CVE-2026-63888: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-ww53-m8wh-v825
CVSS 9.8
CWE-415
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-63888 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8) security vulnerability vulnerability (CWE-415: Double Free) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The weakness occurs when the product calls free() twice on the same memory address.. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-63888 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-63888
GHSA Identifier GHSA-ww53-m8wh-v825
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.8
CWE Classification CWE-415: Double Free
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-63888

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-63888, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-415: Double Free, where the product calls free() twice on the same memory address. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd() Two latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the original LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1"): 1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in). text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf(): if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) { ... rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN; } ... if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) { data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL); iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C. Fix by passing the actual padded payload length (ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc(). 2) Stale cmd->text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL>0 bad DataDigest drop. On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel > 0 the handler silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap: kfree(text_in); return 0; cmd->text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which unconditionally does kfree(cmd->text_in_ptr); cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL; freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives. On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so #4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after login produces two back-to-back splats: BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x?? BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x?? showing the same pointer freed in the ERL>0 drop path and again in iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts the slab freelist. Fix by clearing cmd->text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL>0 drop path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4 less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together. Both fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and the wire protocol is unaffected.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-63888?
CVE-2026-63888 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under CWE-415: Double Free.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-63888?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-63888?
CVE-2026-63888 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-63888?
CVE-2026-63888 is classified under CWE-415: Double Free (The product calls free() twice on the same memory address.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-63888?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-ww53-m8wh-v825",
  "modified" : "2026-07-20T15:31:50Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-19T18:31:44Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-63888" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd()\n\nTwo latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the\noriginal LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c (\"iscsi-target: Add\niSCSI fabric support for target v4.1\"):\n\n1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in).\n\n   text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4).  rx_size is then\n   incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest\n   in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the\n   buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf():\n\n       if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {\n               ...\n               rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN;\n       }\n       ...\n       if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {\n               data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL);\n\n   iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so\n   when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the\n   text_in allocation.  KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched\n   mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text\n   PDU path.  The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against\n   the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to\n   the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text\n   PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C.\n\n   Fix by passing the actual padded payload length\n   (ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc().\n\n2) Stale cmd->text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL>0 bad DataDigest\n   drop.\n\n   On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel > 0 the handler\n   silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap:\n\n               kfree(text_in);\n               return 0;\n\n   cmd->text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer.  The next Text\n   Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which\n   unconditionally does\n\n       kfree(cmd->text_in_ptr);\n       cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL;\n\n   freeing the same pointer a second time.  Session teardown via\n   iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free\n   if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives.\n\n   On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on\n   the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so\n   #4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this\n   patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three\n   relevant kfree() sites.  The observability prints are not part of\n   this patch.  On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after\n   login produces two back-to-back splats:\n\n       BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x??\n       BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x??\n\n   showing the same pointer freed in the ERL>0 drop path and again in\n   iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once\n   more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown).  On distro kernels\n   with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free\n   becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts\n   the slab freelist.\n\n   Fix by clearing cmd->text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL>0 drop\n   path.  With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock\n   tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4\n   less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together.\n\nBoth fixes are one-liners.  The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and\nthe wire protocol is unaffected.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63888"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5118ea225fe63b44207ba88047e4866e1ea43812"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e22a1cdcc8277af4acc43710577157b77a02c5d"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/778c2ab142c625a8a8afa570e0f9b7873f445d99"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89c81d1228c00fa6dd91de6c1c5aa1ef8a7875e3"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/badf178b76b0690851df00f4ca9cf2eb8eb0f963"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3e9b79aa794f7a23e82de4d710e7d2df610e349"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec9f19d52074a191ed1756ed4a7d39fff1a2085c"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7948af0dd03de84079dcd4dc215a69fd6fbb95d"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-415" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-07-19T16:17:05Z"
  }
}