CVE-2026-53145: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-x237-c35r-5vq5
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CVSS 7.8
CWE-367
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-53145 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.8) security vulnerability vulnerability (CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The weakness occurs when the product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-53145 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-53145
GHSA Identifier GHSA-x237-c35r-5vq5
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.8
CWE Classification CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-53145

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release: 

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-53145, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition, where the product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/gem: Try to fix change_handle ioctl, attempt 4 [airlied: just added some comments on how to reenable] On-list because the cat is out of the bag and we're clearly not good enough to figure this out in private. The story thus far: 5e28b7b94408 ("drm: Set old handle to NULL before prime swap in change_handle") tried to fix a race condition between the gem_close and gem_change_handle ioctls, but got a few things wrong: - There's a confusion with the local variable handle, which is actually the new handle, and so the two-stage trick was actually applied to the wrong idr slot. 7164d78559b0 ("drm/gem: fix race between change_handle and handle_delete") tried to fix that by adding yet another code block, but forgot to add the error handling. Which meant we now have two paths, both kinda wrong. - dc366607c41c ("drm: Replace old pointer to new idr") tried to apply another fix, but inconsistently, again because of the handle confusion - this would be the right fix (kinda, somewhat, it's a mess) if we'd do the two-stage approach for the new handle. Except that wasn't the intent of the original fix. We also didn't have an igt merged for the original ioctl, which is a big no-go. This was attempted to address off-list in the original bugfix, and amd QA people claimed the bug was fixed now. Very clearly that's not the case. Here's my attempt to sort this out: - Rename the local variable to new_handle, the old aliasing with args->handle is just too dangerously confusing. - Merge the gem obj lookup with the two-stage idr_replace so that we avoid getting ourselves confused there. - This means we don't have a surplus temporary reference anymore, only an inherited from the idr. A concurrent gem_close on the new_handle could steal that. Fix that with the same two-stage approach create_tail uses. This is a bit overkill as documented in the comment, but I also don't trust my ability to understand this all correctly, so go with the established pattern we have from other ioctls instead for maximum paranoia. - Adjust error paths. I've tried to make the error and success paths common, because they are identical except for which handle is removed and on which we call idr_replace to (re)install the object again. But that made things messier to read, so I've left it at the more verbose version, which unfortunately hides the symmetry in the entire code flow a bit. - While at it, also replace the 7 space indent with 1 tab. And finally, because I flat out don't trust my abilities here at all anymore: - Disable the ioctl until we have the igt situation and everything else sorted out on-list and with full consensus. v2: Sashiko noticed that I didn't handle the error path for idr_replace correctly, it must be checked with IS_ERR_OR_NULL like in gem_handle_delete. So yeah, definitely should just the existing paths 1:1 because this is endless amounts of tricky. Also add the Fixes: line for the original ioctl, I forgot that too.

References

NVD — CVE-2026-53145 NVD
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53145
Software Security Information SECURITY
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53145
bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi WEB
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492773
git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a4f03d22f... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a4f03d22fb655e5f192244fb2c87d8066fcfca2
git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d9b93df7f... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d9b93df7fc768228906e24220591ec1cddad391
git.kernel.org/stable/c/c0639ede2f... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c0639ede2f24ac224b2079cd35ecd5fd8ad4e3cd
Software Security Information SECURITY
https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-53145.json

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-53145?
CVE-2026-53145 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-53145?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-53145?
CVE-2026-53145 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-53145?
CVE-2026-53145 is classified under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition (The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-53145?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
View Raw JSON 
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-x237-c35r-5vq5",
  "modified" : "2026-06-30T03:37:13Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-25T09:31:19Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-53145" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/gem: Try to fix change_handle ioctl, attempt 4\n\n[airlied: just added some comments on how to reenable]\nOn-list because the cat is out of the bag and we're clearly not good\nenough to figure this out in private. The story thus far:\n\n5e28b7b94408 (\"drm: Set old handle to NULL before prime swap in\nchange_handle\") tried to fix a race condition between the gem_close and\ngem_change_handle ioctls, but got a few things wrong:\n\n- There's a confusion with the local variable handle, which is actually\n  the new handle, and so the two-stage trick was actually applied to the\n  wrong idr slot. 7164d78559b0 (\"drm/gem: fix race between\n  change_handle and handle_delete\") tried to fix that by adding yet\n  another code block, but forgot to add the error handling. Which meant\n  we now have two paths, both kinda wrong.\n\n- dc366607c41c (\"drm: Replace old pointer to new idr\") tried to apply\n  another fix, but inconsistently, again because of the handle confusion\n  - this would be the right fix (kinda, somewhat, it's a mess) if we'd\n  do the two-stage approach for the new handle. Except that wasn't the\n  intent of the original fix.\n\nWe also didn't have an igt merged for the original ioctl, which is a big\nno-go. This was attempted to address off-list in the original bugfix,\nand amd QA people claimed the bug was fixed now. Very clearly that's not\nthe case. Here's my attempt to sort this out:\n\n- Rename the local variable to new_handle, the old aliasing with\n  args->handle is just too dangerously confusing.\n\n- Merge the gem obj lookup with the two-stage idr_replace so that we\n  avoid getting ourselves confused there.\n\n- This means we don't have a surplus temporary reference anymore, only\n  an inherited from the idr. A concurrent gem_close on the new_handle\n  could steal that. Fix that with the same two-stage approach\n  create_tail uses. This is a bit overkill as documented in the comment,\n  but I also don't trust my ability to understand this all correctly, so\n  go with the established pattern we have from other ioctls instead for\n  maximum paranoia.\n\n- Adjust error paths. I've tried to make the error and success paths\n  common, because they are identical except for which handle is removed\n  and on which we call idr_replace to (re)install the object again. But\n  that made things messier to read, so I've left it at the more verbose\n  version, which unfortunately hides the symmetry in the entire code\n  flow a bit.\n\n- While at it, also replace the 7 space indent with 1 tab.\n\nAnd finally, because I flat out don't trust my abilities here at all\nanymore:\n\n- Disable the ioctl until we have the igt situation and everything else\n  sorted out on-list and with full consensus.\n\nv2:\n\nSashiko noticed that I didn't handle the error path for idr_replace\ncorrectly, it must be checked with IS_ERR_OR_NULL like in\ngem_handle_delete. So yeah, definitely should just the existing paths\n1:1 because this is endless amounts of tricky.\n\nAlso add the Fixes: line for the original ioctl, I forgot that too.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53145"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53145"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492773"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a4f03d22fb655e5f192244fb2c87d8066fcfca2"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d9b93df7fc768228906e24220591ec1cddad391"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c0639ede2f24ac224b2079cd35ecd5fd8ad4e3cd"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-53145.json"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-367" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-25T09:16:31Z"
  }
}