CVE-2026-41583: Zebrad Zebra Vulnerable To Consensus Divergence Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj
CVSS 9.1
CWE-573
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-41583 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1) zebra vulnerable to consensus divergence vulnerability (CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller) affecting Zebrad libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves zebra vulnerable to consensus divergence in transparent sighash hash-type handling. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.3.1, 5.0.2.

CVE-2026-41583 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-41583
GHSA Identifier GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.1
CWE Classification CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller
Affected Product Zebrad
Package Ecosystem crates.io
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-41583

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Zebrad dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

zebrad fixed: 4.3.1
Upgrade zebrad to 4.3.1
zebra-script fixed: 5.0.2
Upgrade zebra-script to 5.0.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for zebrad

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-41583, inspect your project dependencies for Zebrad:

inspect dependencies for zebrad

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Zebrad in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.3.1), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller, where the product does not follow or incorrectly follows the specifications as required by the implementation language, environment, framework, protocol, or platform. In Zebrad, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# CVE-2026-41583: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling ## Summary After a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. ## Severity **Critical** - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes. Note that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run `zcashd`. ## Affected Versions All Zebra versions prior to version 4.3.1. (Some older versions are not impacted but are no longer supported by the network.) ## Description Verification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++. Since it is consensus-critical, this code was called from Zebra through foreign function interface (FFI). That interface was clunky because it required parsing the whole transaction in C++ code, which would then pull Rust libraries which could get in conflict with Zebra code. A refactoring was done so that only the verification itself was done in C++, and the rest done by Rust code, using a callback. However, in this refactoring, it was not noticed that a particular consensus rule - only accepting known hash types in transparent transaction signatures - was being enforced in C++ code and thus had to be enforced by the Rust caller. An attacker could exploit this by: - Submitting a V4 or V5 transaction with an invalid hash type - The V5 transaction would be accepted by Zebra nodes but not by `zcashd` nodes (and vice-versa for V4), creating a consensus split in the network. ## Impact **Consensus Failure** - **Attack Vector:** Network. - **Effect:** Network partition/consensus split. - **Scope:** Any Zebra affected Zebra node ## Fixed Versions This issue is fixed in Zebra 4.3.1. The fix adds the consensus check in the caller of the C++ verification code. It also uses the raw hash type for V4 sighash computations. ## Mitigation Users should upgrade to Zebra 4.3.1 or later immediately. There are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks. ## Credits Thanks Alex “Scalar” Sol for finding and reporting the issue, and to @sangsoo-osec who independently found the same issue and demonstrated that the V4 variant was also exploitable.

CVE-2026-41583 Affected Zebrad Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.3.15.0.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
zebrad
crates.io
< 4.3.1
4.3.1
zebra-script
crates.io
< 5.0.2
5.0.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-41583?
CVE-2026-41583 is a security vulnerability in Zebrad involving Zebra Vulnerable to Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling under CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller.
Which Zebrad versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.3.1, 5.0.2 across affected packages: zebrad, zebra-script.
What version fixes CVE-2026-41583?
Upgrading to 4.3.1, 5.0.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is zebrad affected?
Yes, zebrad is affected in releases prior to 4.3.1. Upgrade your dependency to 4.3.1 or later.
Is zebra-script affected?
Yes, zebra-script is affected in releases prior to 5.0.2. Upgrade your dependency to 5.0.2 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-41583?
CVE-2026-41583 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-41583?
CVE-2026-41583 is classified under CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller (The product does not follow or incorrectly follows the specifications as required by the implementation language, environment, framework, protocol, or platform.).
How can I check crates.io dependencies for CVE-2026-41583?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for zebrad'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj",
  "modified" : "2026-05-12T13:33:05Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-18T01:15:24Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-41583" ],
  "summary" : "Zebra Vulnerable to Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling",
  "details" : "# CVE-2026-41583: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling\n\n## Summary\n\nAfter a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes.\n\nIn a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the \"canonical\" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Critical** - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes.\n\nNote that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run `zcashd`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll Zebra versions prior to version 4.3.1. (Some older versions are not impacted but are no longer supported by the network.)\n\n## Description\n\nVerification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++. Since it is consensus-critical, this code was called from Zebra through foreign function interface (FFI). That interface was clunky because it required parsing the whole transaction in C++ code, which would then pull Rust libraries which could get in conflict with Zebra code. A refactoring was done so that only the verification itself was done in C++, and the rest done by Rust code, using a callback. However, in this refactoring, it was not noticed that a particular consensus rule - only accepting known hash types in transparent transaction signatures - was being enforced in C++ code and thus had to be enforced by the Rust caller.\n\nAn attacker could exploit this by:\n\n- Submitting a V4 or V5 transaction with an invalid hash type\n- The V5 transaction would be accepted by Zebra nodes but not by `zcashd` nodes (and vice-versa for V4), creating a consensus split in the network.\n\n## Impact\n\n**Consensus Failure**\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network.\n- **Effect:** Network partition/consensus split.\n- **Scope:** Any Zebra affected Zebra node\n\n## Fixed Versions\n\nThis issue is fixed in Zebra 4.3.1.\n\nThe fix adds the consensus check in the caller of the C++ verification code. It also uses the raw hash type for V4 sighash computations.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUsers should upgrade to Zebra 4.3.1 or later immediately.\n\nThere are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks.\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks Alex “Scalar” Sol for finding and reporting the issue, and to @sangsoo-osec who independently found the same issue and demonstrated that the V4 variant was also exploitable.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"
  }, {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "zebrad"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.3.1"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "zebra-script"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "5.0.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41583"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1f605eca5c55e3b65229fa01a97d9aa84fd37447"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-573" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-18T01:15:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-08T15:16:41Z"
  }
}