CVE-2026-54175: Laravel Backpack CRUD Unverified Password Change Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-xpv2-hrfc-hw62
CVSS 7.6
CWE-620
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-54175 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.6) unverified password change vulnerability (CWE-620: Unverified Password Change) affecting Laravel Backpack CRUD libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves unverified password change in myaccountcontroller via mass assignment. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 6.8.11, 7.0.34.

CVE-2026-54175 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-54175
GHSA Identifier GHSA-xpv2-hrfc-hw62
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.6
CWE Classification CWE-620: Unverified Password Change
Affected Product Laravel Backpack CRUD
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.6

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability Low (A:L)

How to Fix CVE-2026-54175

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Laravel Backpack CRUD dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

backpack/crud fixed: 6.8.11
Upgrade backpack/crud to 6.8.11
backpack/crud fixed: 7.0.34
Upgrade backpack/crud to 7.0.34
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for backpack/crud

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-54175, inspect your project dependencies for Laravel Backpack CRUD:

inspect dependencies for backpack/crud

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Laravel Backpack CRUD in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 6.8.11), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-620: Unverified Password Change, where when setting a new password for a user, the product does not require knowledge of the original password, or using another form of authentication. In Laravel Backpack CRUD, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The `MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` action bound to `POST /admin/edit-account-info` calls `$this->guard()->user()->update($request->except(['_token']))`. Because the controller uses `except(['_token'])` rather than `$request->validated()` or the restricted keys defined in `AccountInfoRequest::validationData()`, **any column present in the user model's `$fillable` array is mass-assigned from the request**, including `password`. Backpack ships a separate `POST /admin/change-password` route (`postChangePasswordForm`) that requires `old_password` verification via `ChangePasswordRequest::withValidator`. The `edit-account-info` endpoint silently bypasses that security control. For the default Laravel 11 `App\Models\User` model — which Backpack's installer and documentation use as the canonical admin user model — `$fillable` is `['name','email','password']`. The `password` cast is `hashed`, so a plaintext `password=…` form field is automatically hashed and persisted. Any attacker holding an authenticated Backpack session (session theft, stolen cookies, XSS, public-terminal residual session) can permanently take over the account by issuing one POST that includes `password=<attacker_value>`, with no knowledge of the victim's current password. This converts time-limited, session-bound access into persistent account takeover. ## Vulnerable code `src/app/Http/Controllers/MyAccountController.php:38` ```php public function postAccountInfoForm(AccountInfoRequest $request) { $result = $this->guard()->user()->update($request->except(['_token'])); ... } ``` `src/app/Http/Requests/AccountInfoRequest.php` `validationData()` only narrows what gets validated (`name`, email column) — it does NOT narrow what is later saved. ## Impact 1. **Persistent account takeover after session theft.** An adversary holding any authenticated Backpack session cookie (XSS, malware, stolen device, shared workstation) can rewrite the victim's password and retain access indefinitely, even after the original session expires or the victim logs out. Without this bypass the equivalent action requires `old_password`, which the adversary does not have. 2. **Email pivot for full takeover.** The same handler permits unverified change of the authentication column (`email` by default). A hijacked session can change the email to one the attacker controls and then use Backpack's password-reset flow as a backup channel. 3. **Mass-assignment of any other `$fillable` attribute.** In real deployments where the admin user model carries fields such as `role_id`, `is_admin`, `team_id`, `email_verified_at`, `two_factor_secret`, etc., the same request mass-assigns those fields. This expands the impact to privilege escalation and 2FA disablement on apps that follow standard Laravel patterns of adding such columns to `$fillable`. ## Fix recommendation Replace `$request->except(['_token'])` with an explicit allowlist that mirrors `AccountInfoRequest::validationData()`: ```php public function postAccountInfoForm(AccountInfoRequest $request) { $data = $request->only([backpack_authentication_column(), 'name']); $result = $this->guard()->user()->update($data); ... } ``` This preserves `change-password` as the sole path for password mutation (which already enforces `old_password`). ## Coordinates - Repository: https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD - Vulnerable file & line: `src/app/Http/Controllers/MyAccountController.php:38` (release 6.8.10; master `e7201c5`) - Route: `POST /admin/edit-account-info` (default admin prefix; `setup_my_account_routes=true`) - Verified against: `backpack/crud 6.8.10`, `laravel/framework 11.x`, PHP 8.4.7 — therawdev (responsible disclosure) Reported by AI Agent sechub.dev and Vishal Shukla (@shukla304)

CVE-2026-54175 Affected Laravel Backpack CRUD Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
6.8.117.0.34
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
backpack/crud
Packagist
< 6.8.11
6.8.11
backpack/crud
Packagist
≥ 7.0.0-alpha.1
< 7.0.34
7.0.34

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-54175?
CVE-2026-54175 is a security vulnerability in Laravel Backpack CRUD involving Unverified password change in MyAccountController via mass assignment under CWE-620: Unverified Password Change.
Which Laravel Backpack CRUD versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 6.8.11, 7.0.34 across affected packages: backpack/crud.
What version fixes CVE-2026-54175?
Upgrading to 6.8.11, 7.0.34 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is backpack/crud affected?
Yes, backpack/crud is affected in releases prior to 6.8.11, 7.0.34. Upgrade your dependency to 6.8.11, 7.0.34 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-54175?
CVE-2026-54175 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.6 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-54175?
CVE-2026-54175 is classified under CWE-620: Unverified Password Change (When setting a new password for a user, the product does not require knowledge of the original password, or using another form of authentication.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-54175?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for backpack/crud'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-xpv2-hrfc-hw62",
  "modified" : "2026-08-20T18:38:26Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-20T18:38:26Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54175" ],
  "summary" : "Laravel Backpack CRUD: Unverified password change in MyAccountController via mass assignment",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe `MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` action bound to `POST /admin/edit-account-info` calls `$this->guard()->user()->update($request->except(['_token']))`. Because the controller uses `except(['_token'])` rather than `$request->validated()` or the restricted keys defined in `AccountInfoRequest::validationData()`, **any column present in the user model's `$fillable` array is mass-assigned from the request**, including `password`. Backpack ships a separate `POST /admin/change-password` route (`postChangePasswordForm`) that requires `old_password` verification via `ChangePasswordRequest::withValidator`. The `edit-account-info` endpoint silently bypasses that security control.\n\nFor the default Laravel 11 `App\\Models\\User` model — which Backpack's installer and documentation use as the canonical admin user model — `$fillable` is `['name','email','password']`. The `password` cast is `hashed`, so a plaintext `password=…` form field is automatically hashed and persisted. Any attacker holding an authenticated Backpack session (session theft, stolen cookies, XSS, public-terminal residual session) can permanently take over the account by issuing one POST that includes `password=<attacker_value>`, with no knowledge of the victim's current password. This converts time-limited, session-bound access into persistent account takeover.\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\n`src/app/Http/Controllers/MyAccountController.php:38`\n\n```php\npublic function postAccountInfoForm(AccountInfoRequest $request)\n{\n    $result = $this->guard()->user()->update($request->except(['_token']));\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n`src/app/Http/Requests/AccountInfoRequest.php` `validationData()` only narrows what gets validated (`name`, email column) — it does NOT narrow what is later saved.\n\n## Impact\n\n1. **Persistent account takeover after session theft.** An adversary holding any authenticated Backpack session cookie (XSS, malware, stolen device, shared workstation) can rewrite the victim's password and retain access indefinitely, even after the original session expires or the victim logs out. Without this bypass the equivalent action requires `old_password`, which the adversary does not have.\n2. **Email pivot for full takeover.** The same handler permits unverified change of the authentication column (`email` by default). A hijacked session can change the email to one the attacker controls and then use Backpack's password-reset flow as a backup channel.\n3. **Mass-assignment of any other `$fillable` attribute.** In real deployments where the admin user model carries fields such as `role_id`, `is_admin`, `team_id`, `email_verified_at`, `two_factor_secret`, etc., the same request mass-assigns those fields. This expands the impact to privilege escalation and 2FA disablement on apps that follow standard Laravel patterns of adding such columns to `$fillable`.\n\n## Fix recommendation\n\nReplace `$request->except(['_token'])` with an explicit allowlist that mirrors `AccountInfoRequest::validationData()`:\n\n```php\npublic function postAccountInfoForm(AccountInfoRequest $request)\n{\n    $data = $request->only([backpack_authentication_column(), 'name']);\n    $result = $this->guard()->user()->update($data);\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nThis preserves `change-password` as the sole path for password mutation (which already enforces `old_password`).\n\n## Coordinates\n\n- Repository: https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD\n- Vulnerable file & line: `src/app/Http/Controllers/MyAccountController.php:38` (release 6.8.10; master `e7201c5`)\n- Route: `POST /admin/edit-account-info` (default admin prefix; `setup_my_account_routes=true`)\n- Verified against: `backpack/crud 6.8.10`, `laravel/framework 11.x`, PHP 8.4.7\n\n— therawdev (responsible disclosure)\n\nReported by AI Agent sechub.dev and Vishal Shukla (@shukla304)",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "backpack/crud"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "6.8.11"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "backpack/crud"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "7.0.0-alpha.1"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "7.0.34"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/security/advisories/GHSA-xpv2-hrfc-hw62"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/pull/5980"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/pull/5981"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/6.8.11"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/7.0.34"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-620" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-20T18:38:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}