CVE-2026-80970: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

UNKNOWN
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-x4cq-72c3-qv9j
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Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-80970 is a security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-80970 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-80970
GHSA Identifier GHSA-x4cq-72c3-qv9j
Severity N/A
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-80970

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release: 

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-80970, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace: buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size; void *resp __free(kfree) = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); ... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) return -EFAULT; Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer: err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 0, private->bInterfaceNumber, step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); if (err < 0) return err; usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); ... memcpy(data, buf, size); Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255: # init_on_alloc off, no spray step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232 # identical run, init_on_alloc=1 step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0 # all three runs step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62 a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region. Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

References

NVD — CVE-2026-80970 NVD
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80970
git.kernel.org/stable/c/29ab2df278... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/29ab2df278ab4f1d238cd9c1c393ee00db175cba
git.kernel.org/stable/c/4335e38778... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4335e387786479889e6db691fe06d345e52ea536
git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9e5243712... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9e52437120fb5f802152877ba20c4b406c9fa9e

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-80970?
CVE-2026-80970 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-80970?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-80970?
CVE-2026-80970 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-80970?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
View Raw JSON 
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-x4cq-72c3-qv9j",
  "modified" : "2026-09-14T15:32:21Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-11T21:31:22Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-80970" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response\n\nfcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies\nthe whole buffer back to userspace:\n\n\tbuf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size;\n\n\tvoid *resp __free(kfree) =\n\t\tkmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);\n\t...\n\tif (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size))\n\t\treturn -EFAULT;\n\nNothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading\nstep0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer:\n\n\terr = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0),\n\t\tFCP_USB_REQ_STEP0,\n\t\tUSB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN,\n\t\t0, private->bInterfaceNumber,\n\t\tstep0_resp, private->step0_resp_size);\n\tif (err < 0)\n\t\treturn err;\n\nusb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or\nzero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg()\nreturns a small actual_length.  The only check is err < 0, so a short\ntransfer is accepted as success.\n\nsnd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally:\n\n\tbuf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL);\n\t...\n\tmemcpy(data, buf, size);\n\nBytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged\nand copied to userspace.  step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each\nvalidated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from\nkmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512.\n\nOn 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data\nstage, s0 = s2 = 255:\n\n  # init_on_alloc off, no spray\n  step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255\n  000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01\n  010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff\n\n  # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag\n  step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255  tagbytes=232\n\n  # identical run, init_on_alloc=1\n  step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255  tagbytes=0\n\n  # all three runs\n  step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62\n\na8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address\nffff8000805fc4a8.  The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is\nexactly the step-0 region.\n\nZero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full\nstep0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error.\n\nDiscovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>",
  "severity" : [ ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80970"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/29ab2df278ab4f1d238cd9c1c393ee00db175cba"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4335e387786479889e6db691fe06d345e52ea536"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9e52437120fb5f802152877ba20c4b406c9fa9e"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : null,
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-09-11T20:19:03Z"
  }
}