationID: \"getTemplate\",\n    Method:      \"GET\",\n    Path:        \"/templates/{id}\",\n    ...\n}, h.GetTemplate)\n\nhuma.Register(api, huma.Operation{\n    OperationID: \"getTemplateContent\",\n    Method:      \"GET\",\n    Path:        \"/templates/{id}/content\",\n    ...\n}, h.GetTemplateContent)\n```\n\nArcane's auth bridge (`backend/internal/huma/middleware/auth.go:168-172`) only enforces authentication when the operation declares one of the security schemes (`BearerAuth` or `ApiKeyAuth`). With `Security` omitted, `parseSecurityRequirements` returns `isRequired=false` and the request flows through with no token check.\n\n`TemplateHandler.GetTemplateContent` (`templates.go:478-499`) calls `templateService.GetTemplateContentWithParsedData` (`backend/internal/services/template_service.go:1303-1347`), which returns the model's `Content`, `EnvContent`, parsed services, and parsed env-variable key/value pairs verbatim. The model `models.ComposeTemplate` (`backend/internal/models/template.go:15-16`) stores `Content` and `EnvContent` as plain `text` columns and has no owner / user binding.\n\n### Impact\n- Pre-auth confidentiality breach. An unauthenticated client on the same network (or through any path-unaware reverse proxy) recovers the full `envContent` of every locally-stored Compose template. Because the supported \"Save as Template\" workflow takes the operator's real env values verbatim, this commonly includes database passwords, registry tokens, third-party API keys (Stripe, Sentry, etc.), and OIDC client secrets.\n- Internal asset enumeration. `GET /api/templates` returns names, descriptions, tags, and registry metadata for every template, leaking what services the team runs internally and which compose files they reuse",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.18.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-cxx3-hr75-4q96"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42461"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/releases/tag/v1.18.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-30T20:55:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-09T04:16:26Z"
  }
}