CVE-2026-39368: WWBN/AVideo WWBN AVideo Has A Live Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9
CVSS 6.5
CWE-918
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-39368 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.5) wwbn avideo has a live vulnerability (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)) affecting WWBN/AVideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves wwbn avideo has a live restream log callback flow enabling stored ssrf to internal services. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-39368 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-39368
GHSA Identifier GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.5
CWE Classification CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affected Product WWBN/AVideo
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-39368

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected WWBN/AVideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

WWBN/AVideo fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade WWBN/AVideo to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for WWBN/AVideo

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-39368, inspect your project dependencies for WWBN/AVideo:

inspect dependencies for WWBN/AVideo

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of WWBN/AVideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where the web server receives a url or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this url, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. In WWBN/AVideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The Live restream log callback flow accepted an attacker-controlled `restreamerURL` and later fetched that stored URL server-side, enabling stored SSRF for authenticated streamers. The vulnerable flow allowed a low-privilege user with streaming permission to store an arbitrary callback URL and trigger server-side requests to loopback or internal HTTP services through the restream log feature. ## Details The vulnerable chain was: 1. `plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php` exposed a fresh `tokenForAction` 2. `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/verifyTokenForAction.json.php` exchanged it for a valid `responseToken` 3. `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/add.json.php` accepted attacker-controlled `restreamerURL` 4. `plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php` and `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/getAction.json.php` later fetched that stored URL server-side The original issue existed because the `responseToken` was accepted, but the callback destination was not tightly constrained to trusted restreamer endpoints. The maintainer confirmed the vulnerability and stated that the fix was applied by validating `restreamerURL` at storage time and re-validating the log-entry branch before use. The maintainer also noted that the `m3u8` field follows the same general pattern but is not server-fetched in the current flow. ## Proof of concept 1. Log in as a non-admin user with streaming permission. 2. Create a normal restream destination. 3. Trigger `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/testRestreamer.json.php` to create a live transmission history row. 4. Call: ```text GET /plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php?live_transmitions_history_id=<id>&restreams_id=<id> ``` 5. Extract `tokenForAction` from the returned URL. 6. Exchange it for `responseToken` via: ```text POST /plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/verifyTokenForAction.json.php ``` 7. Store a loopback callback URL: ```text POST /plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/add.json.php restreamerURL=http://127.0.0.1:9999/index.php ``` 8. Trigger `getRestream.json.php` again. 9. Observe that the returned response now contains the JSON body from the loopback-only service. ## Impact An authenticated streamer can cause the AVideo server to send HTTP requests to loopback or internal services and return the response through normal application endpoints by storing a malicious `restreamerURL` in the restream log flow. Because the callback destination was not constrained to trusted restreamer endpoints, the application could be used as a proxy to internal-only services that trust network locality. Successful exploitation can expose local admin panels, internal-only APIs, cloud metadata services if reachable, or other sensitive internal responses available from the application host. ## Recommended fix - Validate `restreamerURL` against explicitly configured restreamer endpoints at storage time - Re-validate the stored callback URL before server-side fetch - Bind `responseToken` to the expected restream row and callback host - Apply SSRF validation to the initial destination of every server-side fetch, not only redirect targets - Ignore or reject user-supplied callback hosts that do not match trusted configuration

CVE-2026-39368 Affected WWBN/AVideo Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
WWBN/AVideo
Packagist
≤ 26.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-39368?
CVE-2026-39368 is a security vulnerability in WWBN/AVideo involving WWBN AVideo has a Live restream log callback flow enabling stored SSRF to internal services under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
Which WWBN/AVideo versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: WWBN/AVideo.
What version fixes CVE-2026-39368?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is WWBN/AVideo affected?
Yes, WWBN/AVideo is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-39368?
CVE-2026-39368 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-39368?
CVE-2026-39368 is classified under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-39368?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for WWBN/AVideo'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9",
  "modified" : "2026-04-08T00:08:42Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-08T00:08:42Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-39368" ],
  "summary" : "WWBN AVideo has a Live restream log callback flow enabling stored SSRF to internal services",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe Live restream log callback flow accepted an attacker-controlled `restreamerURL` and later fetched that stored URL server-side, enabling stored SSRF for authenticated streamers.\n\nThe vulnerable flow allowed a low-privilege user with streaming permission to store an arbitrary callback URL and trigger server-side requests to loopback or internal HTTP services through the restream log feature.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable chain was:\n\n1. `plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php` exposed a fresh `tokenForAction`\n2. `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/verifyTokenForAction.json.php` exchanged it for a valid `responseToken`\n3. `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/add.json.php` accepted attacker-controlled `restreamerURL`\n4. `plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php` and `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/getAction.json.php` later fetched that stored URL server-side\n\nThe original issue existed because the `responseToken` was accepted, but the callback destination was not tightly constrained to trusted restreamer endpoints.\n\nThe maintainer confirmed the vulnerability and stated that the fix was applied by validating `restreamerURL` at storage time and re-validating the log-entry branch before use. The maintainer also noted that the `m3u8` field follows the same general pattern but is not server-fetched in the current flow.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Log in as a non-admin user with streaming permission.\n2. Create a normal restream destination.\n3. Trigger `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/testRestreamer.json.php` to create a live transmission history row.\n4. Call:\n\n```text\nGET /plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php?live_transmitions_history_id=<id>&restreams_id=<id>\n```\n\n5. Extract `tokenForAction` from the returned URL.\n6. Exchange it for `responseToken` via:\n\n```text\nPOST /plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/verifyTokenForAction.json.php\n```\n\n7. Store a loopback callback URL:\n\n```text\nPOST /plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/add.json.php\nrestreamerURL=http://127.0.0.1:9999/index.php\n```\n\n8. Trigger `getRestream.json.php` again.\n9. Observe that the returned response now contains the JSON body from the loopback-only service.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated streamer can cause the AVideo server to send HTTP requests to loopback or internal services and return the response through normal application endpoints by storing a malicious `restreamerURL` in the restream log flow. Because the callback destination was not constrained to trusted restreamer endpoints, the application could be used as a proxy to internal-only services that trust network locality. Successful exploitation can expose local admin panels, internal-only APIs, cloud metadata services if reachable, or other sensitive internal responses available from the application host.\n\n\n## Recommended fix\n\n- Validate `restreamerURL` against explicitly configured restreamer endpoints at storage time\n- Re-validate the stored callback URL before server-side fetch\n- Bind `responseToken` to the expected restream row and callback host\n- Apply SSRF validation to the initial destination of every server-side fetch, not only redirect targets\n- Ignore or reject user-supplied callback hosts that do not match trusted configuration",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "WWBN/AVideo"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "26.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39368"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-08T00:08:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-07T20:16:30Z"
  }
}