CVE-2026-105753: vLLM Mirrored Multimodal IPC Caches Desync Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-ph3r-5jfg-f84f
CVSS 6.5
CWE-617
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-105753 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.5) mirrored multimodal ipc caches desync vulnerability (CWE-617: Reachable Assertion) affecting vLLM libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves mirrored multimodal ipc caches desync after a rejected request — a later request reusing the same media hash trips a receiver assertion in the engine core. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.28.0.

CVE-2026-105753 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-105753
GHSA Identifier GHSA-ph3r-5jfg-f84f
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.5
CWE Classification CWE-617: Reachable Assertion
Affected Product vLLM
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-105753

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected vLLM dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

vllm fixed: 0.28.0
pip install vllm>=0.28.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show vllm

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-105753, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show vllm

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of vLLM in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.28.0), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show vllm command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-617: Reachable Assertion, where the product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary. In vLLM, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Affected - **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm` - **Affected versions:** vLLM ≤ 0.25.1 (confirmed on 0.25.1, commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34)). The lower bound predates 0.25.1; maintainers can confirm how far back the mirrored sender/receiver cache protocol reaches. ## Summary vLLM's default multimodal cache (`mm_processor_cache_type="lru"`) mirrors state across two processes: the frontend (P0) holds only metadata (`MultiModalProcessorSenderCache`) while the engine core (P1) holds the real payload (`MultiModalReceiverCache`). The design invariant is that `get_and_update()` runs on P0 and P1 in lockstep for every request, so eviction order stays mirrored and P0 can answer "is this cached in P1?" without talking to P1. That invariant breaks when a request is **rejected after P0 has rendered and hashed the multimodal input** (populating the P0 cache) **but before P1 receives the item** — for example, an oversized chat prompt rejected on `max_model_len` *after* rendering. P0 now believes the media is cached while P1 never got it. A later request reusing the same media hash gets a P0 hit, so P0 sends `None` instead of the payload, and P1 — which has nothing cached — trips `assert mm_item is not None, f"Expected a cached item for {mm_hash=}"`. This is a remotely reachable, request-controlled cache-mirroring desync on the standard multimodal inference path. It requires only the default cache configuration. ## Affected code Links pinned to the confirmed commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34) (v0.25.1): - **P0 metadata cache** — `MultiModalProcessorSenderCache` at [`vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L379`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L379); `get_and_update_item` at [`#L410-L421`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L410-L421), commit assertion at [`#L418`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L418). - **P1 payload cache (the actual sink)** — `MultiModalReceiverCache` at [`vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L630`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L630); `get_and_update_item` at [`#L652-L663`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L652-L663), with the failing `assert mm_item is not None, f"Expected a cached item for {mm_hash=}"` at [`#L660`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L660). - **Default `mm_processor_cache_type = "lru"`** at [`vllm/config/multimodal.py#L132`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/config/multimodal.py#L132); dispatch in [`vllm/multimodal/registry.py#L294-L307`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/registry.py#L294-L307) (sender) and [`#L322-L331`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/registry.py#L322-L331) (receiver). The `processor_only`, disabled-caching, and `shm` paths are not affected. - **Rejection-after-render window** — rendering happens before length validation in [`vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/serving.py#L206-L231`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/serving.py#L206-L231) (`render_chat_request`), and the length check raises after the render in [`vllm/entrypoints/serve/utils/api_utils.py#L171-L189`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/serve/utils/api_utils.py#L171-L189). - **Cache-commit call site** — [`vllm/multimodal/processing/processor.py#L1347`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/processing/processor.py#L1347) (`_merge_mm_kwargs`) commits the P0 sender entry during render. - The separate stale-order eviction hang is already fixed via [`vllm/utils/cache.py#L120-L121`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/utils/cache.py#L120-L121) (`LRUCache.touch()` guarding `if key in self:`) — a different mechanism that does not touch the sender/receiver commit-ordering protocol and does not remediate this assertion. The P1 receiver sink — the assertion that fires when P1 receives `None` for a hash it never cached: ```python # vllm/multimodal/cache.py Lines 651-663 @override def get_and_update_item( self, mm_item: MultiModalKwargsItem | None, mm_hash: str, ) -> MultiModalKwargsItem: if (cached_item := self._cache.get(mm_hash)) is not None: return cached_item assert mm_item is not None, f"Expected a cached item for {mm_hash=}" self._cache[mm_hash] = mm_item return mm_item ``` The P0 sender — on a hit it drops the payload (returns `None`) and, on a miss during render, unconditionally commits the metadata entry with no rollback tied to admission: ```python # vllm/multimodal/cache.py Lines 409-422 @override def get_and_update_item( self, mm_item: MultiModalProcessorCacheInItem, mm_hash: str, ) -> MultiModalProcessorCacheOutItem: if (cached_item := self._cache.get(mm_hash)) is not None: return None, cached_item.prompt_updates assert mm_item is not None, f"Expected a cached item for {mm_hash=}" self._cache[mm_hash] = MultiModalProcessorCacheItemMetadata(*mm_item) return mm_item ``` ## Impact A remote client submitting multimodal requests can poison a cache identity — render a media item successfully, then have that request rejected — so a **later** request reusing the same media hash fails on the P1 receiver assertion. This is an availability failure against a shared serving instance. No code execution, memory corruption, or data disclosure is claimed. On this revision the failure is scoped as a request-level preprocessing error (the engine core catches around `preprocess_add_request`); public reports show the same assertion cascading into further engine-loop assertions on other revisions. It applies to multimodal models running the default mirrored `lru` cache. ## Suggested Fix Two complementary changes: 1. **Make the mirrored commit atomic with admission** — insert into the P0 sender cache only after the request has passed all admission checks (length, limits) and P1 has acknowledged the item, or roll back the P0 insert on rejection. 2. **Defense in depth** — convert the P1 receiver `assert mm_item is not None` into a checked, request-scoped error (fetch-on-miss from P0) so a desync degrades a single request rather than asserting in the engine loop. The core of the rollback half: wrap the post-render length check so a `ValueError` rejection discards the P0 entries the render just committed, before re-raising. Add a `discard_sender_cache_item()` on the processor cache (no-op default, `pop` on the sender) and a `Renderer.discard_mm_cache_entries()` that walks a rendered request's `mm_hashes`: ```python # vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/serving.py (_create_chat_completion) - max_tokens = get_max_tokens( - max_model_len, - ..., - truncate_prompt_tokens=request.truncate_prompt_tokens, - ) + try: + max_tokens = get_max_tokens( + max_model_len, + ..., + truncate_prompt_tokens=request.truncate_prompt_tokens, + ) + except ValueError: + for rendered_input in engine_inputs: + if mm_hashes := rendered_input.get("mm_hashes"): + self.renderer.discard_mm_cache_entries(mm_hashes) + raise ``` ```python # vllm/multimodal/cache.py (MultiModalProcessorSenderCache) + @override + def discard_sender_cache_item(self, mm_hash: str) -> None: + self._cache.pop(mm_hash, None) ``` This closes the `max_model_len` rejection path; because any other rejection-after-render path reopens the same window, pairing it with the defense-in-depth change above (making the P1 `assert` a checked, request-scoped error) is recommended. ## Credit **Reported by:** Patch the Planet (Trail of Bits + OpenAI collaboration) This vulnerability was discovered using GPT-5.5-Cyber as part of the Patch the Planet security initiative. --- **Proposed fix:** a fix for this issue is proposed in a public pull request: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51897

CVE-2026-105753 Affected vLLM Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.28.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
vllm
PyPI
< 0.28.0
0.28.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-105753?
CVE-2026-105753 is a security vulnerability in vLLM involving Mirrored multimodal IPC caches desync after a rejected request — a later request reusing the same media hash trips a receiver assertion in the engine core under CWE-617: Reachable Assertion.
Which vLLM versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.28.0 across affected packages: vllm.
What version fixes CVE-2026-105753?
Upgrading to 0.28.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is vllm affected?
Yes, vllm is affected in releases prior to 0.28.0. Upgrade your dependency to 0.28.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-105753?
CVE-2026-105753 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-105753?
CVE-2026-105753 is classified under CWE-617: Reachable Assertion (The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-105753?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show vllm'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-ph3r-5jfg-f84f",
  "modified" : "2026-10-06T00:02:06Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-06T00:02:05Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-105753" ],
  "summary" : "vLLM: Mirrored multimodal IPC caches desync after a rejected request — a later request reusing the same media hash trips a receiver assertion in the engine core",
  "details" : "## Affected\n\n- **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm`\n- **Affected versions:** vLLM ≤ 0.25.1 (confirmed on 0.25.1, commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34)). The lower bound predates 0.25.1; maintainers can confirm how far back the mirrored sender/receiver cache protocol reaches.\n\n## Summary\n\nvLLM's default multimodal cache (`mm_processor_cache_type=\"lru\"`) mirrors state across two processes: the frontend (P0) holds only metadata (`MultiModalProcessorSenderCache`) while the engine core (P1) holds the real payload (`MultiModalReceiverCache`). The design invariant is that `get_and_update()` runs on P0 and P1 in lockstep for every request, so eviction order stays mirrored and P0 can answer \"is this cached in P1?\" without talking to P1.\n\nThat invariant breaks when a request is **rejected after P0 has rendered and hashed the multimodal input** (populating the P0 cache) **but before P1 receives the item** — for example, an oversized chat prompt rejected on `max_model_len` *after* rendering. P0 now believes the media is cached while P1 never got it. A later request reusing the same media hash gets a P0 hit, so P0 sends `None` instead of the payload, and P1 — which has nothing cached — trips `assert mm_item is not None, f\"Expected a cached item for {mm_hash=}\"`.\n\nThis is a remotely reachable, request-controlled cache-mirroring desync on the standard multimodal inference path. It requires only the default cache configuration.\n\n## Affected code\n\nLinks pinned to the confirmed commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34) (v0.25.1):\n\n- **P0 metadata cache** — `MultiModalProcessorSenderCache` at [`vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L379`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L379); `get_and_update_item` at [`#L410-L421`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L410-L421), commit assertion at [`#L418`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L418).\n- **P1 payload cache (the actual sink)** — `MultiModalReceiverCache` at [`vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L630`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L630); `get_and_update_item` at [`#L652-L663`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L652-L663), with the failing `assert mm_item is not None, f\"Expected a cached item for {mm_hash=}\"` at [`#L660`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/cache.py#L660).\n- **Default `mm_processor_cache_type = \"lru\"`** at [`vllm/config/multimodal.py#L132`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/config/multimodal.py#L132); dispatch in [`vllm/multimodal/registry.py#L294-L307`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/registry.py#L294-L307) (sender) and [`#L322-L331`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/registry.py#L322-L331) (receiver). The `processor_only`, disabled-caching, and `shm` paths are not affected.\n- **Rejection-after-render window** — rendering happens before length validation in [`vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/serving.py#L206-L231`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/serving.py#L206-L231) (`render_chat_request`), and the length check raises after the render in [`vllm/entrypoints/serve/utils/api_utils.py#L171-L189`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/serve/utils/api_utils.py#L171-L189).\n- **Cache-commit call site** — [`vllm/multimodal/processing/processor.py#L1347`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/multimodal/processing/processor.py#L1347) (`_merge_mm_kwargs`) commits the P0 sender entry during render.\n- The separate stale-order eviction hang is already fixed via [`vllm/utils/cache.py#L120-L121`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/utils/cache.py#L120-L121) (`LRUCache.touch()` guarding `if key in self:`) — a different mechanism that does not touch the sender/receiver commit-ordering protocol and does not remediate this assertion.\n\nThe P1 receiver sink — the assertion that fires when P1 receives `None` for a hash it never cached:\n\n```python\n# vllm/multimodal/cache.py Lines 651-663\n    @override\n    def get_and_update_item(\n        self,\n        mm_item: MultiModalKwargsItem | None,\n        mm_hash: str,\n    ) -> MultiModalKwargsItem:\n        if (cached_item := self._cache.get(mm_hash)) is not None:\n            return cached_item\n\n        assert mm_item is not None, f\"Expected a cached item for {mm_hash=}\"\n\n        self._cache[mm_hash] = mm_item\n        return mm_item\n```\n\nThe P0 sender — on a hit it drops the payload (returns `None`) and, on a miss during render, unconditionally commits the metadata entry with no rollback tied to admission:\n\n```python\n# vllm/multimodal/cache.py Lines 409-422\n    @override\n    def get_and_update_item(\n        self,\n        mm_item: MultiModalProcessorCacheInItem,\n        mm_hash: str,\n    ) -> MultiModalProcessorCacheOutItem:\n        if (cached_item := self._cache.get(mm_hash)) is not None:\n            return None, cached_item.prompt_updates\n\n        assert mm_item is not None, f\"Expected a cached item for {mm_hash=}\"\n\n        self._cache[mm_hash] = MultiModalProcessorCacheItemMetadata(*mm_item)\n\n        return mm_item\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA remote client submitting multimodal requests can poison a cache identity — render a media item successfully, then have that request rejected — so a **later** request reusing the same media hash fails on the P1 receiver assertion. This is an availability failure against a shared serving instance. No code execution, memory corruption, or data disclosure is claimed.\n\nOn this revision the failure is scoped as a request-level preprocessing error (the engine core catches around `preprocess_add_request`); public reports show the same assertion cascading into further engine-loop assertions on other revisions. It applies to multimodal models running the default mirrored `lru` cache.\n\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nTwo complementary changes:\n\n1. **Make the mirrored commit atomic with admission** — insert into the P0 sender cache only after the request has passed all admission checks (length, limits) and P1 has acknowledged the item, or roll back the P0 insert on rejection.\n2. **Defense in depth** — convert the P1 receiver `assert mm_item is not None` into a checked, request-scoped error (fetch-on-miss from P0) so a desync degrades a single request rather than asserting in the engine loop.\n\nThe core of the rollback half: wrap the post-render length check so a `ValueError` rejection discards the P0 entries the render just committed, before re-raising. Add a `discard_sender_cache_item()` on the processor cache (no-op default, `pop` on the sender) and a `Renderer.discard_mm_cache_entries()` that walks a rendered request's `mm_hashes`:\n\n```python\n# vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/serving.py (_create_chat_completion)\n-            max_tokens = get_max_tokens(\n-                max_model_len,\n-                ...,\n-                truncate_prompt_tokens=request.truncate_prompt_tokens,\n-            )\n+            try:\n+                max_tokens = get_max_tokens(\n+                    max_model_len,\n+                    ...,\n+                    truncate_prompt_tokens=request.truncate_prompt_tokens,\n+                )\n+            except ValueError:\n+                for rendered_input in engine_inputs:\n+                    if mm_hashes := rendered_input.get(\"mm_hashes\"):\n+                        self.renderer.discard_mm_cache_entries(mm_hashes)\n+                raise\n```\n\n```python\n# vllm/multimodal/cache.py (MultiModalProcessorSenderCache)\n+    @override\n+    def discard_sender_cache_item(self, mm_hash: str) -> None:\n+        self._cache.pop(mm_hash, None)\n```\n\nThis closes the `max_model_len` rejection path; because any other rejection-after-render path reopens the same window, pairing it with the defense-in-depth change above (making the P1 `assert` a checked, request-scoped error) is recommended.\n\n## Credit\n\n**Reported by:** Patch the Planet (Trail of Bits + OpenAI collaboration)\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered using GPT-5.5-Cyber as part of the Patch the Planet security initiative.\n\n---\n\n**Proposed fix:** a fix for this issue is proposed in a public pull request: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51897",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "vllm"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.28.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-ph3r-5jfg-f84f"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/46747"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51897"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/396204230423b7cc6798300926b8fa30190d26a9"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.28.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-617" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-06T00:02:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}