CVE-2026-107282: AsyncHttpClient Replay To A Different Host Vulnerability
CRITICALCVE-2026-107282 is a CRITICAL replay to a different host vulnerability (CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information) affecting AsyncHttpClient libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The issue involves replay to a different host sends the original host request and credentials to the new host. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.0.13, 2.16.1.
CVE-2026-107282 at a Glance
How to Fix CVE-2026-107282
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected AsyncHttpClient dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
<dependency>
<groupId>org.asynchttpclient</groupId>
<artifactId>async-http-client</artifactId>
<version>3.0.13</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.asynchttpclient</groupId>
<artifactId>async-http-client</artifactId>
<version>2.16.1</version>
</dependency>
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=org.asynchttpclient
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-107282, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:
mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=org.asynchttpclient
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of AsyncHttpClient in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.0.13), your application is affected.
Note: The mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=org.asynchttpclient command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information, where the product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors. In AsyncHttpClient, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-107282 Affected AsyncHttpClient Versions
2 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
|
Maven |
≥ 3.0.0
< 3.0.13
|
3.0.13
|
|
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client
|
Maven |
≥ 2.0.0
< 2.16.1
|
2.16.1
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-107282?
Which AsyncHttpClient versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-107282?
Is async-http-client affected?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-107282?
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-107282?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w",
"modified" : "2026-10-08T16:30:46Z",
"published" : "2026-10-08T16:30:46Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-107282" ],
"summary" : "AsyncHttpClient: Replay to a different host sends the original host request and credentials to the new host",
"details" : "### Impact\nWhen a request is replayed onto a different host, the client updates only the current request and leaves the target request pointing at the original host. Four consumers read that stale value, and each one sends the first host's request, credentials, or both to the second host.\n\nA replay happens through documented, ordinary features: a `ResponseFilter` that returns a different request, which is the supported failover pattern, and the IOException retry path. The attacker does not need to induce the replay; an application that uses failover produces it by design.\n\n* The socket to host B is filed in the connection pool under host A's key. A later request the application addresses to A is served over the connection to B, and A's `Authorization` header goes to B.\n* Over a CONNECT tunnel, the client tunnels to B and negotiates TLS with B correctly, then writes A's request into that tunnel. B receives A's path, A's `Host`, and A's `Authorization`. TLS does not protect against this, because the handshake really is with B, so no certificate mismatch occurs.\n* The replay reuses the original realm, so A's credentials are regenerated onto a replay request that carries no realm of its own. The cross-origin redirect path strips realms for exactly this reason; the replay path never did.\n* The stale value also decides whether TLS is used at all. When the original request was `http://` and the replay is `https://`, no SSL handler is installed and the replayed request, credentials included, is written in cleartext.\n\n### Affected versions\n* 3.x: up to and including 3.0.12\n* 2.x: up to and including 2.16.0\n\nBoth lines are affected identically. This is long-standing behaviour, not a recent regression.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in 3.0.13 on the 3.x line and in 2.16.1 on the 2.x line. The target request now moves when a request is replayed, and the proxy moves with it: the proxy is part of the connection pool key, so correcting only the host would convert a harmless pool miss into a hit and route a proxied connection to a direct request.\n\n### Workarounds\nDo not use a `ResponseFilter` that replays to a different host, and disable request retries, if the client is configured with credentials or used through a proxy. Replaying to the same host is not affected.\n\n### Details\n`NettyRequestSender.newNettyRequestAndResponseFuture` calls `setCurrentRequest` without `setTargetRequest`, and `replayRequest` does not move the target either. The stale target is then read by the pool key derivation in `NettyResponseFuture`, by `ConnectSuccessInterceptor` when it writes the tunnelled request, by the realm selection in `NettyRequestSender`, and by `NettyConnectListener` when it decides whether to install an SSL handler.\n\nExisting replay tests do not cover this, because all of them replay to the same host.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V4",
"score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Maven",
"name" : "org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "3.0.0"
}, {
"fixed" : "3.0.13"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.0.12"
}
}, {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Maven",
"name" : "org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "2.0.0"
}, {
"fixed" : "2.16.1"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.16.0"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/security/advisories/GHSA-jmqq-x5g9-9p2w"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107282"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/15b254514a411623e5f1d8c99ea79c0f82f8a466"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/bbc31aed3b044f9f7a126cf689a8c8d7ad2ae1cb"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/releases/tag/async-http-client-project-2.16.1"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/releases/tag/async-http-client-project-3.0.13"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-319", "CWE-441", "CWE-522" ],
"severity" : "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-08T16:30:46Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-10-07T22:17:04Z"
}
}