CVE-2025-25188: Hickory proto Hickory DNS's DNSSEC Validation May Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4
CWE-345
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2025-25188 is a MODERATE hickory dns's dnssec validation may vulnerability (CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) affecting Hickory proto libraries in the crates.io ecosystem. The issue involves hickory dns's dnssec validation may accept broken authentication chains. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.24.3.

CVE-2025-25188 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2025-25188
GHSA Identifier GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Affected Product Hickory proto
Package Ecosystem crates.io
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2025-25188

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Hickory proto dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

hickory-proto fixed: 0.24.3
Upgrade hickory-proto to 0.24.3
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for hickory-proto

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2025-25188, inspect your project dependencies for Hickory proto:

inspect dependencies for hickory-proto

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Hickory proto in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.24.3), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, where the product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data. In Hickory proto, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. ### Details `verify_dnskey_rrset()` will return `Ok(true)` if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in `verify_rrset()` returning a `Secure` proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. `verify_default_rrset()` looks up DNSKEY records by calling `handle.lookup()`, which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in `verify_default_rrset()`, `verify_rrset_with_dnskey()` is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its `Proof` is returned. Similarly, `verify_dnskey_rrset()` returns `Ok(false)` if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to `verify_rrset()`, it will call `verify_default_rrset()`. The special handling for DNSKEYs in `verify_default_rrset()` will then call `verify_rrset_with_dnskey()` using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its `Proof`. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside `verify_dnskey_rrset()` and cut `verify_default_rrset()` out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely. ### PoC The proof of concepts have been integrated into the conformance test suite, as `resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_trust_anchor_dnskey` and `resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_ds_covered_dnskey`. ### Impact This impacts Hickory DNS users relying on DNSSEC verification in the client library, stub resolver, or recursive resolver.

CVE-2025-25188 Affected Hickory proto Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.24.3
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
hickory-proto
crates.io
≥ 0.8.0
< 0.24.3
0.24.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-25188?
CVE-2025-25188 is a security vulnerability in Hickory proto involving Hickory DNS's DNSSEC validation may accept broken authentication chains under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity.
Which Hickory proto versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.24.3 across affected packages: hickory-proto.
What version fixes CVE-2025-25188?
Upgrading to 0.24.3 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is hickory-proto affected?
Yes, hickory-proto is affected in releases prior to 0.24.3. Upgrade your dependency to 0.24.3 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2025-25188?
CVE-2025-25188 is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.).
How can I check crates.io dependencies for CVE-2025-25188?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for hickory-proto'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4",
  "modified" : "2025-02-10T19:51:23Z",
  "published" : "2025-02-10T17:46:00Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2025-25188" ],
  "summary" : "Hickory DNS's DNSSEC validation may accept broken authentication chains",
  "details" : "### Summary\nThe DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone.\n\n### Details\n`verify_dnskey_rrset()` will return `Ok(true)` if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in `verify_rrset()` returning a `Secure` proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. `verify_default_rrset()` looks up DNSKEY records by calling `handle.lookup()`, which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says \"DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup\", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in `verify_default_rrset()`, `verify_rrset_with_dnskey()` is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its `Proof` is returned.\n\nSimilarly, `verify_dnskey_rrset()` returns `Ok(false)` if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says \"If all the keys are valid, then we are secure\", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to `verify_rrset()`, it will call `verify_default_rrset()`. The special handling for DNSKEYs in `verify_default_rrset()` will then call `verify_rrset_with_dnskey()` using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its `Proof`. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside `verify_dnskey_rrset()` and cut `verify_default_rrset()` out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely.\n\n### PoC\nThe proof of concepts have been integrated into the conformance test suite, as `resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_trust_anchor_dnskey` and `resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_ds_covered_dnskey`.\n\n### Impact\nThis impacts Hickory DNS users relying on DNSSEC verification in the client library, stub resolver, or recursive resolver.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "crates.io",
      "name" : "hickory-proto"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.8.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.24.3"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25188"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/e118c6eec569f4340421f86ee0686714010c63e9"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-345" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2025-02-10T17:46:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2025-02-10T18:15:35Z"
  }
}