CVE-2024-35803: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-w77r-vc72-rx49
CVSS 5.5
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2024-35803 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.5) security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2024-35803 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2024-35803
GHSA Identifier GHSA-w77r-vc72-rx49
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.5
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2024-35803

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2024-35803, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/efistub: Call mixed mode boot services on the firmware's stack Normally, the EFI stub calls into the EFI boot services using the stack that was live when the stub was entered. According to the UEFI spec, this stack needs to be at least 128k in size - this might seem large but all asynchronous processing and event handling in EFI runs from the same stack and so quite a lot of space may be used in practice. In mixed mode, the situation is a bit different: the bootloader calls the 32-bit EFI stub entry point, which calls the decompressor's 32-bit entry point, where the boot stack is set up, using a fixed allocation of 16k. This stack is still in use when the EFI stub is started in 64-bit mode, and so all calls back into the EFI firmware will be using the decompressor's limited boot stack. Due to the placement of the boot stack right after the boot heap, any stack overruns have gone unnoticed. However, commit 5c4feadb0011983b ("x86/decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code") moved the definition of the boot heap into C code, and now the boot stack is placed right at the base of BSS, where any overruns will corrupt the end of the .data section. While it would be possible to work around this by increasing the size of the boot stack, doing so would affect all x86 systems, and mixed mode systems are a tiny (and shrinking) fraction of the x86 installed base. So instead, record the firmware stack pointer value when entering from the 32-bit firmware, and switch to this stack every time a EFI boot service call is made.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2024-35803?
CVE-2024-35803 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2024-35803?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2024-35803?
CVE-2024-35803 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2024-35803?
CVE-2024-35803 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2024-35803?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-w77r-vc72-rx49",
  "modified" : "2025-09-26T18:31:17Z",
  "published" : "2024-05-17T15:31:09Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2024-35803" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/efistub: Call mixed mode boot services on the firmware's stack\n\nNormally, the EFI stub calls into the EFI boot services using the stack\nthat was live when the stub was entered. According to the UEFI spec,\nthis stack needs to be at least 128k in size - this might seem large but\nall asynchronous processing and event handling in EFI runs from the same\nstack and so quite a lot of space may be used in practice.\n\nIn mixed mode, the situation is a bit different: the bootloader calls\nthe 32-bit EFI stub entry point, which calls the decompressor's 32-bit\nentry point, where the boot stack is set up, using a fixed allocation\nof 16k. This stack is still in use when the EFI stub is started in\n64-bit mode, and so all calls back into the EFI firmware will be using\nthe decompressor's limited boot stack.\n\nDue to the placement of the boot stack right after the boot heap, any\nstack overruns have gone unnoticed. However, commit\n\n  5c4feadb0011983b (\"x86/decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code\")\n\nmoved the definition of the boot heap into C code, and now the boot\nstack is placed right at the base of BSS, where any overruns will\ncorrupt the end of the .data section.\n\nWhile it would be possible to work around this by increasing the size of\nthe boot stack, doing so would affect all x86 systems, and mixed mode\nsystems are a tiny (and shrinking) fraction of the x86 installed base.\n\nSo instead, record the firmware stack pointer value when entering from\nthe 32-bit firmware, and switch to this stack every time a EFI boot\nservice call is made.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35803"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2149f8a56e2ed345c7a4d022a79f6b8fc53ae926"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/725351c036452b7db5771a7bed783564bc4b99cc"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/930775060ca348b8665f60eef14b204172d14f31"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cefcd4fe2e3aaf792c14c9e56dab89e3d7a65d02"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fba7ee7187581b5bc222003e73e2592b398bb06d"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2024-05-17T14:15:13Z"
  }
}