CVE-2026-25580: Pydantic ai Pydantic AI Has Server-Side Request Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3",
  "modified" : "2026-02-06T21:42:27Z",
  "published" : "2026-02-06T18:32:39Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-25580" ],
  "summary" : "Pydantic AI has Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in URL Download Handling",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Pydantic AI's URL download functionality. When applications accept message history from untrusted sources, attackers can include malicious URLs that cause the server to make HTTP requests to internal network resources, potentially accessing internal services or cloud credentials.\n\n**This vulnerability only affects applications that accept message history from external users**, such as those using:\n- **`Agent.to_web`** or **`clai web`** to serve a chat interface\n- **`VercelAIAdapter`** for Vercel AI SDK integration\n- **`AGUIAdapter`** or **`Agent.to_ag_ui`** for AG-UI protocol integration\n- Custom APIs that accept message history from user input\n\nApplications that only use hardcoded or developer-controlled URLs are not affected.\n\n### Description\n\nThe `download_item()` helper function downloads content from URLs without validating that the target is a public internet address. When user-supplied message history contains URLs, attackers can:\n\n1. **Access internal services**: Request `http://127.0.0.1`, `localhost`, or private IP ranges (`10.x.x.x`, `172.16.x.x`, `192.168.x.x`)\n2. **Steal cloud credentials**: Access cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDSv1 at `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure, Alibaba Cloud)\n3. **Scan internal networks**: Enumerate internal hosts and ports\n\n### Who Is Affected\n\nYou are affected if your application:\n\n1. **Uses `Agent.to_web` or `clai web`** - The web interface accepts file attachments via the Vercel AI Data Stream Protocol, where users can provide arbitrary URLs through chat messages.\n\n2. **Uses `VercelAIAdapter`** - Chat interfaces built with Vercel AI SDK allow users to submit messages containing URLs that are processed server-side.\n\n3. **Uses `AGUIAdapter` or `Agent.to_ag_ui`** - The AG-UI protocol allows users to provide file references with URLs as part of agent interactions.\n\n4. **Exposes a custom API accepting message history** - Any endpoint that accepts message history or `ImageUrl`, `AudioUrl`, `VideoUrl`, `DocumentUrl` objects from user input.\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\nVia chat interface, an attacker submits a message with a file attachment pointing to an internal resource:\n```json\n{\n  \"role\": \"user\",\n  \"parts\": [\n    {\"type\": \"file\", \"mediaType\": \"image/png\", \"url\": \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"}\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n### Affected Model Integrations\n\nMultiple model integrations download URL content in certain conditions:\n\n| Provider | Downloaded Types |\n|----------|------------------|\n| `OpenAIChatModel` | `AudioUrl`, `DocumentUrl` |\n| `AnthropicModel` | `DocumentUrl` (`text/plain`) |\n| `GoogleModel` (GLA) | All URL types (except YouTube and Files API URLs) |\n| `XaiModel` | `DocumentUrl` |\n| `BedrockConverseModel` | `ImageUrl`, `DocumentUrl`, `VideoUrl` (non-S3 URLs) |\n| `OpenRouterModel` | `AudioUrl` |\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Upgrade to Patched Version\n\n**Upgrade** to the patched version or later. The fix adds comprehensive SSRF protection:\n\n- Blocks private/internal IP addresses by default\n- Always blocks cloud metadata endpoints (even with `allow-local`)\n- Only allows `http://` and `https://` protocols\n- Resolves hostnames before requests to prevent DNS rebinding\n- Validates each redirect target\n\n### New `force_download='allow-local'` Option\n\nIf an application legitimately needs to access local/private network resources (e.g., in a fully trusted internal environment), it can explicitly opt in:\n\n```python\nfrom pydantic_ai import ImageUrl\n\n# Default behavior: private IPs are blocked\nImageUrl(url=\"http://internal-service/image.png\")  # Raises ValueError\n\n# Opt-in to allow local access (use with caution)\nImageUrl(url=\"http://internal-service/image.png\", force_download='allow-local')\n```\n\n**Important**: Cloud metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`, `fd00:ec2::254`, `100.100.100.200`) are **always blocked**, even with `allow-local`.\n\n### Workaround for Older Versions\n\nIf a project cannot upgrade immediately, use a [history processor](https://ai.pydantic.dev/message-history/#processing-message-history) to filter out URLs targeting local/private addresses:\n\n```python\nimport ipaddress\nimport socket\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nfrom pydantic_ai import Agent, ModelMessage, ModelRequest\nfrom pydantic_ai.messages import AudioUrl, DocumentUrl, ImageUrl, VideoUrl\n\ndef is_private_url(url: str) -> bool:\n    \"\"\"Check if a URL targets a private/internal IP address.\"\"\"\n    try:\n        parsed = urlparse(url)\n        hostname = parsed.hostname\n        if not hostname:\n            return True  # Invalid URL, block it\n\n        # Resolve hostname to IP\n        ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)\n        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)\n\n        # Block private, loopback, and link-local addresses\n        return ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local\n    except (socket.gaierror, ValueError):\n        return True  # DNS resolution failed, block it\n\ndef filter_private_urls(messages: list[ModelMessage]) -> list[ModelMessage]:\n    \"\"\"Remove URL parts that target private/internal addresses.\"\"\"\n    url_types = (ImageUrl, AudioUrl, VideoUrl, DocumentUrl)\n    filtered = []\n    for msg in messages:\n        if isinstance(msg, ModelRequest):\n            safe_parts = [\n                part for part in msg.parts\n                if not (isinstance(part, url_types) and is_private_url(part.url))\n            ]\n            if safe_parts:\n                filtered.append(ModelRequest(parts=safe_parts))\n        else:\n            filtered.append(msg)\n    return filtered\n\n# Apply the filter to your agent\nagent = Agent('openai:gpt-5', history_processors=[filter_private_urls])\n```\n\n## Technical Details of the Fix\n\nThe fix introduces a new `_ssrf.py` module with comprehensive protection:\n\n1. **Protocol validation**: Only `http://` and `https://` allowed\n2. **DNS resolution before request**: Prevents DNS rebinding attacks\n3. **Private IP blocking** (by default):\n   - `127.0.0.0/8`, `::1/128` (loopback)\n   - `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` (private)\n   - `169.254.0.0/16`, `fe80::/10` (link-local)\n   - `100.64.0.0/10` (CGNAT)\n   - `fc00::/7` (unique local)\n   - `2002::/16` (6to4, can embed private IPv4)\n4. **Cloud metadata always blocked**: `169.254.169.254`, `fd00:ec2::254`, `100.100.100.200`\n5. **Safe redirect handling**: Each redirect validated before following (max 10)",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "pydantic-ai"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.0.26"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.56.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "pydantic-ai-slim"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.0.26"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.56.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25580"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/commit/d398bc9d39aecca6530fa7486a410d5cce936301"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-02-06T18:32:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-02-06T21:16:17Z"
  }
}