CVE-2026-41659: Admidio/admidio Admidio Leaks Hidden Profile Field Vulnerability

LOW
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-68pr-7prh-mpv4
CVSS 2.7
CWE-200
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-41659 is a LOW (CVSS 2.7) admidio leaks hidden profile field vulnerability (CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) affecting Admidio/admidio libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves admidio leaks hidden profile field values via blind search oracle in member assignment. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 5.0.9.

CVE-2026-41659 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-41659
GHSA Identifier GHSA-68pr-7prh-mpv4
Severity LOW
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 2.7
CWE Classification CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Affected Product Admidio/admidio
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 2.7

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required High (PR:H)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-41659

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Admidio/admidio dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

admidio/admidio fixed: 5.0.9
Upgrade admidio/admidio to 5.0.9
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for admidio/admidio

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-41659, inspect your project dependencies for Admidio/admidio:

inspect dependencies for admidio/admidio

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Admidio/admidio in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 5.0.9), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, where the product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. In Admidio/admidio, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The member assignment DataTables endpoint (`members_assignment_data.php`) includes hidden profile fields (BIRTHDAY, STREET, CITY, POSTCODE, COUNTRY) in its SQL search condition regardless of field visibility settings. While the JSON output correctly suppresses hidden columns via `isVisible()` checks, the server-side search operates at the SQL level before any visibility filtering. This allows a role leader with assign-only permissions to infer hidden PII values by observing which users appear in search results for specific values. ## Details The search columns are hardcoded at `modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php:118-126`: ```php $searchColumns = array( 'COALESCE(last_name, \' \')', 'COALESCE(first_name, \' \')', 'COALESCE(birthday, \' \')', // hidden field - no visibility check 'COALESCE(street, \' \')', // hidden field - no visibility check 'COALESCE(city, \' \')', // hidden field - no visibility check 'COALESCE(zip_code, \' \')', // hidden field - no visibility check 'COALESCE(country, \' \')' // hidden field - no visibility check ); ``` These columns are concatenated into a SQL LIKE search at line 139: ```php $searchCondition .= ' AND LOWER(CONCAT(' . implode(', ', $searchColumns) . ')) LIKE LOWER(CONCAT(\'%\', ' . $searchValue . ', \'%\')) '; ``` The SQL query at lines 200-235 fetches all these fields via LEFT JOINs on `adm_user_data`, and the search condition is applied as a subquery filter at lines 258-262: ```php $sql = 'SELECT usr_id, usr_uuid, last_name, first_name, birthday, city, street, zip_code, country, ... FROM (' . $mainSql . ') AS members ' . $searchCondition . $orderCondition . $limitCondition; ``` The output visibility checks at lines 291-335 correctly call `$gProfileFields->isVisible('BIRTHDAY', $gCurrentUser->isAdministratorUsers())`, which returns `false` when `usf_hidden=1` and the user is not an admin. However, this only controls whether the column appears in the JSON response — the result set has already been filtered by the search. The authorization check at line 77 uses `allowedToAssignMembers()` (`src/Roles/Entity/Role.php:98-121`), which passes for role leaders with `ROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN` (value 1). These leaders do not have `isAdministratorUsers()` privileges, so `isVisible()` returns false for hidden fields — but the search still operates on them. ## PoC ```bash # Prerequisites: # - Authenticated as a role leader with ROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN rights # - BIRTHDAY field is configured as hidden (usf_hidden = 1) # - Target role has a known UUID # Step 1: Baseline - get all members without search filter curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session>' \ 'https://target/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php?role_uuid=<ROLE_UUID>&draw=1&start=0&length=25&search%5Bvalue%5D=' # Response: returns all users. Birthday column is NOT in output (hidden). # Note recordsFiltered count. # Step 2: Search for a specific birthday value curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session>' \ 'https://target/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php?role_uuid=<ROLE_UUID>&draw=1&start=0&length=25&search%5Bvalue%5D=1990-03-15' # Response: only users whose hidden birthday matches "1990-03-15" appear. # Birthday column is still NOT in output, but result set is filtered by it. # User names (always visible) reveal which users have that birthday. # Step 3: Enumerate hidden street addresses curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session>' \ 'https://target/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php?role_uuid=<ROLE_UUID>&draw=1&start=0&length=25&search%5Bvalue%5D=123+Main+St' # Response: only users living at "123 Main St" appear in results. # Address fields are hidden in output but the search matched against them. ``` ## Impact A role leader with assign-only permissions (the lowest leader privilege level) can extract hidden PII for all organization members including: - **Birthdays** — exact date of birth for any user - **Street addresses** — full street address - **Cities and postal codes** — location information - **Countries** — nationality/residence This is a blind oracle attack: hidden field values are never displayed, but by searching for specific values and observing the filtered result set (user names and `recordsFiltered` count), an attacker can determine which users match any hidden field value. This defeats the administrator's intent in marking these fields as hidden. ## Recommended Fix Filter search columns by visibility before constructing the SQL search condition. Replace lines 118-126 with: ```php $searchColumns = array( 'COALESCE(last_name, \' \')', 'COALESCE(first_name, \' \')', ); $isAdmin = $gCurrentUser->isAdministratorUsers(); if ($gProfileFields->isVisible('BIRTHDAY', $isAdmin)) { $searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(birthday, \' \')'; } if ($gProfileFields->isVisible('STREET', $isAdmin)) { $searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(street, \' \')'; } if ($gProfileFields->isVisible('CITY', $isAdmin)) { $searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(city, \' \')'; } if ($gProfileFields->isVisible('POSTCODE', $isAdmin)) { $searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(zip_code, \' \')'; } if ($gProfileFields->isVisible('COUNTRY', $isAdmin)) { $searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(country, \' \')'; } ``` This ensures the SQL search only operates on fields the current user is authorized to see, matching the behavior of the output visibility checks.

CVE-2026-41659 Affected Admidio/admidio Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
5.0.9
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
admidio/admidio
Packagist
< 5.0.9
5.0.9

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-41659?
CVE-2026-41659 is a security vulnerability in Admidio/admidio involving Admidio Leaks Hidden Profile Field Values via Blind Search Oracle in Member Assignment under CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor.
Which Admidio/admidio versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 5.0.9 across affected packages: admidio/admidio.
What version fixes CVE-2026-41659?
Upgrading to 5.0.9 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is admidio/admidio affected?
Yes, admidio/admidio is affected in releases prior to 5.0.9. Upgrade your dependency to 5.0.9 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-41659?
CVE-2026-41659 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 2.7 (LOW) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-41659?
CVE-2026-41659 is classified under CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor (The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-41659?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for admidio/admidio'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-68pr-7prh-mpv4",
  "modified" : "2026-05-08T20:13:48Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-29T21:47:29Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-41659" ],
  "summary" : "Admidio Leaks Hidden Profile Field Values via Blind Search Oracle in Member Assignment",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe member assignment DataTables endpoint (`members_assignment_data.php`) includes hidden profile fields (BIRTHDAY, STREET, CITY, POSTCODE, COUNTRY) in its SQL search condition regardless of field visibility settings. While the JSON output correctly suppresses hidden columns via `isVisible()` checks, the server-side search operates at the SQL level before any visibility filtering. This allows a role leader with assign-only permissions to infer hidden PII values by observing which users appear in search results for specific values.\n\n## Details\n\nThe search columns are hardcoded at `modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php:118-126`:\n\n```php\n$searchColumns = array(\n    'COALESCE(last_name, \\' \\')',\n    'COALESCE(first_name, \\' \\')',\n    'COALESCE(birthday, \\' \\')',    // hidden field - no visibility check\n    'COALESCE(street, \\' \\')',      // hidden field - no visibility check\n    'COALESCE(city, \\' \\')',        // hidden field - no visibility check\n    'COALESCE(zip_code, \\' \\')',    // hidden field - no visibility check\n    'COALESCE(country, \\' \\')'      // hidden field - no visibility check\n);\n```\n\nThese columns are concatenated into a SQL LIKE search at line 139:\n\n```php\n$searchCondition .= ' AND LOWER(CONCAT(' . implode(', ', $searchColumns) . ')) LIKE LOWER(CONCAT(\\'%\\', ' . $searchValue . ', \\'%\\')) ';\n```\n\nThe SQL query at lines 200-235 fetches all these fields via LEFT JOINs on `adm_user_data`, and the search condition is applied as a subquery filter at lines 258-262:\n\n```php\n$sql = 'SELECT usr_id, usr_uuid, last_name, first_name, birthday, city, street, zip_code, country, ...\n      FROM (' . $mainSql . ') AS members\n       ' . $searchCondition . $orderCondition . $limitCondition;\n```\n\nThe output visibility checks at lines 291-335 correctly call `$gProfileFields->isVisible('BIRTHDAY', $gCurrentUser->isAdministratorUsers())`, which returns `false` when `usf_hidden=1` and the user is not an admin. However, this only controls whether the column appears in the JSON response — the result set has already been filtered by the search.\n\nThe authorization check at line 77 uses `allowedToAssignMembers()` (`src/Roles/Entity/Role.php:98-121`), which passes for role leaders with `ROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN` (value 1). These leaders do not have `isAdministratorUsers()` privileges, so `isVisible()` returns false for hidden fields — but the search still operates on them.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Prerequisites:\n# - Authenticated as a role leader with ROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN rights\n# - BIRTHDAY field is configured as hidden (usf_hidden = 1)\n# - Target role has a known UUID\n\n# Step 1: Baseline - get all members without search filter\ncurl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session>' \\\n  'https://target/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php?role_uuid=<ROLE_UUID>&draw=1&start=0&length=25&search%5Bvalue%5D='\n\n# Response: returns all users. Birthday column is NOT in output (hidden).\n# Note recordsFiltered count.\n\n# Step 2: Search for a specific birthday value\ncurl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session>' \\\n  'https://target/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php?role_uuid=<ROLE_UUID>&draw=1&start=0&length=25&search%5Bvalue%5D=1990-03-15'\n\n# Response: only users whose hidden birthday matches \"1990-03-15\" appear.\n# Birthday column is still NOT in output, but result set is filtered by it.\n# User names (always visible) reveal which users have that birthday.\n\n# Step 3: Enumerate hidden street addresses\ncurl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session>' \\\n  'https://target/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php?role_uuid=<ROLE_UUID>&draw=1&start=0&length=25&search%5Bvalue%5D=123+Main+St'\n\n# Response: only users living at \"123 Main St\" appear in results.\n# Address fields are hidden in output but the search matched against them.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA role leader with assign-only permissions (the lowest leader privilege level) can extract hidden PII for all organization members including:\n\n- **Birthdays** — exact date of birth for any user\n- **Street addresses** — full street address\n- **Cities and postal codes** — location information\n- **Countries** — nationality/residence\n\nThis is a blind oracle attack: hidden field values are never displayed, but by searching for specific values and observing the filtered result set (user names and `recordsFiltered` count), an attacker can determine which users match any hidden field value. This defeats the administrator's intent in marking these fields as hidden.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nFilter search columns by visibility before constructing the SQL search condition. Replace lines 118-126 with:\n\n```php\n$searchColumns = array(\n    'COALESCE(last_name, \\' \\')',\n    'COALESCE(first_name, \\' \\')',\n);\n\n$isAdmin = $gCurrentUser->isAdministratorUsers();\nif ($gProfileFields->isVisible('BIRTHDAY', $isAdmin)) {\n    $searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(birthday, \\' \\')';\n}\nif ($gProfileFields->isVisible('STREET', $isAdmin)) {\n    $searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(street, \\' \\')';\n}\nif ($gProfileFields->isVisible('CITY', $isAdmin)) {\n    $searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(city, \\' \\')';\n}\nif ($gProfileFields->isVisible('POSTCODE', $isAdmin)) {\n    $searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(zip_code, \\' \\')';\n}\nif ($gProfileFields->isVisible('COUNTRY', $isAdmin)) {\n    $searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(country, \\' \\')';\n}\n```\n\nThis ensures the SQL search only operates on fields the current user is authorized to see, matching the behavior of the output visibility checks.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "admidio/admidio"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "5.0.9"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 5.0.8"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-68pr-7prh-mpv4"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41659"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/releases/tag/v5.0.9"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-200" ],
    "severity" : "LOW",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-29T21:47:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-07T04:16:29Z"
  }
}