CVE-2022-36056: Github.com/sigstore/cosign Cosign Bundle Can Be Crafted Vulnerability

MODERATE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388
CVSS 5.5
CWE-347
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2022-36056 is a MODERATE (CVSS 5.5) cosign bundle can be crafted vulnerability (CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature) affecting Github.com/sigstore/cosign libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify a blob even if the embedded rekorbundle does not reference the given signature. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.12.0.

CVE-2022-36056 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2022-36056
GHSA Identifier GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 5.5
CWE Classification CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Affected Product Github.com/sigstore/cosign
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 5.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2022-36056

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/sigstore/cosign dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/sigstore/cosign fixed: 1.12.0
Upgrade github.com/sigstore/cosign to 1.12.0
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/sigstore/cosign

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2022-36056, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/sigstore/cosign:

inspect dependencies for github.com/sigstore/cosign

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/sigstore/cosign in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.12.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature, where the product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data. In Github.com/sigstore/cosign, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary A number of vulnerabilities have been found in `cosign verify-blob`, where Cosign would successfully verify an artifact when verification should have failed. ## Vulnerability 1: Bundle mismatch causes invalid verification. ### Summary A cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify a blob even if the embedded rekorBundle does not reference the given signature. ### Details Cosign supports "bundles" which intend to allow offline verification of the signature and rekor inclusion. By using the --bundle flag in cosign sign-blob, cosign will create a JSON file called a "bundle". These bundles include three fields: base64Signature, cert, and rekorBundle. The desired behavior is that the verification of these bundles would: - verify the provided blob using the included signature and certificate - verify the rekorBundle SET - verify the rekorBundle payload references the given artifact. It appears that step three is not being performed, allowing "any old rekorBundle" to pass validation, even if the rekorBundle payload does not reference the provided blob or the certificate and signature in the rekorBundle do not match those at the top level. ### Steps to reproduce Enable keyless signing: ``` export COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 ``` Create two random blobs: ``` dd bs=1 count=50 </dev/urandom >blob1 dd bs=1 count=50 </dev/urandom >blob2 ``` Sign each blob: ``` cosign sign-blob blob1 --bundle bundle1 cosign sign-blob blob2 --bundle bundle2 ``` Create a falsified bundle including the base64Signature and cert fields from bundle1 and the rekorBundle from bundle2: ``` jq --slurpfile bundle2 bundle2 '.rekorBundle = $bundle2[0].rekorBundle' bundle1 > invalidBundle ``` Now, the falsified bundle can be used to verify blob1: ``` $ cosign verify-blob blob1 --bundle invalidBundle tlog entry verified offline Verified OK ``` ### Patches Users should update to the latest version of Cosign, `1.12.0`. ### Workaround If you extract the signature and certificate from the `bundle`, you may use it for verification as follows and avoid using an invalid bundle: ``` $ cosign verify-blob blob1 --signature $(jq -r '.base64Signature' bundle1) --certificate $(jq -r '.cert' bundle1) ``` Note that this will make a network call to Rekor to fetch the Rekor entry. However, you may then be subject to Vulnerability 4. ## Vulnerability 2: Certificate Identities are not checked in some cases ### Summary When providing identity flags, the email and issuer of a certificate is not checked when verifying a Rekor bundle, and the GitHub Actions identity is never checked. ### Details Users who provide an offline Rekor bundle (`--bundle`) when verifying a blob using `cosign verify-blob` and include flags that check identity such as `--certificate-email` and `--certificate-oidc-issuer` are impacted. Additionally, users who provide the GitHub Actions verification flags such as `--certificate-github-workflow-name` when running `cosign verify-blob` without a bundle, key reference, or certificate are impacted. When providing these flags, Cosign ignored their values. If a certificate's identity did not match the provided flags, Cosign would still successfully verify the blob. ### Patches Users should update to the latest version of Cosign, `1.12.0`. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds, users should update. ## Vulnerability 3: Invalid Rekor bundle without the experimental flag will result in successful verification ### Summary Providing an invalid Rekor bundle without the experimental flag results in a successful verification. ### Details Users who provide an offline Rekor bundle (`--bundle`) that was invalid (invalid signed entry timestamp, expired certificate, or malformed) when verifying a blob with `cosign verify-blob` and do not set the `COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1` flag are impacted. When an invalid bundle was provided, Cosign would fallback to checking Rekor log inclusion by requesting proof of inclusion from the log. However, without the `COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL` flag, Cosign would exit early and successfully verify the blob. ### Patches Users should update to the latest version of Cosign, `1.12.0`. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds, users should update. ## Vulnerability 4: Invalid transparency log entry will result in successful verification ### Summary An invalid transparency log entry will result in immediate success for verification. ### Details Users who provide a signature and certificate to `verify-blob` will fetch the associated Rekor entry for verification. If the returned entry was invalid (invalid signed entry timestamp, invalid inclusion proof, malformed entry with missing verification), then `cosign` [exits](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/blob/42c6e2a6dd9d92d19077c8e6b7d66d155a5ea28c/cmd/cosign/cli/verify/verify_blob.go#L357) early and succeeds unconditionally. ### Patches Users should update to the latest version of Cosign, `1.12.0`. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds, users should update. ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) * Send us a message on [Slack](https://sigstore.slack.com/).

CVE-2022-36056 Affected Github.com/sigstore/cosign Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.12.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/sigstore/cosign
Go
< 1.12.0
1.12.0

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2022-36056?
CVE-2022-36056 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/sigstore/cosign involving Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify a blob even if the embedded rekorBundle does not reference the given signature under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature.
Which Github.com/sigstore/cosign versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.12.0 across affected packages: github.com/sigstore/cosign.
What version fixes CVE-2022-36056?
Upgrading to 1.12.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/sigstore/cosign affected?
Yes, github.com/sigstore/cosign is affected in releases prior to 1.12.0. Upgrade your dependency to 1.12.0 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2022-36056?
CVE-2022-36056 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.5 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2022-36056?
CVE-2022-36056 is classified under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature (The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2022-36056?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/sigstore/cosign'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388",
  "modified" : "2024-05-20T21:33:21Z",
  "published" : "2022-09-16T19:13:13Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2022-36056" ],
  "summary" : "Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify a blob even if the embedded rekorBundle does not reference the given signature",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nA number of vulnerabilities have been found in `cosign verify-blob`, where Cosign would successfully verify an artifact when verification should have failed.\n\n## Vulnerability 1: Bundle mismatch causes invalid verification.\n\n### Summary\nA cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify a blob even if the embedded rekorBundle does not reference the given signature.\n\n### Details\nCosign supports \"bundles\" which intend to allow offline verification of the signature and rekor inclusion. By using the --bundle flag in cosign sign-blob, cosign will create a JSON file called a \"bundle\". These bundles include three fields: base64Signature, cert, and rekorBundle. The desired behavior is that the verification of these bundles would:\n\n- verify the provided blob using the included signature and certificate\n- verify the rekorBundle SET\n- verify the rekorBundle payload references the given artifact.\n\nIt appears that step three is not being performed, allowing \"any old rekorBundle\" to pass validation, even if the rekorBundle payload does not reference the provided blob or the certificate and signature in the rekorBundle do not match those at the top level.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\nEnable keyless signing:\n\n```\nexport COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1\n```\nCreate two random blobs:\n```\ndd bs=1 count=50 </dev/urandom >blob1\ndd bs=1 count=50 </dev/urandom >blob2\n```\nSign each blob:\n```\ncosign sign-blob blob1 --bundle bundle1\ncosign sign-blob blob2 --bundle bundle2\n```\nCreate a falsified bundle including the base64Signature and cert fields from bundle1 and the rekorBundle from bundle2:\n```\njq --slurpfile bundle2 bundle2 '.rekorBundle = $bundle2[0].rekorBundle' bundle1 > invalidBundle\n```\nNow, the falsified bundle can be used to verify blob1:\n```\n$ cosign verify-blob blob1 --bundle invalidBundle\ntlog entry verified offline\nVerified OK\n```\n\n### Patches\n\nUsers should update to the latest version of Cosign, `1.12.0`.\n\n### Workaround\n\nIf you extract the signature and certificate from the `bundle`, you may use it for verification as follows and avoid using an invalid bundle:\n```\n$ cosign verify-blob blob1 --signature $(jq -r '.base64Signature' bundle1) --certificate $(jq -r '.cert' bundle1)\n```\n\nNote that this will make a network call to Rekor to fetch the Rekor entry. However, you may then be subject to Vulnerability 4.\n\n##  Vulnerability 2: Certificate Identities are not checked in some cases\n\n### Summary \n\nWhen providing identity flags, the email and issuer of a certificate is not checked when verifying a Rekor bundle, and the GitHub Actions identity is never checked.\n\n### Details\n\nUsers who provide an offline Rekor bundle (`--bundle`) when verifying a blob using `cosign verify-blob` and include flags that check identity such as `--certificate-email` and `--certificate-oidc-issuer` are impacted. Additionally, users who provide the GitHub Actions verification flags such as `--certificate-github-workflow-name` when running `cosign verify-blob` without a bundle, key reference, or certificate are impacted. \n\nWhen providing these flags, Cosign ignored their values. If a certificate's identity did not match the provided flags, Cosign would still successfully verify the blob.\n\n### Patches\n\nUsers should update to the latest version of Cosign, `1.12.0`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds, users should update.\n\n##  Vulnerability 3: Invalid Rekor bundle without the experimental flag will result in successful verification\n\n### Summary\n\nProviding an invalid Rekor bundle without the experimental flag results in a successful verification.\n\n### Details\n\nUsers who provide an offline Rekor bundle (`--bundle`) that was invalid (invalid signed entry timestamp, expired certificate, or malformed) when verifying a blob with `cosign verify-blob` and do not set the `COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1` flag are impacted.\n\nWhen an invalid bundle was provided, Cosign would fallback to checking Rekor log inclusion by requesting proof of inclusion from the log. However, without the `COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL` flag, Cosign would exit early and successfully verify the blob. \n\n### Patches\n\nUsers should update to the latest version of Cosign, `1.12.0`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds, users should update.\n\n##  Vulnerability 4: Invalid transparency log entry will result in successful verification\n\n### Summary\n\nAn invalid transparency log entry will result in immediate success for verification.\n\n### Details\n\nUsers who provide a signature and certificate to `verify-blob` will fetch the associated Rekor entry for verification. If the returned entry was invalid (invalid signed entry timestamp, invalid inclusion proof, malformed entry with missing verification), then `cosign` [exits](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/blob/42c6e2a6dd9d92d19077c8e6b7d66d155a5ea28c/cmd/cosign/cli/verify/verify_blob.go#L357) early and succeeds unconditionally.\n\n### Patches\n\nUsers should update to the latest version of Cosign, `1.12.0`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds, users should update.\n\n\n## For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign)\n* Send us a message on [Slack](https://sigstore.slack.com/).\n",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/sigstore/cosign"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.12.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.11.1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36056"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/commit/80b79ed8b4d28ccbce3d279fd273606b5cddcc25"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/tag/v1.12.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-347" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2022-09-16T19:13:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2022-09-14T20:15:00Z"
  }
}