CVE-2026-27622: OpenEXR OpenEXR's CompositeDeepScanLine Integer-overflow Leads To Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-cr4v-6jm6-4963
CWE-787
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-27622 is a HIGH openexr's compositedeepscanline integer-overflow leads to vulnerability (CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write) affecting OpenEXR libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves openexr's compositedeepscanline integer-overflow leads to heap oob write. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.2.6, 3.3.8, 3.4.6.

CVE-2026-27622 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-27622
GHSA Identifier GHSA-cr4v-6jm6-4963
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write
Affected Product OpenEXR
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-27622

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected OpenEXR dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

OpenEXR fixed: 3.2.6
pip install OpenEXR>=3.2.6
OpenEXR fixed: 3.3.8
pip install OpenEXR>=3.3.8
OpenEXR fixed: 3.4.6
pip install OpenEXR>=3.4.6
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show OpenEXR

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-27622, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show OpenEXR

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of OpenEXR in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.2.6), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show OpenEXR command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write, where the product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. In OpenEXR, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary Function: `CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels`, reachable from high-level multipart deep read flows (`MultiPartInputFile` + `DeepScanLineInputPart` + `CompositeDeepScanLine`). Vulnerable lines (`src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfCompositeDeepScanLine.cpp`): - `total_sizes[ptr] += counts[j][ptr];` (line ~511) - `overall_sample_count += total_sizes[ptr];` (line ~514) - `samples[channel].resize (overall_sample_count);` (line ~535) Impact: 32-bit sample-count accumulation wrap leads to undersized allocation, then decode writes with true sample volume, causing heap OOB write in `generic_unpack_deep_pointers` (`src/lib/OpenEXRCore/unpack.c:1374`) (DoS/Crash, memory corruption/RCE). Attack scenario: - Attacker provides multipart deep EXR with many parts and very large sample counts per pixel. - Uses compression (RLE/ZIPS) to keep file size relatively small vs decode pressure. - The overflow happens in composite sample accounting (`unsigned int`), while pointer progression for decode uses larger counters and reaches out-of-bounds. Tested on: `OpenEXR 4.0.0-dev` (commit 83449669402080874b25ff1fa740649a9e6ea064) but this code has existed since v2.3.0 ## Steps to reproduce [composite_deepscanline_poc_bundle.patch](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25383205/composite_deepscanline_poc_bundle.patch) PoC files used: - Writer/generator: `poc/composite_deep_scanline_e2e_compressed_poc.cpp` - Minimal high-level reader harness: `poc/simple_exr_reader.cpp` The reader harness intentionally mimics realistic app behavior: open EXR, iterate parts, select `DEEPSCANLINE`, add sources to `CompositeDeepScanLine`, bind a normal `FrameBuffer`, then call `readPixels`. Build with ASAN/UBSAN: ```bash cmake -S . -B build-asan \ -DOPENEXR_BUILD_POC=ON \ -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo \ -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS='-fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer' \ -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS='-fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer' \ -DCMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS='-fsanitize=address,undefined' \ -DCMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS='-fsanitize=address,undefined' cmake --build build-asan --target composite_writer simple_exr_reader -j ``` Generate malicious file (decode-path focused profile): ```bash ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 timeout 180s \ ./build-asan/poc/composite_writer \ --profile low-ram \ --file /tmp/composite_decode_focus.exr ``` Trigger: ```bash ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 timeout 30s \ ./build-asan/poc/simple_exr_reader /tmp/composite_decode_focus.exr ``` ASAN builds are slower. If needed, a non-sanitized build + debugger is faster for iteration. ## Example runs Writer (abbrev): ```bash ❯ ./build-asan/poc/composite_writer exploit math: benign samples : 300 malicious parts : 86 malicious samples per part : 50000000 true total samples : 4300000300 uint32 overflow reached : yes wrapped uint32 total : 5033004 composite Z/A alloc from wrap : 40264032 bytes (38.40 MiB) per-part unpacked sample bytes : 300000000 bytes (286.10 MiB) min parts to overflow (current benign/samples): 86 writing compressed multipart deep EXR: /tmp/composite_deep_scanline_e2e_compressed.exr writing donor malicious part (50000000 samples) copying malicious part 1/86 from donor chunk ... file size: 26112896 bytes (24.90 MiB) ``` Reader ASAN crash: ```bash ❯ ./build-asan/poc/simple_exr_reader reading /tmp/composite_overflow_optimized.exr with 16 deepscanline parts ================================================================= ==175024==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ed1a55d90b0 at pc 0x7ed1da7854f7 bp 0x7ffe8c83a680 sp 0x7ffe8c83a670 WRITE of size 4 at 0x7ed1a55d90b0 thread T0 #0 0x7ed1da7854f6 in generic_unpack_deep_pointers /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXRCore/unpack.c:1374 #1 0x7ed1da7623e9 in exr_decoding_run /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXRCore/decoding.c:664 #2 0x7ed1dbcb153b in run_decode /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfDeepScanLineInputFile.cpp:816 #3 0x7ed1dbcc597f in Imf_4_0::DeepScanLineInputFile::Data::readData(Imf_4_0::DeepFrameBuffer const&, int, int, bool) /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfDeepScanLineInputFile.cpp:568 #4 0x7ed1dbc01ca4 in Imf_4_0::CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels(int, int) /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfCompositeDeepScanLine.cpp:576 #5 0x64669005f233 in main /home/pop/sec/openexr/poc/simple_exr_reader.cpp:88 #6 0x7ed1d942a1c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #7 0x7ed1d942a28a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #8 0x6466900601e4 in _start (/home/pop/sec/openexr/build-asan/poc/simple_exr_reader+0x1b1e4) (BuildId: 86b018d0dce48def6ca06be031266f0205c914d2) 0x7ed1a55d90b0 is located 0 bytes after 820132016-byte region [0x7ed1747b5800,0x7ed1a55d90b0) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ed1dd0fe548 in operator new(unsigned long) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_new_delete.cpp:95 #1 0x7ed1dbc29600 in std::__new_allocator<float>::allocate(unsigned long, void const*) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/new_allocator.h:151 #2 0x7ed1dbc29600 in std::allocator_traits<std::allocator<float> >::allocate(std::allocator<float>&, unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/alloc_traits.h:482 #3 0x7ed1dbc29600 in std::_Vector_base<float, std::allocator<float> >::_M_allocate(unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/stl_vector.h:381 #4 0x7ed1dbc29600 in std::_Vector_base<float, std::allocator<float> >::_M_allocate(unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/stl_vector.h:378 #5 0x7ed1dbc29600 in std::vector<float, std::allocator<float> >::_M_default_append(unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/vector.tcc:663 #6 0x7ed1dbc00184 in std::vector<float, std::allocator<float> >::resize(unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/stl_vector.h:1016 #7 0x7ed1dbc00184 in Imf_4_0::CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels(int, int) /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfCompositeDeepScanLine.cpp:535 #8 0x64669005f233 in main /home/pop/sec/openexr/poc/simple_exr_reader.cpp:88 #9 0x7ed1d942a1c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #10 0x7ed1d942a28a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #11 0x6466900601e4 in _start (/home/pop/sec/openexr/build-asan/poc/simple_exr_reader+0x1b1e4) (BuildId: 86b018d0dce48def6ca06be031266f0205c914d2) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXRCore/unpack.c:1374 in generic_unpack_deep_pointers Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x7ed1a55d8e00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x7ed1a55d8e80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x7ed1a55d8f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x7ed1a55d8f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x7ed1a55d9000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x7ed1a55d9080: 00 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x7ed1a55d9100: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x7ed1a55d9180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x7ed1a55d9200: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x7ed1a55d9280: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x7ed1a55d9300: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==175024==ABORTING ``` ## Root cause analysis In `CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels`: 1. Per-pixel totals are accumulated in `vector<unsigned int> total_sizes`. 2. For attacker-controlled large counts across many parts, `total_sizes[ptr]` wraps modulo `2^32`. 3. `overall_sample_count` is then derived from wrapped totals and used in `samples[channel].resize(overall_sample_count)`. 4. Decode pointer setup/consumption proceeds with true sample counts, and write operations in core unpack (`generic_unpack_deep_pointers`) overrun the undersized composite sample buffer. Allocation is based on a tiny wrapped value, but decode writes correspond to the true large sample volume. ## Impact Heap OOB write during decode. This is at minimum a reliable crash/DoS. As heap corruption, this bug could be used for potential remote code execution.

CVE-2026-27622 Affected OpenEXR Versions

3 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.2.63.3.83.4.6
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
OpenEXR
PyPI
≥ 2.3.0
< 3.2.6
3.2.6
OpenEXR
PyPI
≥ 3.3.0
< 3.3.8
3.3.8
OpenEXR
PyPI
≥ 3.4.0
< 3.4.6
3.4.6

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-27622?
CVE-2026-27622 is a security vulnerability in OpenEXR involving OpenEXR's CompositeDeepScanLine integer-overflow leads to heap OOB write under CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write.
Which OpenEXR versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.2.6, 3.3.8, 3.4.6 across affected packages: OpenEXR.
What version fixes CVE-2026-27622?
Upgrading to 3.2.6, 3.3.8, 3.4.6 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is OpenEXR affected?
Yes, OpenEXR is affected in releases prior to 3.2.6, 3.3.8, 3.4.6. Upgrade your dependency to 3.2.6, 3.3.8, 3.4.6 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-27622?
CVE-2026-27622 is classified under CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write (The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-27622?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show OpenEXR'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-cr4v-6jm6-4963",
  "modified" : "2026-03-04T02:00:10Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-02T18:30:20Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-27622" ],
  "summary" : "OpenEXR's CompositeDeepScanLine integer-overflow leads to heap OOB write",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nFunction: `CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels`, reachable from high-level multipart deep read flows (`MultiPartInputFile` + `DeepScanLineInputPart` + `CompositeDeepScanLine`).\n\nVulnerable lines (`src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfCompositeDeepScanLine.cpp`):\n- `total_sizes[ptr] += counts[j][ptr];` (line ~511)\n- `overall_sample_count += total_sizes[ptr];` (line ~514)\n- `samples[channel].resize (overall_sample_count);` (line ~535)\n\nImpact: 32-bit sample-count accumulation wrap leads to undersized allocation, then decode writes with true sample volume, causing heap OOB write in `generic_unpack_deep_pointers` (`src/lib/OpenEXRCore/unpack.c:1374`) (DoS/Crash, memory corruption/RCE).\n\nAttack scenario:\n- Attacker provides multipart deep EXR with many parts and very large sample counts per pixel.\n- Uses compression (RLE/ZIPS) to keep file size relatively small vs decode pressure.\n- The overflow happens in composite sample accounting (`unsigned int`), while pointer progression for decode uses larger counters and reaches out-of-bounds.\n\nTested on: `OpenEXR 4.0.0-dev` (commit 83449669402080874b25ff1fa740649a9e6ea064) but this code has existed since v2.3.0\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n[composite_deepscanline_poc_bundle.patch](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25383205/composite_deepscanline_poc_bundle.patch)\n\nPoC files used:\n- Writer/generator: `poc/composite_deep_scanline_e2e_compressed_poc.cpp`\n- Minimal high-level reader harness: `poc/simple_exr_reader.cpp`\n\nThe reader harness intentionally mimics realistic app behavior: open EXR, iterate parts, select `DEEPSCANLINE`, add sources to `CompositeDeepScanLine`, bind a normal `FrameBuffer`, then call `readPixels`.\n\nBuild with ASAN/UBSAN:\n\n```bash\ncmake -S . -B build-asan \\\n  -DOPENEXR_BUILD_POC=ON \\\n  -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo \\\n  -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS='-fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer' \\\n  -DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS='-fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer' \\\n  -DCMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS='-fsanitize=address,undefined' \\\n  -DCMAKE_SHARED_LINKER_FLAGS='-fsanitize=address,undefined'\n\ncmake --build build-asan --target composite_writer simple_exr_reader -j\n```\n\nGenerate malicious file (decode-path focused profile):\n\n```bash\nASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 timeout 180s \\\n  ./build-asan/poc/composite_writer \\\n  --profile low-ram \\\n  --file /tmp/composite_decode_focus.exr\n```\n\nTrigger:\n\n```bash\nASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 timeout 30s \\\n  ./build-asan/poc/simple_exr_reader /tmp/composite_decode_focus.exr\n```\n\nASAN builds are slower. If needed, a non-sanitized build + debugger is faster for iteration.\n\n## Example runs\n\nWriter (abbrev):\n\n```bash\n❯ ./build-asan/poc/composite_writer\nexploit math:\n  benign samples                 : 300\n  malicious parts                : 86\n  malicious samples per part     : 50000000\n  true total samples             : 4300000300\n  uint32 overflow reached        : yes\n  wrapped uint32 total           : 5033004\n  composite Z/A alloc from wrap  : 40264032 bytes (38.40 MiB)\n  per-part unpacked sample bytes : 300000000 bytes (286.10 MiB)\n  min parts to overflow (current benign/samples): 86\nwriting compressed multipart deep EXR: /tmp/composite_deep_scanline_e2e_compressed.exr\nwriting donor malicious part (50000000 samples)\ncopying malicious part 1/86 from donor chunk\n...\nfile size: 26112896 bytes (24.90 MiB)\n```\n\nReader ASAN crash:\n\n```bash\n❯ ./build-asan/poc/simple_exr_reader\nreading /tmp/composite_overflow_optimized.exr with 16 deepscanline parts\n=================================================================\n==175024==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ed1a55d90b0 at pc 0x7ed1da7854f7 bp 0x7ffe8c83a680 sp 0x7ffe8c83a670\nWRITE of size 4 at 0x7ed1a55d90b0 thread T0\n    #0 0x7ed1da7854f6 in generic_unpack_deep_pointers /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXRCore/unpack.c:1374\n    #1 0x7ed1da7623e9 in exr_decoding_run /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXRCore/decoding.c:664\n    #2 0x7ed1dbcb153b in run_decode /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfDeepScanLineInputFile.cpp:816\n    #3 0x7ed1dbcc597f in Imf_4_0::DeepScanLineInputFile::Data::readData(Imf_4_0::DeepFrameBuffer const&, int, int, bool) /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfDeepScanLineInputFile.cpp:568\n    #4 0x7ed1dbc01ca4 in Imf_4_0::CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels(int, int) /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfCompositeDeepScanLine.cpp:576\n    #5 0x64669005f233 in main /home/pop/sec/openexr/poc/simple_exr_reader.cpp:88\n    #6 0x7ed1d942a1c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58\n    #7 0x7ed1d942a28a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360\n    #8 0x6466900601e4 in _start (/home/pop/sec/openexr/build-asan/poc/simple_exr_reader+0x1b1e4) (BuildId: 86b018d0dce48def6ca06be031266f0205c914d2)\n\n0x7ed1a55d90b0 is located 0 bytes after 820132016-byte region [0x7ed1747b5800,0x7ed1a55d90b0)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n    #0 0x7ed1dd0fe548 in operator new(unsigned long) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_new_delete.cpp:95\n    #1 0x7ed1dbc29600 in std::__new_allocator<float>::allocate(unsigned long, void const*) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/new_allocator.h:151\n    #2 0x7ed1dbc29600 in std::allocator_traits<std::allocator<float> >::allocate(std::allocator<float>&, unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/alloc_traits.h:482\n    #3 0x7ed1dbc29600 in std::_Vector_base<float, std::allocator<float> >::_M_allocate(unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/stl_vector.h:381\n    #4 0x7ed1dbc29600 in std::_Vector_base<float, std::allocator<float> >::_M_allocate(unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/stl_vector.h:378\n    #5 0x7ed1dbc29600 in std::vector<float, std::allocator<float> >::_M_default_append(unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/vector.tcc:663\n    #6 0x7ed1dbc00184 in std::vector<float, std::allocator<float> >::resize(unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/13/bits/stl_vector.h:1016\n    #7 0x7ed1dbc00184 in Imf_4_0::CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels(int, int) /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXR/ImfCompositeDeepScanLine.cpp:535\n    #8 0x64669005f233 in main /home/pop/sec/openexr/poc/simple_exr_reader.cpp:88\n    #9 0x7ed1d942a1c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58\n    #10 0x7ed1d942a28a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360\n    #11 0x6466900601e4 in _start (/home/pop/sec/openexr/build-asan/poc/simple_exr_reader+0x1b1e4) (BuildId: 86b018d0dce48def6ca06be031266f0205c914d2)\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/pop/sec/openexr/src/lib/OpenEXRCore/unpack.c:1374 in generic_unpack_deep_pointers\nShadow bytes around the buggy address:\n  0x7ed1a55d8e00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x7ed1a55d8e80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x7ed1a55d8f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x7ed1a55d8f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x7ed1a55d9000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n=>0x7ed1a55d9080: 00 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n  0x7ed1a55d9100: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n  0x7ed1a55d9180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n  0x7ed1a55d9200: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n  0x7ed1a55d9280: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n  0x7ed1a55d9300: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\nShadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):\n  Addressable:           00\n  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07\n  Heap left redzone:       fa\n  Freed heap region:       fd\n  Stack left redzone:      f1\n  Stack mid redzone:       f2\n  Stack right redzone:     f3\n  Stack after return:      f5\n  Stack use after scope:   f8\n  Global redzone:          f9\n  Global init order:       f6\n  Poisoned by user:        f7\n  Container overflow:      fc\n  Array cookie:            ac\n  Intra object redzone:    bb\n  ASan internal:           fe\n  Left alloca redzone:     ca\n  Right alloca redzone:    cb\n==175024==ABORTING\n```\n\n## Root cause analysis\n\nIn `CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels`:\n\n1. Per-pixel totals are accumulated in `vector<unsigned int> total_sizes`.\n2. For attacker-controlled large counts across many parts, `total_sizes[ptr]` wraps modulo `2^32`.\n3. `overall_sample_count` is then derived from wrapped totals and used in `samples[channel].resize(overall_sample_count)`.\n4. Decode pointer setup/consumption proceeds with true sample counts, and write operations in core unpack (`generic_unpack_deep_pointers`) overrun the undersized composite sample buffer.\n\n\nAllocation is based on a tiny wrapped value, but decode writes correspond to the true large sample volume.\n\n## Impact\n\nHeap OOB write during decode. This is at minimum a reliable crash/DoS. As heap corruption, this bug could be used for potential remote code execution.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "OpenEXR"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.3.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.2.6"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "OpenEXR"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "3.3.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.3.8"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "OpenEXR"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "3.4.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.4.6"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/security/advisories/GHSA-cr4v-6jm6-4963"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27622"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-787" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-02T18:30:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-03T23:15:55Z"
  }
}