CVE-2025-62706: Authlib Denial of Service Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-g7f3-828f-7h7m
CVSS 6.5
CWE-400 CWE-770
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-62706 is a MODERATE (CVSS 6.5) denial of service vulnerability (CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) affecting Authlib libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves jwe zip=def decompression bomb enables dos. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.6.5.

CVE-2025-62706 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-62706
GHSA Identifier GHSA-g7f3-828f-7h7m
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 6.5
CWE Classification CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Affected Product Authlib
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 6.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2025-62706

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Authlib dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

authlib fixed: 1.6.5
pip install authlib>=1.6.5
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show authlib

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2025-62706, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show authlib

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Authlib in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.6.5), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show authlib command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, where the product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. In Authlib, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary _Authlib’s JWE `zip=DEF` path performs unbounded DEFLATE decompression. A very small ciphertext can expand into tens or hundreds of megabytes on decrypt, allowing an attacker who can supply decryptable tokens to exhaust memory and CPU and cause denial of service._ ### Details - Affected component: Authlib JOSE, JWE `zip=DEF` (DEFLATE) support. - In `authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7518/jwe_zips.py`, `DeflateZipAlgorithm.decompress` calls `zlib.decompress(s, -zlib.MAX_WBITS)` without a maximum output limit. This permits unbounded expansion of compressed payloads. - In the JWE decode flow (`authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7516/jwe.py`), when the protected header contains `"zip": "DEF"`, the library routes the decrypted ciphertext into the `decompress` method and assigns the fully decompressed bytes to the plaintext field before returning it. No streaming limit or quota is applied. - Because DEFLATE achieves extremely high ratios on highly repetitive input, an attacker can craft a tiny `zip=DEF` ciphertext that inflates to a very large plaintext during decrypt, spiking RSS and CPU. Repeated requests can starve the process or host. Code references (from this repository version): - `authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7518/jwe_zips.py` – `DeflateZipAlgorithm.decompress` uses unbounded `zlib.decompress`. - `authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7516/jwe.py` – JWE decode path applies `zip_.decompress(msg)` when `zip=DEF` is present in the header. Contrast: The `joserfc` project guards `zip=DEF` decompression with a fixed maximum (256 KB) and raises `ExceededSizeError` if output would exceed this limit, preventing the bomb. Authlib lacks such a guard in this codebase snapshot. ### PoC Environment: Python 3.10+ inside a venv; Authlib installed editable from this repository so source changes are visible. The PoC script demonstrates both a benign and a compressible-bomb payload and prints wall/CPU time, RSS, and size ratios. 1) Create venv and install Authlib (editable): Set current directory to /authlib Download [jwe_deflate_dos_demo.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/22519553/jwe_deflate_dos_demo.py) in /authlib ``` python3 -m venv .venv .venv/bin/pip install --upgrade pip .venv/bin/pip install -e . ``` 2) Run the PoC (included in this repo): ``` .venv/bin/python /authlib/jwe_deflate_dos_demo.py --size 50 --max-rss-mb 2048 ``` Sample output (abridged): ``` LOCAL TEST ONLY – do not send to third-party systems. Runtime: Python 3.13.6 / Authlib 1.6.4 / zip=DEF via A256GCM [CASE] normal plaintext=13B ciphertext=117B decompressed=13B wall_s=0.000 cpu_s=0.000 peak_rss_mb=31.0 ratio=0.1 [CASE] malicious plaintext=50MB ciphertext=~4KB decompressed=50MB wall_s=~2.3 cpu_s=~2.2 peak_rss_mb=800+ ratio=12500+ ``` The second case shows the decompression spike: a few KB of ciphertext forces allocation and processing of ~50 MB during decrypt. Repeated requests can quickly exhaust available memory and CPU. Reproduction notes: - Algorithm: `alg=dir`, `enc=A256GCM`, header includes `{ "zip": "DEF" }`. - The PoC uses a 32‑byte local symmetric key and a highly compressible payload (`"A" * N`). - Increase `--size` to stress memory; the `--max-rss-mb` flag helps avoid destabilizing the host during testing. ### Impact - Effect: Denial of service (memory/CPU exhaustion) during JWE decrypt of `zip=DEF` tokens. - Who is impacted: Any service that uses Authlib to decrypt JWE tokens with `zip=DEF` and where an attacker can submit tokens that will be successfully decrypted (e.g., shared `dir` key, token reflection, or compromised/abused issuers). - Confidentiality/Integrity: No direct C/I impact; availability impact is high. ### Severity (CVSS v3.1) Base vector (typical shared‑secret scenario where the attacker must produce a decryptable token): - `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` → 6.5 (MEDIUM) **Rationale:** - Network‑reachable (AV:N), low complexity (AC:L), no user interaction (UI:N), scope unchanged (S:U). - Attacker must hold or gain ability to mint a decryptable token for the target (PR:L) — common with `alg=dir` and shared keys across services. - No confidentiality or integrity loss (C:N/I:N); availability is severely impacted (A:H) due to decompression expansion. If arbitrary unprivileged parties can submit JWEs that will be decrypted (PR:N), the base vector becomes: - `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` → 7.5 (HIGH) ### Mitigations / Workarounds - Reject or strip `zip=DEF` for inbound JWEs at the application boundary until a fix is available. - Fork and add a bounded decompression guard (e.g., `zlib.decompress(..., max_length)` via `decompressobj().decompress(data, MAX_SIZE)`), returning an error when output exceeds a safe limit. - Enforce strict maximum token sizes and fail fast on oversized inputs; combine with rate limiting. ### Remediation Guidance (for maintainers) - Mirror `joserfc`’s approach: add a conservative maximum output size (e.g., 256 KB by default) and raise a specific error when exceeded; document a controlled way to raise this ceiling for trusted environments. - Consider streaming decode with chunked limits to avoid large single allocations. ### References - Authlib source: `authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7518/jwe_zips.py`, `authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7516/jwe.py`

CVE-2025-62706 Affected Authlib Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.6.5
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
authlib
PyPI
< 1.6.5
1.6.5

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-62706?
CVE-2025-62706 is a security vulnerability in Authlib involving JWE zip=DEF decompression bomb enables DoS under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption.
Which Authlib versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.6.5 across affected packages: authlib.
What version fixes CVE-2025-62706?
Upgrading to 1.6.5 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is authlib affected?
Yes, authlib is affected in releases prior to 1.6.5. Upgrade your dependency to 1.6.5 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-62706?
CVE-2025-62706 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-62706?
CVE-2025-62706 is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2025-62706?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show authlib'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-g7f3-828f-7h7m",
  "modified" : "2025-11-03T18:31:46Z",
  "published" : "2025-10-10T22:54:03Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-62706" ],
  "summary" : "Authlib : JWE zip=DEF decompression bomb enables DoS",
  "details" : "### Summary\n_Authlib’s JWE `zip=DEF` path performs unbounded DEFLATE decompression. A very small ciphertext can expand into tens or hundreds of megabytes on decrypt, allowing an attacker who can supply decryptable tokens to exhaust memory and CPU and cause denial of service._\n\n### Details\n- Affected component: Authlib JOSE, JWE `zip=DEF` (DEFLATE) support.\n- In `authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7518/jwe_zips.py`, `DeflateZipAlgorithm.decompress` calls `zlib.decompress(s, -zlib.MAX_WBITS)` without a maximum output limit. This permits unbounded expansion of compressed payloads.\n- In the JWE decode flow (`authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7516/jwe.py`), when the protected header contains `\"zip\": \"DEF\"`, the library routes the decrypted ciphertext into the `decompress` method and assigns the fully decompressed bytes to the plaintext field before returning it. No streaming limit or quota is applied.\n- Because DEFLATE achieves extremely high ratios on highly repetitive input, an attacker can craft a tiny `zip=DEF` ciphertext that inflates to a very large plaintext during decrypt, spiking RSS and CPU. Repeated requests can starve the process or host.\n\nCode references (from this repository version):\n- `authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7518/jwe_zips.py` – `DeflateZipAlgorithm.decompress` uses unbounded `zlib.decompress`.\n- `authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7516/jwe.py` – JWE decode path applies `zip_.decompress(msg)` when `zip=DEF` is present in the header.\n\nContrast: The `joserfc` project guards `zip=DEF` decompression with a fixed maximum (256 KB) and raises `ExceededSizeError` if output would exceed this limit, preventing the bomb. Authlib lacks such a guard in this codebase snapshot.\n\n### PoC\nEnvironment: Python 3.10+ inside a venv; Authlib installed editable from this repository so source changes are visible. The PoC script demonstrates both a benign and a compressible-bomb payload and prints wall/CPU time, RSS, and size ratios.\n\n1) Create venv and install Authlib (editable):\nSet current directory to /authlib\nDownload [jwe_deflate_dos_demo.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/22519553/jwe_deflate_dos_demo.py) in /authlib\n```\npython3 -m venv .venv\n.venv/bin/pip install --upgrade pip\n.venv/bin/pip install -e .\n```\n\n2) Run the PoC (included in this repo):\n```\n.venv/bin/python /authlib/jwe_deflate_dos_demo.py --size 50 --max-rss-mb 2048\n```\n\nSample output (abridged):\n```\nLOCAL TEST ONLY – do not send to third-party systems.\nRuntime: Python 3.13.6 / Authlib 1.6.4 / zip=DEF via A256GCM\n[CASE] normal    plaintext=13B  ciphertext=117B decompressed=13B  wall_s=0.000 cpu_s=0.000 peak_rss_mb=31.0  ratio=0.1\n[CASE] malicious plaintext=50MB ciphertext=~4KB decompressed=50MB wall_s=~2.3  cpu_s=~2.2  peak_rss_mb=800+  ratio=12500+\n```\n\nThe second case shows the decompression spike: a few KB of ciphertext forces allocation and processing of ~50 MB during decrypt. Repeated requests can quickly exhaust available memory and CPU.\n\nReproduction notes:\n- Algorithm: `alg=dir`, `enc=A256GCM`, header includes `{ \"zip\": \"DEF\" }`.\n- The PoC uses a 32‑byte local symmetric key and a highly compressible payload (`\"A\" * N`).\n- Increase `--size` to stress memory; the `--max-rss-mb` flag helps avoid destabilizing the host during testing.\n\n### Impact\n- Effect: Denial of service (memory/CPU exhaustion) during JWE decrypt of `zip=DEF` tokens.\n- Who is impacted: Any service that uses Authlib to decrypt JWE tokens with `zip=DEF` and where an attacker can submit tokens that will be successfully decrypted (e.g., shared `dir` key, token reflection, or compromised/abused issuers).\n- Confidentiality/Integrity: No direct C/I impact; availability impact is high.\n\n### Severity (CVSS v3.1)\nBase vector (typical shared‑secret scenario where the attacker must produce a decryptable token):\n- `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` → 6.5 (MEDIUM)\n\n**Rationale:**\n- Network‑reachable (AV:N), low complexity (AC:L), no user interaction (UI:N), scope unchanged (S:U).\n- Attacker must hold or gain ability to mint a decryptable token for the target (PR:L) — common with `alg=dir` and shared keys across services.\n- No confidentiality or integrity loss (C:N/I:N); availability is severely impacted (A:H) due to decompression expansion.\nIf arbitrary unprivileged parties can submit JWEs that will be decrypted (PR:N), the base vector becomes:\n- `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` → 7.5 (HIGH)\n\n### Mitigations / Workarounds\n- Reject or strip `zip=DEF` for inbound JWEs at the application boundary until a fix is available.\n- Fork and add a bounded decompression guard (e.g., `zlib.decompress(..., max_length)` via `decompressobj().decompress(data, MAX_SIZE)`), returning an error when output exceeds a safe limit.\n- Enforce strict maximum token sizes and fail fast on oversized inputs; combine with rate limiting.\n\n### Remediation Guidance (for maintainers)\n- Mirror `joserfc`’s approach: add a conservative maximum output size (e.g., 256 KB by default) and raise a specific error when exceeded; document a controlled way to raise this ceiling for trusted environments.\n- Consider streaming decode with chunked limits to avoid large single allocations.\n\n### References\n- Authlib source: `authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7518/jwe_zips.py`, `authlib/authlib/jose/rfc7516/jwe.py`",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "authlib"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.6.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/security/advisories/GHSA-g7f3-828f-7h7m"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62706"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/e0863d5129316b1790eee5f14cece32a03b8184d"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/authlib/authlib"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00032.html"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-400", "CWE-770" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-10-10T22:54:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-10-22T22:15:35Z"
  }
}