CVE-2026-39370: WWBN/AVideo WWBN AVideo Has An Allowlisted Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-39370 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.1) wwbn avideo has an allowlisted vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting WWBN/AVideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves wwbn avideo has an allowlisted downloadurl media extensions bypass ssrf protection and enable internal response exfiltration (incomplete fix for cve-2026-27732). Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.
CVE-2026-39370 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.1
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-39370
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected WWBN/AVideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade WWBN/AVideo to Latest secure release
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for WWBN/AVideo
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-39370, inspect your project dependencies for WWBN/AVideo:
inspect dependencies for WWBN/AVideo
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of WWBN/AVideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In WWBN/AVideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-39370 Affected WWBN/AVideo Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
WWBN/AVideo
|
Packagist |
≤ 26.0
|
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-39370?
Which WWBN/AVideo versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-39370?
Is WWBN/AVideo affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-39370?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-39370?
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-39370?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-cmcr-q4jf-p6q9",
"modified" : "2026-04-08T00:08:47Z",
"published" : "2026-04-08T00:08:47Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-39370" ],
"summary" : "WWBN AVideo has an Allowlisted downloadURL media extensions bypass SSRF protection and enable internal response exfiltration (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27732)",
"details" : "## Summary\n\nThe fix for [CVE-2026-27732](https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6) is incomplete.\n\n`objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` still allows attacker-controlled `downloadURL` values with common media or archive extensions such as `.mp4`, `.mp3`, `.zip`, `.jpg`, `.png`, `.gif`, and `.webm` to bypass SSRF validation. The server then fetches the response and stores it as media content.\n\nThis allows an authenticated uploader to turn the upload-by-URL flow into a reliable SSRF response-exfiltration primitive.\n\n## Details\n\n`objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` accepts attacker-controlled `downloadURL` and passes it to `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()`.\n\nInside that function:\n\n1. the URL extension is extracted from the attacker-controlled path\n2. the extension is checked against an allowlist of normal encoder formats\n3. `isSSRFSafeURL()` is skipped for common media and archive extensions\n4. the URL is fetched via `url_get_contents()`\n5. the fetched body is written into video storage and exposed through normal media metadata\n\nThe current code still contains:\n\n- an extension-based bypass for SSRF validation\n- no mandatory initial-destination SSRF enforcement inside `url_get_contents()` itself\n\nThis means internal URLs such as:\n\n`http://127.0.0.1:9998/probe.mp4`\n\nremain reachable from the application host.\n\nThis issue is best described as an incomplete fix / patch bypass of `CVE-2026-27732`, not a separate unrelated SSRF class.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Log in as a low-privilege uploader.\n2. Start an HTTP service reachable only from inside the application environment, for example:\n\n```text\nhttp://127.0.0.1:9998/probe.mp4\n```\n\n3. Confirm that the service is not reachable externally.\n4. Send:\n\n```text\nPOST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php\ndownloadURL=http://127.0.0.1:9998/probe.mp4\nformat=mp4\n```\n\n5. If needed, replay once against the returned `videos_id` with `first_request=1` so the fetched bytes land in the normal media path.\n6. Query:\n\n```text\nGET /objects/videos.json.php?showAll=1\n```\n\n7. Recover `videosURL.mp4.url`.\n8. Download that media URL and observe that the body matches the internal-only response byte-for-byte.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated uploader can make the AVideo server fetch loopback or internal HTTP resources and persist the response as media content by supplying a `downloadURL` ending in an allowlisted extension such as `.mp4`, `.jpg`, `.gif`, or `.zip`. Because SSRF validation is skipped for those extensions, the fetched body is stored and later retrievable through the generated `/videos/...` media URL. Successful exploitation allows internal response exfiltration from private APIs, admin endpoints, or other internal services reachable from the application host.\n\n\n## Recommended fix\n\n- Apply `isSSRFSafeURL()` to all `downloadURL` inputs regardless of extension\n- Remove extension-based exceptions from SSRF enforcement\n- Move initial-destination SSRF validation into `url_get_contents()` so call sites cannot skip it\n- Avoid storing arbitrary fetched content directly as publicly retrievable media\n- Consider restricting upload-by-URL to an explicit allowlist of trusted fetch origins",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Packagist",
"name" : "WWBN/AVideo"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"last_affected" : "26.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-cmcr-q4jf-p6q9"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39370"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-08T00:08:47Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-07T20:16:31Z"
}
}